Welcome back to Anti-War Radio, it's Chaos 92.7 FM in Austin, Texas, and our guest today is Scott Ritter.
He's a former UN weapons inspector, he's the author of a whole bunch of books, including Target Iran, The Truth About the White House's Plans for Regime Change, and Waging Peace, The Art of War for the Anti-War Movement.
You can find what he writes at truthdig.com and often at antiwar.com as well.
We're featuring a brand new article by Mr. Ritter in the Viewpoint section today, Congressional hearings are needed to forestall an attack on Iran.
Welcome back to the show, Scott.
It's a pleasure, thanks for having me.
Well I'm very happy to have you here and obviously with all the news from all different angles going crazy just in the last couple of weeks about Iran, I really appreciate the chance to get your insight here.
I have to tell you, as the drumbeat is getting louder and louder and louder, for some reason my gut is telling me that there's not going to be a war and I guess the news that came out last week that Bush has at least taken half a step backwards and is willing to have some talks about maybe having some talks if only the Iranians will only stop expanding their nuclear program makes me feel like, hey, maybe Bush is backing down and we're not going to have a war after all.
I know that sounds kind of silly when there's so much other news that would seem to indicate the contrary, but I don't know, what do you think?
Well, first of all, I share your gut feeling that the chances for war are actually being reduced, but not because of what you've said.
I simply do not trust the Bush administration, the ideologues who populate the Bush administration to be serious about meaningful diplomatic dialogue with Iran.
The Bush administration has a long track record of using diplomacy as a smokescreen to position itself for conflict.
I think we need to understand that at the same time the president has been making these announcements, these suggestions that there might be talks about having talks about having talks, the United States has been increasing its preparations for the potential of military conflict in the region, not just unilateral American attacks on Iran, but joint attacks or facilitating a unilateral Israeli attack.
There are reports now that Israel has been operating out of U.S. bases in Iraq, at least setting up logistics preparations for the potential of having Iraqi airspace cleared for Israeli jets.
Now, this is an odd thing to be happening if the president was serious about, you know, lowering the chances of conflict by engaging in genuine diplomacy.
There's never been genuine diplomacy engaged in by this administration when it comes to Iran, just as it was in the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
But you know, something did happen this week that I think changes the atmosphere tremendously, the landscape.
And that is, Iran eliminated any doubt as to what its response would be to a limited military strike.
Up until now, you know, some people, including myself, have been scratching their heads saying, what would Iran do if we simply bombed one or two Revolutionary Guard command sites, or if we limited an attack simply to the Natanz enrichment facility?
And there was a hope that we could, you know, contain the strike.
I think Iran has eliminated speculation by engaging in their missile tests and announcing that if they are attacked, they will shut down the Strait of Hormuz, they will disrupt oil production, and they will unleash a massive bombardment of American troop concentrations in Iraq and Kuwait and elsewhere, and attack Israel.
Well, now that Iran is committed to this, it makes a limited military action impossible.
If the United States and or Israel is contemplating military action against Iran, they now must accept that the initial attack must be massive and overwhelming, designed to neutralize or eliminate the Iranian ballistic missile threat.
And this, frankly speaking, is a virtual impossibility in the timeframe left for the Bush administration.
They have not positioned themselves to carry out this kind of massive strike.
So in many ways, the Iranian action, I think, has made the possibility of war now more remote.
I mean, we still have the rhetoric, we still have the chest-thumping, etc.
But the reality is that no responsible military planner can consider a limited military strike against Iran anymore from this point on.
They must understand that any military action against Iran has to be massive and overwhelming, and this is something that the Bush administration is not prepared to do at this point in time.
Meaning the Navy and the Air Force just aren't prepared to do it?
The Navy and the Air Force have not positioned themselves to initiate and sustain this kind of strike.
And it's not just the Navy and the Air Force anymore, because in order to secure the Strait of Hormuz, you have to talk about not just putting aircraft over Iranian airspace, but you have to put boots on the ground.
The Marine Corps and Army Special Operations Forces will have to operate on the ground to clear out the surface-to-surface anti-shipping missile sites.
American commandos will have to operate in the depth of the Iranian landmass to interdict ballistic missile launch potential.
And so this isn't simply flying airplanes over Iran anymore.
