For Antiwar.com and Chaos Radio 95.9 in Austin, Texas, I'm Scott Horton.
This is Antiwar Radio.
I'm in Los Angeles, and I believe my guest, Syed Salim Shahzad, a reporter for the Asia Times, is in Pakistan.
Is that right, sir?
That's true.
That's true.
I'm in Pakistan, Islamabad.
Okay.
Well, sounds like we got a pretty good connection for all the way on the other side of the world.
Welcome to the show.
I really appreciate you joining us today.
Thank you.
All right.
Yeah, very little time delay and everything.
Sounds good.
All right.
So I have a lot of things I'd like to ask you about, but the first thing is this article from October the 30th, 2002.
It was sent to me by somebody.
I think it was a link posted in the comment section on one of these interviews.
And it's an article about how Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was killed in a shootout with Pakistani police during a raid back in 2002, which I guess would imply that the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed we've heard about ever since then is somebody else.
And I just wonder whether there have been more follow ups to this article, whether you've developed this story, whether you still stand by this story or further information has made it clear otherwise.
Or what is the deal nowadays in 2010?
Well, the thing is that that article was penned in, you know, in 2002.
And that perspective was an ISI raid on a residence in Karachi on the first anniversary of 11th September 2002.
In the same raid, they arrested Ramzi Binal Shib.
So when there was a long exchange of gunfire between the Pakistani security forces and Al-Qaeda, and after that they arrested Ramzi Binal Shib and they killed a couple of other people over there.
So my sources told me that when they went there, they found a body over there and some American FBI agents, they spotted one dead body as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
That was it and they told me about that, that they suspected Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was killed in that encounter.
Later on, that information turned out to be wrong and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was arrested.
So, I mean, I wrote another article when he was arrested.
That, I mean, that was, that information was based on some intelligence sources because you see the thing is that in the war on terror, everything was, is discreet.
And the reporters don't have the access to the information.
They have to rely on the intelligence agents.
And at that time, intelligence agents pass on the information, not only to me, to other media outlets as well, that they suspect that the person killed in that encounter on September 11, 2002 was one of the dead bodies that belonged to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
So that's it.
Well, now, you know how it is and how it's been.
All these years, the American government had such incentive to lie and obfuscate and cover up how much they knew and how easily they could have prevented the attack if only they'd been doing their jobs, whether or not they were doing their, whether or not they were failing to do their jobs deliberately is a question that's debated a lot.
And articles like this one are cited continuously.
And it's, it's been left up to not just alternative journalists, but even just regular people to try to figure out what happened on September 11, since our government wouldn't tell us.
And so there's all this muddy water out there.
And this article that you wrote back then has been included and is still used to say, see, this whole thing is a sham.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has been dead since 2002.
And they don't just lie to you about some things.
They're lying to you about everything.
Well, as a reporter, my take is that, yes, I mean, indeed, I mean, there's a lot of murky water in this, in this whole thing.
And I mean, the governments and the states have been, you know, trying to shove everything under the carpet.
But you see, the thing is that as far as this article is concerned, I mean, I clarified after the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that, you know, that was, that article was based on some, you know, wrong information.
And I clarified that.
And I, as a reporter, because you see it later on, I had access to the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's family in Karachi, Pakistan.
So, I mean, I could, you know, they, not only to me, but to other reporters, including some American journalists.
And those people, of course, have been clarified that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the person who was arrested by the Americans, was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Well, and please forgive me, because I don't mean to beat you over the head with it.
I mean, it's possible for a reporter to get something wrong and then make a clarification later.
I'm sorry that I didn't see the clarification.
There ought to be a link to it on the Asia Times original story here, maybe.
But I understand that, you know, I'm not saying it's your fault.
I'm just saying it's one of these things that continues to circulate around.
So I'm really happy to have a chance to let you address it on this show.
