All right y'all, welcome back to Antiwar Radio, it's Chaos in Austin, also streaming at antiwar.com slash radio.
And introducing our guest Daniel Levy, he's senior fellow and co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation, that's newamerica.net, and his own blog is called prospectsforpeace.com.
Welcome back to the show, Daniel.
Thanks, good to be back, how are you doing?
I'm doing great, it's good to talk to you.
So let's talk about these Israeli elections, I guess last I heard Netanyahu has first chance at forming a coalition, but that's not a done deal yet, is that right?
Yes, Netanyahu is tasked by the president to try and form a governing coalition, he has 28 days in which to do that, he can ask for a two week extension.
He has a government, almost, in his pocket, so I think we are in a situation whereby the overwhelming likelihood is that Benjamin Netanyahu is the next Israeli prime minister, the question is with what kind of a coalition, the coalition that is perhaps easiest for him to put together is a coalition of his Likud party, the right-wing party, the ultra-right, what I call the secular nationalist right, and the orthodox, the religious right, all together the parties that fall into those categories have 65 seats in 120 member parliament, that's a coalition, that's a majority right there, a little tricky because the secular nationalist right and the orthodox religious right have issues which they disagree on, but they've sat before in coalition, and the conventional wisdom is you can find a formula that they can agree to.
The real question is between that kind of a coalition and a coalition that is more centrist in its bent and that would include the party that actually got the most seats in the election, the party of the current governing formation that's now led by Zippy Livni, she's the outgoing foreign minister.
So Netanyahu is stating a clear preference for a broad government that would include Kadima and that would even include the Labour Party, and then he would have either Kadima and Labour with Likud or Kadima with Likud with perhaps just the nationalist right of Lieberman who I imagine we'll talk about, or just with the religious, but not with all of the right wing together.
Kadima is putting some conditions on joining such a government and what most people are going to be following in the coming days and almost certainly weeks is which of those formations take shape.
Well, there's a question as to how much difference it'll really make, right?
Because Kadima is actually basically just sort of Likud light, right?
I think there is a big question as to how much difference it makes.
Many people will tell you all the difference in the world, the far right are absolute greater land of Israel, territorialists seed no inch.
Kadima is committed to a two state solution.
When you look at it, Kadima has just been in government.
They didn't end the occupation, the settlements expanded, the number of checkpoints and obstacles to movement expanded.
There were two wars, not so different to what's happened in the past.
He didn't fight wars when he was prime minister, Mr. Netanyahu.
Livni is making a big deal though of the formulation.
She is saying that she wants Netanyahu to acknowledge the need for a two state solution in order to come into government.
Most people would look at that and say, yes, it's a big deal if the Likud leader says two states, but in practical terms, what does it mean?
Because no one expects the current peace process as it's currently configured.
The current talks between the moderate leadership on the Palestinian side, the Abbas leadership and the Israelis, no one expects that to really deliver.
So in essence, I think the only thing that would make a difference, a significant difference is if the entire peace effort is reframed.
If the way to go about getting the occupation and two states is changed, what might make a difference, and I think this is why Netanyahu is apparently so keen on having the broad government, is that if Livni is inside the coalition, and certainly if Labour is inside the coalition, it makes it much easier for Netanyahu to go to the international community and say, this is continuity.
You know, I've got the center in the government, no big deal what's happening here.
And it would, in many ways, it's perceived it would provide a fig leaf.
Well, so if Netanyahu is able to bring in Kadima and Labour, then that means he won't be able to bring in the right wing parties or vice versa, is that right?
It's painfully complex.
Israel's parliamentary democracy where in 120 seat parliament, you have 12 parties represented.
The largest is less than a quarter of a seat, so it's all these little factions and coalition building the whole time.
Essentially, it's like this, bottom line, almost anyone can sit with anyone other than the 11 members of Knesset who represent non-Zionist parties, principally but not exclusively Arab-Israelis.
They tend to not be seen as legitimate coalition partners by anyone.
Almost anyone else can sit with each other, and they have in the past.
In the current configuration, the expectation would be that if the center party, Livni's Kadima party, which as you say is largely including Livni herself, made up of people who used to be in the Likud, if they do go in to government, then that does not preclude having either the religious right also in the government, or the secular nationalist right in the government, or even both.
But under those circumstances, it would probably be one or the other.
