All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
It's anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton and our next guest on the show is Mark Sheffield.
He keeps the blog policy on point at policyonpoint.com.
Latest piece is called Arab Spring, Israeli Fall.
Welcome back to the show, Mark.
How are you doing?
Thanks for having me.
I appreciate you joining us today.
So, uh, this is a pretty good review of, uh, the tough situation Israel finds itself in, uh, with the Arab spring and summer breaking out all around them.
And particularly they're, uh, quite, uh, quickly evolving relationship with the governments and for that matter, the populations of Egypt and Turkey.
So let's start off with Egypt.
The Mubarak is gone.
Uh, everything isn't solved yet, but apparently the people of Egypt have, uh, greater and greater say in, uh, their government's postured toward Israel.
You think that's right?
Or maybe, um, yeah, yeah.
I mean, it seems like Mubarak for a long time kind of served as a stop gap for the public opinion, uh, breaking out.
I mean, the Egyptian people have been resentful of the Israelis for a long time for kind of obvious reasons, but yeah, they've been made to Israeli policy against the Palestinians.
Right, exactly.
Something they're obviously not in favor of.
And Mubarak was there to just keep a lid on it and now he's gone.
So the generals can't come out and control the population as absolutely as Mubarak could before.
Um, so now you have things like, uh, it's just that they're, they're very reactionary right now and they can actually express as opposed to when Mubarak was there, they couldn't come out on the streets and do what they're doing now.
Um, so, you know, you have this recent killing of five Egyptian border policemen and I've read conflicting stories.
Um, some of them claim it's stray gunship fire from an Israeli gunship.
And some of them are saying that it's Palestinians trying to sneak across the border into Egypt and then got into a firefight.
Um, but either way, the reaction from the Egyptian people, you know, it doesn't really matter at this point what caused it.
They still stormed the embassy.
Well, and the Egyptian government was either unwilling or unable to stop them, I guess.
There were, there were fights in the streets with, with security police, you know, with the regular tear gas and stuff like that.
But I mean, when you see pictures of it, there's just no way to stop them.
The streets filled.
I mean, it looks like a, just a regular Egyptian protest that we've seen for months now, except with the actual target in mind that they were trying to destroy and they're throwing thousands of documents out the windows.
Um, burning police cars.
So obviously it doesn't set a good diplomatic environment between Egypt and Israel right now.
Yeah.
Well, uh, at news.antiwar.com from September 11th is this piece by Jason Ditz, US demands Egypt crack down on protesters.
Uh, Egyptian Bunta vows harsh measures against dissent and, uh, the, uh, Obama administration here is quoted as demanding that the Egyptian military quote, meet its obligations under the Vienna convention and warns them of consequences if they don't crush the protests around the Israeli embassy.
Well, I did not read that one, but that's not really surprising when you think about it.
Uh, we've, we've had such, such a two-faced policy towards these people for so long.
Anyway, we just wait until Mubarak's too far away.
We just wait until Mubarak's too far gone.
And then we throw them under the bus and act like we're on the side of the people.
And now it's just kind of, that reveals exactly what, you know, you and your listeners probably have assumed this whole time is that we're not on the side of these people, um, on the side of the Israelis.
And at this point, it doesn't really seem like the governing council, the military rulers are willing to do what Mubarak did to the pro the protesters to begin with.
They're not really willing to go out and just kill hundreds of them, but they're also not really willing to get into a direct confrontation with Israel.
So, you know, it's probably doubtful that the people of Egypt want a direct confrontation.
No, no, not at all.
Not at all.
But I mean, they are kind of risking something there when they attack an embassy.
I mean, that's considered actual Israeli ground, but, but yeah, I mean, nobody wants, they don't want to square off against the IDF.
The IDF doesn't want to square off against them.
Both of the governments just want everybody to calm down, really.
But I mean, you know, like we were talking about before, it's just the tendencies of the Egyptian populations have gotten to the point where it's just highly reactive and expressible.
Finally, you know, this pressure has been building up for decades and now, you know, every time they get a chance to express their rage, I guess, they do it in large numbers.
So the all important question here is the upcoming elections, which were supposed to be held this month, but weren't or aren't going to be.
Yeah, I mean, the last I heard about that was that they were, they don't have a date for them yet.
Now, what's the current situation at the Rafah border crossing?
It's been, you know, partially open last I heard.
But, you know, that that's really where I'm at, too.
You know, I'll hear that sometimes it's open and then they have to shut it down for various reasons.
And it certainly hasn't caused any love to be had flowing from the Israelis to the Egyptians.
But, I mean, I think it's a positive step in general.
It's just, you know, it's just hard to pull off, really.
I'm not I'm not exactly up to date on the Rafah border crossing.