This is about committing thousands, if not tens of thousands, of American troops to combat operations on the ground in Iran, and this is a completely different picture than what has been talked about before.
Now that Iran has committed that it will unleash a massive missile barrage if attacked, the only option now for the United States, if it wants to indeed attack Iran, is to preempt the Iranians with our own massive military assault, which will be inclusive of ground forces.
And we're just not positioned to do that.
It doesn't mean that we can't do that.
But the Bush administration at this point in time is not positioned to do that.
And in order to get ourselves to the position where we can carry out this huge airstrike combined with this considerable ground action, troops will have to be moved, money will have to be allocated, Congress will have to be briefed, and I just don't see Congress going along with this.
Now you combine this with the OPEC Secretary General saying, if you attack Iran, all bets are off.
There will be a limitless expansion in the price of oil, $300, $500, $1,000 a barrel.
The American economy will not survive this.
The European economy will not survive.
I just can't see Congress allowing this to happen, especially since no one can demonstrate that Iran poses a threat to the United States, Israel, or the rest of the world that warrants this kind of action.
Israel can sit here and talk all they want about Hamas and Hezbollah and terrorist attacks that kill one or two or three or four people, and as horrible as that is, I don't think anybody in the world will say, well, we will commit economic suicide to help Israel resolve its problems with Hamas and Hezbollah, understanding that any attack on Iran will not resolve Israel's problems with Hamas and Hezbollah, but only exacerbate them.
Well, here's the problem, though, is everything that you're saying here, this reminds me of what you said before the Iraq war.
These are what we call reality-based arguments, and Scott, this is the same discussion that we've been having for years now, that reality, in terms of economic problems, in terms of backlash against our soldiers in Iraq, and on down the list, the possible consequences of war with Iran have always been a deal-breaker, seemingly, and yet that hasn't seemed to have much to do with the argument.
It's sort of like last November when all of America's intelligence agencies said they don't have a nuclear weapons program, and yet we still talk about we have to preempt their nuclear weapons program, or our politicians do.
No, look, I'm not disagreeing.
I always said that the fact that the Bush administration is populated by ideologues who believe that America can generate its own reality, a new reality, and that they are dismissive of arguments that are based on what they call old reality.
I mean, I think Ron Suskin came up with this argument when he wrote his book.
This is a reality check for us as the American people.
We're dealing with an administration that is not logical, that derives its national security policy formulation not from reality or a sense of responsibility, but based upon adherence to certain ideologically-based principles of global domination.
But the difference here is that in the past, when we talked about Iraq, we talked about theoretical.
We postulated the problems that could emerge.
I think today we have enough data that we're no longer talking about the theoretical, we're talking about the probable.
And oil is no longer at 40 bucks a barrel.
The American population has to deal with the reality that oil is going through the roof, and so it's not theoretical the prices will go up.
We now know they will go up, and we know what the consequences will be.
And I do think that this economic reality check, this gut check, will compel Congress to take a look at what it's allowing this administration to do.
I mean, we'll find out in the near term.
Congress is considering resolutions at the House and Senate level, calling for a naval blockade of Iran.
I'd like to see what the future of these resolutions are, given the current state of affairs.
If Congress will continue to articulate in favor of policy directions that promote war, promote instability, and promote economic catastrophe, or if Congress is going to wake up and say, you know, we need to put a brake on this, we've got some serious, serious problems, what are the American people going to do?
I mean, what are these citizens going to wake up and say, you know, we're tired of paying this much money for oil, and we don't want our government to get us in a situation where they commit economic suicide for the majority of the American people.
So I do think we're at, you know, one of these tipping points, and let's see what happens.
Yeah.
Well, you know, I keep thinking in the back of my mind of that Downing Street memo, option B, rolling start, let's think of a way to make this war Saddam Hussein's fault.
And I think that's always really been the danger in Iran, that we're a border dispute away from war.
We're a couple of miles, maybe, of water between their navy and ours, and incidents can happen all the time.
And in fact, I guess there was press, right, that Cheney actually did try to seize upon the speedboat incident at the beginning of this year and try to figure out a way to escalate that, and it was simply the navy officers on the high seas who shut it down.
Well, there's no, it's a very frightening possibility.
One of the dangers of the escalation of rhetoric, which is what is occurring right now, is that it creates a heightened sense of tension that can be exploited by an incident.