In other words, you could end up with a government of the center, the right, and the ultra-right.
And all this really is still up in the air.
Well, how much difference does it make whether it's Netanyahu or Livni who are able to make the coalition?
It does look like it will be Netanyahu, not Livni.
It's now pretty much inconceivable that Livni will be able to form a government.
Something very unexpected would have to happen.
There was talk for some period that maybe there would be what we call a rotation, where each take in a four-year term, they have two years each as prime minister.
That's happened in the past, in the 1980s.
The bigger question of how much difference does it make, though, I think comes down to this, Scott.
It might be worth thinking about whether the election on February 10th was the one that mattered for what happens next with Israel, the Palestinians, peace efforts, or whether it was the election on November 4th of last year that was the election that mattered.
And I would argue that that is the case.
If you have a determined administration in Washington that not only articulates a position which says that getting a two-state solution is a priority, and that it is in the American interest, that it's not because one's doing any favors to Israelis and Palestinians, but because this matters to the United States of America and its interests and its security.
If you have an administration here in Washington that not only articulates that position but then clicks on it, then you're in a very different place, whether it's Netanyahu or Livni or anyone else in the prime minister's office in Jerusalem.
If you don't have both the determination and then a smart plan to make it happen, and a willingness to stick with this coming from Washington, then I think you will see more years of paralysis, of backsliding.
You may well see more of what you saw in December, January, of what happened in Gaza with that, the devastating consequences of that.
And you'll continue to see an erosion in America's standing and in America's security interests.
And I would argue also an erosion in Israel's position as well.
Well, so how optimistic are you that that kind of thing is likely, that the Obama administration would really put pressure on whoever exactly, whatever coalition is in charge of Israel to actually come up with a two-state solution and abide by it?
I'd say the following.
First of all, it's early days.
Second of all, I would draw encouragement from the way in which, very early on, this has been identified and talked about as a priority, that it has been followed up by the appointment of an envoy who is not necessarily in the traditional mold of envoys.
One who was meticulously fair-handed in his previous venture into the Middle East, Senator George Mitchell.
He headed the commission in 2000-2001 that looked into the outbreak of the then Intifada.
He produced a very powerful report, which is almost the gold standard for reporting that has come out on this issue.
He, of course, did Northern Ireland in the past as well.
So you have the appointment of Mitchell.
For me, the next key question is less, at this stage, the degree of assertiveness, but more what is the way in which the administration is going to frame how they look at this question?
Because I think this has been one of the biggest flaws.
The idea that America's job is to encourage the parties themselves, and if the parties want to go slow, okay, if the parties want to go a bit faster, if the parties get stuck, there's not much one can do.
If one acknowledges that this is almost certainly not going to be resolved now in bilateral negotiations, and that this is important enough to America that it should not be held up by the vicissitudes of local politics in Palestine or Israel, then we're in a different space.
If there's an acknowledgment that one needs a different approach, a different plan, and yes, to create both incentives and disincentives, I think it's too early to say.
I don't think the administration itself has worked this through yet.
You have Secretary Clinton going to the region this weekend.
I think it will largely be a maintenance exercise visit.
It will be to commit money at a conference to reconstruct Gaza being held in Egypt, but you have, essentially you don't have a government in either Israel or Palestine right now.
You have coalition negotiations in both because the Palestinians should now in Cairo start discussing finally reforming a national unity government.
So I think we're still in the testing period.
I'm not sure we'll see a change.
One other thing that I'm a little bit more confident about, Scott, is that if they see they're pursuing a path which is leading nowhere, I think it would be fair to say that there's a possibility, and not a small one, that they will reassess, unlike what was done under the Bush administration.
Well, now, if it just sort of goes without saying that in order to have peace, there has to be a two-state solution, then that means getting all the Israeli settlers out of the West Bank, and at that point, I guess my understanding is that that's almost impossible.
You know, you could have a mutiny in the army or something before they would really remove all the Jewish settlers there.
Well, here's how I'd slightly redefine the way you phrased it, Scott.
I'd say that to get some kind of peace, new equilibrium situation, you need to end the occupation and remove the infrastructure of occupation, and create a situation whereby the area designated to be the Palestinian state is no longer under occupation.
