All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
It's anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton and our next guest is Michael Hastings.
He's contributing editor to Rolling Stone magazine, author of the article, The Runaway General That Cost Stanley McChrystal His Job, and also author of the book, I Lost My Love in Baghdad, A Modern War Story.
Welcome back to the show.
Michael, how are you doing, man?
Good, Scott.
Thanks for having me.
Happy holidays.
Yeah, you too.
I'm glad to have you back here.
It's been a little while since we talked.
So I think everybody listens to this show anyway knows that there was an election in Iraq last March and that the winners didn't win and the losers haven't conceded and nobody seems to be able to form a coalition.
And yet there's always announcements that we've made a breakthrough and we're going to form a government now.
And then I'm not sure exactly where it stands right now.
I was wondering if you could help provide some insight as to what the hell's going on over there.
Well, you're right.
The political leader who got the most votes is not going to be the leader of the country.
That would be Ayatollah Ali, where Prime Minister Maliki, who has been running Iraq for the last few years, it looks like he's going to maintain control of the country.
And it seemed I just got a press release from the U.S. Embassy saying that the government had been formed.
So it seems that after nine months, which I believe is the longest, one of the longest government formation processes in history of any of any country, the government in Iraq is finally formed.
And not surprisingly, as I had predicted at the time and then what others have also said, it essentially solidifies a Shiite dominated Iraqi government that looks like it's going to be in control for four years to come, essentially.
Well, you know, I wonder, they say that Ayatollah Ali and his group, that even though he's a Shia, he's really a secular Baathist kind of guy and has the support of the Sunnis.
But I wonder to what degree could this former Saddam, former CIA agent, former puppet prime minister of the country, who after all helped start the civil war against the Sunnis back a few years ago, I guess five years ago now.
How could it be that he's all the political representation they have?
And is it really true that up there in the Anbar province that they consider him to be their representative of any kind?
They vote for him?
They would vote for him and what it actually indicates just how bad things got in Iraq between, you know, 05 and 08 essentially.
You know, there's this great, I think this is a true story, when a journalist friend of mine asked an Anbari resident this question.
So how could you, you know, vote for for Ali after what he did to Fallujah Ramadi?
And the answer is, well, he did it to Najaf as well, which was a Shiite city.
So he was, you know, equal on his sort of brutal treatment of both sects.
But the reality is, from what I saw, you know, I spent a lot of time there this past year, as well as when I was there for Newsweek years ago.
And, you know, if you're not a Shia, if you're not part of the Maliki sort of team, you're not going to have much political power.
That's just it, you know.
And in fact, what Maliki has done by sort of seizing control of the security forces, the police, as well as the army, as well as a lot of government ministries, is to essentially squeeze out any and all political opposition of which a lawyer who, yeah, as you said, it's kind of, you know, here's a guy who is a US puppet CIA agent, and he becomes like, you know, the best hope, you know, for moderate, moderate Iraqis.
It just shows how, how off the rails the whole thing had had really gone.
All right, now, so Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who was the patriarch, I guess, of the Hakim clan, which controlled the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, he's died.
And I guess they say his son is sort of ineffectual type and doesn't have nearly the clout that his father had.
And I was just wondering, you know, and the Iraqi National Alliance as it used to be, and the different pieces as it's broken up on the Shiite power side there, I guess, underneath all we on the or, yeah, underneath Maliki on the flow chart there.
Can you describe the relative power as it exists now, per your best understanding between the Supreme Islamic Council types, the Hakim clan, Muqtada al-Sadr, and those loyal to him and, and for that matter, the Fadil militia down there in Basra and whoever else on the Shiite side?
Sure, I think the way that I understand it, and probably the most accessible way to understand it is that both Maliki and, and Sadr even represent a sort of Iraqi nationalist strain of, of the sort of Shiite, of Shiite Islam, while the Skiri guys, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, are very much are viewed with great suspicion by a lot of Iraqis because of their close ties to Iran.
So, so, you know, the Badr Brigade, Skiri, you know, Aziz's son, they are going to have their sort of 20% following, just because they have, you know, they have still great influence within the security services, and they were able to really, you know, grab a foothold in government, but they're not popular.
They're not politically popular on the street, so to speak, where both Maliki, surprisingly, as well as Sadr have, have much greater sort of popularity and credibility even among, among Iraqis.
You know, you'll find Iraqis, when you do just sort of voice, you know, man on the street interviews, who will say, you know, why they like Maliki and why they like Sadr, but it's really rare to find anyone who likes Hakim.