You can't get this rolling start.
I mean, we face this, you know, throughout the day, you talk about, you know, the Cuban Missile Crisis, you talk about the Berlin Crisis before that, you talk about any number of situations where, you know, we were basically one mistake away from having events spin out of control.
And here, we have the United States and Israel, and now Iran, all thumping their chest, raising the level of tension.
And while there appear to be some saner, rational heads in the background saying, no, no, this isn't the direction we want to go, all it takes is that one spark to create the energy impulse that leads to the situation spinning madly out of control.
And so, you know, we are in a dangerous time, and again, this is where responsible action on the part of the United States Congress could definitely help resolve this situation.
Congress needs to facilitate the lessening of tension, the lowering of the rhetoric, the expansion of options available to the United States, instead of serving, frankly speaking, as, you know, the rubber stamp facilitators of irresponsible policy.
What do you think is the significance, if any, of the P5-plus-1 offer to begin to have some talks toward the holding of talks?
I mean, Bush has this whole time demanded unconditional surrender before anybody sits at a table about anything.
Is this significant at all?
Well, again, I need to see what's going on behind the scenes.
Remember, the Bush administration, you brought up Iraq earlier.
I always believe that people need to be judged upon their past performances, past patterns of behavior.
And we had a situation with Iraq where the Bush administration all but ruled out inspections.
If you remember, in September and October of 2002, press conference after press conference where they said that inspections could never work and would never be accepted because the Iraqis had built this elaborate mechanism of deception, and that if we sent inspectors in, they would find nothing which would only prove that the Iraqis were hiding everything.
But in the end, because Saddam Hussein accepted the return of inspectors, the international community pressured for inspectors.
The Bush administration was compelled to accept the return of inspectors, all the while rejecting any notion of inspection-based success.
So I think we're at a situation here where the Bush administration has run into a brick wall.
The international community, indeed certain elements here in the United States, are demanding that diplomacy truly be exhausted, and this requires direct talks between Iran and the United States.
And what the Bush administration is doing is paying lip service to this, saying, yes, okay, we will consider talks about the issue of having talks, but I don't believe at any time that the Bush administration is serious about expanding relations with Iran.
I mean, if it was, we don't need to have talks about having talks.
If the Bush administration is serious about this, Condi Rice gets on an airplane and flies to Tehran, and within a month we have an interest section opened up, we create the conditions that are conducive to the return of an exchange of diplomats, we open up an embassy and we move forward.
There is nothing to stop us from doing this except the ideology of the Bush administration, which says that our long-term objectives in Iran aren't about improving relations, but of achieving regime change.
We can never forget that.
The single focus of this administration when it comes to Tehran is to eliminate the theocracy in Tehran.
Right.
In fact, it seems like all this rhetoric, there was some reporting I was reading this morning about how all this rhetoric has increased support for the hardliners in Iran.
We're basically weakening very much, or if not destroying, the moderate middle in Iran, the people that we could deal with.
Seems like the war party doesn't want to deal with anybody.
They rather have the hardliners so they can point at Ahmadinejad and them and say, see how evil they are.
You know, and it's ironic, because Ahmadinejad was in a position where he was, you know, and he still may very well be on his way out.
There's not too many people that are putting money on Ahmadinejad winning the next presidential election.
He has lost credibility in Iran, not just in terms of, you know, his stance on the nuclear issue and his statements about Israel, etc., but he hasn't delivered on any of his domestic program promises.
You know, the economy is trashed, unemployment's at a record high, the quality of life is dropping, and the Iranian people are fed up.
So here's a situation where the United States, by doing nothing, can facilitate a major shift, you know, in the nature of the Iranian government, because the Iranian people will facilitate this shift.
What do we do?
We create the condition that empowers the hardliners, undermines the moderates, and suddenly, you know, Ahmadinejad is looking like a viable political figure once again.
It's absurd what's going on.
I've always said that the Bush administration is very good at creating these scenarios for self-fulfilling prophecies, where, you know, they say the end of the world is coming, and then they do everything they can to facilitate the end of the world.
They say that the conservatives are in control in Tehran, and we're doing everything we can to help the conservatives maintain control in Tehran.