But also, you know, as long as we're talking about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, I was wondering, because I've seen where you've written a little bit here about Jundala, this Balaki terrorist group that it's been reported by, well, a few different people, I think, including Andrew Coburn and Seymour Hersh, that the CIA and or the Joint Special Operations Command has been financing these guys and controlling them and using them as, you know, to commit terrorist attacks or supporting their terrorist attacks against Iran.
And then isn't it the case that this is actually Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's group, this Jundala?
No, no, well, there is a misunderstanding on part of the Western media, especially, that there are two Jundalas, basically.
One Jundala was founded in South Waziristan.
And that Jundala belonged to Al-Qaeda.
Another Jundala was Iranian Jundala, and that one belonged to Abdul Malik Regi.
And that is completely separate, you see.
Well, but I thought Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Youssef were Balukis, and that they were from that kind of southwestern part of Pakistan, right?
Of course, I mean, they come from Pakistani Balochistan, but their Jundala was founded.
The Jundala we talked about, I mean, I talked about, was formed in Pakistani, South Waziristani tribal areas.
And that Jundala carried out the attack on the Pakistani military convoy in 2004 on the Corps Commander's motorcade in Karachi.
So these really are very separate groups from each other.
These are completely separate.
They are completely apart from each other.
The Iranian Jundala was completely different, and the Jundala from South Waziristan was completely different.
And Khalid Sheikh Mohammed belonged to, I mean, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was involved with the Jundala of South Waziristan, not the Iranian one.
Okay.
Well, can you tell us about the one that he wasn't a member of, that has been carrying out the attacks in Iran?
Do you know about them?
You mean the Iranian Jundala?
Right.
Well, I guess my understanding was they kind of straddled the border of the two states there.
The region of Baluchistan was bigger than, or, you know, didn't conform to the borderline.
Yeah, as far as South Waziristan Jundala is concerned, its operation was only Pakistan-focused, and the Iranian Jundala was actually, you know, aiming for Iranian targets only.
So they are two separate operations altogether.
I see.
Well, do you know whether, like ideologically, are they basically the same?
My impression was that the Jundala that America's government is accused of supporting against Iran, whether or not it was the same group as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, are basically ideological cousins of the Bin Ladenites.
No, no, no.
I tell you, I will tell you about the Iranian Jundala.
Iranian Jundala was initially an Iranian-Baluch separatist group, and it was, you know, led by Abdul Malik Rehgi.
Abdul Malik Rehgi was an Iranian-Baluch who was initially a Baluch nationalist, and he also worked for the Baluch Liberation Organization as well.
And he changed many colors in the past.
I mean, at one time he was a Baluch nationalist, and when he came to Karachi and Pakistan, you know, he came close to Sipahi Sahaba, an Islamic anti-Shiite group.
So, later on, I mean, he developed ties with the Sipahi Sahaba's breakaway faction, that is Lashkar-e-Jangvi, and Lashkar-e-Jangvi had some loose connections with Al-Qaeda.
But the thing is that Lashkar-e-Jangvi and Abdul Malik Rehgi were both against the Shias, and you know that Iran is predominantly a Shia country.
So, they had a common interest.
So, they, you know, joined the strategies to carry out actions against the Iranians inside, you know, Iran.
In the meantime, what I learned from my sources, and I also documented that in my article as well, that in 2009, Lashkar-e-Jangvi members, you know, got Abdul Malik Rehgi, got a meeting, arranged a meeting with Abdul Malik Rehgi to some Al-Qaeda members in the Pakistani Balochistan area.
And in that meeting, I mean, they agreed that both organizations would facilitate each other.
For example, Al-Qaeda required somebody in Iran who would facilitate their members to go to Turkey and to Iraq through Iran.
And Abdul Malik Rehgi was, you know, very much involved in smugglings in the past, and he knew the smuggling routes through Iran.
So, he agreed that he would, you know, facilitate the Al-Qaeda members, and in return, he would receive the money from Al-Qaeda.
And he expected Al-Qaeda to support Iranian Jundullah's operation inside Iran.
So, that was an understanding.
What I was saying was that later on, Abdul Malik Rehgi was arrested by the Iranian authorities, and that arrest was facilitated by the Pakistani establishment.