It's because of, because of this view that Skiri is Iranian influence.
A lot of the Skiri guys actually fought against Iraq in the 80s during the Iran-Iraq war, so it's, you know, there's history there.
Yeah, and I guess, now Maliki's a Dala Party guy, but I'm trying to remember if it was Juan Cole or somebody taught me years ago, I think, that the Dala Party was basically split in half during the Iran-Iraq war years, and that where Jafari, the first Dala Party prime minister, had been in Iran, like the Skiri guys, that, that Maliki had not, that he was in Europe, I guess, at the time in exile, and so I guess somehow is viewed less suspect that way, but I guess he's been the prime minister for quite a few years now, so.
Yeah, exactly.
I guess, though, I'm interested in the way you say that he's seen as really a more nationalist figure, like Muqtada al-Sadr, rather than very pro-Iranian.
Could you elaborate on that a little bit?
Because that's, usually he's, I would think, lumped in with the more pro-Iranian factions there.
After all, it was the, it was Iranian Revolutionary Guard intervention that got him the job in the first place.
Sure, sure.
No, and I think it's one of these tricky questions, you know, the question, how, how in the pocket of, of Iran is, is Maliki?
And yeah, and you're, and again, this also goes back to the early 80s, where Maliki himself, after being kicked out of Iraq, he had to leave Iraq because he was a member of the Dala Party, which was banned, actually was in exile in Iran for a couple of years, where he was involved in political activities.
Now, the Iranians kicked him out of Iran, which is kind of interesting, and, and, you know, people say, his friends say, he's never forgiven them for, for kicking him out of the country, because his wife was pregnant at the time, and basically sent him over to Syria, and it was a very difficult time in his life.
Now, so you have this sort of personal baggage you have against Iran.
You know, my, my take on Maliki is he's going to play Iran.
Iran is clearly more of a natural ally to him than the United States, but he's going to play both the United States and Iran for what he thinks, thinks are his best interests.
And clearly, he has, he has, you know, at times, his relationship with Iran is really, really tricky.
You know, I spoke to one of his close friends last time I was there, and he said to me, and actually, this story never ran, so it's sort of, but it was a really interesting quote.
And what he said was that Maliki had told him, he said, if, if, if I die, it's going to be because Iran killed me.
So literally, Maliki was spearing for his life that the Iranians were actually going to take him out.
But essentially, I would put, I would put Maliki, I would say that he is closer to Iran than to the Saudis.
He certainly hates the Saudis.
And, and he's going to use Iran when it suits him, and Iran's going to use him.
But it's, I think it's a little bit of an oversimplification to say he's in Iran, Iran's pocket.
Though, you'll hear a lot of people in the States say that, especially, you know, neocon types, because they want to continue to push a kind of everlasting, enduring presence in, in Iraq, which is, this is the next big step, right?
Right, and yet, somehow, they don't have to take responsibility for being behind a war that installed the Iranians in power there.
They just only want to complain about Iranian influence in Iraq, but never mind the day before yesterday, or how it got to be that way.
But now, hold on one second, because we can talk more about that in a minute, but, or you can say whatever you want.
But I want to ask you this before I forget.
This has been five years ago now, so maybe everything's different, but it was after both battles of Najaf, but it was before that, you know, the big war of 2007 against the Sadrists.
But Muhtar al-Sadr, five years ago, December 2005, said, look, let's have a government of national salvation.
It'll be me and one of these minor Kurdish factions and the Sunnis together, nationalist Iraqis first, and forget all this sectarianism and whatever.
And now, it seems like that's not his way.
He would, he doesn't seem to have tried to pursue very, very hard at all the coalition with Alawi.
So, that would seem to me to define Muhtar al-Sadr's so-called nationalism nowadays as pretty much the same as Maliki's, which is pretty much in favor of Iran.
It really is ultimately what the Supreme Islamic Council always wanted, which was Baghdad to Basra, a new Shia stand in alliance with Iran and nominally in control of the rest of Iraq, but not really.
And it seems like if Sadr was really the nationalist, at least that he used to be, that he would have been pushing as hard as he could for an alliance with the Sunnis and say, you know, we're Iraqis first, America out and all that, like he was doing five years ago, whatever happened to that?
And not that I like Muhtar al-Sadr, but, you know, his power seems to me the best hope of America being forced to get out of that country, and I want that.
Right.