Well, even in July of 2005, all the guys around Ahmadinejad, however you say it, I'm sorry, all the guys surrounding him, all came out and publicly thanked George Bush and laughed and said, yeah, all your rhetoric about the people of Iran better get one thing straight, they better not turn out and elect the right-winger, really helped us with our turnout.
Appreciate it.
Oh, absolutely.
You know, we ran into the same problem with Iraq.
We had a situation where, you know, economic sanctions were biting deeply into the people of Iraq, and basically, Saddam and his advisers, you know, we didn't get that personally from Saddam, but we got it from his inner circle, saying, hey, we thank the United Nations for, and you, Scott Ritter and others, for carrying out these aggressive inspections, because by doing this, you've allowed the Iraqi people to rally behind the government.
So we really appreciate what you've been up to.
And that's pretty much what's happening today in Iran, where, you know, this government had lost, you know, faith, the people had lost faith with their government, and yet thanks to the United States, basic nationalistic tendencies take over, Persians will support Persians, and the Iranians will support their government, when confronted by, you know, the irresponsibility, the irresponsible actions of the United States government.
One question here is whether any of this has anything to do with uranium enrichment.
I mean, we talk with Dr. Gordon Prather and Gareth Porter on this show all the time, and I've read all the news, and I don't really even want to bore you with going back over all the details, but basically, we all know that the IAEA has safeguarded all of Iran's nuclear facilities, and that they're not even that good at enriching uranium at all, and when they try and succeed, they're only enriching to 3.6% or 4% or something, and that can't possibly be used to make a nuclear bomb.
They'd have to kick out the IAEA and withdraw from the NPT with great fanfare to even begin trying to enrich highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.
So does anybody in Israel or America even really care about their nuclear program at all, or is this simply an excuse?
Well, I'm sure you can find those who will continue the original argument, which is that the enrichment of uranium represents a redline capability that Iran can never be allowed to possess, and then you can extend that argument.
And I'm sure there's people that will continue to make that argument, but as you pointed out, that argument's moot now.
It's overcome by events.
A, the Iranians have the technological capability to enrich.
B, their poor technical capability, combined with the serious safeguarding measures that have been implemented, come together to make it impossible for Iran to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program.
Iran would have to kick the inspectors out and then pray for some sort of miraculous technological breakthrough that allowed them to achieve the level of enrichment necessary to have highly enriched uranium capable for use in a weapon.
All this would take time and give the world not only the opportunity, but the motive to respond.
So this is no longer about Iran's nuclear program.
I keep telling people, I get called up all the time, you know, what can we do?
How should we move forward?
And I say, look, anybody in Washington, D.C., any think tank, any arms control wonk-type group that continues to articulate in favor of the suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment program as the way to resolve this issue is missing the point.
It's no longer about that.
It's about regime change, and what we need to do is be focusing on, you know, issues that deal with the reality of American-Iranian relations.
It's not about the nuclear program.
We've got that one solved.
That is solved.
The IAEA has solved this.
There is no nuclear weapons program in Iran.
Their nuclear program is safeguarded.
It constitutes a threat to no one.
To continue down the path of having dialogue with Iran for the purpose of achieving a suspension of a program Iran will never suspend only reinforces the spacious arguments put forward by the Bush administration, Israel, etc.
It's time we start focusing on other issues, and, you know, Iran has given the world an opening.
I don't know if people are smart enough to pick up on it, but, you know, Iran's recent testing of its missiles has created the conditions where, you know, people can talk about a freeze of missile testing, perhaps a INF treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty-type configuration for the Middle East in which Iran will give up its Shahab-3 missile in conjunction with verified arms inspections of not just Iran but Israel and others.
What this does is it eliminates the one means of delivery of a nuclear weapon the world is worried about.
And if you eliminate the Shahab-3 missile, now all that other talk about an Iranian nuclear program is gone.
And then, you know, this would suddenly create turmoil in Europe where Russia would come in and say, wait a minute, if Iran's getting rid of its missile, there's no need for this anti-ballistic missile program.
I mean, it's this kind of creative thinking that people should be thinking about as opposed to this continuous pounding away at a suspension of uranium enrichment which is an absolutely pointless direction to head in because it's not connected to reality.
Iran is going to enrich uranium for a nuclear energy program.
This program is under safeguards.
It constitutes a threat to no one.
And for the world of diplomacy and nonproliferation to allow itself to be trapped in that mode of thinking that suspension is the answer only facilitates the likelihood of conflict.
