Hey guys, I'm giving a speech to the Libertarian Party in Rhode Island on October the 27th and then November the 3rd with Ron Paul and Lou Rockwell and a bunch of others down there in Lake Jackson.
Jeff Deist and all them, Mises Institute, are having me out to give a talk about media stuff.
And that's November the 3rd down there in Lake Jackson.
If you like Ron Paul events and you're nearby, I'll see you there.
Sorry I'm late!
I had to stop by the Whites Museum again and give the finger to FDR!
We know Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, is supporting the opposition in Syria.
Are we supporting Al-Qaeda in Syria?
It's a proud day for America, and by God we've kicked Vietnam Syndrome once and for all.
Thank you very, very much.
I say it, I say it again, you've been had.
You've been took.
You've been hoodwinked.
These witnesses are trying to simply deny things that just about everybody else accepts as fact.
He came, he saw us, he died.
We ain't killing they army, but we killing them.
We be on CNN like Say Our Name been saying, say it three times.
The meeting of the largest armies in the history of the world.
Then there's going to be an invasion.
Alright you guys, introducing Major Danny Sherson, U.S. Army, active duty, and a regular writer for Antiwar.com, as well as Truthdig.org, and other places too.
Welcome back to the show, Danny, how you doing?
I'm great, thanks for having me again, it's always a pleasure.
Very happy to have you here, and especially to comment on something that you happen to know a personal bit of information about, and that is General Razek.
This is unbelievable.
Boy, how lucky for General Miller, some bodyguards of the Kandahar, the governor of Kandahar province, I believe it was, pulled out an AK and killed General Razek, and killed a few other Afghan officials.
I don't know exactly representing which all agencies or what.
And wounded four Americans, although General Miller, who was there meeting with General Razek, Scott Miller, the new commander of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, got away unharmed.
But still, boy, what a gigantic, crazy event to happen.
And then it's interesting for the narrative for TV and the government and everything, that when they tried to say, oh no, not General Razek, rats, you know, he was the kingpin of our Kandahar strategy.
They don't really want to talk too much about that or about him.
They don't really know how to handle that.
It's not like he was that nice guy Khashoggi who wrote for the Washington Post.
Well, that's what's so interesting.
I mean, this attack is indicative of the folly of the whole war in Afghanistan on a number of levels.
And I think there's really only two areas I need to speak on.
But first of all, these insider attacks, what the military calls green on blue attacks, this is the 103rd fatal one that has occurred in Afghanistan.
These are essentially situations where the very people we're training or the very people that we are mentoring turn their guns on Americans or on Afghan allies.
It's really detrimental to the mission because if you believe the hype, the reason we're in Afghanistan now is to advise and assist.
That's the terminology the military uses.
Well, nothing breaks trust more than these sort of events.
So that's the first part.
The first part is the Taliban sleepers that are within the security forces really just drive a wedge between us and the training, the trainees.
The second thing is this indicates the Taliban can strike when and where they want.
I mean, the fact that they even got close to General Miller is is extraordinary.
And it shows that, yes, the Taliban is contesting more districts than ever before.
And that's a story in itself.
But like even in the districts, they're not contesting.
They can still bring terror attacks or insider attacks.
And then finally, there's Razik.
OK, so three Afghans were killed so far based on the reporting.
And so one was the provincial governor.
That's a big deal.
OK, there's like that's a big deal to kill a provincial governor.
One was the provincial intelligence chief and one was the provincial police chief, General Razik.
I knew him, actually, not best friends, but we met on a number of occasions and and he came to Kandahar with much fanfare because he was known as a tough guy.
He was known as a go getter.
And quite frankly, most of the Afghan police and military folks we dealt with were not very effective.
So everyone up and down my chain of command was excited about Razik showing up.
I, on the other hand, had my doubts.
I happen to be a reader and I like Harper's and there was a piece in Harper's before I was in Afghanistan and I read it while I was in Afghanistan.
It was all about Razik and it was all about his time as a border patrol policeman, which is how he started.
He started as like a border patrol guy down in Spin Boldak.
Let me just say, the piece is called The Master of Spin Boldak and it's by the great Matthew Akins, too, who did all the great work on the A-Team.
Wait, was it the A-Team or it was the Kill Team?
The Kill Team, yeah.
Yeah, it was when he did on the Kill Team.
I can't remember.
It was in the Second Infantry Division.
Yeah, it was a great piece.
And so I actually brought that to the attention of my command and I said, hey, I know everyone's really excited that this Razik guy is coming here, but read this article.
Now, of course, I was completely shut down and told to buy my fucking business because fucking colonels don't read, let's be honest.
They just, you know what I mean?
There's no chance that anyone on my chain of command was ever going to grab that magazine that I handed them and actually flip through the pages because they're not intellectuals.
They're not intellectually curious.
They just want to get the job done and get promoted.
And so I was ignored.
And Razik came in and look, Razik was effective.
I mean, the Taliban were scared to death of him.
I'm surprised he lived this long.
He's actually survived other attempts on his life, I think.
I think that's true.
I actually just read about, yeah, there was an attack, an attempted suicide attack or something against him in 2012 where all kinds of people were killed except him.
Yeah, they're after him because he's effective, but he's a war criminal.
He executes prisoners.
He deals drugs.
He indiscriminately kills and abuses villagers as he seeks out the Taliban.
Look, he's a monster, or he was.
I mean, Razik was a monster, but he was our monster.
And my whole point on this, and I'm writing – I just finished an article for Any War that will come out on Tuesday or maybe Monday on this very topic.
But my point is this attack that happened yesterday is indicative, it's instructive on the entire absurdity of the war.
It speaks to on so many levels.
There's so much nuance in this attack.
And my point is – and you know this as a scholar of the Afghan war – the absurdity of that mission is sort of illustrated through this individual attack.
Well, yeah, I mean, it really does go right to the heart of what all is going on here.
Here's our guy, the chief of police for the province, right, like the head of the state troopers or whatever.
And he's a criminal.
He's a drug dealer.
He's a murderer.
And he's exactly the kind of guy that America supported in the 1980s.
Like, say, oh, I don't know, Jalal ad-Din Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, these guys who are simply criminals because, hey, they're effective at fighting.
They supported Massoud too, although it turned out he was working for the KGB all along.
Ha ha.
