05/08/09 – Burton Folsom – The Scott Horton Show

Okay guys, welcome back to the show, it's Anti-Everything Radio here on Chaos Radio Austin 95.9 FM in Austin, Texas, streaming worldwide on the internet, ChaosRadioAustin.org again at Antiwar.com slash radio, every day one to three, or well, Tuesday through Friday, one to three central time.
And I'm happy to welcome to the show, Burton Folsom Jr., he's the author of a new book called New Deal, or Raw Deal, and he teaches, I believe, yes, professor of history at Hillsdale College in Michigan, and is a senior historian at the Foundation for Economic Education.
Welcome to the show.
Hey, Scott, thank you for having me on.
Ah, well thank you very much for joining me on the show today.
I really love this book, I'm sorry it took so long for me to get through it, I've had so much going on here, but...
Well, I'm glad you did.
Yeah, it's great, it's New Deal, or Raw Deal, how FDR's economic legacy has damaged America.
And if I could be so bold as to start this interview off with absurd hyperbole, it's my belief that George Washington and Thomas Jefferson and even Abraham Lincoln are dead, and that Franklin Roosevelt is the real founding father of America now, and the myth of the 1930s and then the 1940s, as America turned from Clark Kent to Superman to save the world and then become the world empire, is basically the dominant narrative that rules our political culture to this day.
Well, you certainly see that, Scott, the influence of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, which was so strong on the founding, and the whole idea of limited government and the Constitution, especially Article I, Section 8, which really limits the powers of Congress, and we see the powers of the executive limited in Article II, all of that changed in the 1930s.
When Franklin Roosevelt came in, we really opened up the executive branch, and we're going to have a lot of authority coming from Washington, D.C., and yes, most historians today prefer Franklin Roosevelt to George Washington.
Well, and what is it that's so great about him, exactly?
I mean, we all know that he's great, from the time we were little kids, everybody says so and what have you, but I guess, you know, if you just got here from another country or something, you might look at Roosevelt and say, wow, that depression really lasted a long time, and maybe rather than saying, well, good thing he was there, maybe you'd question whether he was part of the reason it lasted so long and was as bad as it was.
Right.
The 1930s was the only decade in our history where we had double-digit unemployment throughout the decade, and under Franklin Roosevelt, the double-digit unemployment continues, not only all through almost all of his second term, but as late as 1939, in April 1939, it was 20.7% in April of 1939, so the administration was not successful, the massive spending was not successful in curing the unemployment, but what historians like is they believe that we need an active central government to solve economic problems, and therefore, because he was in there trying and because he had good intentions, therefore, we need to applaud what he did and pursue it in further generations.
Well, and there's this whole thing, too, where it's almost like it's not falsifiable, where it's sort of an argument in a circle that, well, the fact that the New Deal wasn't exactly the cure-all for the depression just shows that he didn't really have the courage to go far enough to do what it would have really taken to go into enough debt to really stimulate the economy back to health.
Well, you're right.
There were some people who said he didn't spend enough, but of course, there's no limit to that argument, because then when you never come out of the depression, it's always because you needed to spend more, but the truth is that every time you spend money, you have to get the money from somewhere else.
Either you defer getting the money because you borrow it, which means you put the burden on the next generation, or else you have to raise it in taxes, and therein lies the problem with Roosevelt.
Almost no textbook tells you that Roosevelt raised the tax rate on top incomes to 79% in 1935, and think about that a minute.
How many people are going to invest and going to invest in businesses to try to get us out of the Great Depression if they're having to pay four out of every five dollars past a certain point, because it's marginal tax rates?
So if you all agree, basically, it's a good time to just live off your savings and not really do anything with your money, because who knows what might happen to it.
You're right, Scott.
That's what we find happen.
We get a burgeoning yacht sale business.
In other words, we're just going to sort of coast and wait until better times before we invest our money, but meanwhile, for other people, the depression continues.
If we could have had lower tax rates, we would have had a much better chance of getting America out of the depression.
We did that in previous depressions, and we did it in later crises, after Jimmy Carter, and we had 14.5 percent inflation, 7 percent unemployment.
We get Reagan in, and the top rate comes from 70 to 28 percent, and we just get an explosion of industry, especially at a Silicon Valley.
You get, of course, Walkman radios, microwave ovens, and telephones.
