All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
It's anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton, and if you Google me, you'll find this guy, the other Scott Horton, contributing editor of Harper's Magazine and author of the No Comment blog there, he lectures at Columbia Law School and is the former chair of the New York City Bar Association's Committees on Human Rights and International Law.
Welcome back to the show, Scott.
How are you?
Hey, I'm doing fine.
Great to be with you.
Well, I appreciate you joining us on the show, and I sure appreciate your blog, No Comment, too.
I get to learn all kinds of things.
We're linking today at antiwar.com to injudicious judge about, well, this one very important case about NSA spying, and maybe we can get to that, but I wanted to start with the previous post on your blog, Brennan Does Yemen, and this is deputy national security advisor and, I guess, counterterrorism chair something, maybe that's his old job, I don't know, John O.
Brennan delivered an important speech at Harvard last Friday evening.
Can you please elaborate on that?
Yeah, this is the John O.
Brennan who we know was President Obama's initial pick to head the CIA.
In fact, he was a career CIA guy, and a public storm caused Obama to back away from that nomination, so instead, he basically got the CIA corresponding slot at the White House, and this speech he gave, important speech, it's an attempt to explain what the Obama administration is up to with drone war and also to explain some other aspects of their counterterrorism policy, and I think, you know, we've got to give him credit for being out there and giving the speech because the Obama team has kept most of this stuff under the covert action cloak, so they've kept it secret, they don't explain things, and this is Brennan stepping up to the plate saying, I'm going to tell you why we're doing what we're doing, but he falls pretty short in some important areas, and I think one of the most significant ones has to do with drones.
Well, now, so far, you say they kind of keep it under this blanket of covert action, for intents and purposes, what that means is it basically admitted criminal behavior, right?
I mean, I'm the king of hyperbole here, I understand, I hope you can kind of straighten me out with better detail, but the way I understand, the National Security Act of 1947 basically authorizes the president to authorize the CIA to commit crimes, that they can break the law, they can basically do whatever they want, as long as they have a finding from him saying he's giving them permission to do so, that's why it's covert.
Well, I wouldn't say everything they do is necessarily a violation of the law, but I would say that they are author, or let's say the fact that they're violating the law of some foreign country, when they break into somebody's office and steal records from a file or try to bribe a government official, let's just say that's not an impediment.
But I don't think that's one of the big issues here with the drone wars.
So you're saying that I'd be wrong if I thought that the National Security Act of 47 authorized the president to authorize them to break American laws.
It should not.
Yeah, it should not.
In fact, it cannot authorize them to break American laws.
But, you know, we obviously have areas of interpretation sometimes, and let's face it, there's no question but that the CIA over the long history of the agency has broken American laws many times in the past.
So that's out there.
But, you know, here when we deal with the drone wars, you know, you've got to deal with every single strike on its own and decide whether it's a legal strike or not.
And, you know, there's nothing under the laws of war, per se, that says you can't use this kind of technology.
But there are a lot of issues about how it's being applied and particularly in Pakistan today.
You know, there's a question of these strikes have been going on for five years where we have more than 3000 people who've been injured or killed in them, including 160 children who were killed.
A lot of issues about that, a lot of questions about whether or not Pakistan is actually saying, yeah, go ahead and do this on our territory, because it seems that they say one thing to American officials and they say something else to the newspapers in Pakistan.
Well, that's for sure.
And well, aside from their permission, I wonder about, well, I guess what does their permission count in the American law when it's an undeclared war, when it's a covert action like this?
Because it does include the CIA as well as the Joint Special Operations Command of the Army, right?
Or of the military?
That's right.
You basically have a dividing line along that old Durand line frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the CIA handles everything on the south side of the frontier and JSOC on the north.
And they're coordinating with everything.
And I'd say the actions are going on here have probably been authorized under the authorization for the use of military force.
Remember that old law?
Because that frontier area, both on the Pakistani side and the Afghan side, is viewed by our military and our intelligence community as the very heart, the center theater of war for this war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Right.
