All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show.
I'm the Director of the Libertarian Institute, Editorial Director of Antiwar.com, author of the book Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan, and the brand new Enough Already, Time to End the War on Terrorism, and I've recorded more than 5,500 interviews since 2003, almost all on foreign policy, and all available for you at scotthorton.org.
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All right, you guys, introducing William Hartung.
He is the Director of the Arms and Security Program at the Center for International Policy, and is the author of Inside the ICBM Lobby.
Special Interests or National Interest?
And there's an excerpt from that new book at Arms Control Association, that is armscontrol.org.
And the article is also called Inside the ICBM Lobby, Special Interests or the National Interest?
Welcome back to the show.
How you doing, William?
Good, good.
How are you?
I'm doing great.
Good to talk to you again.
And I just love this subject.
It's everybody's favorite subject.
The, as you call them, pork barrel politics behind America's hydrogen bomb policy.
What fun.
It's the kind of thing that I guess maybe won't surprise people that that's how it works, but they might have never thought of it that way.
I guess I'm thinking back to when I was a kid.
I'm being redundant from previous interviews, but that's okay.
I remember thinking that there was something like a demand for nukes, and the government needed a certain amount, they thought, and then they had these companies make them for them, something like that.
It really does work the other way around, huh?
The companies tell the Congress how many H-bombs they need, tell the military how many H-bombs they need, and how many different kinds of which sorts of missiles, and the tail wags the dog the whole time.
Is that it?
Well, it's kind of symbiotic.
I mean, you know, the Pentagon has a big ambitious plan.
Congress doesn't stand in the way because of the lobby.
The companies do some of the studies to decide how many we need.
There's people from government lobbying for these companies, people from the companies going inside the Pentagon and even running the Pentagon.
So yeah, it's kind of hand in glove.
Now that makes sense if we're just talking about, I don't know, F-35s or literal combat ships or whichever turkey you want to point and laugh at.
But H-bombs, why, those things are serious business, right?
And I don't just mean in a money sense, but you can kill a whole city with just one.
Well, yeah.
So different rules should apply, but they don't.
I would think for our own safety, we'd want them to decide on the merits and on the merits we should be getting rid of these things if we want to be safe, you know.
Yeah.
Now in this article, you kind of take an all other things being equal approach.
In other words, you're not advocating necessarily getting rid of all nukes, at least in this piece.
But you're saying we would just fine with submarines and or with air power, but without land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles at all.
Is that right?
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, the problem with the ICBMs is they're vulnerable.
They'd be the first thing to be attacked.
The president would have a few minutes to decide, is this a real attack?
Is this a false alarm?
And to launch the thing.
So they, you know, as William Perry, the former defense secretary under Clinton said, there's some of the most dangerous weapons in the world because they could trigger an accidental nuclear war.
So it's hard to make gradations among nuclear weapons that can end life as we know it.
But within that kind of universe, the ICBMs are probably the riskiest of the bunch.
In other words, it makes a real qualitative difference.
The fact that our submarines are undersea and can hide and cannot readily be found and don't pose the same even kind of family of category of risk that the ICBMs do.
Is that right?
Yeah, exactly.
And the same thing for the airpower.
I mean, the Russians can find our bombers, can't they?
Yes.
I mean, they can put them on alert, which makes it much harder.
And I mean, the main thing about the bombers is you have time to recall them if you made a mistake.
You know, whereas the ICBM, it's launched, it's launched, and that's, you know, the end of it.
Right.
Yeah.
There's no self-destruct or recall button on those things, right?
No.
You'd think they might have thought of that, but I guess not.
Well, it's funny.
I was on a show with an arms lobbyist at some point, which is always fun.
And he was talking about shoulder-fired missiles, which had fallen into the hands of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.
And he said, oh, yeah, we can destroy those from a distance.
That's not a problem, which he was completely making up.
But it's along the lines of that concept, you know, sort of the self-destruct mechanism.
And, you know, on a Stinger is one thing, but on an H-bomb, on an intercontinental ballistic missile, you know, that's, yeah.
Honestly, it wouldn't make sense, I guess, to put one of those on a Stinger, even if you're giving it to the Mujahideen just for cost-effective purposes or whatever.
But on an ICBM, I don't know.
I think that seems reasonable if you're going to have these things, that you would have an oops, change my mind switch on the thing, no?
Yeah, I never thought of that.
And I don't know what the thinking is in the nuclear kind of elite planning class about that, you know.
But anyway, so I've had Tom Colina on the show numerous times, and he specializes in popularizing the theory of the nuclear sponge about how the nuclear policy that these, I don't know, University of Chicago kooks or I don't know who comes up with this stuff, the game theory, you know, experts have decided that what we need to do is we need to have all these ICBMs to draw Russian fire.
So if we have a war with them, that they will have to waste so many of their H-bombs taking out our H-bombs in the middle of the country, in the Dakotas and Colorado and Nebraska and Montana and so forth there that the coasts will be spared.
Good for them, which, of course, is crazy, because if there was a full scale nuclear war with Russia, of course, they would nuke New York and D.C. and Charlotte and wherever on the East Coast to, you know what I mean?