We need to start thinking outside the box, expanding, you know, our venues for resolving this problem.
And again, you know, Iran has created the conditions with its missile testing that have created some windows of opportunity.
Let's see if people are smart enough and brave enough to exploit it.
All right.
Now, one of the reasons I'm really glad I have you on the show today, Scott, is because I want to ask you about some of these details about the smoking laptop and the accusations contained therein because even though the IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials to any military or other special purpose, quote-unquote, they also keep saying, well, there are still some unresolved questions here and unresolved questions there.
So I'm hoping that I can get the full explanation from you as best as you can possibly tell me about the smoking laptop.
But I'll start with what I think I understand about it, and that is that the NCRI, the political front for the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, are the ones who came up with this laptop.
And that contained therein are at least two accusations.
If there are more, I'd love to hear them.
The first is the idea that they had planned to build a laser enrichment facility to create what's called green salt uranium tetrafluoride, and that that doesn't make any sense because they make uranium hexafluoride down the street at their IAEA safeguarded facility and buy the barrel full, and that's what you need to put in your centrifuges anyway.
And so that accusation makes no sense, and the building was never even built.
The other accusation is that there are plans on there for a delivery vehicle for an atomic warhead, although even David Albright has said in letters to the New York Times, has angrily pointed out that you couldn't fit a nuclear bomb in the delivery vehicle that they describe anyway.
So that's basically all I know about the smoking laptop, and I would like, I guess, hopefully for you to fill in any missing accusations, any details about where this thing came from in the first place that you can tell us, and also whether the Iranians have fessed up and honestly answered these so-called outstanding questions.
First of all, we need to acknowledge that I'm not a key and relevant player in this problem set.
I'm not an inspector.
I don't work with the Iranians, so I'm like an interested observer on the outside.
And so, you know, I need to say that any comments I make are based upon very limited information and is informed based upon, you know, a certainty of knowledge.
Having said that, what I will say this about laptop computers, having done this before, we have the means, we being the United States of America, to forensically examine a laptop computer to build a history of that computer, of, you know, when it was turned on, when it was turned off, when data was inputted, when programs were loaded.
Anytime that anything happened in that computer, we are able to extract that information.
We can build a very detailed chronological picture, and this is done all the time in criminal and intelligence work to, you know, to investigate computer usage.
So here we have a computer that's alleged to contain all this important information.
The first thing that should be done in order to help sell this to the world, especially now that we know that it's a computer of questionable provenance, I mean, coming from an opposition group that has a history of inaccurate reporting regarding Iran's activities, and a history of its accurate reporting being prompted by intelligence services openly hostile to Iran.
For instance, Israel and its Mossad.
So why would we trust the MEK, the Mujahideen al-Taq?
I mean, haven't we been burned once by trusting an opposition group?
Don't we remember the Iraqi National Congress and Ahmed Chalabi?
So here we have a laptop.
One would think that we would run these forensic checks on it and say, look, I know this came from a questionable source, but, you know, even the worst criminal could become a confidential informant to help put bad person behind bars.
So, yeah, we're not saying the MEK is great, we're not saying what's happened here is wonderful, but, you know, in this case they've given us something good.
Look, let's look at how this computer was created, when it was turned on, who accessed it, how this information was logged in.
It makes chronological sense.
You know, everything here is conducive to saying, yeah, this data should be paid attention to, as opposed to simply fronting the data in a very curious manner.
I mean, opening up a computer in a room and telling people they can look at the computer, printing out the files and giving them to people as opposed to giving them access directly to the computer.
This computer stinks from day one, and that's what people need to understand.
It doesn't pass the smell test.
Not only the analysis of the data it contains, but the computer itself, just how this is being handled, is not being handled correctly.
If this was a court and a prosecutor was trying to make a case based upon this computer, it would be thrown out immediately, because the prosecutor has done nothing to establish the viability, the credibility of this computer and the data contained within it.
The prosecutor in this case is the United States of America making charges against Iran.
This computer's got to go.
It's not a good computer, and anybody who continues to promote the data contained in this computer only demonstrates their lack of understanding of the rules of evidence.
You know, when we're going to talk about going after Iran on the issue of its nuclear program, we're talking about the rule of law.
