Sorry, I'm late.
I had to stop by the Whites Museum again and give the finger to FDR.
We know Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, is supporting the opposition in Syria.
Are we supporting Al-Qaeda in Syria?
It's a proud day for America.
And by God, we've kicked Vietnam syndrome once and for all.
Thank you very, very much.
I say it, I say it again, you've been had.
You've been took.
You've been hoodwinked.
These witnesses are trying to simply deny things that just about everybody else accepts as fact.
He came, he saw us, he died.
We ain't killing they army, but we killing them.
We be on CNN like, say our name, Ben, say it, say it three times.
The meeting of the largest armies in the history of the world.
Then there's going to be an invasion.
All right, you guys, introducing Jonathan Fenton Harvey.
He is an independent journalist who writes for a great number of publications, including Al-Arabi and Middle East Eye and trtworld.com and others.
This one at Al-Arabi.co.uk is called Trump's pandering to Saudi Arabia is tearing the Middle East apart.
I had noticed that.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing, Jonathan?
I'm great.
Thanks, Scott.
Thanks for having me again.
Happy to have you here.
And yeah, you're right about that.
It seems like, I don't know, I think this is usually overstated that Obama was leaning back toward Iran.
It seemed like he was slightly opening up the possibility of another president in the future to start leaning toward Iran or something.
But there's no balance whatsoever when it comes to the new guy here, huh?
Yeah, absolutely.
He's been a bit more full on and open about his support for Saudi Arabia over Iran and particularly his condemnation and increased antagonism towards Iran.
I think that has definitely been a big increase, though, particularly if you look at how much increased influence that Saudi Arabia actually has on the U.S.
And that is definitely an increasing trend of closer ties between the two.
And now, so what all has that meant in practice other than continuing Obama's war in Yemen and, well, as you say, cranking up tensions with Iran?
But, you know, pulling out of the JCPOA, that's really a lot more about Israel than Saudi, right?
Yeah, well, I've been looking particularly with Trump's relations with Saudi Arabia regarding this, and it seems that there is a lot of alignment between the two, particularly looking at Iran.
And statistically, Trump has actually sold a lot more weapons to Saudi Arabia or increased weapon sales towards Riyadh.
And there has been more direct intervention from Trump towards issues like Yemen, where Saudi Arabia is supposedly fighting a battle against an Iran proxy.
Well, that's what they say.
That's their official line.
And it looks like Trump overall is trying to follow Saudi Arabia's line a lot more openly than Obama has at least, at least openly.
So, like I said, it seems like there is more kind of an alignment between the two.
And it's quite obvious if you look at the statistics and Trump's open rhetoric about Iran and similar issues.
Well, you know, one thing about Trump is some of the time, at least he's honest.
And he comes right out and says things like, well, listen, they pay us a lot of money for weapons and we like money.
And so that's why we have to keep doing this.
We all kind of knew that was a lot of what this is about anyway.
But so says the president of the United States.
Yeah, absolutely.
He's not very, he doesn't beat around the bush, does he?
He just likes to try to say how he feels it is anyway.
And even worse than that, I remember he said that he needs to keep, well, the US needs to keep selling weapons to Saudi Arabia.
Otherwise, thousands of American jobs will be lost.
So that right there shows his priorities, that he is focusing more on economic interests when it comes to weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, rather than human rights and a sensible foreign policy.
And I think that's why Saudi Arabia has a lot more influence over this particular administration, incidentally.
Because if you look at lobbying efforts from Saudi Arabia, there has been a noticeable increase under Trump of Saudi lobbying money, particularly from the UAE as well.
That's also something I follow quite closely.
So it shows that Trump is more willing to accept lobbying and money, well, putting money and business first over anything else.
And that has clearly got him in a lot of trouble.
Yeah, it's funny, you know, in a conversation with Chuck Todd recently, I'm pretty sure he was defending his Korea policy from criticism that it was naive or something.
And he invoked the military-industrial complex by name from the other point of view and said, listen, there is a military-industrial complex in this town and they like war.