But these are the kind of criminals who will fight the Soviets for us or claim to fight the Soviets for us.
So we go ahead and back them.
And the exact same kind of people who – this is what was behind the rise of the Taliban in the first place was people said somebody has got to pull rank on these warlords.
And the only people left to do so, because the Soviets had killed so many Pashtun tribal leaders and so forth, the only people left to do so were the religious authorities.
And so it was up to the Taliban to come and instill law and order to protect the people from the likes of this guy.
This guy is an exact clone of the mess that the Taliban were cleaning up.
And America helped them do it, by the way, took their side then against their old friends in the 90s.
But I don't know.
Yeah.
So here's – this is the mission, is to install a guy who is, I guess, as you say, effective up to the point when he gets assassinated and almost gets the American general in charge of the war assassinated with him because of what a brutal warlord he is or because of how effective he was.
But so what?
I mean, if that's what it results in is this kind of blowback.
Yeah, I mean, absolutely.
And there's so much to unpack in this whole endeavor.
I mean, Razik is just one warlord.
The vice president of Afghanistan is a warlord, OK?
We backed all kinds of warlords in the – after the invasion in order to, quote, stabilize Afghanistan.
But it was those very warlords who alienated the people and contributed to the rise of the Taliban, which brings me to another point, which is Saudi Arabia.
Our friends in Saudi Arabia, the guy – suddenly they're in the news because they killed a journalist.
Like, don't get me wrong.
I think it's monstrous what they did to him.
But I'm appalled that it took this minor, really minor incident to get the attention.
The only reason Saudi Arabia is in the news is because they killed one of the media's own because he was one of them.
So now the media is reporting on it.
They didn't report on 16,000 Yemeni civilians killed.
They didn't report on women being beheaded for sorcery.
But now, because one of their own, a Washington Post correspondent, was killed, now suddenly it's news.
The Saudis financed those madrasas in the Pakistani refugee camps for Afghans and really contributed to the rise of the Taliban, and you know that Talib means student.
And the thing is, they were largely based on the students who had studied in these Saudi-financed Wahhabi madrasas, which kind of creates the Taliban.
I mean, there's more to it, but part of it.
They've supported the Afghan-Taliban insurgency in the country against the U.S. since 2005.
We're going to change the subject to Iraq in a second, but on Afghanistan, and that's even the New York Times, not that that was on the front page, but Helene Cooper has written about that, that the Saudis have been, along with our other allies, the Pakistanis, backing the Afghan-Taliban against us.
Because America's on the side, even though they hate it, they're on the side of the Iranians and the Russians.
Right.
Right.
Yeah, I mean, you're absolutely right.
The whole thing is, it's like we're through the looking glass, Alice.
When you start to unpack all this, you realize how twisted the story is, and it's really disturbing to understand how deep into the mess the United States is, and so much of our policy is counterproductive.
It's absurd.
The only people that are winning these wars are Lockheed Martin and Boeing and Honeywell.
Yeah, it's the generals getting some fancy ribbons, some extra stars.
That's it, yeah.
And then when they're done with those stars, they turn them in, they retire, and they go work for Honeywell.
That's the revolving door of the military-industrial complex.
But I mean, that's the only people who are winning are the arms dealers and the generals who go work for them.
Yep.
All right, so now listen here.
There's a whole national security pundit community that has their credibility at stake here, too.
And I wanted to ask you about this piece.
I don't know if you saw it or not, but I can paraphrase it close enough, I think.
It was Thomas Joslin from the Small Wars Journal, which is a project of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, who are hawks.
Right.
But Joslin, and I know you know, Joslin and his pal, Bill Roggio, both are real experts on the Afghan war.
Not that I necessarily agree with all their takes or anything, but they do know what they're talking about, and they're honest guys, I think, from what I can tell from what I've read of them.
And so Joslin wrote this thing for the Weekly Standard saying, ah, jeez, just forget it.
We lost.
The fact that they were able to almost kill General Miller like this, the fact that we were relying on Razek, and then now he's dead.
I mean, this whole thing.
The game is up.
The Taliban have won.
And you can tell that mostly he's trying to spin this as Obama's failure, because you never give them a timeline.
And once he told them we're going to come and go in 18 months, they knew all they had to do was wait.
Now, he doesn't answer any of the questions that that statement raises.
What if he hadn't told them?
What real difference would that have made?
Or anything like that.
Right, right.
But you can tell that he's saying, he doesn't believe that Donald Trump is going to turn around and put another 100,000 guys in here forever in order to win the thing.
And so we might as well go, but it's a total failure.
Basically, he's saying, he's predicting that even a short-term deal to keep the Taliban out of Kabul probably wouldn't last and they would end up sacking the capital and taking control of the whole country at some point in the near future.
But so I wonder if, and he's just saying, we're leaving.
I mean, that's it.
It is really over.
And even the generals are not going to be able to say we have to stay because there's, we can't stay at this point, you know, just to keep Bagram only and lose the rest of the country, lose Kabul and the rest of this that we're not willing to fight for, it's not going to happen.
And so I wonder if you really agree with that, that the game is up.
They can want to stay forever if they want, but that ultimately they're going to be forced out.
And then his second point, of course, is boo-hoo.
Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda are going to come back to Afghanistan and then therefore they'll have their magic portal to Boston Logan Airport and kill us all.
Well, yeah, I do think that the war is over for all intents and purposes.
And whether the United States stays and wastes a few more of our soldiers' lives or not, I think that the reality is Afghanistan is probably going to fracture.
And I don't know if you agree with this, but I think the South and the East are going to fall under some version of Taliban control.
And then the North and the West are going to be under like a Northern Alliance sort of control.
I think that probably fracture is in the future.
Yeah, I mean, that's to me is the deal that the capital city should offer is, look, man, we won't mess with you guys anymore.
We won't divide the country completely, but you'll have total autonomy, basically.
Right.
We don't want to call it a new country and start another war with other neighbors and all these kinds of problems.
But we'll leave you alone if you'll stay out of the non-Pashtun dominant areas, that kind of thing.
Right.
Good luck with that, though, because, I mean, apparently they have the ability now to take the whole country if they want.
I mean, to me, it seems like if they're smart at all, they would know better than that.
Look at what a pain in the ass it's been to conquer them this whole time.