Well, of course, at that point, they had brought in Paul Volcker to finally abandon the stimulative policy of the 1970s and say, fine, let's force a recession, crank up the interest rates, and put the country in a stranglehold.
We'll get rid of every last mal-invested dollar before we start again.
They had finally quit trying to do what they had been doing before.
You are exactly right.
When Volcker came in as Fed Chairman, replacing William Miller, we had a change in policy, and all of a sudden, the 11 percent increase each year in the money supply is going to stop, and we're going to have a very small increase in the money supply, and that is going to put the brakes on inflation, and also will help recovery.
Well, and of course, he's the guy who helped to take us off the gold standard in 1971, but never mind that.
Back to the 30s here.
Everybody knows, and this is pretty much right, isn't it, that Herbert Hoover was sort of a Ron Paul-ian, a laissez-faire libertarian type?
Ah, that's what some people, of course, a lot of people think.
Herbert Hoover was a problem.
Calvin Coolidge is much more the free market president, and we had budget surpluses.
Every year of the Coolidge presidency, we knocked a third off of the national debt.
We dropped the tax rates significantly.
We had tremendous investing from air conditioning to radios, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners.
All of this really comes into being in a big way in the 1920s, but Hoover was really more like Roosevelt in many ways.
Hoover favored increase in federal spending and an increase in the tax rate, so really, Hoover and Roosevelt belong in sort of the same camp.
Well, how exactly did Hoover respond to the Great Depression?
It was, of course, Roosevelt didn't take power until the first part of 1933, and the crash started in 29, so Hoover oversaw quite a bit of the first part of this mess.
Well, you're right, Scott.
He did, and he didn't do a very good job.
Now, some of this was beyond his control.
When the Federal Reserve began increasing interest rates, thus discouraging investment, that kind of is out of control of the president.
It's true, he can appoint Fed chairman, but if that person is not up for reappointment, there's not much you can do.
So Hoover is off the hook a little bit on this.
The Fed is on the hook.
Milton Friedman won his Nobel Prize arguing that the disaster that the Federal Reserve created with the money supply in the 1920s and early 30s was awful, and so that is a little bit beyond Hoover's scope, but where he does deserve some blame is by signing the highest tariff in U.S. history.
Well, Europeans refuse to buy our exports because we are refusing to buy their exports, which means the auto industry has their sales plummet from $5 million to $1.6 million.
We have tremendous decline in our export business.
Also, Hoover raised the income tax, and so that discouraged investment as well.
Well now, on the point about the protectionism and the high tariff, I mean, depending on how you categorize these things, that might sound like sort of a right-wing, kind of reactionary populist sort of thing, but you're arguing that that's part of a progressive program of Hoover's?
It is, and the whole idea of high tariffs was something that you cultivate constituencies here who want a high tariff because they don't want foreign competition to interfere with the products they're trying to sell.
The problem is that then the foreigners who lose the markets that they could have had by selling to us get angry, and they put in tariffs against our goods so that, as I say, our auto industry, I mean typewriters, all sorts of products, especially steel-related manufacturing products where America was supreme in the 1920s, we lose those markets because the foreigners refuse to buy from us where they used to do so.
So while you're protecting watchmakers who produce an uncompetitive watch, you then lose your car-making industry, or at least have it damaged, and that was a competitive industry.
So free markets were to the United States' benefit, certainly in the 1920s.
Well now, when the election of 1932 rolled around and Franklin Roosevelt was running against this progressive Republican, how did he differentiate himself?
He just said, I want to do like Hoover, but more?
Right, that's a good question, Scott, because Hoover was occupying the ground on the big spending side.
He had an increase in public works.
We created what was called the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to give massive government loans.
It was corporate welfare.
Hoover had dabbled in that.
Roosevelt separated himself by saying he wanted a balanced budget.
In fact, he advocated cutting 25 percent in the federal budget if he's elected, and he never followed through on that promise, which was not only a Roosevelt promise, it was written into the Democratic platform in 1932.
But when he got in, he began spending in a big way, and he believed that by massively spending, he really did believe it would get us out of the Depression without realizing that the high taxes would squelch the recovery.
But also, he did a lot of spending because he thought, I can buy certain interest groups with this money.
We spend on farm programs like the AAA, and then the farmers will come on our side.
We'll protect unions, and that way the unions will come on our side, so we'll try to make it easier for them to organize.