I just remember, you know, I keep up with it randomly.
So, yeah, I mean, I can't tell you exactly what's happening on the Rafah border crossing right now.
Well, it's certainly it's another one of those things where the the new government of Egypt is trying to because, as you say, they're trying to avoid having to do the the massacres that Hosni Mubarak did back when this thing started.
So they have to walk this, you know, very thin tightrope between what the people want and what will cause too much of a problem with the government in Israel.
Exactly, exactly.
Exactly, exactly.
And that's a hard balance to make when you have the population just totally opposed to almost everything that Israel has been doing.
Yeah.
And when you start off a very, very thin policy that has been do whatever they say for the last 30 years, I mean, in moderation of that means major changes.
Right, exactly.
And that's the one thing that, you know, I think the the governing council.
I don't think that they don't want to implement the reforms.
I just don't think they can do them all at once or have the ability or have the will to try to do them all at once.
You know, they're going to have to draw this out.
And that gives us time and other Western powers time to come in and exert pressure on them to try to get them to.
You know, I feel like we're going to have to come in there and I'm not saying this is I support it, but we are going to go in there and try to put as much pressure on them.
To keep them from the level of democracy that they seek.
Right.
Because if.
You know, if the Egyptians ever reach that level, then.
They're going to open the borders and they're not going to have a totally lay down in front of the bus attitude towards Israel anymore.
They're going to vote the way they feel, and it's pretty obvious that.
The majority of the population is not in love with Israel.
Well, we're almost at the break here, so I'll save my turkey questions till we get back.
But of course, this is another very important subject is Israel's evolving relationship with Turkey.
We talked with Phil Giraldi about a little bit on the show yesterday, and it's especially with the what just less than less than 10 days away here a week away is the vote in the United Nations.
I'm not sure if they decided yet the Security Council or the General Assembly or how that works, but whether there should be a Palestinian state and America's promise to veto it and all that kind of stuff in context.
So we get back and talk with Mark Sheffield more about that policy on point dot com is his blog.
Go check it out.
It's antiwar radio, I'm Scott Horton, I'm talking with Mark Sheffield, he writes the blog Policy on Point, the article in question here today is Arab Spring, Israeli fall, and we're talking a little bit before the break there about Israel's relationship with Egypt in these wild and crazy times over there in the Middle East.
And but now to Turkey, where a long term friendship seems to really be breaking apart.
I think, you know, just kind of as background Israelis for quite a long time now, a generation or more have considered the Turks to be great because they're Muslim, but they're not Arab.
And they have that whole Ataturk legacy of secularism and sort of kind of Europeanism and whatever there.
And so they've made a great ally for the Israelis this whole time.
Their spy agencies and their militaries have been extremely close.
And ever since the Mavi Mamara, this seems to be breaking apart and this alliance and the goodwill between these two countries.
And and it's getting even more that way late this summer.
Mark, why don't you fill us in what's going on now?
Yeah, well, this problem seems even more important or more problematic for the Israelis and the Egyptians.
It's different fundamentally because with the Egyptian dispute, it's more the population of the Egyptians are angry at the government of the Israelis.
And in this case, it's government versus government.
You know, like you said, the Turks have had a long time pragmatic relationship with Israel.
You know, they have had no reason to really go after them in any way.
But and I'm not saying that their current status isn't pragmatic.
It's just that the circumstances have changed since the Arab Spring has started.
You know, they don't want to be.
Or how do you say they don't want to be on the late train of supporting the Palestinians, what do they have to lose?
Let's just say assume 10 years down the road that, you know, Britain, the U.S., France are able to kind of recolonize that area and put in some more puppets.
What are the Turks lost by actually going full throttle at this point?
They lost nothing.
But if it turns out that you do see some sort of democratic societies evolving over there, then they got on it at the very beginning.
They were vocal supporters of it.
They are, you know, they didn't miss the train.
They're not jumping on any bandwagon, really.
And so now, like you said, the Mavi Marmara caused a big, big dispute last year, and a UN report was leaked that detailed the blockade is legal, but the force using the Mavi Marmara as excessive.
So that's leaked to the press right before this Palestinian statehood debate goes down.
And Erdogan latches onto it and denounces the Israelis, calls them, I think, the West's spoiled child, which is a pretty strong language.
And so, yeah, now you have a serious diplomatic dispute in an area where the Israelis have for a long time enjoyed a high degree of freedom in the eastern Mediterranean.
You know, they were given relatively free reign over international waters.
And now, since this report was leaked, Erdogan has come out and said, or the Turkish government has come out and said, that the Turkish navy will actually convoy further aid flotillas up to the limit of the territorial waters of Israel, 12 miles off the coast.
And so, I mean, as you can imagine, the Israelis aren't thrilled about this at all.