We're accusing Iran of violating its treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Due process and the rule of law is a two-way street.
If we're going to tell Iran that they're in violation of a treaty, then we ourselves have to abide by certain processes in presenting this data.
When you enter into a treaty relationship, you're talking about a legal relationship.
Therefore, we do not get to insert ad hominem attacks.
We do not get to insert baseless allegations, irresponsible speculation, which of course is what this computer constitutes.
So now, put yourself in the shoes of the Iranians.
You have the CIA, which is openly hostile to you, which is engaged in an ongoing, well-funded operation to destabilize your government.
The CIA is the one handling this computer.
The CIA presents it to the IAEA, and then through the State Department of the United States, and in cooperation with Great Britain, Germany, France, and others, we pressure the IAEA to make this computer and its data an issue, even though the IAEA says, we're not too comfortable with this computer.
They're compelled to do so, because at the end of the day, the IAEA is a technical organization that is responsible to its political masters, and its political masters dominate the Board of Governors, and they dominate the Security Council, and so the IAEA has to take action.
They go to Iran, and they say, we need you to address these issues.
Now you're the Iranians, and you're saying, wait a minute, these issues aren't technical-based, they're not legal-based.
These issues are derived from a piece of intelligence of questionable provenance, coming from an intelligence agency openly hostile to us.
Why are you, the international inspectors, fronting for the CIA?
Because that's, in effect, is what occurred.
The CIA is demanding that the IAEA ask these questions, not based upon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or based upon things that are relevant to Iran's legal obligations, but based upon this wild goose chase that the CIA is engaged in, and so Iran rightly says, these questions have no merit, they have no bearing, they have no relevance, we're not going to answer them.
The second Iran does that, everybody jumps up and says, ah, they're not being cooperative, they're hiding something.
No.
They're just refusing to play a game, the rules of which are being dictated by the CIA.
That's not how it's supposed to work.
So this computer, again, if it's going to be something that's going to be introduced, I think we have to go through due diligence.
We have to go through due process.
There's nothing ultra-secret on this computer.
If it came from Iran, what are we hiding?
If the Iranians built this computer, what are we hiding from the world?
We don't want the Iranians to know what's on the computer that the Iranians apparently built?
What are we afraid of?
Let's expose this computer, let's demonstrate its veracity, its viability, by subjecting it to some honest-to-goodness forensic examination.
Well, I hate to say it, but as much as I agree with your argument, I think that the average Sean Hannity listener who might be tuning into this show today would say that ultimately what you're arguing is that we ought to throw this stuff out on a technicality, when in fact the court of international relations is much more like a Guantanamo system than an American civilian trial system, and that if there are outstanding questions, there are outstanding questions.
Who cares where they come from?
The Iranians, you're basically making excuses for them, not having to answer these very important questions about the threat that this nation poses, etc., like that.
There's a difference between legitimate questions and illegitimate questions.
I will never say that we should not pursue legitimate questions, but one has to examine where the question comes from.
I mean, it's not a technicality to say that fabricated information is fabricated information.
If we had reason to believe the Iranians were pursuing a program that violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, then we can pursue it.
And you know what, to those Sean Hannity listeners, the IAEA has done just that.
I don't know if the general public is aware of the scope and breadth of the IAEA's investigation, but the Iranians have given the IAEA tremendous latitude to examine facilities and issues that are well beyond the scope of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for that very reason, because the Iranians want to shut the door on irresponsible speculation.
But you cannot introduce fundamentally flawed information into the system, especially if it's a system that espouses legitimacy.
This isn't about dismissing a real concern on a technicality.
It's not as though there's really a nuclear design out there, or there's really a green salt project that's getting laser-enriched.
You don't get to manufacture evidence, then introduce it and demand that an investigation occurs.
You know, this isn't as though there's legitimate evidence that I'm trying to toss out on a technicality.
I'm not trying to throw out a gun that has Iran's fingerprints on it.
But I'm not going to allow the prosecution to build a gun from scratch, and then fabricate a story around the gun, and then introduce that gun.
No, you don't get to ask that question, because it's an illegitimate question.
It has no bearing on reality, and this is where we're at.
I would hope that anybody, whether they be a Sean Hannity listener, or anybody else who claims to be an American, understands the absolute importance of due process.
That's what gives us credibility, and that's what gives us superiority over other ways and other systems out there.