All of this spending, even silver miners, get in on the constituency.
He's trying to cultivate constituencies to create a majority for the Democratic Party.
Well, and it sure worked.
Everybody loves this guy, and they loved him then.
They gave him four terms and died in part of the fourth one, so he must have been doing something right.
You're saying it was just bribing people with their own money?
Well, yes, I am, Scott, because you're into an area that gets sensitive.
One of the aspects of my research that I had to come to grips with was if Roosevelt's programs were so bad, and I think that most of them did not work well, the WPA, the NRA did not work well, the AAA.
The idea of paying farmers not to produce, that's not a real winner for getting the United States out of the Depression, especially when we then have to import the very crops that we paid farmers not to produce.
So those aren't winners, so then how do you explain Roosevelt getting re-elected so easily?
Because in 1936, he got 523 electoral votes, and the Republican opponent only got eight, and a lot of historians say that shows that Roosevelt was popular, that trying to do something was very important, and that we need to credit Roosevelt with trying to do something.
But when we look at all the constituencies that ended up, in effect, getting bought off, the whole picture begins to look a little bit different.
Many people campaign saying, if you'll elect me, many Democrats, I will try to bring the pork into my district, and I can do it through President Roosevelt.
Well, you know, there's this whole meme that I've heard repeated.
In fact, people skeptical about Obama and his stimulus, and saying, wow, this is a lot of money to be doled out, and we can expect some pretty bad corruption.
Not like in the 30s, Roosevelt had some guys in charge who were really good at making sure that none of their stimulus money was siphoned off to corruption.
So I'm not exactly sure what that's referring to, I almost, I can imagine that that's technically true in a sense, that they didn't want to do the kind of, you know, completely under the table, kickback, bribe, mobster kind of thing.
They wanted to just have the whole program institutionalized bribery in such a way that it's not even corruption anymore.
And really, in this chapter, I forget which number chapter here in this book, New Deal or Raw Deal, it's actually shocking the way you describe how this guy had his, FDR had all of his little Karl Roves going, you know, precinct by precinct, district by district through the entire country, deciding, you know, with algorithms almost, who we need to give this much tax money to in order to guarantee this many votes so that we can win again.
It's really quite shocking to read, actually.
I was shocked in my research, I didn't know it was going to be this bad.
You're right, Emil Hurja was his man who tabulated the exact amount of money that each district was receiving.
Then Roosevelt would bring the congressman in and say, if you don't go along with what I'm trying to do, this money's going to be stopped.
And most of the congressmen needed that to bring home the pork to get reelected, at least it had come to that.
And so when Roosevelt was threatening to cut it off, they became very compliant with what Franklin Roosevelt wanted, especially the Democrats.
And the Republicans were on the spot.
Because if they opposed the pork, then people in their district say, hey, you're opposing me getting my roads built in this district.
But if they favor the pork, then the voters say, well, why should we vote for you?
We have the Democrats who got us this pork in the first place.
Why should we switch pork in midstream?
And so that was the problem the Republicans faced, and they did not handle it very well, and they got just absolutely clobbered in 1936.
Well, and it was, wasn't it, or I guess it was the midterm election of 1934 where it was historic by the numbers, unprecedented in American history, the extent to which the Republicans got clubbed.
That was the election that got me going on this, Scott, because it's about the only election in the 20th century where the party in power won seats in the midterm.
If we look at the historical record from 1904 to 1998, that's almost the entire 20th century, that midterm election of 1934 is the only time that the party in power won seats, and Roosevelt did it with 22% unemployment.
So how do you explain that the president who had the highest unemployment going into an election, a midyear election, ended up winning seats, and part of it is this attempt to try to graft voting groups onto the Democratic Party with the pork.
The pork doesn't get you out of the Great Depression because you have to have the tax rates raised, but the pork will cement different voting blocs into your constituency, and the New Deal coalition, the political group that Roosevelt formed, was formidable running for elections in the 30s, 40s, and even thereafter into the 50s and 60s.
Right now, let me ask you about the court packing scheme and the anti-lynching law.
You compare his effort on these two different things, and obviously there's a whole lot to the court packing case going in there, but I think also I might as well use the same kind of thing to segue into the fact that this guy's character, that he really was kind of a lying, double-talking scumbag, the kind of presidents we've become very used to.