Now, it may be that, as has happened elsewhere, Kosovo, East Timor, for instance, it may be that you don't hand over directly from Israeli control to Palestinian control, but that Palestinian statehood would be shadowed, incubated by the international community for a period of time.
I say that because, yes, the settlements are key, but if settlers remain, but not as part of an infrastructure of occupation, in other words, as communities who the Palestinians have said, you want to live under Palestinian sovereignty, by Palestinian rules, without the Israeli army, maybe that's still possible.
In other words, I'm saying, yes, the classic model of the two-state solution requires a very significant evacuation of settlers.
If Israel doesn't want to find itself in a one-state scenario, in a struggle to argue that denying these people rights is somehow compatible with Israeli democracy, if Israel doesn't want to find itself in that situation, either it has to find the gumption to remove those settlers.
If that's not possible, I still think it's worth saying, can we break our heads again?
Is there another way to do this?
You can remove the occupation, but the Palestinians will accept that there's a Jewish minority living in Palestine.
I'm not saying it's my preferred scenario, but I'm saying that we shouldn't necessarily say that creativity ends with only one model of two-state solution being possible.
Mm-hmm.
Well, no, I mean, that's great.
There are Arabs that live in Israel.
Why not have Israelis that live in Palestine?
It makes perfect sense.
Myself included, we've always looked at this, and Israel's never even suggested it in the negotiations because the assumption was that the settlers who stay behind would be provokers who would try and suck the Israeli military back in.
It would cause endless clashes, and no settler would really agree to physically live under a Palestinian sovereignty and protection.
I would say, clearly, they will not have the IDF there, but if one had, for instance, a rule where anyone who'd broken the law, any settler, and there's quite a lot of them fall into this category, who have law and order violations on their record couldn't stay, for instance, but someone who doesn't could stay.
You perhaps have to remove some of the more extreme settlements, and there are a list of settlements that one could come up with, a smaller list.
Maybe the communities that stay behind would have permanent residency rights in Palestine, but would still be citizens of Israel.
I'm suggesting that if there's a determination to get this done, if there's a determination to end the occupation, and if there's an assertive American move, there's still more creativity to be put into this, and it can be done, again, with those provisos, if the determination is there.
And by the way, I would say, maybe there is a model which gives some of the settlers an interest in this.
I think you need to bring the hardliners in.
It may be a clarifying and liberating moment to have the right wing in power in Israel, to in essence, you have Hamas in power in Palestine, they're a far more potent political force today than Fatah.
And maybe when you have the hardliners on both sides, and if you have an assertive international community, those are more conducive circumstances for progress than when you have cuddly moderates who I may well respect and like personally, and they may well have a more liberal vision of the world, but who actually can't get it done.
Well, and that's what your associate Steve Clemons said on the show a couple of weeks back, was that the hope here is that if it's a Netanyahu government, that then we'll be in a position where we can have a Nixon goes to China kind of moment where maybe Ehud Barak would not be able to give up land for peace, Netanyahu will be able to.
The point of that is the very few Nixons actually go to their respective Chinas, which is why one can still use that phraseology after so many years.
I don't know if Netanyahu can do it.
What I would say is absolutely test the hypothesis.
I agree with Steve.
I think this can be a clarifying moment, but not if one plays the game of saying, ah, Mr.
Netanyahu, you don't want to talk about ending the occupation and actually getting this thing done.
You'd rather talk about economic peace.
You want America and everyone else to spend the next few years dancing to your tune, which is a tune of creating an industrial park in the southern West Bank town of Bethlehem or the central West Bank town of Nublar.
No, we're not in that game.
That's the key.
The proposition only becomes relevant, and I think it is relevant, but it only becomes relevant if you actually go for a game changing and game closing effort with Netanyahu.
Only if everyone in this is forced to make real choices does this become relevant.
That for me is undoubtedly the direction to go in.
Will others see it that way?
I hope so.
Well, and there's the question, too, about the Israel lobby in the United States and whether the Obama government will be able to put the kind of pressure that you're hoping to see on the situation, because the Israel lobby at least has been completely dominated by those who side with Likud on all these issues.
Do you think that there's much of a change to that with J Street and these other kind of...
Well, and even with the coming in of the Obama administration, does that give more liberal Israel lobby types in this country strength to face down AIPAC and JINSA and WINEP?
First of all, I think there is a different atmosphere in the United States.