So, I mean, they could not materialize any alliance between Iranian Jundullah and Al-Qaeda.
It was some sort of an arrangement, because both organizations were working underground.
And somehow, there was some go-betweens between the two organizations, which, I mean, they both trusted on.
So, they developed some kind of arrangement, but that, again, I mean, came only in 2009, not before that.
I see.
All right, everybody, I'm talking with Syed Salim Shahzad.
Am I saying that right at all, sir?
True, true.
Okay, good, good.
Yeah, he's on the phone from, what city in Pakistan are you in?
I'm in Islamabad, in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad.
Okay.
And he's a reporter from the Asia Times, and I'm learning all kinds of things.
Here's one from BostonReview.net.
The real danger is that Al-Qaeda and the neo-Taliban will drag the United States into regional war.
Who is the neo-Taliban?
Well, the neo-Taliban is a new generation of the Taliban who actually absorbed Al-Qaeda's ideology.
I mean, they are from the local population, Pakistani population.
They are from Afghan population, and they might be from, you know, if they come from South Asia, they might be coming from different tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But they absorbed Al-Qaeda's ideology.
They are not Arabs, but they still absorb their ideology in all letter and script, and they are practicing their strategy.
That's why I call them neo-Taliban.
Well, it's very interesting the way you say in this article that the American war in Afghanistan, in destroying much of the Taliban and forcing the survivors across the border, made them dependent on the Egyptians and the Saudi friends of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in order to help them to wage their resistance, at least in terms of strategy and this kind of thing.
Neo-Taliban sounds right like they got their own little AEI over there, their own little war party controlling these guys.
And so now, after years of fighting, these Pakistani locals, as you say, have ended up becoming very Al-Qaeda-ized in their ideology after depending on the Al-Qaeda guys to help them all this time.
That's true, Eamon, that the more Taliban leadership is being eliminated in this war, the lower cadre is more inclined towards Al-Qaeda, because they require guidance, they require strategy, they require financing.
And Al-Qaeda is providing all those things to them.
And the more their leadership would be eliminated, Al-Qaeda would be more in a controlling position to these neo-Talibans in South Asia.
Well, and you say in this article that they have this strategy of trying to pick a fight, a real fight, I guess in Kashmir between Pakistan and India, in order to draw America into a much bigger conflict, rather than just bogging us down and bleeding us dry with guerrilla warfare.
Why not go ahead and have a big war, they figure, huh?
Well, the thing is that I did not mention Kashmir.
Actually, Al-Qaeda was aiming to expand the war theater up to India, and they want to engage India in this conflict.
And the Mumbai attack was actually a bid to expand the war theater.
Because, you see, the thing is that if India and Pakistan were engaged in any conflict, the first thing which would happen is the naval blockade by the Indian Navy in the Arabian Sea.
And the first casualty of that blockade would be the NATO supply line.
Because the thing is that NATO supply line goes through Pakistan to the landlocked Afghanistan.
And if Indian Navy make a naval blockade of the Arabian Sea, NATO would never be able to send the supplies through Pakistan.
And that would greatly affect the war in Afghanistan.
The second thing is that, of course, if India and Pakistan engage in any conflict, Pakistan's support and Pakistan's allegiance to the American war in Afghanistan would be automatically neutralized.
It would have to pull out its troops from the eastern border, from its western border, and relocate to the eastern border near India.
So that way, Americans would completely lose their grip on their war in Afghanistan.
Because, you see, the militants in Afghanistan would conveniently cross the border inside Pakistan, and there would be nobody to prevent them.
All the Pakistani forces would be engaged in a war against India.
So that was al-Qaeda's plan.
And because of that, they hatched the Mumbai plot.
Because the Mumbai attack would antagonize India and it would attack Pakistan.
But, you see, what happened was that Americans immediately intervened and prevented India to go against any adventurism against Pakistan.
