All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton, it's Anti-War Radio, and, uh, oh man, I can't get a hold of David Enders.
Oh, wait, here he is in the email.
Standing by, he says.
Try this way.
Oh, I didn't get it that he's out of the country.
Well, no.
How about this?
All right, it worked.
It's hard to reach a guy in Iraq when calling his American cell phone number or something.
I was calling the wrong one.
My bad.
All right, well, good.
Uh, David.
Oh, you were calling, okay.
Well, there you go.
It happens.
Live radio, no problem.
Hey, so you're in Iraq right now?
Is that correct?
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
That's I thought that's why you were calling.
Oh, well, actually, I was calling about, uh, the time you spent in Libya, but let's go ahead and start there, uh, if you want to.
Oh, no, no kidding.
Okay, all right.
We can do that too.
Well, you're a hell of a reporter, man, going to all these wars and writing all these things about them.
Let's start with Iraq.
Uh, well, what's your most important story coming out of Iraq today?
The situation in Iraq at the moment is that the Americans appear to be, indeed, withdrawing combat troops.
I think that's a fact.
It does not appear that there is any way, uh, the Iraqi government will approve a presence of combat troops following the end of the year.
Obviously, there will still be a military, uh, presence and a, uh, C.I.K. presence.
I mean, the Americans are still very much involved in counterterrorism on the ground here, and that will probably continue to be the case.
Uh, we'll also be heavily involved in training, um, and supporting the Iraqi military, which is essentially, you know, become a client of the U.S.
Uh, the situation on the ground, I think, for the average Iraqi has changed very little.
Uh, the government still remains essentially a dictatorship.
Uh, Iraq still is a police state.
I was arrested, uh, this afternoon or this morning, rather, for filming on the highway.
I was actually filming a a convoy of Americans, sort of, you know, packing up to go, and, uh, I got arrested for filming on the highway.
Um, I was detained for a few hours.
Nothing, nothing serious, and let go.
Uh, but, but that gives you an idea of, um, you know, the amount of personal freedom one, one perhaps has in Iraq.
Uh, electricity is still on 12 hours a day, at best.
Right now, um, it's October.
This, this is a time where, where electricity demand is probably the lowest.
It's before it gets cold, and people turn on their heaters.
It's after the, you know, super hot summer months, so people aren't running the ACs quite as much, and I'm living a stone's throw from, from the presidential compound, and this neighborhood has 12 hours of national power a day.
Uh, so I think that gives an idea of, of how the quality of life has improved for the average Iraqi.
Security is much better than it was.
I haven't been here since 2009.
Um, but that comes with, with a, a soldier-to-person ratio of, that, that must be one of the highest in the world.
I mean, the, the number of checkpoints, the number of, the, the security presence on the streets is just kind of incredible.
Um, and that does still not mean that there's not violence, uh, but, you know, compared to 2007, 2008, it's considerably reduced.
So that's the situation in Iraq as, as we near the, the official date of withdrawal.
All right.
Now, uh, the status of forces agreement, uh, stipulates, of course, that December 31st is the last day for combat forces, and you said combat forces are packing up and going, but they're leaving, and let's put aside Hillary Clinton's private army here for a minute, and stick with these counterterrorism forces that you mentioned.
Also, I'd like to edge in a question here about, uh, American air power, and, and airplanes sold to them that almost certainly, I would think, would require the American Air Force to build them airports, or help them, and air traffic control, and training in every way, and all these kinds of things.
I'm trying to get my head around, uh, exactly how big of a loophole in the status of forces agreement are we dealing with here?
And, I mean, like counter, counterterrorism forces, that means combat troops, doesn't it?
Infantry, right?
Uh, no, not necessarily.
That means advisors, that means, uh, people in support of, uh, and there, there is, my impression is, and, and I haven't, um, done all of this reporting, and I've been focused on some other things as well, because, because, you know, I think it's kind of a foregone conclusion we're going to be supporting them, uh, very heavily in this sense.
Um, so, so it, it does mean people advising, that, that does not necessarily mean, um, leading operations.
I don't think that rules out helping them plan operations.
Uh, my understanding is we are still very heavily involved, and probably will be very heavily involved, uh, in, uh, intelligence gathering.
Um, I mean, it doesn't, doesn't seem to me much different than, than the kind of support we provide for a lot of client states.
