All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
It's Anti-War Radio.
First guest on the show today is my friend, Gareth Porter, independent historian and journalist for Interpress Service, that's IPSnews.net.
And of course, we reprint every bit of it at antiwar.com/Porter.
Welcome back, Gareth.
How are you doing?
Hello again, Scott.
How are you?
I'm doing good.
Appreciate you joining us today.
Big doings in Pakistan.
A week ago Saturday, right, the Americans bombed the Pakistani army right on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the old British Durand line there.
And then apparently all diplomatic hell is broken loose from just the surface, you know, kind of headline reading of it.
It seems like if Barack Obama would just say, sorry, things would be okay.
But instead all he'll say is, well, how about condolences?
Here, here's some condolences, but he won't apologize.
Why not?
What is going on?
Well, it's a very interesting development.
It seems to me, it illuminates so much about the relationship between the United States and Pakistan on both sides, really.
I'm not sure that it's true that an apology by itself, in fact, I'm sure that an apology by itself would not be enough to really change the dynamic that now exists with regard to Pakistan's population and their anger towards the United States over these strikes, which killed 25 Pakistani soldiers.
And, you know, basically in the middle of the night, they were essentially asleep because this was, you know, one of these raids that they carry out in the middle of the night, the special operations forces from the Afghan side of the border.
And this has created an unprecedented level of anger and outrage in Pakistan.
And I think it's fair to say that this is really a bigger turning point than any of the ones that we've seen so far over the past year.
And there have been several, including, of course, the bin Laden hit and unilateral bin Laden hit without informing Pakistan ahead of time, which humiliated the Pakistani military and again angered the population.
But now I think you have a situation where the Pakistani military and government really does not have any choice but to stand up to the United States because they know that a failure to do so would be condemned by everybody in Pakistani politics and society.
And so you're right that the Obama administration, the White House has said no apology here, please accept our condolences.
And that, of course, is worth nothing at this point, because what the Pakistanis are waiting for is for the United States to own up to their responsibility for what happened.
Well, and it's not just worthless.
It's an antagonistic, you know, boo hoo.
I'm so sorry your feelings got hurt from the terrible thing I did to you.
That just pisses people off, man.
And so what is so interesting, Scott, about this situation is why the military, the Pentagon and now the White House have taken this position that we don't want to apologize.
We want to have a full investigation and wait until investigation's over before we comment on what really happened.
Now, you know, we have to remember that the U.S. military really knows from its initial inquiries essentially what happened.
And what essentially happened was that the Special Operations Forces unit essentially got it wrong.
Whether it was deliberate or not, we don't know, but they certainly got it wrong and they pursued what they thought were Afghan or Pakistani Taliban across the border into Pakistan and attacked them.
They claimed that they were actually inside this encampment, which they took for an insurgent encampment rather than a Pakistani border post.
Now, that's very hard to swallow because the border posts are clearly delineated on the map, which is that the coordinates are given to the U.S.
NATO forces, the U.S.
NATO Command ISAF.
We know that this information was available to all U.S. forces.
They were supposed to, all the helicopter pilots were supposed to have this, these coordinates on their map.
And the idea that they simply forgot is very difficult to swallow.
Obviously, it's difficult to swallow for the Pakistanis.
It's also difficult to swallow for anybody who is objectively looking at the situation.
So they got it wrong and they attacked the border post, supposedly, again, thinking that these were encampments of insurgents.
And the somebody in the U.S.
Pentagon told the New York Times privately that they understand that the U.S. was at fault.
U.S. forces were at fault in this.
They were culpable, as they said.
Well, wait, so are you saying you don't buy it, that it was a mistake or what?
I'm saying that, first of all, the Pentagon knows that at least a mistake was made by the Special Operations Forces unit.
And like you're saying, it seems it seems unlikely since this would have been right there on their heads up display that these are friendly, friendly bases.
Yes, I'm saying that certainly we don't know what happened.
And, you know, you can't rule out mistake automatically, but it's difficult to understand how that could have happened.
And so what we have here is the Pentagon, the military and the White House refusing to acknowledge this culpability that they privately know is is true.
And in the process, as you quite aptly put it, pissing off the Pakistani government, military and population unknowingly.