Because they never declared war against Afghanistan or said go after those that did September 11th, as long as they're in Afghanistan.
They just said, you have carte blanche to go after them, whichever side of whichever line they're on.
Right.
And we've always said it was global, of course.
But we've also localized it in terms of territory.
And there's no question where the real heart of action has been.
And it's really on both sides of that frontier.
Well, you know, I'm sure you saw Lindsey Graham is pushing and saying that they have bipartisan support.
And surely that's true in both houses of Congress for, you know, some kind of special forces incursion to go and whatever, finish or escalate the war in the tribal territories there.
What's the legality of that?
That's still just under the AUMF from September 2001.
They could do that.
That's right.
And then when you commit land forces, then you've definitely got a question of whether Pakistan, which in theory is our ally, is authorizing it or not.
But generally right now, we've got a really dangerous meltdown in our relationship with Pakistan.
They've been, you know, you might even call them the original frenemy.
You know, they're an ally.
They've been described as our most important NATO ally.
Yet we have an increasingly hostile and menacing relationship with them, you know, to the point where the Pakistanis were going through their senior military echelons and their intelligence service and weeding out all the people they thought had committed a very serious crime of cooperating with the Americans.
At the same time, when the number of, you know, these Islamist radicals and people with connections to them seems to be growing in those same quarters.
So dangerous situation.
Looks like they're trying to kick us out.
Looks like the relationship is getting hostile.
May well be that soon the Pakistanis will just say, absolutely no more drones.
You're out of here.
And then I think, you know, what's the U.S. reaction going to be?
You know, the Pakistani military has been funded by the United States.
So we look at more than $10 billion in taxpayer money that the Bush administration gave to Pakistan, most of which was supposed to go for public projects and aid, almost all of which got diverted to the military.
And under Barack Obama, that's just carried forward.
No real change in that policy.
Well, and as far as the legality is concerned with sending JSOC troops across the border there, does it matter so much whether they say, yeah, sure.
Go ahead.
Or whether they say absolutely not.
You know, you have, you have legality on a whole series of different lines.
So under American statutory authorization, it would be authorized.
But then under international law, they're a sovereign state.
They have control over their territory and you're not supposed to send the military force onto their territory unless they give you an okay to do it.
Unless of course they are the enemy and you're at war with them, in which case it would be an authorized military operation.
But our position has consistently been that no, they're our ally.
They're our friend.
And if that's true, they have to approve it.
Right.
Okay.
And now, as far as spreading the war into Yemen, Somalia, and anywhere else they want to with their Predator and Reaper drones, is that, is the original authorization used military force really written that broadly?
I mean, cause I don't know word for word what was in the original, but I thought I understood that Tom Daschle and them had toned it down a little bit, that it wasn't completely everything Dick Cheney wanted and yet somehow, now the music playing, I guess I'll ask you again when we get back from this break, Scott, just how much authority was given to President Bush and now Obama by that authorization use military force and then discuss the new one that they're pushing through that makes it even broader.
It's the other Scott Horton from harpers.org the no comment block here on anti-war radio.
We'll be right back.
All right, y'all welcome back.
It's anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton and I'm talking with the other Scott Horton, international expert and contributing editor to Harper's magazine, writes the blog, no comment there at a harpers.org.
And I was asking about the extent of that authorization to use military force.
I guess, you know, Bush and Obama both have claimed that it gives them power to the ends of the earth, huh?
Well, it's very broad.
I mean, there's no limit in terms of a place in it.
There's only a limit in terms of who the target is.
So if the, uh, with, with, with respect to an enemy that is Al Qaeda or associated forces, it's completely open.
So that's how, uh, this is used as authorization for actions.
And, uh, Somalia and Yemen, uh, Saudi Arabia, any associated forces that broadly, this is the interpretation that's been placed on it by, in fact, the Obama administration used that interpretation and that's a narrowing, uh, compared to the interpretation that was used by the Bush administration.
And what was their interpretation?
Uh, there's one.
It looks kind of funny.