But Baltimore and whatever.
But that's the theory, the nuclear sponge.
Let's draw Russian fire.
And so does that play into the lobbying at all?
Do they talk about that specifically?
Like, yes, that's what we want to do.
Well, they don't put it in that sort of stark terms, but basically they make the same argument that the proponents of the nuclear triad, that we need bombers, we need land based missiles, we need missiles launched from submarines.
It's like, you know, if we got rid of the ICBMs, then we wouldn't be drawing away that huge part of the other side's arsenal.
And then it could somehow attempt to first strike, you know, they can't find the submarines.
So it sort of factors in, but they don't sort of take it to the next logical step, which is that they're basically saying they're guaranteeing that they're going to sacrifice the people of a whole part of the country in service of this crazy strategy.
So they kind of kind of work around that.
But they're making the same argument.
All right.
And then as far as the vulnerability, it really goes in practice.
That means that they are permanently on high alert in a way that the bombers and the submarines are not.
Is that correct?
Yeah.
It's the decision time.
You know, people have used different numbers, but, you know, some estimates as low as, you know, seven to 10 minutes, depends on when you have to decide whether to launch the missiles.
Whereas on a submarine, they can sort of decide when to do it because they're not going to be destroyed.
And bombers, should they survive, you can recall them.
So it's, yeah, it's sort of unique to the land-based missiles, this kind of time crunch, which is what increases the risk of a mistake.
And how many of these things are there deployed in the U.S.?
Well, there's now 400.
There used to be many more in the 60s, and they sort of negotiated them down.
Before the New START treaty, there were 450.
And they may well have gone lower than that.
But the ICBM lobby said, oh, no, you know, we need these things.
400 is enough to maintain three separate ICBM bases, which is what part of the goal was.
So Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota.
They were afraid if they went down further under New START, one of those bases would get eliminated.
So the whole, you know, local jobs, pork barrel angle, came heavily into play.
All right, back to that in one sec.
But then I think the kind of what makes this timely right now is that they're pushing for a whole new generation, not just of nuclear bombs and warheads, but they want to replace all the missiles they've got with a brand new, you know, replace the Minuteman with something else.
Yeah, which in typical Pentagon jargon, which is supposed to kind of conceal more than it reveals, it's called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent or GBSD, which doesn't sound so threatening, really.
You know, it's like, oh, OK, whatever that is, so be it.
But in fact, you know, as I mentioned, it's one of the most dangerous weapons in the world because of this risk of accidental war.
But yeah, they want to spend over $100 billion just buying the missiles, and then it'll cost another $164 billion to sustain and maintain, keep them at the ready to be launched.
So it's a serious chunk of change, and it's part of a larger buildup, $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years for the land-based missiles, the bombers, new ballistic missile submarines, new warheads.
So they're basically modernizing every element of the nuclear arsenal if they're allowed to do so.
And you know, for people paying attention, that was $1 trillion when Barack Obama announced it.
Now they call it $1.7 trillion, but it'll probably be $3 trillion or $4 trillion by the time they're done.
And that includes like completely redoing Sandia and Lawrence Livermore and who am I leaving out the other major one over there out west?
So yeah, there's Sandia, and then they're building a whole new factory in South Carolina to help make the plutonium cores of the H-bomb.
And by some estimates, that could cost $20 billion all by itself.
So yeah, they're throwing a lot of money at this.
An unbelievable amount of money.
Hold on just one second.
Be right back.
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Now, let's get into the racket, and I love the way you write, you name names like you should, of the senators and the congressmen and the companies involved in this.
It really is essentially just a scam as much as any other kind of racket involved with big companies and government contracts, whether it's Halliburton building army bases, or I think even Lockheed had a great scam administering the federal welfare program there for a while and cashing in on large percentages the whole time, that kind of thing.
This is really no different, it's just H-bombs.
They could kill every single last one of us with this thing, but that aside, it's all in a day's work, it seems like.
Yeah, it's like the same methods apply regardless of the product that they're trying to push, and that's what makes it so dangerous.
Yeah.
All right, so tell us about these senators so that the listeners who have these senators as their senators might make it known that they disagree with being a nuclear sponge.
Well, the senators from Utah, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, which is where the ICBM bases are as well as in Utah, a lot of development-related work, including Northrop Grumman's new headquarters for its new ICBM program.
So those senators form the ICBM coalition.
They got about $1.2 million over the last five cycles from the major contractors that are building this thing.
So Northrop Grumman's in the lead, but you've got Lockheed Martin involved, you've got General Dynamics, you've got Raytheon Technologies, a company called Aerojet, plus some construction contractors like Bechtel.
So it's a big gravy train for these companies, and they want to keep the money flowing.
And since these senators are their biggest defenders on the Hill, even after New START when they decided they only needed 400 instead of 450, they wouldn't let them destroy the other silos.
They said, well, what if we build up again?
We need those things.
We're not going to let you get rid of them.
So any little even kind of microscopic change in ICBM policy, these senators are on the case.
And so this money is kind of a reward for that, because they don't need to persuade them.
They've already got this pork barrel interest in this stuff.