Well, I think, I mean, what happened, I think, is the Civil War happened.
Sadr got marginalized.
Maliki did go after him in a pretty significant way.
And, you know, Muhtar al-Sadr ended up in Iran himself.
I believe he's still there, you know, under kind of Iranian protection.
So, I think, you know, the Sadrists, and the Sadrists, in fact, didn't want to support Maliki and eventually came around to it.
But yeah, it's a Shiite nationalism, for sure.
And as you said, I mean, definitely, you know, pro-Iran, but certainly there's a spectrum from the security guys to the Sadrists, at least how they're perceived in terms of their nationalist tendencies.
But yeah, I mean, the idea of some sort of unity government, I think, is basically a fiction.
And the political lines have been drawn down, sectarian lines, for the most part, you know, with their token kind of, you know, unity government stuff going on.
But I think that's going by the wayside.
Yeah, well, here's my worry, that the Sunni and Shiite power among the Arabs in Iraq will paper over their differences and begin to get along against their new enemy, the Kurds, who are trying to take Kirkuk and the oil land there.
And that doesn't seem like a problem that's going to be worked out in this parliament or another one either.
That's going to be worked out on the battlefield right there.
It's certainly possible.
I mean, I remember interviewing the Kurdish defense minister up in Erbil a couple of years ago, and he had a map of Kurdistan, independent Kurdistan, you know, on his wall.
You know, when is that, you know, that's been at a boil for a while.
And the question is, you know, is it going to, as you said, you know, get settled on the battlefield, or is it going to sort of stagger on as it is, you know, trading shots here and there?
And I think that's certainly a concern.
I know it's a concern of the U.S. military, you know, for a reason, why they want to keep American soldiers in Iraq is to sort of, you know, do some peacekeeping is the wrong word, but to be around that fault line to try to contain some of the damage.
But certainly, you know, Maliki has no real love for the Kurds.
You know, a lot of the Sunnis have no love for the Kurds, and the Kurds feel the same way about them.
So, yeah, I mean, that's definitely another fault line.
And perhaps, and you're probably right, you know, as likely to end up in a battle as any sort of larger Sunni Shiite fight in the region.
Assuming we don't bomb Iran, but then that changes the whole equation.
Yeah.
Reminds me of 2002 and all the reasons I said not to do this in the first place, but nobody could hear me because I was going out at 100 watts and nobody was listening.
Well, it's definitely amazing, you know, still talking about Iraq with, I mean, the most troubling thing to me about Iraq is, in fact, the sort of national amnesia that we have as a country, basically just trying to forget it.
And then when we do remember it, it's now being remembered as this sort of success.
And in fact, that's the blueprint we're using for our, you know, current, quote unquote, success in Afghanistan is what we learned in Iraq.
That, to me, is the most disturbing element of it all from a U.S. perspective.
Yeah.
Well, and the most disturbing thing about that part of it, to me, is that all it took was a three-word slogan, just like they used to put protecting the homeland over and over again on the background when George Bush would give a speech since he couldn't say anything coherent.
At least people will read over and over and over again while he's talking, protecting the homeland, protecting the homeland, protecting the homeland.
And it worked.
And in this case, they said the surge is working.
The surge is working.
The surge is working a million billion times.
And then the surge worked.
The surge worked.
Even Barack Obama has to admit the surge worked.
And nobody ever explained what that meant at all.
And the American people bought it completely.
Yeah.
And in fact, you know, I'm working on a story.
I spent most of last month in Afghanistan, you know, basically working on, you know, talking, you know, discussing these kinds of themes.
Right.
Because you're seeing the same thing now with Afghanistan.
You know, what did this review that just happened say?
It said it's working.
Right.
All we're going to hear is that it's working.
It's working.
It's working.
And that's going to be the narrative, you know.
And and it's it's it's very because people that's what people want to believe.
I mean, it's really incredible that it doesn't actually matter what the facts on the ground are, so to speak, because everybody there's no, you know, the political incentive is just to sort of pretend that pretend that it's working.
So you've you're just back from Afghanistan, is that what you're saying?
Yeah.
Yeah.
I just got back this weekend.
Hey, man, can I call you back at 2 2 30 and we'll do an Afghanistan interview?
Yeah, sure.
That'd be great.
OK, killer.
I'll talk to you then.
We'll see you.
All right.
Thanks.
That's Michael Hastings.
He's contributing editor of Rolling Stone magazine.
This is anti-war radio.