And don't kid yourself, there's a big push against anything that would help make peace anywhere.
Chuck Todd could have said, is that the same one that you invoke all the time as your excuse for the genocide in Yemen?
But he's not really quick on his feet, that one.
No, absolutely.
Well, either way, it seems like Trump is putting a lot more emphasis on economic development rather than anything else.
Well, supposed short-term gains.
And obviously, like you said, the people of Yemen are suffering a lot from that.
It's harder to memorize all the excuses.
You might as well just stick with it.
The real story is money.
And so, yes, speaking of which, is the war in Yemen and the recent attacks on the Aramco facilities there in Saudi Arabia claimed by the Houthis and yet blamed by the Americans on the Iranians.
What do you think?
Well, of course, that's going to be Trump's initial stance, particularly to blame Iran, particularly as we said, he is taking more of an antagonistic stance towards the Islamic Republic.
And quite shockingly, I'm sure you'd agree on this, Scott, it was quite bad how he said that he would leave the decision up to Riyadh.
He would wait to hear their call on it, even though they are trying to, at the same time, get Washington to take a harder stance on Iran.
So that just shows openly that Trump is trying to give more influence and power to Saudi Arabia.
And that's exactly what's happened.
He's trusting them too much.
And that's why I was arguing in that article for Al-Arabi that the reason there is more increased antagonism in the Middle East region and polarization between two, well, between increasing sides is because Trump is putting too much trust and emphasis on Saudi Arabia's narrative.
So that's a big problem.
Hang on just one second.
Hey, guys, I got to tell you about WallStreetWindow.com.
It's the great Mike Swanson.
He made a killing on Wall Street back in the day, and now he sells advice for reasonable prices.
You need to know what to do to protect your assets.
WallStreetWindow.com.
Hey, guys, I know you're going to love Will Grigg's new book we just published at the Libertarian Institute, No Quarter, The Ravings of William Norman Grigg.
It's wonderful.
It's terrible.
It's devastating.
You'll laugh.
You'll get angry.
You'll miss him.
You'll be inspired to fight for freedom.
With perfect cover art by Scott Alberts and a brilliant introduction by Will's great friend and protege Thomas R. Edlum, it is a fitting legacy for a brilliant man and nearly tireless defender of liberty.
Get No Quarter, The Ravings of William Norman Grigg in paperback or Kindle on Amazon.com.
All right, now, so you have this other important piece about the UAE and China, but as a segue there, let's just talk about Saudi and the UAE and their joint mission, this horrible war in Yemen, where the UAE is now somewhat backing down.
I think they're still backing a lot of mercenaries there, but supposedly they pulled their main military force back.
And there's been a big clash between Saudi and UAE over who to support in the south and the southern secessionists and the Muslim Brotherhood and Hadi and all these things.
So what do you make of all of that?
Well, just to start with the UAE's, well news about the UAE's military drawdown, as you said, the key word is supposedly.
So at first they withdrew their troops from fighting the Houthis in certain parts of the west of Yemen, particularly against Hodeidah, where the Houthis still have a lot of control.
Even then, for starters, one, the UAE retained a lot of its military presence in other parts of the country, like some less significant, but still important bases for them.
And two, they have not halted any support for the secessionist militias and the Southern Transitional Council, which is the political body seeking to claim an independent South Yemen and rule over it by force at the moment.
And that just shows that their so-called withdrawal is an illusion, as I've argued in previous pieces.
Now onto the Saudi and UAE rivalry.
I think that while they do have differences in the ideal government they would like to support, as I've argued recently, I think a lot of their supposed divisions are over-exaggerated.
For example, they came into the conflict trying to fight the Houthis and push them out of different parts of Yemen.
Since the Arab Spring took place in Yemen as well, since they had their revolution, it looks like Yemen was moving closer towards democracy and independence from outside interference from other Gulf states.
Now the thing that Saudi Arabia and the UAE fear the most is an independent democratic state nearby.
So they've both been working together to kind of crush this potential threats of independence from within the country.