I think that that trend started with Roosevelt because once pork becomes, and how much you can get from government financially, how much can you impose a tax burden on somebody else and bring roads, schools, different kind of federal projects into your district, once that becomes the name of the game, then character, the element of character, becomes less important.
So in other words, a lot of voters say, well, I don't care if he is a, you know, to use your phraseology, I don't care if he is a scumbag, as long as he brings those roads into my district, I'll vote for him.
So once you get the emphasis coming on pork and you begin to move outside the Constitution and move to get the government with a centrally directed economy and more federal programs, character diminishes as a characteristic that you consider when you're selecting a president.
And the greatest example of this, of course, is that he came up against a Supreme Court that refused to say that the Commerce Clause says, and I guess the Necessary and Proper Clause say, that he can do anything he wants in the whole world if he can get Congress to go along with it.
And so he decided, well, that's fine, I'll just increase the number of Supreme Court justices to 19.
I'll have my Democrats in Congress do that, and then we'll see who has a majority and what's constitutional and what ain't.
And he basically stopped at no length to try to get this thing done, even after he was licked.
He was so confident that he could bribe congressmen to vote in his way that when he tried his court packing scheme to add six justices to the Supreme Court, thus giving him a majority where he could pack the court and get his programs declared constitutional, when he did that, he thought he could just bring congressmen and senators in one by one and lay some pork on them and get it through.
And oddly enough, some began to start resisting him.
They thought that this encroachment on the judicial branch was going too far.
And then when he tried to get the majority leader selected, and in fact did so through buying votes, an Illinois senator's votes, then we saw him encroaching on the legislative branch, and that's when the Senate began to draw the line, and they refused to adopt his court packing scheme.
It's really Franklin Roosevelt's biggest defeat that he experienced while president of the United States during his first two terms.
And as you point out, he could have very easily at this point been pushing through federal anti-lynching legislation at a time when there was, I think you say, a lynching and a half per month on average?
Yes.
That was an interesting discovery because I had thought Roosevelt was a little bit more sympathetic to black Americans, but he never once supported the anti-lynching laws.
And there were many Democrats in Congress who favored it, Senator Wagner from New York being a key one, but also anti-lynching became part of the Republican platform.
Every Republican senator was anxious to make lynching a federal offense because the states were not reacting appropriately with their justice on people who were lynching black Americans.
So Roosevelt absolutely refused to expend any political capital whatsoever to enact a federal anti-lynching law, and none was ever enacted.
If he had invested as much energy in trying to get an anti-lynching law passed as he did with trying to pack the Supreme Court, we would have had an anti-lynching law enacted.
Tell us about the National Recovery Administration and all the Tennessee Valley and all the public works and welfare for farmers to not grow crops and these things.
What exactly was going on in terms of new federal intervention in the economy?
If you can give us some illustrative examples.
Sure, Scott.
The National Recovery Act was where Roosevelt told businessmen, in effect, you can overcharge your customers.
You can charge what you think needs to be charged for the products you're selling.
Well, surprise, surprise, some businessmen decided to charge huge amounts for their product and what they came up with, the prices they came up with, were legally binding.
Well, when some businessmen said, wait, these are outrageous prices and tried to give discounts to the customers, after all, we're in a Great Depression.
When they tried to give discounts to customers, some were actually thrown in jail.
This was part of the tragedy.
When I did my chapter on the National Recovery Act, I read the BORA papers in the Library of Congress and you go through their 9,000 complaints by customers who are saying these guys are overcharging and often by businessmen who say, I'd like to give customers a discount, but I can't do so legally.
It's one of the real tragedies that we had under Roosevelt's administration and in all of American history.
Sending people to jail for giving discounts to customers, in the case of Jacob McGibb, he charged a nickel less than the prevailing National Recovery Act rate to press a pair of pants.
He charged $0.35 instead of the $0.40 rate and went to jail.
Isn't it the case that the Supreme Court, when they finally did give in, even though Roosevelt failed to increase the number of justices, they basically gave in to the threat and started ruling his way?
Wasn't the case that was the giant watershed precedent for the Commerce Clause a case where a guy grew wheat and fed it to his own family and was under arrest?
This is one of the most unbelievable Supreme Court cases we've ever had tried in American history.
Yes, Scott, Wickard v.
Fulburn is the name of that case.