I think we only get the Iraqi situation to understand the fallacy of allowing fabricated information to be introduced into a system that is judging whether or not a nation or a government, in the former case we're talking about Iraq and Saddam Hussein's government, is complying with international obligations.
Have we learned nothing from curveball?
Don't we understand that a drunken Iraqi defector who is hallucinating about global ballistic missile labs does not constitute the basis for a legitimate investigation?
We do toss this out, not on a technicality, because it has no bearing, it has no credibility, it has no relevance.
On the other hand, if you have hard documentation out there, or if you have a scientific investigation that puts together a logical chain of events that must be examined more thoroughly, yes, you go forward and you do this, but you cannot allow unsubstantiated fabrication to be introduced as evidence, and before we move on this computer, all I'm saying is that we need to find out if this is the genuine article, and we will know that by examining the computer forensically.
And it's not that we can't.
I don't think this computer, unlike this other Swiss laptop, this one hasn't been destroyed yet.
It still exists.
So what is the United States afraid of?
I mean, I'm more than happy to help them out on this one.
I'll help put together the committee that will forensically examine this, and we'll let the chips fall where they might.
But I'll tell you what, the U.S. will never go for it, because they know the truth of this computer.
It's fabricated information put together in a manner to create the impression of Iranian wrongdoing, when the reality is there's nothing there.
Well, it's still a very kind offer on your part.
Speaking of which, is it okay if I keep you another few minutes here, Scott?
Sure.
Everybody, I'm talking with Scott Ritter, former U.N. weapons inspector, author of Target, Iran, and the Art of War for the Anti-War Movement, Waging Peace, it's called.
Okay, now here's something that's of extreme importance, and it's something that I've heard conflicting arguments about back and forth.
I'll tell you, most recently, Philip Giraldi, who originally broke this story for the American Conservative Magazine back in 2005, told me that his understanding is that in the event of an air war against Iran, that the option of using nuclear weapons on them, regardless of how nonexistent their nuclear weapons program is, remains on the table for two purposes.
One would be to get at the deeply buried and reinforced nuclear facilities and other military facilities in Iran, and the other would be to hold them basically in our back pocket, I think were his words, in case they tried to fight back, to basically say, you have to sit there and take it, or else we'll nuke you.
Then I talked to Seymour Hersh a couple of weeks ago, and Seymour Hersh told me that his understanding is that the nuclear first strike option is completely off the table, and that no matter what they do, they're definitely not going to use nukes.
I know that you've written about this in the past as well.
Do you have any recent information along these lines?
Well, again, I have to caveat it by saying I'm not sitting in on the inner circles, and I'm not privy to what is, in effect, national security classified information.
I will say that the Bush administration has created the legal mechanism which allows for first use of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear environment, and the circumstances in which they could justify this deal with loss of life and weapons of mass destruction.
I think the Bush administration would be able to articulate that Iran's nuclear program is considered a weapons of mass destruction program, and that first use of nuclear weapons to neutralize this is, therefore, legitimate under the existing guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons.
So let's just say, in theory, we can start off by noting that you can't be dismissive of any discussion that talks about American preemptive use of nuclear weapons on Iran.
I would say that the whole initial discussion that was taking place on taking out Iran's nuclear facilities, that my understanding is that there were annexes derived that talked about the use of nuclear weapons as a means of getting at these Iranian facilities.
So in one sense, Giraldi is correct.
On the other sense, I understand that Seymour Hersh has a point, too, because this is an evolving process, and as the U.S. government and the Pentagon considers the ramifications, A, it was clear that because we don't have absolute certainty of knowledge of where the totality of the Iranian nuclear program is, for us to preempt with a nuclear weapon, and without a guarantee of absolute success, is foolhardy and foolish, and even the Bush administration had to acknowledge that that wasn't a very wise idea.
So I think Hersh is right.
As this plan evolved, nuclear weapons were taken off the table, because there were more negatives than positives in terms of their being used, and we saw the military strike plan get winnowed down from 45 days to 15 days to 7 days to one day.
But now I think the situation's changed greatly.
If I were a betting man, and I could guarantee access to all documents, I would bet that as you and I are speaking right now, in the Pentagon, there are people involved in Iranian operations who are now updating our strike plan, because they're sitting there saying, holy cow, we now have to neutralize the entire Iranian ballistic missile capability.