So they've tried to upset the Arab Spring and Yemen revolution.
And I don't think that any political divisions they have in Yemen, the parties they would like to support, is significant enough to drive them apart.
As you see, they've still issued statements supporting each other and claiming that they both want to work together to solve the differences.
And if you look at the wider regional issues and wider security concerns, I still think that they are largely unified on many of these issues and that alliance is otherwise quite important for them.
So I think any differences that they do have, they will work around it, as they have in the past in Yemen incidentally.
Now, this is just a side point, but it kind of seems important, even though it is just a figure of speech or something.
But after four and a half, almost five years, really, of Houthi control of Sana'a, they're still called rebels.
But what makes them rebels when they succeeded in seizing the capital city and the administration of the government almost five years ago?
And then meanwhile, you got Hadi living in a hotel room in Riyadh, and he and his Muslim Brotherhood friends, they're the legitimate official government of the country, even though they're no such thing.
Or am I wrong about that?
I know the STC controls areas in the south, the UAE armed forces controls areas in the south and can keep the Houthis out.
But does Hadi really even have a force in the country at all?
Well, from what I figured out from speaking to many different Yemenis as individuals, Hadi is largely not considered representative of Yemeni society now, particularly as many people tend to identify within the region within Yemen rather than a kind of unified government.
The idea of a unified state of Yemen is only a recent thing.
Remember, it was only formed in 1990.
And since Hadi hasn't been representing Yemenis since he was exiled all those years ago, well, after the Houthi insurgency, he hasn't obviously been able to provide any kind of state or life for Yemenis.
And like you said, he doesn't have much of a military force in the country.
Even before the STC coup in August, the STC's military wing, the security belt, which is backed by the UAE as well, were the largest force on the ground in terms of numbers and strength as well.
So that's why they have failed to control this coup, why the STC was able to seize Aden quite, well, not easily, but swiftly.
Swifter than what you would expect from a coup like that.
So really, Hadi, it is safe to say that he doesn't have much legitimacy in Yemen now.
And the Houthis, while many people, many Yemenis I've spoke to don't consider them, well, if they're considered a far from ideal faction to rule over people, especially in the north, they are still quite a dominant force there.
If you look at how they are a stronger force and they know how to operate within Yemen.
So that's why Saudi Arabia has failed to contain them.
Yeah, it's not to praise them to say that the reality is real, that they have won the war thus far for control over the capital city.
It's like pretending that Shanghai Shek is really the ruler of mainland China when, okay, you wish he was and you're still recognizing his government as the official government of China.
But we're not really in denial, are we, about whether or not Mao rules the mainland?
You know what I mean?
How long are we going to continue to believe that Shanghai Shek is really the boss of this country that he does not control?
That thing is ridiculous.
Yeah, absolutely.
So that's one thing that Saudi Arabia will have to look at now.
Not only the fact that the Houthis have been able to consolidate their rule in the north because of their failed bombing campaign.
It's not just semantics, right?
I mean, the point is that the mission is to reinstall Hadi in power.
And they don't have a better excuse for the war than that that's what they're trying to accomplish.
And yet they cannot accomplish that.
Yeah, well, really, for Saudi Arabia now, Hadi just acts as a force to give them legitimacy to intervene in Yemen, because he is considered the UN-recognized president.
That has given them legitimacy to bomb Yemen to pieces, pretty much.
And that's the end in itself?
I mean, do they even have another mission?
Yeah, they do as well.
I think their main aim is to make Yemen divided.
Well, not literally divided between the south at the moment, but they want to keep Yemen weak and more dependent on Saudi Arabia's influence.
There are some historical elements that could be argued, because when Saudi Arabia was founded as a kingdom, they did try to literally conquer Yemen.
So there could be some historical arguments being made there.
But I think for now, at least, as I argued earlier, Saudi Arabia just wants to keep Yemen weak and not independent.
And Saudi Arabia has also been trying to invest in Yemen more and control logistical ports.