We had a farmer growing wheat on his own property.
He was consuming it for his own use.
He was declared to be in violation of interstate trade because that wheat he grew for his own use potentially had an impact of affecting interstate trade and he was not allowed to do so.
When a case like that comes down the line, you know that the repressive arm of government is there and that we are in a dangerous situation.
Yes, I think it must have been that that Garrett Garrett was referring to when he said the revolution was and quit looking ahead.
This thing's already a fait accompli.
It's in the past.
It was saying songs of freedom in the night as it passed by and all that kind of thing.
I like Garrett Garrett and I wish that he would be here and I could discuss this book with him.
Yeah, that would be an interesting interview.
But you're doing as well as Garrett Garrett.
I like your questions, too.
Oh, well, thanks.
I like to think that he'd listen to the show at least occasionally.
And now so the FDIC is all important, too.
This is just a fact of life and it's a wonderful thing.
We all know, right, that the government, no matter if there's a tornado or a bank robbery or a fire or some terribly bad loans made by some businessmen, that our savings account, our checking account is always going to be there.
And even if our money disappears, the government insures it up to 100 grand.
And doesn't that provide great stability to the banking system?
And what could possibly be wrong with that?
The FDIC, oddly enough, is one of Roosevelt's better maneuvers, because that did have the effect of helping to stabilize the banking situation, at least in the short term.
Now, the problem we get into here is that the banks are not paying for the amount of insurance that they're receiving.
When we increase the amount of insurance from $10,000, you know, it starts at a low figure to $25,000, and then it goes up to $200,000.
I think it's $250,000 right now.
In any case, it's up there.
The banks are not paying adequately for this insurance, and so we have a situation where the taxpayers stand to be a loser on this if we're not careful.
Well, yeah, and it encourages bad behavior, right?
Exactly.
They kind of have to skate right on the red line every single, you know, closing time every night.
Well, it also doesn't give them an incentive to behave responsibly, because if you have the federal government ready to bail out all of your savers, then why not just have, say, a half percent reserve rate and just loan out all your money and try to make as much as you can?
Because if you have no reserve, the federal government will pay your savers if you go bankrupt.
So I'm not sure it creates a very good set of incentives for investors.
So the FDIC actually, as I say, in the short term, did good things for Roosevelt, but whether it will have long-term durability is not clear yet.
Well, now, here's the thing, too.
I've got to tell you, despite all the myth-making about the New Deal, you know, saving us from the Great Depression, the way I think I learned it as a youngster was that, well, there were a lot of long-lasting changes that the New Deal brought that were really good, but no, we concede it didn't really quite get us out of the Great Depression.
It was World War II, and that's what really saved us.
And I think I learned that from more or less liberal types, but this is certainly the line on Fox News nowadays, is that it wasn't the New Deal.
It was the war, World Wars.
That's how you end depressions, which, of course, they love.
Is that not, I mean, that is pretty much the case then, right?
Most historians believe exactly that, but that is that World War II got us out of the Great Depression.
If you think about that, that means that if we get into a depression, the sure way to get out is to build bombers and go over and drop them on some people, and then we're out of a depression.
The whole thing doesn't make sense that you destroy people, and that gives you out of a depression, especially when you're building products that have very little use usually in civilian times.
It's really an improbable scenario, and you're right, most historians accept that argument, but it's, I think, a very weak one.
Well, so then what did finally end the depression if it wasn't all that, I don't know exactly how they did it, just inflation or deficit spending, borrowed money to create all those planes and tanks and bring the unemployment rate down and get all those women out in the workforce like Rosie the Riveter and all these wonderful things?
That's not what saved us?
I mean, what are you talking about?
Yeah, you're asking a good question.
I had a quote here that you might be interested in, Scott, from Joseph Schumpeter, of course, Harvard economist, who was making a perceptive observation in the 1940s.
He said, the true costs of the war lie in the goods sphere, the used up goods, the devastation of parts of the country, the loss of manpower.
These are the real costs of war to the economies.
Like a huge conflagration, the war has devoured a huge part of our national wealth.
The economy has become poorer.
And Henry Hazlitt, an economist who was writing for the New York Times during World War II, said, no man burns down his own house on the theory that the need to build it will stimulate his energy.
And so the idea that we're going to be destroying things and that that's going to rebuild the economy is silly.