Why should they want to pick that same fight with the Hazaras and the Tajiks and whoever?
Right.
Why not just settle for division and autonomy like that, you know?
Yeah, I sort of agree.
And, you know, one of the other things you mentioned is I used to write for Small World's Journal a little bit, and they do have a hawkish sort of fetish for counterinsurgency, a lot of the writers there.
And I don't buy, this writer you're speaking of, I don't buy the narrative that, like, Obama is responsible for the loss in Afghanistan.
You know, I'm really sick of that narrative.
And it's not just Afghanistan.
People blame Obama for Iraq as well.
They'll say, well, oh, he didn't leave a residual force of soldiers, and that's why ISIS formed.
And then they'll say, oh, the reason we lost in Afghanistan is because he put a timeline on our surge, and so the Taliban knew they just needed to wait it out.
The thing is, I don't think Obama is a perfect president.
I actually criticize him all the time.
But to put the loss of these two absurd wars on his shoulders is utterly without context.
It misses the fact that the missions themselves were impossible from the start.
It misses the fact that nation-building at the point of a bayonet is folly.
It doesn't work.
You cannot change a 13th century culture and make them into a liberal democracy just because you have magical American soldiers on the ground.
It doesn't work that way.
And I'm really, really sick of that narrative.
And at Small World's Journal, you see that a lot.
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And you know what I want to say too, not as Pat and myself on the back, because I give credit to and diffuse it to everyone who deserves it, which is, you know, tens of millions of Americans, if not more than 100 million, could have told you in 2001 that you cannot conquer Afghanistan.
It's shaped like Colorado.
It's landlocked.
It's the size of Texas.
It's got deserts and mountains and tribal people with rifles who like using them and just don't do this.
I remember I was driving a cab and I had, I'm almost positive it was Bob Cole who was the morning host on the country music station.
He was a really influential guy here in Austin with all his opinions and this and that.
And I remember telling him, this is the wrong thing to do.
You know, you want to do your punitive strike or something.
That's one thing.
But you're going to try to conquer this country.
And all he had was, no, the American fighting man is the greatest in the world.
And so, like you just said, these magical supermen, when 19 year olds come from Alabama, that's what makes them magical.
That's what makes them in an M4 unstoppable.
But it just ain't so.
And anybody who didn't want to believe in it to fit in with their stupid peer group or whatever could have told you that in the first place.
Absolutely.
I mean, I call it the myth of the magical American soldier.
That's sort of a phrase that I use.
And it's this idea that if we would have just left like 5,000 American 19 year olds from Alabama in Baghdad, somehow ISIS wouldn't have formed.
You know, and it's a myth.
It's not true.
I mean, American soldiers are good at what they do, but they're not good at winning wars.
OK.
And that's not their fault.
It's that the wars we give them, the missions we give them are impossible.
They are nearly impossible.
The idea that, you know, a 20 year old kid with an M4 is somehow going to, like, stabilize a society that's been in turmoil for a thousand years.
It's fantasy.
It's fantasy.
We put our soldiers on such a pedestal and it's not healthy.
So we got this great segue into your Iraq article here, too.
But on Afghanistan, first, I did bring up the safe haven myth there.
Jocelyn talked about that.
OK, Danny, so we can't pacify the country.
We can't make the Pashtuns and the Taliban our friends.
But if we leave, al-Qaeda could come back to Afghanistan and that could be a threat.
Do you think?
I mean, there's got to be a possibility the Taliban would allow that.
Does that mean anything to you?
And we're going to get to, you know, just who created ISIS in a minute.
Don't worry about that.
Yeah.
I mean, the safe haven myth is just that.
It's a myth.
It's a legend.
It's a tall tale.
First of all, the Taliban is really like a collection of young unemployed farm boys.
I mean, they barely read and write.
They couldn't find the United States on a map.
And they're not all that much of a threat to the homeland.
I mean, what they want is America to leave Afghanistan.
They've actually the Taliban leadership has actually said they won't let al-Qaeda back.
I mean, during the negotiations, they've actually put that on the table.
Like, look, we are not involved in transnational terrorism.
We just want you out of Afghanistan.
But my problem with the safe haven myth is twofold.
Number one, if you believe in the safe haven myth, then you have to invade about 40 countries.
Because there are numerous, dozens of countries that have al-Qaeda affiliates, some sort of Islamist extremists in their borders.
So we better bring the draft back and make a five million man army, because that's what it would take to put soldiers in Yemen, to put soldiers in Somalia, to put soldiers in any one of these countries where al-Qaeda exists.
In fact, Afghanistan has less al-Qaeda fighters than about 20 other countries.
I mean, Afghanistan is not even the home of al-Qaeda anymore.
They're all over the place.
We'd have to invade Pakistan.
And then the second problem with the whole myth is this notion that the Taliban is al-Qaeda when it's not.
The Taliban is a homegrown militia.
It's a homegrown movement.
They are limited to Afghanistan, and that's all they want.
They don't have transnational terror goals.
And so the safe haven myth is a nightmare.
It's a formula for perpetual war, because if you use that argument, then we have to invade like 15 other countries.
And it doesn't – you don't need a safe haven.
Where was 9-11 planned?
In Germany, in Florida, in San Diego.
I mean it doesn't require a safe haven.
Down the street from NSA headquarters in Maryland.
Absolutely, yeah.
It doesn't require – the new version of terrorism does not require caves to hide in.
They do it from within.
It's sleeper cells.
It's so much more nuanced than the safe haven myth would have you believe.
Yeah.
Well, you know, when Trump announced his escalation, he referred directly to what you just were saying is the common narrative about Iraq.
And we know now from the Bob Woodward book – well, I don't know if you can know something from a Bob Woodward book.
But it's reported in the Bob Woodward book, and quite credibly I think, that James Mattis just straight up blackmailed – the secretary of defense just straight blackmailed Donald Trump.
And the guy who let Osama go – I mean Tommy Franks made him.
But he blackmailed Trump and said, if we leave, then we'll have ISIS in Afghanistan.
And anything bad that happens in Afghanistan or from Afghanistan, I'm going to tell everybody that I told you so and that you wouldn't listen to me about that.
And so Trump was like, OK.
But even then, ISIS in Afghanistan are not international Arab terrorists at all.
They also are local Pashtun militiamen.