So, I mean, they know perfectly well what the consequences of this are.
And yet they are opting for this investigation, which is going to take until December 23rd and perhaps even longer because I'm reading the letter of appointment to to carry out this investigation, which is being carried out by a brigadier general of the Air Force Special Operations Command.
He can ask for more time if he needs it.
And so at the very least, we can say that they're not exhibiting the slightest degree of urgency about coming up with an explanation to the Pakistanis for what happened.
And this raises the question, what are they thinking?
And I think the answer to that is that the military, the Pentagon and the White House, I think at this point automatically goes along with whatever they want, unless it's, you know, sort of declaring Third World War, that they want to be in a position to continue what they were planning to do before all this happened, which was to ratchet up the pressure on the Pakistani military by at least threatening more cross-border operations, if not actually carrying out cross-border operations.
And they are therefore on a track here, which is bound to bring about a break between Pakistan and the United States in the sense that they are going to withdraw from what they call the war on terror.
They're going to refuse to have anything to do with the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
And they have already, as you well know, said that they are permanently interrupting or stopping the passage of supplies through the Pakistani checkpoint into Afghanistan, which the U.S. and NATO cannot live without for more than four to six weeks, as David Ignatius estimated on the basis of his context.
So I think that they are deliberately provoking a crisis in U.S.
-Pakistani relations.
And this is certainly the most interesting development that we've ever seen in regard to U.S. policy toward Pakistan.
It goes to the heart of the problem that we have with our national security state, on a track that is self-defeating from their own point of view, unless they are really so irrational that they are ready to go down in flames.
I mean, that's my dilemma in trying to figure out what they're thinking.
I mean, the solution is it's the Israeli model, low-skill war against the occupied forever.
And if we can expand and expand, we're not ever going to be defeated by the Pakistanis, could be bled completely to death by them, I suppose, which was bin Laden's strategy all along.
But anyway, hold it right there, because, well, I got a lot of follow-up questions from all that.
It's Gareth Porter.
The newest piece is at Antiwar.com/Porter right now.
Rejecting apology, U.S. may hasten end of Pakistan as client.
All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
It's Antiwar Radio.
I'm Scott Horton.
I'm talking with Gareth Porter, independent historian and journalist for Interpress Service.
You find all his articles at Antiwar.com/Porter.
And we're talking about picking a fight with Pakistan for no good reason here.
And now, so for years and years, we've basically insisted that the Pakistani government wage this on-again, off-again civil war.
And basically, I guess what I'm wondering now is if this policy is quite obviously built around going ahead and calling off any attempt to be friends with them anymore.
Is that just because they want to invade those Northwest Territories?
Or don't tell me this is some Robert Kagan thing.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Is this some Robert Kagan dream come true where they're going to actually go in there and try to take the nukes and get a war with the actual state of Pakistan?
I think we're still talking about something else here.
There is an explanation, which we didn't get to.
And I didn't go that far.
But in my article, I point out that over the decades of close client-state relations, really, between the United States and Pakistan, the main client-patron-client relationships have been between the U.S. military and the military leadership of Pakistan, and then secondarily between the CIA and the Pakistani Intelligence Service, the ISI.
But those links were very, very strong at various times, particularly, of course, during the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
That was the high point of all the client-state relationships, and those relationships have continued in some form over the years, although in much attenuated fashion during the 1990s because of the economic sanctions against Pakistan and, in effect, the rupture of normal military relations with Pakistan.
The U.S. military was quite upset about that and has wanted to get back to where things were.
After 9-11, the Musharraf regime agreed to do America's work for it and sign up for the war on terror.
Now, this is leading me to the key point that there is a fundamental conviction on the part of a lot of military people and CIA people, and some others as well, that the Pakistanis are inveterate client-state people who really are incapable of standing independently of the United States and refusing to have any part of U.S. policy in that part of the world, that they will, in the end, cave in and make an accommodation with the United States military and the CIA and, once again, be part of our war in Afghanistan as well as against Al-Qaeda.
So this is smart power.
Well, it's power.
It's not smart power.
It's the notion that we are the great power.
It's smart because they call it smart, Gareth.
