02/19/14 – Trita Parsi – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is my show, Scott Horton Show.
And I think Trita Parsi is going to be joining us here in a moment on the line.
Are you there, Trita?
Oh, he's there.
All right, hang on one second, y'all.
I got to hit the button.
All right, button's hit.
Trita Parsi, he's the founder and the president of NIAC.
That's the National Iranian American Council.
They're at niacouncil.org, niacouncil.org.
And here, man, where's my Iran section?
I'm running behind this segment, you can tell.
Trita's got a thing here in Al Jazeera, aljazeera.com.
U.S.-Iran deal compromise is key.
What could Washington offer Tehran to seal the deal?
Hey, and vice versa, too.
That's what I want to know, Trita, is when the final stage talks take place here in a few months, what does it seem to you like they already pretty much have consensus on?
And what are the real sticking points and outstanding issues?
And what do you imagine can be done to really solve the problems that you foresee coming up here?
Sure.
I think some of the things that essentially have been established is that at the end of this process, let's say that the implementation, let's say the negotiations go on for about 12 months, and then there's an implementation phase, and that phase, we don't know exactly how long that will be.
But during that phase, Iran will have enrichment on its soil.
There will be limitations, but it's not going to be completely eliminated.
That's more or less been agreed upon.
It's also been agreed upon that the sanctions will be lifted.
What the real sticking point is, how long will this implementation phase be?
The Iranians would like it to be as short as perhaps three years, and during those three years, they stop some of these activities, and then they make sure that they have full transparency and the sanctions get lifted during this period.
I think the U.S. would like it to be 25 years, meaning that it would take 25 years to fully lift the sanctions.
It would all be very piecemeal, and Iran would essentially be in a position of having to prove itself over the course of a quarter of a century before it would actually have its nuclear file fully normalized, after which it would be no different from Japan and other countries.
So one of the main sticking points is going to be, how long will this implementation phase be?
Will it be 25?
Will it be three years?
Will they be able to find something in the middle?
If they find something in the middle and it's still relatively long, you know, 10 to 15 years, what will the U.S. do with the sanctions?
Is it going to lift all the sanctions at the end of that process?
I find that very hard for the Iranians to agree to.
It's almost impossible for them to sell to their public or to their political elite.
So those are the key issues, I think, and of course, there's a few more, but those are the main issues that are going to be discussed.
And both sides want to make sure that they don't enter a process that causes them to commit themselves to something and then not be able to walk back if the other side does not reciprocate.
Right.
Now, it's funny when you say 25 years.
I mean, you're not pulling that out of the air.
That's what the American side is talking about.
If they do what they're told for 25 years in a row, then we'll lift the sanctions.
Or that's at least part of the trial balloon process here.
The opening bargaining position, is that right?
Yeah, you know, 25.
I mean, some of the numbers that are being thrown out right now are obviously maximalist positions that the two sides throw out because it would be a good, you know, starting position in a negotiation.
But I'm pretty confident that no one on the U.S. side expects to land at 25 years at the end of this negotiation.
Maybe they're saying that just to get Commentary Magazine to shut up a little bit for a minute.
Exactly, exactly.
But the issue, though, is let's say that they agree on a nice compromise.
Instead of 3 and instead of 25, they end up at, I don't know, 12 or 15.
The problem still remains that if the American concessions are all back-loaded and all the Iranian concessions are front-loaded, it's going to be very difficult for the Iranians to sell this at home.
And vice versa would be the same thing if, you know, if some of the key concessions from the Iranian side, a ratification of the Additional Protocol, happens at the end, but they want full sanctions relief in the very beginning.
That's obviously going to be very tough for the U.S. side to be able to accept.
So what I write in that piece, though, that I think, you know, is the fundamental truth here, is that the success of diplomacy at this point is primarily determined by Obama and Rouhani's ability to absorb and sell compromise.
And I think it's important to understand because it's all about compromise at this point.
It's not about pressuring the other side or, you know, doing some of those things.
At this point, there's not going to be a deal unless there's major compromises from both sides.
And the question is, do the two leaders have enough strength to be able to strike that compromise, sell that compromise at home, and sustain that compromise?
Well, I think certainly they both have, well, I don't know everything about what's going on in Iran, but it looks like the Supreme Leader is backing the President on this for now at least, which that's pretty good, and he did win the election, you know, on the first round, right, and all that.
So, and it seems to me clear, especially after just the events of the last few weeks, that if Obama really wants to do this thing, that at the end of the day, the whole politics-stops-at-the-water's-edge thing still has, if it's not completely true, it still has a lot of sway, and the Senate and the House will follow the President on his foreign policy on something like this if he really means it and, you know, means to win the domestic political fight.
I think there's a lot of truth in that.
The problem, though, is what if the negotiations say that, you know, they're going to lift the sanctions, you know, after five or so years?