They're actually Pakistani refugees from the American war in the northern tribal territories in the Obama years who then came down and allied with former Taliban people who were on the outs and that kind of thing and made their own separate group.
And they can call themselves whatever they want, right?
But they're still just more or less local.
You can call them international barely, being Pakistanis at their core.
But it's one local tribe of Pashtuns.
It's not international Arab terrorists at all.
But boy, do they have a great brand name.
So now it doesn't even matter whether Zawahiri might come back from Pakistan.
Now we already have ISIS in Afghanistan.
And, of course, even though the obvious answer to their problem is to let the Taliban kill them, right?
Yeah, let them fight against each other.
Yeah.
And, yeah, they have a real interest in maybe even taking care of them first.
I mean the Taliban have an interest in maybe even getting rid of ISIS before the central government there as their competition for that Pashtun power.
The truth is that I don't think Afghanistan is the sort of place where ISIS will be able to put down any major roots.
Afghanistan is very inward-looking.
It's very isolated.
It's not actually a great place for transnational terrorism.
The Taliban is very homegrown, and they don't want ISIS there.
They don't want a competitor.
So you're right.
I think the Taliban eventually will fight a short civil war, and it will be one-sided, and I think ISIS will go.
And like you said, ISIS is not ISIS.
I mean they're really just a bunch of Pakistanis and Afghans who took the name brand, who became an ISIS affiliate, but they're not really ISIS.
I mean they're not the same as the guys in Syria.
They're just using the name.
It's a name brand now.
And now to this argument about you can't ever leave anywhere because look what happened when Obama left Iraq.
I mean that is so powerful, and Trump cited, as I said, Mattis blackmailed him with it.
Trump straight-sided it in his speech announcing the escalation in Afghanistan a year ago.
And to me the ultimate irony of this is this is one of those things that Trump went so far to say that no other presidential-level politician would ever dare to be so honestly correct about how ISIS was formed when he accused Obama of creating them.
And he did it.
He did it smart too in the campaign.
Obama created ISIS.
But then he didn't elaborate really.
So he made the media people crazy and demand to know his explanation for what he means by that.
And then he goes, yeah, well see he backed al-Qaeda in Libya in the war there.
And then he backed al-Qaeda in Syria in the war there.
And then also he had pulled the troops out of Iraq.
So when his al-Qaeda killers from Syria went rolling into Iraq, there was no one there to stop them, which was just 100% true.
The way he put it, like I'm not saying that's an argument for keeping troops there, but I'm saying yes, that was one-third of the case of Obama's bad policy here.
But then, of course, he was corrected by his handlers and people and whoever told him to stop saying that.
And so backing the jihadists in Libya, backing the jihadists in Syria, that all got dropped to the floor.
And instead he just said, well, he pulled the troops out of Iraq, and that's what led to the rise of ISIS.
And then – but this is a really powerful myth.
I mean this could be as powerful as don't you spit on our soldiers or you're – this could be a real foundational terror war mythology I think here.
That you know what?
Even if Bush should have never done any of the things he did and even if Obama should have never done any of the things he did, we can still never, ever undo them because then Mosul might fall again.
Right, right.
I mean they're still fighting a Sunni insurgency in Iraq war three and a half right now.
I mean it's not over yet.
It never will be.
No, as long as there's a Shia chauvinist government in Baghdad, the Sunnis are never going to accept that.
I mean this war is only on pause right now in Iraq.
I mean there's going to be an Iraq war, what, 4.0?
What are we up to?
Who knows?
There will be more because the Sunnis are – maybe they won't call themselves ISIS anymore, but there will remain an ongoing latent Sunni insurgency in Iraq probably indefinitely I would say.
Yeah, because George Bush gave Baghdad to the Shia.
It's the first time the Shia Arabs or the Shia at all I guess have ruled an Arab capital city for 1,000 years when I guess the Safavids ruled Cairo I think it was.
Yeah, no, you're right.
You're right.
It was the Fatimids.
Yeah, you're right.
So yeah, I mean – and you know what?
I'm always recommending this article to people because this is just one of the main points to ever explain to me.
I think it's the most important part of the terror war is understanding how Iraq War II was not supposed to empower the Iranians, but it did back, and so – and the whole Shiite axis.
And so America has been making up for that ever since by backing al-Qaeda as is the will of Saudi Arabia to try to get consolation prizes against Assad, for example, or against Hezbollah since we can't restart the Iraq War for the Sunnis and kick the Shia out of Baghdad.
That would take too long.
So – or cost too much or whatever it is.
Right.
Too late for that.
But I'm always recommending the article.
It's by Seymour Hersh from 2007, The Redirection.
Right.
In fact, I always conflate that.
Correction here.
I always conflate that article with Preparing the Battlefield.
So it's in The Redirection he talks about support for jihadists in Lebanon and in Syria, but it's in Preparing the Battlefield where he talks about support for Jandala and PJAK and all that.
It's two separate pieces.
But anyway, it's – man, everyone should read that article.
I read it again the other day.
And it's just amazing how absolutely blatant it is that, oops, we fought Iraq War II for our regional adversaries, and so now we are allying with the American people's killers and enemies, al-Qaeda, in order to try to make up for that fact.
And they're just as blatant as could be about Elliott Abrams, Connalisa Rice, and George W. Bush, and this is their thing.
And Obama, all he did was take that same policy and continue it.
And so now I'm kind of going off track a little bit, but you mentioned George W. Bush and Rice and all the other neocons.
And what is really appalling to me these days is that in the era of Trump, people are starting to like mythologize and sanitize the Bush presidency.
People are starting to be like, oh, Bush wasn't so bad compared to Trump.
Now they're giving him an award, I think in Philadelphia coming up around November 11th, for his support for veterans.
But what has George W. Bush ever done for veterans?
This is true.
This is true.
Well, he's made a lot of them to care for.
Yeah.
He paints veterans like he's a painter now.
That's what he does.
He paints the faces of soldiers who died.
And I'm like that's really cute, but you created all those veterans.
You created a generation of two million Iraq war veterans through your illegal, ill-advised war.
And now we're giving the man a prize.
And like I think the worst thing we could do is sort of sanitize his presidency and pine over, oh, things were better back then because Trump is such a nightmare.
But like that's quite frankly, George W. Bush did more damage in his presidency than Trump ever has.