Uh, theirs was basically Islamic terrorist group of any kind, but then when you come to people like Hezbollah, which wouldn't necessarily fit into that group.
And so we're, I think the big issue we've got here, frankly, is, you know, the CIA as a military force, you keep going back and talking about the national security act, uh, and that act basically said we were going to have a civilian CIA, uh, that was basically going to be intelligence gathering and analysis.
And what we have right now is a military CIA.
And, and the most clear cut example of that is that the CIA is running this sophisticated new weapons system, uh, the predator drone with hellfire missiles.
Uh, and we see expansion of that, uh, with the CIA based, uh, on the, on the Arabian peninsula, we see them running the war, the drone war in Pakistan.
And I think a lot of people look at this and say, this is just not right.
I mean, they, you know, the military knows how to, how to run missile wars, not the CIA, and certainly there's been a lot of question about the efficiency and accuracy of the program that's been run in Pakistan so far.
Well, and the BBC is saying that we're using drones, uh, while the U.S. government is using drones, uh, against al-Shabaab targets in Somalia now.
And you get a figure, a lot of those guys were probably in kindergarten when September 11th happened, but they're associated forces, I guess.
Well, I, they are, uh, but, uh, you know, of course, one of the consistent problems here is that we have many of these groups were at one point recruited by U.S. intelligence, trained by U.S. intelligence, uh, provided weapons and money by U.S. intelligence.
And that's also the case with al-Shabaab.
So they're the enemy right now.
We target them, uh, we're out to overthrow them and they control most of the territory in Somalia.
But if you go back and, and look at the history of our dealings in Somalia, you see that not too far back there, we had a very friendly relationship with al-Shabaab.
So, um, you know, we, we seem to be our own worst enemy.
Yeah.
Well, which is good for business if you're in the war business or the covert action business or any same thing.
That's right.
I mean, you know, you look at Avril Muller says that, uh, al-Haqqani is behind the attack on the U.S. embassy and Pakistan and the Pakistani intelligence service was behind al-Haqqani.
And was driving them.
Uh, and of course that means that the U.S., which has given more than $10 billion, uh, and support to Pakistan.
Most of that going into the military is the greatest provider of, uh, material support to these terrorists.
If we use the U.S. legal standards.
Sure.
Uh, so it's quite a mess we've gotten ourselves in.
Yeah.
Well, and it's been that way.
I mean, uh, for at least the last quite a few years there where the Pakistanis have been put in the position really by us of having to back the anti-government forces in Afghanistan because the government we're installing in Afghanistan is in real tight with the Indians and the Pakistanis figure we were going to leave at some point.
They can't give up the last of their influence there.
Although I wonder whether you think it's credible that, uh, the accusations that they would have, uh, use a Connie network to bomb the American embassy in Kabul.
I mean, that sounds like a bit of a stretch, these latest accusations.
I wonder, you know, why Admiral Mullen is turning on his best friends this way.
Because Admiral Mullen's coming to the end of his term in office.
We've got a new chairman of the joint chiefs coming in, but I think that means that Admiral Mullen can afford to be completely candid and honest.
Uh, and I think these accusations are not only, not only are they credible, but I think we've had pretty good information to this effect for a long time now.
Yeah.
Well, like I say, I agreed definitely on the Pakistani support for the Haqqani's going way back.
I don't think that's in question, but why would they want to bomb the American embassy in Kabul though?
I think the bottom line is they would like to see, uh, a rising American discontent with the effort in Afghanistan and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, uh, because they see that as what's holding up this, as you put it, pro-Indian government in Kabul.
And that's certainly the way most people and the Pakistani military view it.
I think they view it as a waiting game.
The quicker the Americans are out, the sooner they'll be able to re-establish their influence and control over Afghanistan.
And that's still their objective.
Um, so, which means that, you know, they're not our friends.
Okay.
Now, so the new version of the authorization to use military force that I guess last I heard is still making its way through Congress right now, other than the changes to detainee policy, it doesn't it broaden the, uh, associated forces doctrine there of the original authorization to use military force and the way you describe makes me wonder why they would need to at all.