And I think you're going to have people examining some options, including enhanced nuclear weapons to generate electromagnetic impulse, EMP, to fry Iranian electronics, because they're going to say there's no way we can go in and knock out all these systems with conventional weapons.
We can't afford to have an Iranian ballistic missile hit an Israeli city.
And I'm not saying that their bosses are going to sit there and go, yep, we're going to sign off on that.
But I guarantee you right now, we have planners going through the motions of saying, how can we use nuclear weapons to deal with this new threat of a massive Iranian ballistic missile response, retaliation to any American attack?
And so while I won't say that nuclear weapons are right there, ready to be used against Iran, I would say that, you know, things have evolved beyond the point of which even Seymour Hersh's article was talked about.
There is a new reality that has to be dealt with.
And given the irresponsible nature of this administration, nuclear weapons are once again being considered purely speculation on my part.
But I, you know, I judge things based upon past patterns of behavior.
And I will tell you, having sat through war planning back in 1990, 1991, when we had a nuclear weapons annex for the first Gulf War, I virtually guarantee that a nuclear weapons annex is being prepared right now.
What final shape that takes, whether or not they're first-use weapons or second-strike weapons or whatever, is another question.
But I don't think as long as we have an administration called Bush in office, we can talk about nuclear weapons being taken off the table.
All right.
Last question for you, Scott.
What do we do about it?
Your article today, congressional hearings are needed to forestall an attack on Iran.
It seems like there's a real lack of congressmen who even understand this topic good enough to even ask the right questions at a hearing if you could somehow force them to hold one.
What do we do about it?
Well, I think most Americans are extremely frustrated by the fact that, you know, when they pick up their phone and call their congressman, when they write a letter, they, you know, they get a form response and a, you know, curt answer on the phone and that they don't feel that there's much that can be done.
I do believe that we have to start looking at the indirect approach.
Congress may not listen to the average citizen, but they will listen to business.
I mean, the stock market's below $11,000 now.
Our economy is tanking.
The price of oil is going through the roof.
And businesses are going to fail.
It's not just a matter of Americans losing their homes now or losing their jobs.
Businesses are going to fail on a massive scale.
And Congress is beholden to these businessmen and businesswomen.
And maybe it's time that the American people seek out allies in corporate America to say, you know, if you guys want to survive as a corporation, even if you're a peacenik who hates, you know, corporate America and all that, let's look at the big picture up front.
You can spend the next 20 years trying to revise, you know, corporate control of America.
Let's exploit the fact that there is corporate domination in America today and use these corporations as a vehicle to get Congress to get serious about a situation, Iran, which if we continue down this path is going to lead to the economic decimation of America.
And I think we need to start, you know, not just saying, you know, we the people, but we need to reflect the reality that, you know, there is a corporate environment here that's involved as well.
And we the people need to start using corporate America in the short term to leverage pressure on Congress, because that Congress will listen to.
If you bring in the CEOs of these companies who say, you know, get Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart will sit down and tell Congress the price of diesel's terminating my ability to support this network of stores.
I can't ship low-cost goods across the country anymore because they become high-cost goods as I transfer the cost of diesel onto the cost of goods.
Ask people who expect to be able to feed themselves on a limited budget what they do when the price of food goes up 16, 20, 25, 30 percent because of the price of oil.
And, you know, and as, you know, people who are engaged in that business say, I can't afford to pay my people anymore.
This is what we need to do.
I mean, this is an economic crisis, and we need to start playing our economic cards.
And that goes well beyond simply one person or two people or a group of activists picking up the phone or writing a letter.
We need to drag in corporate America right now.
They're perhaps one of our greatest allies in getting Congress to wake up in the short term because it is going to require short-term action on the part of Congress to preempt a Bush administration war against Iran.
All right.
Scott Ritter, thank you very much for your time today.
Okay.
Thank you.
That's Scott Ritter, everybody, former U.N. weapons inspector, author of Target Iran, the truth about the White House's plans for regime change and waging peace, the art of war for the anti-war movement.
You can find much of what he writes at truthdig.com.
And also you can read his article, Congressional hearings are needed to forestall an attack on Iran.
It's in the viewpoint section and in the highlights at the top of the page today at antiwar.com.
We'll be right back.