And I'm not a big fan.
I didn't vote for Donald Trump.
What I'm saying is George W. Bush's presidency was one of the most horrific presidencies in American history.
He has to be in the bottom three of presidents.
And I'm a historian.
I say that with some authority.
Yeah.
I mean, look, I think he's directly comparable to Woodrow Wilson in knocking down a chain of dominoes that is just going to last forever.
I mean, he's one of Wilson's dominoes for that matter.
But yeah, I mean, and just like what we're talking about there, where we fought this five-year civil war for the Shiite side in this massive sectarian cleansing campaign against the Sunni Arabs to kick them out of the capital city there.
And so therefore, as Prince Bandar said, we're sick and tired of these Shia and something's going to be done about it.
And what's going to be done about it is they're going to be flinging suicide bombers at the capital of Iraq from now on.
Right.
They're never going to get over the loss.
I remember the war nerd John Dolan wrote a piece right in 2014 when the Islamic State got to the gates of Baghdad and had to stop.
And the cartoon graphic was it was like John Cusack from Say Anything where he's holding the stereo over his head because he's in love with the girl.
But it's an ISIS guy in his all-black ninja uniform, and he's holding the stereo up, pining over Baghdad that he'll never control again.
It's just over.
And people were saying, oh, Baghdad could fall to ISIS.
And it's like, yeah, only if you don't know anything about the history of Iraq War II do you believe that because that is just – they could hurt a lot of people in Baghdad, but they could never take over that city.
They would need the American Army and Marine Corps to help them do it.
Yeah.
I mean the Shia are about 60 percent of the population.
They have their own militias.
Even though the Iraqi army failed in Mosul and a number of other places, as soon as that happened, the clerics like Sistani and others, they called for like a mass uprising.
And so they formed militias that were actually as big or larger than the army.
And the Shia are never giving Baghdad up.
They took it during the civil war of 2006, and they're never giving it back.
And the reality is Baghdad and the southern half of the country will forever be Shia-dominated.
That's just the reality.
Well, and of course Mosul was like Fort Apache out on foreign territory.
I mean it wasn't even really Iraq anymore.
It was Iraqi Sunnistan.
Right.
I don't know if I've talked to you about this before, but I mean almost exactly a year before the fall of Mosul, Patrick Coburn, who is of course great on Iraq and Syria and all these things all at the same time.
And doesn't differentiate the way policymakers do in all of their kind of fake constructs.
He said, hey, look, I'm in Mosul.
I went up to Mosul, and the Iraqi army is AWOL.
I mean there are just a few guys left, and most of them have withdrawn back behind Shiite lines because they feel like they're occupying a foreign country basically, way out there in somebody else's territory, and without the supply lines and the backup to keep them safe.
So they're just saying forget this, and they're just leaving their post.
And so Western Iraq is wide open.
Right.
And so that was, if you go back, and I bet somebody someday is going to go back and do a study of the archives of my show between the time Patrick Coburn said that and one year later when the Islamic State took Mosul, which I was predicting basically every day in that meantime.
And trying to draw attention to that fact that, as Coburn put it, Coburn was quoting the Iraqi Shiite commanders and politicians saying that the American support for the insurgency in – for the Sunni-based insurgency in Syria is re-energizing the insurgency in Iraq, and they're not sure if they can handle it.
I mean Iraq is an artificial state, I mean as you know.
When Iraq was under the Ottoman Empire until the Ottomans broke up in the early 1920s, Iraq was actually three different districts.
The way the Ottomans did it is they just like broke their empire into numerous districts, and what we now know as Iraq was actually three separate districts.
It was a district for the Shia in the south, it was a district for the Sunnis in the west, and it was a district for the Kurds in the north, and then after World War I they sort of just combined those three and said we'll call this Iraq.
But the reality is that that state will fracture as well, just like we were talking about Afghanistan.
In the long term there will be a Sunni west, a Kurdish north, and a Shia middle and south, and trying to keep that state together is a losing effort.
And the only way those other parts, the Sunni part and the Kurdish part, can be kept in Iraq is through the force of military occupation.
And so when you say that the Shia army was like basically occupying Indian country up in Missouli, you're absolutely right, because that is foreign.
The people up there want nothing to do with Baghdad.
Yeah.
Alright, so now listen, you've got this great piece of truth dig here.
Saudi Arabia financed the killers of American troops I commanded, and this is one of the biggest stories of Iraq War II that got no coverage.
And it's all part of this unexamined narrative about who's on whose side here in the Sunni-Shia war when they just never would explain.
During Iraq War II, as I'm sure you remember, there are kids listening to this show who don't remember, but during Iraq War II they said, well, it's America and the good guys versus the bad guys.
It's America and the Iraqi people creating a democracy and the terrorists who are trying to stop them, which still completely ignores all of the real questions about who's who and what's going on here.
So the most important part that I'm trying to get to, which is the Saudis, just like in Syria in more recent times, that they were the ones backing the Sunni-based insurgency against the Americans and their Shiite allies in that war virtually all along.
The Saudis get a pass from Washington that is abhorrent.
The Saudis are the ultimate rogue regime.
That's kind of the point of my article.
We always talk about these rogue states.
Iran is a rogue state.
North Korea is a rogue state.
Venezuela is a rogue state.
Anybody we don't like.
But if the definition of a rogue state is a country that pursues policies that are detrimental to American values and detrimental to American security, if that's the definition of a rogue state, then actually the number one rogue state in the world is Saudi Arabia.
Fifteen of 19 9-11 hijackers were Saudis.
The Saudis have backed the al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria.
They backed the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.
They put together the madrasas and the Pakistani refugee camps that helped form the Taliban.
Saudi Arabia's fingerprints are on every single group that kills Americans across the greater Middle East.
Our blood is on their hands, and yet somehow we stay allied to them.
We do sword dances.
We touch orbs.
We give them $110 billion.
It's a nightmare.
And the fact that the Khashoggi killing was the thing that got attention is appalling because that's the least of Saudi Arabia's crimes.
I mean, it's a crime.
I'm horrified by it, but it's the least of our troubles.
Saudi Arabia has been a counterproductive force, an insidious force from the start that has directly contributed to the killing of American civilians and American soldiers.
Yeah.