Uh, we, we are going to be here, um, helping them do all sorts of things.
American airpower, well, Iraq is in the process of buying, um, F-18s, uh, so I think that gives you a pretty solid idea of, of how this is happening.
Um, they are being set up to, to do their own airpower, uh, with, with our assistance.
And now, about that State Department presence, um, is that just the big loophole?
We don't need bases because we have the biggest embassy ever in a private army of thousands?
Well, I, I mean, I guess it depends on, on how you're looking at it.
I think, uh, I think the Iraqi army is at a point where, where it can, it can hold its own on the ground.
Um, I don't think the status of forces, I mean, in the status of forces agreement to withdraw, we're just talking about, we're talking about combat troops, boots on the ground, guys doing patrols, guys securing areas.
Um, I mean, if you look at, you know, say Yemen, right, where we're doing airstrikes there, um, you know, with government support and approval, I, I don't see how the situation in Iraq is necessarily going to be different than that, or, or different than, you know, Egypt, where, where we rendition people and have for a long time.
Um, I, I think that kind of coordination is certainly, um, going to be, going to be present.
So really, would it be right then that it's sort of an illusion that they were pushing for bases and tens and tens of thousands of troops that really, this is pretty much what they wanted in the end anyway, the Pentagon, I mean?
Uh, you know, I, that's a good question.
Uh, I'm sorry.
I'm going to send you your answer until we get back from this break, David.
Hang it right there.
It's, uh, David Anders from McClatchy Newspapers, everybody.
We'll be right back.
All right, y'all welcome back.
It's Anti-War Radio.
Scott Horton, I'm talking with David Enders.
He's an independent journalist, been writing for McClatchy Newspapers.
And I'm sorry, I don't have a full bio in front of me.
I have the page open here somewhere.
David, where else are you writing these days?
Well, at the moment, uh, always doing stuff for Free Speech Radio News on Pacifica.
Uh, there'll be some stuff on McClatchy from Iraq, or there should be later this week.
Um, and wow, what else have I got lined up on this trip?
Sorry, I can't even keep track.
Whoever's paying, uh, is how it works these days.
Um, pick up my book, Bag That Bulletin from the University of Michigan.
Oh, there you go.
Bag That Bulletin.
Great.
Um, all right.
Now, so when we went out to the break, I was asking you about this relationship between America and, uh, the American government and the Iraqi government here.
And what I was trying to get at was how, uh, you know, they've refused to authorize the stationing of tens of thousands of troops there.
And there's a lot of posturing by the Americans that that's what they wanted.
Uh, but then on the other hand, apparently they're willing to have a huge number of private contractors and special forces trainers and a long-term relationship with the Air Force and all these other things, which makes me wonder whether they're, you know, standing up to the Americans and refusing anything at all, or whether this is really what they were after in the end was, you know, what basically the status quo or what it looks like we're going to have now is basically what both sides wanted anyway.
Well, I think, uh, it's hard to say.
I mean, if you go back to like 2005, it's quite, I don't think it's unfair to say that that's probably what the architects of all of this had in mind.
Um, or rather back to 2002, 2003, I think probably, um, there was an idea of, of an imposing American military force and bases in Iraq.
And Iraq is a, as a extremely strategic location, uh, for U.S. forces.
And I, you know, that's, um, but the reality of the occupation has been that, um, the presence has greatly alienated Iraqis in many, many ways.
And that's why, um, Iraqi lawmakers essentially couldn't keep their jobs if they were to allow a huge presence of U.S. combat forces on the ground.
Um, and I think also the reality of the amount of money we've spent here and what it's done to our military is, is probably setting in as well.
Uh, I, you know, as, as far as American strategy, it's, you know, hard to say exactly as, as we rarely articulated in, in the way that, um, you know, in, in what is the reality, I guess, I guess when you look at it, if this has been a success, then what you can say is that what's changed since 2003 is that Iraq is once again, a client state.
It's, uh, essentially a free market kleptocracy.
Um, and the U.S. has access to oil here.
Um, and at least a, a nominal ally in some ways.
So, so perhaps that was the goal.
Um, and I don't think it's, it's unfair to say that that was certainly what, uh, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, uh, Paul Wolfowitz were hoping for.