Obama is now President, then.
Right, yeah.
Well, I mean, this is what I was going to ask you.
I'm sorry, because I'm kind of interrupting, but technically speaking, forget the politics of this for a minute, if we're just talking sneetches or whatever it is.
Technically speaking, to go from the current IAEA inspections regime, where all of their nuclear material is verified to not be diverted ever, to go from that to what it would look like after an additional protocol, etc., etc., additional protocol squared or something.
That still isn't that much further of a regime to actually be implemented.
So what is the time limit about, other than just saying, that's not the time limit for the new inspection regime to be implemented.
That's the time limit for, it's just an arbitrary thing.
You have to do what I say for this many years straight before I will go ahead and agree to my part of the deal.
Is that all it's supposed to represent?
The time differential here?
Between the implementation of the inspection regime and the actual lifting of the sanctions?
Well, part of the reason for how long this period is going to be, part of the reason why from the U.S. side there's a desire to make it lengthy, is because at the end of that process, once this process is over, then Iran, as I mentioned earlier on, will be a normal country, which means that its nuclear program is not going to have restrictions on it, much beyond what the restrictions are on the Japanese program.
And right now, it's very difficult for people in Washington to stomach the idea that Iran actually will be a normal country ten years from now.
Mindful of the many other problems that U.S. foreign policy has with Iran.
It's not just a nuclear issue.
That's part of the reason why there's a bit of a desire to make the process lengthy, and then make the argument in D.C., well, you know, it's enough time to make sure that this regime in Iran falls, so that once Iran becomes a normal country, it's going to be a different regime.
Well, you know, I always oversimplify these things, but it seems like, you know, obviously the Cold War comes first, and all the bogus hype about their civilian nuclear program comes second, and why make peace with them on the nuclear issue, if it's not to go ahead and break that ice and warm up relations?
I mean, because that's all it is, is this the biggest fake, outstanding issue.
Yeah, I made that argument over here as well, which is that, you know, once this nuclear issue is resolved, and if it's resolved the right way, you actually have an opportunity to really shift the orientation of Iran in many different ways.
Resolve many of the other issues.
Most of the issues that actually are resolvable between the U.S. and Iran have been put on ice, because the decision has been not to touch any issue until the nuclear issue is first resolved.
Right.
So, we actually can do much better than this, and I think at the same time, having a negotiation and kind of telling the other side that, you know, you're not going to have a normalized situation until 15 years from now, it's a very tough sell for that country to take home, and say that, you know, this is a great deal, we'll see the benefits of it 15 years from now.
Yeah.
Well, now, so what's your read on the president?
You know, I've been reading all over the place that this big victory in the Senate of the Peace Party, that is the Americans, over the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee in the Senate on the sanctions there, that that was in big part because of your lobbying efforts and editorial writing.
Do you think that you've really gotten through to people, not you alone, but obviously with others, that the argument has really already kind of been won in the minds of the people in Washington?
In Washington, D.C., the foreign policy establishment, that, come on, this really is the right time to do this, or really is still a free-for-all up there, and it really could still go the other way?
I think the combination of a whole set of different people working together has had the impact of changing a bit of the political landscape here in Washington.
You know, those kind of defeats that AIPAC has now suffered are, you know, not terribly common.
And obviously the fact that the president decided to really stand his ground on this issue made a huge difference, without a doubt.
And I think the understanding of the public, much as a result of the way the administration framed it, which is a correct frame, in my view, it's accurate, it's a reflection of reality, which is, this is either dis-diplomacy or it's a war, it's a very effective framing as well, because the vast majority of the American public is sick and tired of war.
Well, it is kind of overblown, though, right?
Because they still never were making nukes, and aren't going to anytime soon anyway, right?
So, what's to go to war over, even if the talks fail?
Well, you know, it doesn't mean just because they're not making nukes doesn't mean that it's not going to be a war.
I mean, we've had pretty good examples of that recently.
I'm saying it doesn't have to be a crisis.
It sort of sounds like it concedes that it really is a crisis that needs to be resolved, but it's only a fake one.
That's what really needs to be resolved, the American warmongers using a civilian nuclear electricity program as their excuse to beat the Iranian regime that they hate for its independence over the head all these years.
That's pretty simple, right?
I don't disagree with you, Scott.
I think this is a huge paradigm shift to expect to go from ten years ago having the United States Congress supporting a war of choice to suddenly shift over to the opposite and realize that things can be done in a much smarter way.
We can do it.
You're doing it.
You really are accomplishing that task right now, Trita, and I thank you again for all your work and your time on the show.
Thank you for having me.
Thank you so much.
Sorry to interrupt there.
My timing's terrible.
Trita Parsi, everybody.
The National Iranian American Council.
Hey, Al Scott here.
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