It's true that we do go down in unemployment, Scott, but that's because we are transferring people overseas into the war effort, and then we're paying their salaries, and then we have a huge national debt after World War II.
There are two questions here.
There's the political question, of course, and that relates to stopping Hitler.
And that's a separate question, because Hitler was a menace.
And a country could argue, of course, that he needs to be stopped.
That's fine.
But I'm just addressing the argument that the military aspect of this got us out of the Great Depression, and I think that's hogwash.
In fact, we loaned $50 billion to our allies during World War II, never were paid back, and that was 20% of our entire national debt after World War II.
Now, how does giving away 20% of the equivalent of your national debt going to get you out of a Great Depression?
That simply was taking capital and transferring it overseas.
We didn't get our World War I debts paid back, either.
So that's an ongoing problem that we had in both wars.
I did some calculation, too, Scott.
We had two people die and three Americans wounded every minute of World War II.
That's not exactly a way you get out of a depression.
Two Americans killed, three wounded every minute.
So the argument I think that works best for, you know, you're asking, well, what did get us out?
When Roosevelt died, that actually, Truman changed direction a little bit, and that gave investors more confidence.
The income tax was slightly cut down.
Unions were restricted by the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Republicans got control of Congress in 1946 and promised to pass laws that were more sympathetic to investors.
These kinds of events gave investors more confidence, and I think that goes a long way.
Bob Higgs, have you read Bob Higgs' material on this, Scott?
Sure, Depression War and Cold War.
That's a wonderful book, isn't it?
Oh, yeah, Bob Higgs is the greatest.
That book is helpful because he points out in that book that the polls that were taken in Fortune Magazine and other magazines of World War II that asked businessmen, do you think it's a good time to invest, that most businessmen said, absolutely not, when Roosevelt was president.
And after he was gone, they said, well, maybe we have someone here who's not going to attack us so much and raise our taxes.
Well, and it kind of really was a change in power, too.
I'm not exactly sure all the names and dates and relationships and so forth, but it sort of seems like FDR and his buddy Harry Hopkins were very much pro-Soviet, at least not necessarily turning America into the U.S.S.
A., but only halfway.
But in terms of international relations, it seems like Truman's set was a more right-wing set, the kind of people who were more likely to hire former Nazis and gear us up for a more kind of right-wing, corporatist Cold War situation.
I guess that is still the legacy of Roosevelt and the military industrial complex that grew up to fight his war.
Well, I think so.
We were locked into that after World War II for all the pluses and minuses.
That gets to be a complicated question because I guess we'll never know to what extent the Cold War was helpful in resisting the Soviet Union or not.
To the extent that you believe the Cold War did help resist the Soviet Union and that they might have prevailed internationally, then you say, well, maybe it was worth it.
But maybe it wasn't.
It's not easy to calculate that.
It's not easy to calculate that.
But one thing we do know is that for World War II, we became much more internationalist.
And a lot of that resulted in a huge amount of federal spending, and taxpayers are going to have to pay for it.
And that will end your regime uncertainty, right?
If you know that you and your senator buddy are going to make sure that you get to keep selling airplanes or bombs or whatever it is to the government for the indefinite future, then that's the end of all that shakiness revealed in the fortune poll you referred to.
Right.
It is.
And we become a very different nation after the war, don't we?
Yeah, it sure seems like it.
And this is really where I started with that hyperbole about, I really think that this is the founding myth of the society that we now live in, what Garrett Garrett called ex-America.
Yes, and Garrett Garrett lived through that time.
You know, the rationing, it's hard.
One of the reasons historians have not written much on the domestic scene in World War II is because it's tricky to write on.
We had price controls from September 1942 on.
But then you have the rationing of meat, butter, sugar, coffee, shoes, gasoline, and all of that.
And yet you still had to pay for those products.
And it's hard to come up with calculations on to what extent consumer demand was was affected by all this.
And of course, so much of the economy was geared toward making war material that it's hard to make the kinds of computations that Bob Higgs and others like to make to measure the difficulties that we faced during World War II.
All right, everyone, that's Burton Folsom.
The book is New Deal or Raw Deal, How FDR's Economic Legacy Has Damaged America.
He's a professor at Hillsdale College.
Thanks so much for your time on the show today, Burr.
Thank you for having me, Scott.
I enjoyed it a lot.