Well, and, you know, it's funny, too, because I remember from—you know, I covered Iraq War II in a lot of great detail, and I think there were kind of some rumors, but it didn't seem like there was that much great reporting about it.
And I remember Greg Palast coming on the show, and his bent, of course, is all about, you know, the oil business is the lens he's looking through.
And so he was saying, you know, of course, look, the entire insurgency and the American war in Iraq War II, this is all a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran over who's going to be dominant over oil resources in the Middle East here.
And so, yeah, obviously, America's fighting against our allies, the Saudis, and the Saudis are the ones who are financing this insurrection against the new American order there.
And, in fact, years later—and, you know, I mean, there was just so little reporting about that.
And years later, I asked Greg about that, and he was like, I never said that.
I don't remember that.
And I was like, oh, man, I know it was you.
It was great, and it was all about the oil and the context.
I don't know.
But then the other day, because I'm writing about Iraq War II now for my next book, I went and Googled it just to see what I could find.
And there was a ton of stuff, including a piece in The Washington Post that you linked to as well, where—and they make the context completely clear.
The king of Saudi Arabia has made it clear to Dick Cheney, specifically to the vice president who traveled to Saudi to talk to him.
He's very disappointed that, you know, just like he warned, the Iranians and their friends are coming to power in Iraq instead of putting the next Sunni Baathist mustache in line, as Palast had put it.
Right.
And so he's threatening to start backing the Sunni insurgency against us.
And then it was if you leave was the way that they phrased it, as though if we stayed, it would prevent that outcome when that was the outcome that we were fighting for there.
But they just made it clear right there in The Washington Post, CIA sources and whatever as official as can be in a way that I was really surprised to see.
I didn't remember that from the time that they were that good on it or that there were that many different sources on it.
I found like 10 or 12 great articles to read about it.
Yeah, I mean it's really insane.
America's relationship with Saudi Arabia is just insidious.
It puts the lie to the whole notion that America has, quote, liberal values.
In Saudi Arabia, they execute women for sorcery and witchcraft.
OK, I don't even know what that means.
But the difference between ISIS and Saudi Arabia is quite narrow.
The only difference between ISIS and Saudi Arabia, their theology is the same.
Their version of Islam is the same.
The only difference is that Saudi Arabia is organized as a state and ISIS is organized as more of an insurgency.
I mean besides that, on the surface, right, if we're just looking at the two organizations, they're the same.
They're the same.
Saudi Arabia is ISIS.
It's our ISIS, though.
They're our guys.
How can we fight Sunni Islamist jihadis and then still be allied with the greatest Sunni Islamist jihadis in the world, the Saudi Arabians?
Yeah, I read a thing the other day where – oh, it was – I think it was Elijah Magnier on Twitter.
Maybe Moon of Alabama was quoting Elijah Magnier saying that ISIS would never listen to earphone, to music on their headphones while cutting a guy up.
That would be sinful.
This is the difference between Saudi – that's the Khashoggi supposedly.
The advice that the Khashoggi killer boss gave the others was put your iPod headphones in and rock out to something while you're cutting this guy up.
It was a – I mean it really was a mafia-style killing.
It was like something out of the American mafia.
Oh, yeah.
No, but the Islamic State would be much more pious about it.
They would never listen to music while they butchered the guy.
It's crazy.
The whole thing is crazy.
Never mind the liberal values.
It puts the whole lie to the war on terrorism at all.
That as soon as they took advantage of the war on terrorism to take the war to Iraq and they made this major – committed this blunder in a sense of empowering Iran in a way that they never meant to do.
They've been on the side of al-Qaeda against the Iranian Shiite crescent faction since 2006.
Right.
Since 2006 just as Seymour Hersh writes in The Redirection.
It's treason season right there, and it's just as blatant as can be.
And it's funny.
The way that they try to obscure – they quote Connolly as a rice grower.
Oh, yeah.
The differences between extremists and moderates.
Except all the extremists are the Shiite Iranian side, and the moderates are the Saudi sorcerer headchoppers.
Right.
And they're allies of course.
So that was how they were trying to obscure it, but it was clear enough.
And anyway, I love recommending that article.
I had forgotten how good it was.
I reread it, and there's some killer quotes in there where it's amazing what they're willing to admit.
Yeah.
I mean it's insane.
I've given my adult life to the war on terror.
I'm embarrassed to admit.
I spent 18 years in the Army, most of that time either training for or fighting these wars.
And when I look back on my career in the military, the truth is I fought for nothing.
I mean nothing I ever did made America safer.
In fact, much of my mission was counterproductive.
I have served the interests primarily of Saudi Arabia and Israel.
That's what my service actually contributed to.
Yeah, they even had you fighting against the Shiite side in the war for the Shiite side.
That's right.
That's got to be frustrating.
Yeah, so my – on January 25, 2007, two of my soldiers were killed in an IED strike.
It was a nightmare.
One of them was my closest friend in the Army, Alex Fuller, who my son is named after him.
My son's name is Alexander, my 10-year-old.
The group that killed him and Mike Bosley that day were Shia.
They were Shia insurgents.
They were under Muqtada al-Sadr who just won the election in Iraq.
I mean we're through the looking glass, Alex.
You know what I mean?
Like we – it's crazy.
I was fighting Sunni insurgents south of Baghdad.
Then they moved me into Baghdad and east Baghdad.
Now suddenly I'm fighting Shia insurgents and I'm like, who's the good guys?
Who are we fighting for?
I thought the Shia were the good guys.
I thought we were fighting to put the Shia in power, which we were.
But they're still attacking us.
I mean the whole thing is insane.
Hey, guys.
Check out my book, Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan by me, Scott Horton.
It's about a year old now.
The audio book is out too if you're interested in that and a lot of people seem to like it.
It's got all good reviews on Amazon.com and that kind of thing.
Check it out.
And guess what?
I'm writing a new book.
I know I told you I didn't want to, but I got away with not doing it.
It's a transcript of a presentation I gave.
So the whole first draft is really done for me.
I just have to edit it 100,000 times until it's good enough to put out as a book.
And it's going to be basically one chapter on each of the terror wars of the 21st century.
Try to get everybody caught up there.
So look forward to that.
And help support the effort if you like at scotthorton.org slash donate at patreon.com slash scotthortonshow.
Stuff like that.