Well, and you say in here, too, that the leaders of this thing, when we hear the Karzai government and the Obama government, both in different ways and on different timelines, but talking about negotiating with the Taliban and trying to work something out and come to some sort of agreement and bring them into the government one way or the other, either as groups, as Karzai wants, or as individuals, as Obama would prefer it, you're saying in this article that you cannot deal with these guys, with Haqqani and with Hekmatyar, that these guys are...
Well, it just seems like the only way that America could ever leave there, according to the way it's set up now, would be to say that, well, we made a deal and we made peace, we achieved victory, and so now we can go, kind of thing.
But you're saying that in your article here, I believe, that the people that we're fighting against, led by the Haqqanis, this neo-Taliban, that they are irreconcilable to the Karzai government, to the American occupation, that they will never... that we are not in a position to deal with them, basically, right?
Well, the thing is, that's true.
I mean, the minute Americans would move out of Afghanistan, of course, I mean, they would initiate their global...
Al-Qaeda would initiate its global operation, and they would insist on re-establishing their Islamic emirates.
They would never allow democracy to flourish in Afghanistan.
They would never allow any elections to take place.
They would never allow any other groups, including Northern Alliance and other groups, to be the part of the government.
They would insist on their regime, their student militia, Taliban, to come back and control everything in Afghanistan and re-establish their emirates.
And they would continue to protect Al-Qaeda and would allow them to operate.
Because, you see, their war, their vision of war, their vision of war is not limited up to Afghanistan.
They are looking for the liberation of Palestine, you know, and this is very much part of their ideology as well as their strategy, that once they would finish with Afghanistan, they would send the armies to fight with Israel and to liberate the Palestine.
So, I mean, that would go on, and that way I think that it is their only concern.
Well, so if I understand you right, what you're saying is that, well, for example, reporting that says that the Taliban have had it with Al-Qaeda, and if the Taliban did have an opportunity to take power in Afghanistan, that they wouldn't blow it again by helping the Saudi and Egyptian people who are at war with the United States there.
You're saying that that's wrong, that at this point they've been pushed so close together that there's no question that Al-Qaeda would be welcomed by the Taliban in Afghanistan to use that as a base of operations for further war against the West.
Is that what you're saying?
No, I'm not saying that.
I'm saying that if the Americans leave Afghanistan, the Taliban would revive their emirates, their government, and their Islamic system in Afghanistan immediately, and would continue to protect Al-Qaeda members, and would allow them to operate in Afghanistan against the Western targets.
Has it been that way unendingly since September 11th?
Was there a period of time there when the Taliban might have really been willing to give up all the Saudis and Egyptians if you just leave us alone kind of thing?
You know, before September 11th, Al-Qaeda was welcomed there by Mullah Omar and the Taliban, and then September 11th, a giant war happened, and now you're saying again that if America left there and the Taliban ruled the place, that they would allow Al-Qaeda to be there.
But what I'm wondering is, was there ever a time where we could have cut a deal with them that said, look, just give us Al-Qaeda and we'll let you be the Taliban?
I mean, it sounds like you're saying it's too late for that now, but was there ever a time that would have worked?
Why they would hand you over to Al-Qaeda?
Why they would hand Americans over to Al-Qaeda?
Had they been, you know, if they have that kind of intentions, they would have handed over Osama bin Laden to Americans in the first place.
So they are not willing to, you know, give up.
They are, you know, they would never compromise on Al-Qaeda.
They would continue to protect Al-Qaeda.
They would continue to provide them all sort of bases over there, and they don't have any intentions to, you know, cut a deal with Americans on that.
Well, that's a bummer because it sounds like a prescription for America has to stay forever.
Even though we can't eliminate the enemy, we can't leave because we'll be right back where we were in the summer of 2001 again.
That's true.
I'm sorry.
I really appreciate your time on the show today.
I hope we can do this again often.
I've learned a lot, and I have a ton more follow-up questions, but I've got to move on to my next interview.
But thank you very much for your time on the show.
I hope we can stay in touch.
Okay, everybody, that was Syed Salim Shahzad.
He writes for the Asia Times.