Well, they hardly need to, but I, it's, it is, it opens it up basically to say, to give the executive discretion to declare anyone the executive wants a, uh, a terrorist adversary and thereby to extend the war.
So, you know, for instance, he could use this to expand the war, to include Sendero Luminoso in Peru or the, uh, the Indian rebels in Chiapas in Mexico, or, or you can keep on going around the world.
Uh, and I think there are a lot of people, including a lot of people in the military who think that's not really a smart idea.
Uh, I think traditional military strategy is, you know, you want to define a war in such a way that you can win the war and you can say you won the war.
So having this ongoing forever conflict that is never wrapped up means also that you're in a very difficult position ever saying you won anything.
That's not smart military doctrine.
And this is the reason why we have a lot of folks in the military right now putting forward very tentatively this idea that we won the war against Al Qaeda.
They have been reduced to an insignificant force.
They're probably only a few hundred of them left in Afghanistan.
This war is coming close to an end.
And that argument is being fought by the Republicans who are sponsoring this new definition for the, um, authorization for the use of military force.
They want the forever war.
They don't want the war ever to end.
They don't want the U S ever to be in a position to claim victory.
Right.
Well, yeah.
And I guess that really must anger some military guys, which who that's what they're in it for.
They don't want to just be able to say at the end, well, at least we never lost a battle because nobody cares about that.
You lost the whole war.
They don't want some of them at least must be opposed to this, uh, one, two, three, many Vietnam's doctrine that they have now.
Well, you know, general Petraeus is a great example on this score.
I mean, he was a, um, a very aggressive advocate of the narrow definition of conflict because he wanted to be in a position to say, we won Iraq, we won Afghanistan, they've got another campaign.
It'll be another campaign and we'll win that.
But having this soft definition that expands everywhere, they hate that because you can never claim a success.
Right.
I don't know.
I mean, isn't it Petraeus's guys though, that pushed the long war doctrine?
I guess that's just moving it from place to place and declaring victory here and there on the way.
I think it's mostly politicians who are pushing that, but let's say we have differences between political realization and military doctrine.
Yeah.
Um, well, and, uh, I guess the war in Libya now, I, you know, when you look at the Haqqani situation in Pakistan, it kind of makes you wonder how long before they declare that we have a jihadist threat in the form of the people that we just helped overthrow Qaddafi there.
We have to go right from there.
Yeah, indeed we do.
I mean, the situation in Libya is, you know, as I think we've, we've discussed previously on your show, it's a very complicated situation because we have, uh, a transitional government with a council that incorporated everybody who opposed Qaddafi and that included, uh, extremely dangerous terrorist groups were involved in opposing him, uh, as well as more moderate pro-democracy, uh, pro-free enterprise groups.
Uh, so we've got a wide array of interests that may not be so easy to reconcile, uh, and still unclear who's going to come out on top there.
Well, and you know, the independent and McClatchy, especially, I think have been covering, uh, the worst kind of war crimes by the victors there.
The very, some of the very same crimes that they were accusing Qaddafi of falsely in the war propaganda, such as mass rapes.
Well, that's right.
I think human rights organizations were out there very early on, uh, saying, uh, you know, look, uh, Qaddafi had sort of race-based strategies.
He would bring in all these people, uh, from the Sahel and from Sub-Saharan Africa, uh, which is to say blacks, and he would use them aggressively as troops.
Uh, and what does that, that leads to, uh, people on the street then instantly identifying blacks as, uh, allies of Muammar Qaddafi, uh, and harassing, mistreating, and killing them.
Uh, and that's a disaster.
And we still have that disaster going on in Libya.
Yeah, for it.
So, all right.
Well, I've already kept you over, Tom.
I really appreciate your time on the show today.
Great being with you.
Good luck.
All right, everybody.
That's the other Scott Horton heroic anti-torture international human rights lawyer.
You can find his blog.
No comment at harpers.org/no comment.
And we'll be right back.