So that is a clear sign that it is trying to keep Yemen dependent on its own influence.
And now, well, but I mean, the stated goal is still to win the war at some point, something like that.
I've read a few articles that said that there was some dissent inside the royal family in Saudi Arabia.
This Operation Decisive Storm was supposed to be over really quickly.
It was launched by this inexperienced young deputy crown prince at the time.
Deputy, now Crown Prince Bonesaw there, Mohammed bin Salman.
And I guess I haven't heard much talk recently about him being marginalized, and them bringing his cousin back or anything like that.
But it must be reflecting badly on him now as much as it helped him politically when he launched it, right?
Absolutely.
Well, if you look at many factors, I mean, Saudi Arabia has been trying to carry out this Vision 2030, where it's diversifying its economy.
And therefore, it needs to attract investors into the country and create a more liberal image.
But then after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi and other issues, as well as Yemen, such as the blockade on Qatar and kidnapping the Lebanese Prime Minister, all of these really have a lot to do with Saudi Arabia.
All of this really hurts his image as being a reformist.
And that's going to have long term implications for Saudi Arabia's attempts to reform itself and meet its economic goals.
Especially if you look at the fact now that the Houthis have started firing into Saudi territory, regardless of whether or not they did the recent attack on the oil facilities.
There have been other missile attacks.
So that's going to create an impression that Saudi Arabia is not completely secure.
Well, and you know, I talked with Nasser Arabi, the great reporter out of Sinan.
He told me that the Houthis have said explicitly that they had help from Saudi Shiites.
That, you know, that was the explanation for how they were able to do it.
No Iran required in the loop at all, really.
Iran does have some support for them.
And there are some, there are some ideological support, but calling them a Shia proxy, as you might see in some news outlets is definitely an over exaggeration.
Well, talk about that a little bit more, would you?
Because just like with the Houthi rebels, we're just goes without saying that these guys are rebels, no matter what they do or how long they control the capital here.
Everybody knows that they're Iran backed, they're the Iran backed Houthis, Iran backed this, Iran backed that, Iran backed every time.
So how true is that?
Well, it definitely creates a big misrepresentation of a conflict.
If you just went through, if you judged Yemen based on what you'd seen in some mainstream media outlets, you would just think it's a Sunni Shia proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
That would be the best way to summarise it.
But that's obviously not true.
The Houthis emerged before Iran started getting involved in the region more in 1994.
There are some historical elements to look at as well, particularly as the Zaidi community in Yemen, which is a lot of it's contained in the north, they were considered marginalised by Saudi Arabia's policies in the north when they were supporting the Yemeni Arab Republic.
So the Houthis were considered by some analysts to have emerged from that.
So really, they are quite a localised faction.
Although as they have been more marginalised and blockaded from the conflict, and since Iran have as well, all of this has pushed the two closer together, in my opinion.
If you look at what Trump has been doing to isolate Iran more and what Saudi Arabia has been pushing for in Yemen and against Iran.
Yeah, and you know what, going forward?
I don't know.
It doesn't seem like the Houthis will ever be what they used to be this small faction, hiding in the mountain or I don't know, hiding, but dwelling in the mountains in the north in their own little territory bribed by the Saudis to mind their own business most of the time.
And there's, it's gonna be really hard to put this genie back in that bottle.
So from the strategic point of view over at the think tank, well, we can't just let Iran dominate the southwest corner of Arabia, we have to keep this genocide going until they're all dead.
Yeah, well, what Saudi Arabia has tried to contain has actually expanded and come back at it because the Houthis are more dominant now in the north than they've ever been.
This was growing a lot since 2004 when they first launched conflicts against the US backed government of Ali Abdullah Saleh.
But now because of the war and because there has been a lot of instability from the conflict, particularly as Saudi Arabia's bombing campaign has destroyed the Yemeni state effectively, the Houthis actually have more room to manoeuvre.
So Saudi Arabia has actually given them more freedom to operate and expand.
So that is definitely something that a massive strategic failure from Riyadh.
Yeah, well, we can't quit now.