I think there were a lot of, of different motivations, uh, for the war.
Uh, but I think the main one was definitely economic and oil related.
And I think, I think when you look at what we've done for the average Iraqi in eight years, uh, it's hard to dispute that there's been, you know, the U.S. military and then the state department have done Jack all for the millions of refugees that are in this country.
Um, the infrastructure is still in terrible, terrible shape.
Um, you know, the country has a government that is extremely, extremely corrupt.
Second, you know, perhaps Afghanistan, which, you know, we're also occupying.
Um, so, so I, it's, it's hard to say exactly whether this was the end goal or whether there were different, um, I think there were different versions or different scenarios for the end goal.
But I think this is in some ways an acceptable outcome for American foreign policy.
If you accept the idea that Americans foreign policy, when we say interests, we mean economics.
Yeah.
Or at least the economics of state power anyway.
But yeah, I should have been more clear.
I was thinking, you know, post-surge policy, what were they really trying to accomplish?
I, I saw, um, a blog called, uh, the common ills writes about Iraq quite a bit.
And, um, uh, they basically, uh, were writing that they thought it was a red Herring that, uh, you know, like Patrick Coburn reported back in 08, that they were pushing for 56 permanent bases and all that, as though it was still 2003, um, that they knew they weren't getting that, but they didn't care because they're still getting their biggest embassy in the history of the world, you know, that one country has ever had and another, and they're still going to have this air power relationship, et cetera.
And I guess, um, you know, that sounds pretty much right to me.
And, uh, they're talking, you know, post post-surge strategy, post-Petraeus, uh, going over there and, and redefining what winning means.
But, you know, I have to wonder too, David, uh, how much influence they've really bought with all this blood and all this money, uh, in the Washington post this morning, they're horrified.
Uh, no, it's October 8th.
Uh, Iraq siding with Iran sends essential aid to Syria's Assad, and they just can't believe how little influence they seem to have in Baghdad when it comes to issues like Iraq for, uh, Iraqi foreign policy.
Uh, well, that's, that's perhaps naive.
Um, the big, I mean, I guess, I guess when you look at how many people have died here, um, and the damage that has been done to an already damaged country and Iraqis don't see the American for Iraqis, the American war with Iraq does not begin in 2003.
It begins in 1991.
Um, Iraqis have essentially endured two decades of war with the U S and America doesn't really acknowledge that.
Um, so, so you have a group of people who are quite happy to see us go, who don't really want us here in many, many ways.
And as I said before, it puts their politicians in an awkward position because they, they can't do it.
They're there.
I mean, we've seen in the last two Iraqi elections, has become a power broker and he is vehemently anti-American and, and opposed to the presence of us forces, uh, first militarily and certainly now politically.
And he's continued to threaten military action.
If, if the U S were to stay, um, Iraq being close to the Iranian government is a natural thing.
I mean, the countries are geography, the countries are right next to each other.
Uh, certainly that the people in power in Iraq have a lot in common with the people in power in Iran.
They are Shiite Muslims, um, who essentially have many of the same religious leaders and share many of the same ideas about, uh, the role of religion in government.
And, and, uh, Iran is a major backer of Syria.
Now that does not necessarily mean that, uh, Iraq will always side with Iran.
There are definite, uh, differences, um, between Iraq and Iran, but for the moment, it's not at all surprising that Iraq is not criticizing Syria.
You also have to look at the fact that there are a million refugees doing part to our occupation in Syria from Iraq.
Um, and, and those people have not started coming back in huge numbers, even with all of the unrest in Syria, they currently remain in Syria.
So you have them as, as potential political pawns or political footballs, uh, and the implications that has, uh, you know, many of them are afraid to go back because of violence.
Many of them are, you know, exiled because of our occupation.
And, and so it's not at all surprising that the Iraqi government is tiptoeing around the issue in Syria and probably doesn't want to get involved, A, for alienating the Iranian government to some extent, B, for, for, uh, you know, potential retaliation against Iraqi citizens in Syria.
All right, well, I'm sorry, we'll have to leave it there.
Uh, maybe I'll try to get you back on in a day or two to talk about Libya.
Would that be all right?
That'd be great.
Okay, everybody, that's David Enders, read his book, Bad Dad Bulletin, and also read them at McClatchy, uh, McClatchyDC.com.