Well, you know, Phil Giraldi said on the show yesterday that if you look at the statement carefully, they say that they'll protect any Turkish boats that are part of the flotilla and that there aren't any Turkish boats scheduled to go anytime soon.
So he got to make a point without it being a real threat.
Oh, that's a very good point.
I guess he does kind of lay the groundwork there for some sort of, you know, he's probably also trying to propel himself into the political spotlight.
You know, he's doing the same thing with this tour to Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
And I'm not saying that he's not really angry at the Israelis, but a lot of this is definitely politics.
I mean, why?
Right.
And well, and why would the average Turk, why would it appeal to the average Turk to, you know, pick a fight with the Israelis all the time, at least rhetorically?
You know, it's because they have apparently, they think, at least real reasons to resent what the Israelis are doing over there.
The Mali, for one example.
Well, the Mali, the Mamar is a good example, but also it's, you know, traditionally, like we said, they've had a relatively neutral stance as far as the Israel-Palestine issue of the occupied territories goes.
Now that's gone.
They've come out vocally against Israel or against Israel's argument here.
So that, I mean, that in itself is huge because Turkey, Turkey is not some slouch in the eastern Mediterranean.
It's, you know, the power, aside from Israel, unless you count Israel, of course.
And, you know, that's just a really big switch going from being relatively peaceful neighbors, cooperating commercially, militarily with intelligence, diplomatic friends.
All of that is put on hold right now.
Ambassadors expelled, go, you know, on and on down the line.
Now, whether or not it's all politics on, or whether or not part of its politics on Erdogan's part, there are serious repercussions for the diplomatic relations between them.
And just even the threat of putting a Turkish warship 12 miles off Israel's coast, that's not something to scoff at, whether there's not a Turkish flotilla lined up next week or not.
Right.
Yeah, absolutely.
You know, worst case scenario, as you say in your article here, actual, you know, fighting breaks out on the high seas over there that could escalate really quickly.
Well, I don't really see that happening unless, you know, somebody doesn't follow their orders.
You know, the worst case scenario would be for Israel to try to intercept a flotilla in international waters while it's under convoy.
And equally bad, but probably less likely, would be for a single Turkish ship to just stop following orders and try to go all the way to the coast flotilla.
And I don't think that would happen.
But the first scenario, you know, given Israel's track record in these four things, you know, it's not likely, but it could happen.
Can't rule it out.
Well, and now what about this vote in the U.N.
Security Council?
The you say that the Turks have, you know, dropped their neutrality on the Palestine issue.
Are they strongly championing Palestinian statehood at this point, since it's the issue right now?
Yes.
I mean, that's that's exactly what Erdogan is doing.
And, you know, I think he arrived in Egypt on Monday and that was, you know, he's starting his Arab Spring tour and.
And he's come out he's come out very strongly in favor of Palestinian statehood.
He's saying pretty much the same thing as even the Saudis are saying at this point.
Well, yeah.
Prince Turkey, Al-Faisal said that they will break off their alliance with the United States.
Yeah, it's crazy.
It's crazy.
It's really, really interesting to watch, because, I mean, I would never I can't remember where I read this or heard this might have even been from someone on your show.
But it's an interesting theory that our whole middle I mean, our whole eastern Mediterranean policy is geared around not having to make a decision between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
We don't want to have to decide because we know that they're so fundamentally opposed to each other and, you know, on very basic issues.
And now we've got to the point where we actually might have to start making those sorts of decisions.
And when we have to start making those decisions.
We have to think about what benefits each what benefits us with regard to each country.
And that's where Israel starts to lose the logic battle, I guess.
It's not like our senators.
Even Petraeus said, you guys are costing us our interests in the Middle East with this madness.
I don't hear that.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, he sucked up and apologized for it later to Max Boot.
There's a whole hilarious exchange where he says, well, I had dinner with Eli Wiesel last night.
You think that makes it OK or what?
Anyway.
But yeah, I mean, the the the fact that Israeli policy costs the American people is, I don't think, a secret anymore, is it?
This is what really towers down.
It wasn't bombs in the building.
It was Israeli policy in Lebanon.
Yeah, I mean, it's it's crazy.
I mean, it would be nice to think that it's not a secret anymore, but I mean, most of the people I talk to down here in Austin seem to think it is.
I mean, they don't they don't think of it like that at all.
Yeah.
Well, a part of it's just bigotry, too.
You know, the Israelis, many of them anyway, are European.
So we're on their side.
And you hear the boos at Ron Paul when he just says the word Palestinians, acknowledging them as human beings at all.
But anyway.
All right.
Hey, thanks very much for your time.
We're all out of it.
Mark Sheffield, everybody.
Policy on point dot com.