Come on.
They probably do.
They probably do.
But, in any case, it's a major power mentality that we are the major power, they are the client-state, and that's the way it's going to be.
And the latest reflection of that, I think, is David Ignatius' column of last week, which essentially repeated the same notion, that Pakistan doesn't really want to have a rupture with the United States, therefore they're simply going to have to climb down, as he put it, climb down from the hill now that they've planted the flag.
And I have no doubt that that reflects the thinking pretty deep into the military bureaucracy at the Pentagon and the armed services.
And so, you know, I have to believe that, in the end, that they still think that by putting enough pressure on the Pakistanis, they will cave in.
And, of course, what this means is that they absolutely cannot, they absolutely refuse to take seriously the idea that the Pakistani people have any role in this drama.
And that's where I think they're absolutely off the track.
So, how are things going in Afghanistan?
I mean, is it really the case, do the Americans believe their own propaganda, that if it wasn't for the Pakistanis screwing around, that the war in Afghanistan would be won?
Well, I think I can add a little bit of insight to this eternal question, which I know we've chewed over and over again over the years.
And that is from a source who has been in Afghanistan in the U.S. military, that the distinction here really is between military officers at the level of battalion and below, and military officers at the level of the brigade and above.
And the difference between those two groups of officers is fundamental, as I am understanding.
And the reason is that if you are an officer at the smaller unit level, everything up to a company or a battalion, you have to be honest.
You have to report the truth, because basically your survival depends on understanding the truth.
You can't afford to be passing on lies about how things are going.
You can't report up the chain of command that the Afghan military that you are working with are just a splendid bunch of soldiers and the police are dedicated civil servants and so forth, when you know that they are pot-smoking people who don't want to go out on patrol and who are unprofessional and who are secretly trying to maintain an accommodation with the Taliban in their area, because if you don't know and report the truth, you may suffer the consequences.
You may die.
On the other hand, if you are an officer at the brigade level or above, all the way up to, of course, the top of the chain of command in Afghanistan, now headed by General Allen, you are not so interested in the truth as you are interested in what will help you maintain your interest in continuing your presence in Afghanistan, and that means, of course, misrepresenting the situation on the ground throughout the country.
And so I think this is a very good explanation for what's going on.
The people at the lower level are reporting the truth up the chain of command, and when it gets to the brigade level, it starts to change.
And the mix of the truth and lies begins to shift in favor of lies, and when it gets to the level of General Allen, it's basically all lies.
And to what extent the people in that upper level of the chain of command are consciously doing this, and to what extent they unconsciously do it, I can't sort out.
But what we do know is that that is exactly what happened, that as it ascends the chain of command, once it gets beyond the company battalion level and gets to the brigade level, then you're talking about officers whose primary interest really is to represent the situation in such a way as to be politically palatable.
You know, in the media, all the time they say, you know, just kind of usually in reference to something else, right?
They're talking politics or whatever, and they say, well, we're getting out of Iraq, and we're starting to get out of Afghanistan.
That'll be over by 2014 or so.
It really just kind of goes without saying that that's true in a lot of the media.
And I wonder, you know, what you think the troop level is going to look like, say, halfway through 2014.
Does that mean anything at all, 2014?
Are we there until 2034?
Well, I'm not ready to say that it means nothing at all, but, you know, it's very much up in the air.
The New York Times today had a story which is very important, which does report to the very interesting fact that the Karzai regime is so adamantly opposed to the continuation of night raids by special operations forces that it is actually holding the agreement on continued U.S. military presence beyond 2014 hostage to an agreement to stop the night raids.
And, I mean, this is to some extent unexpected, because I certainly, you know, speaking personally, I did not expect Karzai to take such an adamant position.
I thought that he would have given in by now.
In fact, I mean, it's very clear that something has gone wrong, because the U.S. government expected this to be signed in August.
Well, he's not fooling himself into thinking he doesn't need us anymore, is he?
I think he knows he needs us, but on the other hand, you know, he can't afford, apparently, politically, to be in the position of saying yes to the night raids.
All right, well, we've got to go.
Thanks very much, Gareth.
Antiwar.com/Porter, everybody.
Bye.