Well, I mean, that's the thing.
It goes back to how it was just and it is complicated.
You know what?
But then Patrick Coburn writes and responds to interview requests.
You know, if I'm sure if CNN really wanted to understand, they could have had Bob Dreyfuss in there to say, here's what makes up the Iraqi National Alliance and why it matters.
Here's what the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution is about and why, you know, it wasn't that hard.
I interviewed the guy.
He taught it to me.
But there was such a willful ignorance of who was fighting on whose side.
I mean, I know you saw it, too, where they would just conflate all these guys.
Yeah, we're fighting Sadr.
We're fighting al-Qaeda, whatever.
These extremists, those extremists.
John McCain would get them confused, said al-Qaeda was training in Iran.
And even – never mind any kind of like subtle irony, but just even the blatant contradiction was just never noted at all.
I talk about in my new book, I'm writing the part about how Robert Gates, when the collateral murder video came out from Chelsea Manning and Wikileaks, that leaked the video of the Apache helicopter killing the Reuters reporters and their fixers there in East Baghdad, that Robert Gates says, well, you just don't understand because by that video, you're just seeing the war through a soda straw.
But you don't understand the real context, which I think is a pretty handy turn of phrase.
But then, OK, so remove the soda straw and zoom out a little bit, and what are you looking at?
You're looking at a war in East Baghdad against Sadr, who is fully one-third of the United Iraqi Alliance that the whole damn war is for.
So how is it that I'm the one looking at the war through a soda straw?
It looks to me a lot more like Robert Gates is the one that doesn't know what the hell he's doing.
I agree with you.
I think you're absolutely right.
The people running our wars to me are just – they lack nuance.
They lack context.
They don't understand the war any better than you or I. In fact, they probably understand it less.
They're so devoted to the ideology of American exceptionalism and American militarism that they can't understand the true contours of these wars because they're so brainwashed in the religion, the state religion of American exceptionalism, the notion that American soldiers can do anything, that they can accomplish anything, and that America has to be forward deployed.
We have to intervene everywhere.
They're drunk on that religion.
Yeah.
Well, you know what, too?
I mean you really hit it on the head right there.
I need to find this quote.
I don't remember which general it was, but I believe it was one of Obama's chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifying to Congress about – against the sequester and saying we have to have this money.
And the way he put it was like, look, we can protect America just fine, OK?
That's not a problem.
But you guys want us to be able to hop to and intervene in any situation, any hotspot, anywhere in the world on a moment's notice?
Senator, that's going to cost.
We need more money when it comes to being a world empire.
But hey, I mean he was being pretty dang blatant about it.
You could tell – you might interpret his statement as really opposing our current policy and really trying to emphasize that defending America is actually supposed to be our job, and we could do that.
Absolutely.
I think it was General Dempsey that you're speaking of, and I actually have – I admire him on a number of levels.
He actually taught English at West Point.
He's a little smarter than your average bear.
But I think what was great about Dempsey is that he was candid, like you said.
I mean he didn't hide the fact that he was saying, look, if you want us to do X, Y, and Z, then you've got to fund us.
I don't want to do X, Y, and Z, and I don't want to fund the military at the current rates.
I think we need to downsize.
But Dempsey was correct in the sense that what he was saying is, hey, senators, if you really, really believe in this state religion of American exceptionalism and American intervention all over the world, then we are going to need this money.
And that's true.
I mean I don't think we should be doing those things, but everyone else does.
And so if we're going to do those things, we actually do need a massive military budget.
I don't think it's detrimental to the republic.
I don't want a big military budget.
I don't want to intervene all over the world.
But the fact is, for the most part, that is the state religion.
Nobody really denies it except for like Noam Chomsky, me, and you.
Hey, so help me understand what – you certainly have a different perspective on this.
I don't want to deny people their own individuality and responsibility for their own decisions and yet – and after all, I knew better when I was young than to join Bill Clinton's World Army or whatever.
I don't want any part of it.
And yet I get the idea that most American soldiers join when they're very young, right out of high school and usually from communities where there's consensus that this is a perfectly reasonable thing to do.
No real objection to it that they ever really get a chance to hear.
And that they go in – because I hear all the time the slogans.
I'm sure it's the same ones that recruits here that you're fighting for your country.
You're fighting for freedom.
You're fighting to protect the American people who, after all, are not all young, tough guys.
And so we need young, tough guys to keep us all safe.
So that's your job.
And so it seems to me like there's such a huge betrayal when like, oh yeah, actually, there's some big, fat, soft-handed idiot at some think tank who has some grand strategy where we're actually going to throw your life away for nothing that has nothing to do with defending America at all.
It's the worst bait and switch in the world and kind of betrayal.
And yet of course you sort of exemplify a soldier's ability to at least at some point be able to see through those kind of narratives.
But I guess I do put myself in their shoes because I used to be 17 or 18.
And that's certainly the challenge that basically all young men are given is do you have what it takes to go and prove whatever – this is how a boy becomes a man in our society.
Go join the Army for a few years kind of deal.
And so everybody has that as a pretty big option to choose.
And obviously some percentage of people are going to go for it.
And obviously when you're that young, you figure that the adults are going to decide what the mission is.
You don't worry about that.
Your job is just to be the soldier.
So I don't know.
Anyway, talk to me about that, about the betrayal of American soldiers.
Maybe you think I'm letting your buds off too easy.
Well, I'm guilty of being a pawn in the American militarist game.
I joined the Army when I was 17.
If you're 17, your mother has to actually sign you into the Army because you're not yet an adult.
So you're allowed to join the Army at 17 if your parents sign a form that basically lets you.
I grew up in the American militarist patriarchy.
I was enamored by military service.
I thought that I was going to be fighting for some sort of greater good, some sort of American Pax Romana.
And I was a believer.
When I was 17 years old, just leaving high school, I was a believer.
I got accepted to West Point.
I was super proud of myself.
I went there and was fed the sort of propaganda.
And it was only when I went to Iraq and saw the madness and the absurdity of the war that I turned against it.
Now, a lot of people would ask me, why did you stay so long, Danny?
I served 18 years.
I'm embarrassed of that on some level.
I think that I lacked moral courage at certain points in my career.
The Army is like the ultimate socialist state.
It's free health care.
It's pretty decent pay.