We've got to double down.
As Hillary Clinton says, when you find yourself in a hole, you better grab a shovel and start digging.
She really did say that.
So now I'm sorry, because we have some time left, but not that much.
But talk about the UAE and their rise here overall in the region and their power relative to Saudi and their expanding relationships.
I think you mentioned Libya in here, but especially with China, as you write about here in Middle East Eye.
So the UAE is obviously a young country, but it has expanded and grown massively in its economic prowess, particularly after the Arab Spring.
It looked to become more interventionist across the region and gain more influence.
I believe you could say it is trying to build a regional empire, gaining more influence across different parts of the region by interfering in the government, each government's politics.
To secure its own geopolitical dominance.
So while some observers embraced the Arab Spring, the UAE was particularly fearful of it.
Because if there were too many democratic reforms and too much empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood, that could lead to reforms in the UAE or calls for reforms.
So that's what the UAE is afraid of.
And now this is really important, right?
That their problem wasn't, oh, they're protecting modernity from Islamism.
It was that they're protecting their own power from the vote.
Yeah, exactly.
Because the Muslim Brotherhood, what's wrong with them is they want to stand for election and see if they can win.
And that's really dangerous.
And it sets a terrible precedent for other factions too.
Well, one prominent Emirati minister actually admitted a while ago that if there was an election in the UAE, at the time he said it, the Muslim Brotherhood would win.
So that's why they're afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy all across the region.
Because it would upset not only their desired regional order, which gives them more influence, but also it would upset their political system at home.
And it would lead to massive changes.
So that's why they have aggressively tried to clamp down on democracy and support traditional reactionary authoritarian leaders in different countries.
So they've bankrolled the coup in Egypt.
They tried to crack down on reform calls in Sudan recently by empowering the military.
And they've supported Khalifa Haftar in Libya.
And in Tunisia as well, they've tried to support political figures from the old regime before their revolution, which is relatively successful compared to other countries.
So this is quite indicative of a clear, assertive foreign policy where they are trying to reshape the region for their own interests.
And then so talk to us a little bit for give us a minute on China here.
So it seems like China and the UAE are having a mutually beneficial relationship, both of their own economic expansion.
Obviously, China is willing to support any country in the Middle East region, as long as it can provide economic benefits.
And the UAE sees that as more leverage to carry out its own regional expansion.
So there is clearly a mutually beneficial relationship where they could end up supporting mutual sides across the region.
And meanwhile, the UAE gives consent for China's crackdown on its Muslim population.
So that is definitely bad benefits for both sides in this relationship.
Yeah.
Well, and now, so the American fear then, of course, would be that the Chinese want to militarily dominate the region, but are they doing anything but shaking hands and paying cash here?
Well, that's mostly what they're aiming to do.
They're trying to gain economic dominance across the region, mostly just for their own economic and political benefits, rather than trying to bring about positive investments in the region.
And that's actually in the long term, I believe, giving them more influence in the region over the US because investment is something that America has failed to largely do across the region.
So China is more accepted with its presence because of that.
It's able to win over governments because of its economic prowess.
Yep.
Well, as Ron Paul always says, a communist, so-called communist Chinese are our banker most of the time.
They do a lot of their investing here, too.
So what would we do without them?
Yeah, exactly.
UAE, too.
All right.
Well, listen, thank you so much for your time again on the show today, Jonathan.
I really appreciate it.
Thanks.
It's been a pleasure.
All right, you guys, that's Jonathan Fenton Harvey.
He writes for Middle East Eye and for Al Arabi.co.uk.
This one is called Trump's pandering to Saudi Arabia is tearing the Middle East apart.
And this one at the Middle East Eye is called how ties with China bolster the UAE's bid for regional dominance.
All right, y'all.
Thanks.
Find me at libertarianinstitute.org, at scotthorton.org, antiwar.com and reddit.com slash Scott Horton Show.
Oh, yeah.
And read my book, Fool's Errand, Timed and the War in Afghanistan at foolserrand.us.