I think that you do see, as you've said, there are groups like J Street, which has captured the imagination of a large swathe of the more liberal American Jewish community who have perhaps not found a home or not been active on this issue in the past.
There are other groups that are also upping their game as well.
There's Britzedek for Shalom, there's the Israel Policy Forum, there's Americans for Peace Now, all active within and beyond the Jewish community in advocating this position.
I think you see an atmosphere within the Democratic Party that is cognizant of what this means for American interests and beginning to feel the changing mood out there.
I would like to think that the kind of Republican foreign policy positions staked out by people like former Senator Chuck Hagel also will have increasing traction and that you'll see an increasing interest in this issue from the non-right wing evangelical church groups.
Number one, I think that there is, I don't want to overplay it, there is a changing atmosphere out there.
But number two, which is equally important, if you have a determined and popular American president who makes a move and defines it in the context of America's national security issues in advancing Middle East peace, then I think the nature and the way in which opposition manifests itself and the size of that opposition shrinks to much more manageable proportions.
I think that some of the groups that you mentioned will not be spoiling for a fight necessarily and they may well find themselves having to do as much of a job in explaining to the Israeli government the ways in which the world has changed as they do in trying to explain to the American government the ways in which the world hasn't changed.
I guess that really is the crux of the question in terms of American support for Israel.
After September 11th, it seems like the neoconservatives and, well, basically all of TV news picked up this theme that Israel's enemies are America's enemies and that Hamas and Hezbollah and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Al-Qaeda are all one big Islamofascism and that Israel is basically just on the front lines of our same war against Islamic extremism and things like that.
And what you're talking about is really the acceptance of an entirely different set of truths such as, for example, that these groups are all one big group and perhaps, I don't know, I guess I'll ask for your comment on the idea that our support for Israel, U.S. support for Israel, is part of what got us attacked on September 11th in the first place and that if we want to fight our terrorism problem, we need to try to at least stay out of Israel's cycle of violence or figure out a way to bring it to an end.
I don't think the Israel-America relationship per se is damaging to America.
I think it's the unresolved conflict, which is what undermines America's interests and greatly undermines Israel as well.
I think there's a shared interest for Israel and America of ending this grievance.
That's the thing.
The thing to understand vis-a-vis Global War on Terror 9-11 and the terrible mis-framing was, there was no acknowledgment that there are grievances that these groups feed on that you can actually address and therefore cut these groups off at the knees.
And that's what has to be done.
The way in which- Well, I think Colin Powell did recognize that, didn't he?
I think he did.
And I think he was the one who was cut off at the knees.
The way in which this has played out in recent years, and even before that, but especially in recent years, has so skewed the debate inside Israel that it's almost suffocated that debate.
So I would argue that it's very difficult now for Israel, with its dysfunctional system, with the way in which the neocons here and what preceded them, the way in which those things skewed the debate in Israel to extract itself from this.
America needs to extract itself from this occupation.
I would argue that that happens to also be an Israeli need, but I think there needs to be an American leadership here.
The challenge for the United States is the situation only gets worse over time.
You'll have more Gazas.
You'll have more Operation Car Sleds.
These will be more damaging to America's interests.
And America and Israel may find themselves in an alliance, in a situation in which Israel no longer has any good options.
And it's to forestall it, to prevent that eventuality, why it's important in this administration.
President Obama may be the last president who can realistically pursue a two-state solution, given the trajectory of things on the ground.
It's much more difficult now than it was when you were trying to negotiate this back in the 90s, right?
It's still doable.
It's more difficult.
I'm not sure that the next president could credibly pursue this.
And that's the question.
That's the challenge.
And I would not give up.
I'm far from despondent.
I think there is a new opportunity.
I think even the elections in Israel present an opportunity of types.
I think the way in which the Palestinian unity talks may make progress presents an opportunity of types, but mostly, and despite all the other things on their agenda, there's an opportunity administration acts on the ambitious agenda it has set out for itself on this issue.
And that will require public support from your listeners, from people who have mobilized in different organizations to show that there is an American constituency out there that wants to see this two-state solution delivered on, not just talked about, and understands that America will have to show leadership, and a few noses may be put out of joint, so to speak.
All right, everybody.
That's Daniel Levy.
He's senior fellow and co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation.
His own website is prospectsforpeace.com.
Thank you very much for your time on the show today.
Thanks a lot.