It takes care of you economically, and it gives you an identity.
And I had a lot of friends, all my friends, or soldiers, almost all my friends.
But I was continually told by my superiors, at least the ones I respected, that good people have to stay in the Army.
Thinkers have to stay in the Army because if we leave, then who's left?
Just the war hawks.
And so I kept getting convinced that I could change the system from the inside.
Well, 18 years have now passed, and I realize that's impossible.
And so I would never give that advice to a young soldier.
You cannot change the system from within.
I think I have more effect on U.S. policy from the outside, writing critical pieces, giving interviews like this, than I ever did on the inside.
Yeah, I'm embarrassed of parts of my service, to be frank.
I'm proud of some of it.
I'm embarrassed by a lot of it.
I mean, my career has been in the service of American empire.
And like Smedley Butler, a general from the early 20th century, I now realize that war is a racket, and the best thing I could do is fight against it now.
That's good, man.
I appreciate you taking responsibility for all of that.
But so, okay, for the rest of them, though, do you feel like they're lied to and manipulated?
Or, nope, they're just as responsible as you?
I think both.
American soldiers are lied to, and they are manipulated.
Don't take this the wrong way.
It sounds kind of patronizing.
But most enlisted soldiers lack the intellectual rigor to come to the conclusions that I have.
And I don't think we can expect the average sergeant to think the way you and I think about the war.
They're so busy with their individual jobs that they don't have really the intellectual capital to, like, step back and say, like, oh, what is this all for?
You know, most of these guys didn't go to college.
Most of them come from tough communities.
You know, I'm not taking the responsibility or the onus off of those soldiers.
What I'm saying is that most of them just kind of lack the intellectual capability to really question these wars.
And a lot of them are in the Army for two main reasons.
One is economics, and the second one is identity.
Everyone wants an identity.
Everybody wants to fit in somewhere.
And the military is a very, very great place to just, like, build an identity for yourself and convince yourself you're doing good for the world.
And we've put soldiers on such a pedestal of late that, you know, people want to be in the service because they want to be thanked for their service.
They want to be, you know, adulated at every NFL game when they put the 600-foot flag on the field, you know.
And I don't know.
I mean, I'm torn on this issue because part of me wants to shake every soldier and say, what the fuck are you thinking?
And then another part of me is like, yeah, but it's not totally their fault.
You know what I mean?
They've been raised in a social system where everybody in their existing social circle has told them that serving the military is honorable and a good thing.
So how can we expect them to give that up?
How can we expect them to not think that what they're doing is noble?
Yeah.
Well, you know, an old friend of mine told me a long time ago that, you know, at the end of the day, most people deal with their overall impression of things that they don't know everything about.
And these kind of subjects, as you say, are, you know, not what most people—never mind infantry guys—most people don't want to know anything about foreign policy because what a mess.
Where to begin?
You know what I mean?
It's crazy.
It's like trying to solve the Kennedy assassination or something.
Who's got the time for that?
Who cares?
So, you know, it makes it, you know, really difficult for anyone to kind of analyze.
But, you know, that's why I think the work that you're doing is so important, military officers especially.
You talk about moral courage.
You know, you have the moral courage to send men under you to go get their legs and worse blown off to go fight a no-win war.
You ought to be courageous enough to write some good articles like Danny and try to make this clear and to help to change.
And it is changing.
I mean, this is—you know, maybe just because time has gone on so long with this terror war and maybe because of the work that you and I are doing.
I don't know.
But, you know, the attitudes are changing.
But we need a new narrative, right?
One where the people who are against the war the most are the combat veterans who really know better.
That the anti-war movement really hears from people like you a lot.
That to kind of outflank the—any criticism of, you know, whatever Jane Fonda-ism or whatever taint of some old hippie crap has to—that has nothing to do with the anti-war movement these days.
But just to say that—to kind of focus on that.
You know, like what we're talking about.
That 17-year-old kid trusts that somebody else is taking care of the decision of where they're deployed and that they probably wouldn't deploy them in a place where they shouldn't be.
You know, they just kind of trust it and that it's up to us to make sure that our government doesn't use and abuse the privilege of having troops to deploy.
And so, anyway, you dig what I'm saying.
But I think that's really the most important thing is hearing it from you.
And I'm sure—did you see the new poll where on Afghanistan, the Koch Brothers poll on Afghanistan says that the soldiers there are more anti-war—veterans are more anti-war than the average population.
They are more in favor of the strike in the first place but less in favor of staying than the average American now.
I did.
I did.
I did see that.
And I agree with it.
I think that the soldiers no longer know what we're fighting for.
I mean it's so unclear what we're fighting for in Afghanistan at this point that the average soldier is smart enough to realize that the whole thing is absurd.
I mean we're asking the impossible of these kids.
Right.
All right.
Well, listen, man, I really appreciate your time on the show, and I appreciate you writing for AntiWar.com.
Again, I think it's so important that people hear it, especially from an active duty officer like yourself, to hear this kind of point of view and to have a chance to know better.
Yeah, well, I'm going to keep it up.
And to change the overall opinion.
I think it really is working to change the overall opinion in America that, hey, if these soldiers are against the war, then what are any of us supporting it for?
Right, right.
Well, I'm never going to stop writing.
I'm never going to stop beating the drum.
This is the mission of my life now that I'm out of the military, or almost out of the military.
And, yeah, I mean I think this is the story of our times.
So I'm glad to be here.
I always enjoy being on the Scott Horton Show, and hopefully we can do it again.
Hell yeah.
Right on.
Thank you, man.
Appreciate it very much.
All right.
Talk soon.
Bye.
All right, you guys, that's Major Danny Sherson, U.S. Army.
He writes for TruthDig.com.
I said .org.
I think it's both.
Saudi Arabia financed the killers of American troops I commanded.
And that's at TruthDig.com.
And then his new one for AntiWar.com is coming out on, I think Monday, maybe Tuesday, we're going to run.
I forget.
Probably Monday.
Quagmire.
What the attack on General Miller in Afghanistan tells us.
All right, y'all, thanks.
Find me at LibertarianInstitute.org, at ScottHorton.org, AntiWar.com, and Reddit.com slash Scott Horton Show.
Oh, yeah, and read my book, Fool's Errand, Timed and the War in Afghanistan at FoolsErrand.us.