But then there's the Defense Appropriations Committees in both houses, and there's the Strategic Forces Committees on the Armed Services.
And those folks got $15 million.
And some of them may not be as committed to this because it's not in their state.
They don't have an economic interest.
They might actually step back and say, well, you know, why are we doing this?
So in that case, that money really is to some degree trying to secure or win over support for some of those members, although a lot of them choose those committees because they have some economic interest in some part of the nuclear or arsenal or the larger military production budget.
Hey, tell me this.
Do any of these politicians ever go against the nuclear weapons lobby at all, like for a principal reason ever?
Yeah, there are members.
Representative Garamendi from California has a bill to stop funding for the new ICBM.
There's a related separate bill by Ro Khanna from California and Markey from Massachusetts also to strip out funding.
Markey's got a bigger bill that would kind of roll back the whole nuclear modernization plan.
But it's tough sledding to get support.
You know, Khanna's bill lost in committee last year and Northrop Grumman was heavily involved in twisting arms on that.
Kind of a small victory was Adam Smith, head of Armed Services, voted to cut a billion dollars from the program.
So that was an interesting twist, because normally the chair kind of goes along with whatever the Pentagon and the Air Force are pushing.
So, you know, there are some members, but they're in the minority and and they're, you know, they're facing a challenge to really kind of stop any of this stuff.
There's even they've got a sea launch cruise missile with a low yield nuclear warhead that would come off of attack submarines.
Even the Navy is questioning whether this is a good idea.
But Biden chose to build it, even though it was a Trump innovation on this already massive nuclear budget.
And even that is going to be a tough fight, you know, to get rid of that.
And it's only at the moment $15 million, which is not even change you could find in the couch for the Pentagon.
But of course, once it gets rolling, there'll be billions to be had.
And so, yeah, yeah.
The whole, you know, nuclear arsenal is a difficult thing to fight, in significant part because of the money.
And now, can you elaborate a little bit about that arm twisting?
Because, you know, paying a bunch of money and hiring up some lobbyists is one thing, but really kind of going to war over one specific vote and working really hard on that is that kind of sounds like there might be some anecdotes there, you know?
Well, it's interesting.
They're hard to get because members and staffers don't like to talk about it.
Even the ones that are for it, you know, for cutting this stuff, don't really like to give too much detail about what the lobbyists are saying, when they're coming in, sort of how they're twisting ours.
But basically, it's usually either a form of jobs blackmail.
It's like, hey, there's 10,000 jobs associated with this thing at the early stage, some of them in your state.
Do you want to stand up in front of your constituents and say, I voted against jobs in my district?
So that's a huge thing.
And they make these maps, you know, where they show, they carry them around with them.
You know, they show, well, you know, here's the number of jobs in your state.
Here's the facility here, another one there.
So there's that.
I mean, the money itself is almost just like a, you know, a handshake or a door opener because, you know, the arms industry spends tens of millions every year, but it's much less than, say, pharmaceutical industry or banking or others.
But they've got the jobs argument.
They've got the argument kind of wrapping themselves in the flag.
They've got the role in being on these committees that decide strategy or having former employees do it for them.
So they've got a lot of, you know, a lot of in their quiver in terms of ways to go at this.
And then, of course, there's the general argument of, you know, do you hate America and want us to be defenseless?
And they're not above using that.
A lot of that they do by funding think tanks, which advocate for the nuclear buildup, as opposed to, you know, the CEO of Northrop Grumman going on TV and saying, oh, yeah, let's build more of these because that's such an obvious conflict.
But when it comes out of, you know, someplace like the Hudson Institute or the Lexington Institute or someplace that sounds like, oh, well, they've you know, they're a think tank.
They've taken an objective look at this.
They've decided we need these.
And in fact, you know, they're on the payroll of the companies that profit from this.
Mm hmm.
Yeah.
And that jobs argument especially really works.
There's the old George Carlin routine about NIMBY.
It's that military bases will say, oh, I'll take a little radiation if I can get a job.
And then, you know, because that's kind of how screwed we all are.
These are the choices we're left to make, I think, is how he ends that.
And then I got to find that.
Yeah, that's great.
Yeah, I think it's jamming in New York, either jamming in New York or doing it again, maybe I'd have to look anyways.
But well, you know what?
I'll even Google it while you're talking in a second.
But the jobs thing, that's bogus, right?
I mean, that's the whole deal is these there's a lot of appropriations here, but the base themselves are just a black hole.
It's not like it's an investment in business for people who are producing goods and services that people want on the market.
So there's no improved standard of living and no in other words, they can point at the diner across the street from the base and say, oh, this diner is so dependent on this base.
But in what world is a base a better money making business than business?
Yeah, and they've, you know, there's been some about three dozen cases where bases have closed around the country, and they put in commuter airports, they put in industrial parks, sometimes they make them parks if they're not completely polluted, community colleges.
And in these three dozen cases that the Pentagon studied and then actually hasn't publicly released this thing, but I got a copy of it.
There were 150,000 net new jobs compared to what had existed when there were military bases in these areas.
So there's better uses of that land and of that, you know, of resources.
And a lot of it can come from private investment.
Some of it might be other government activities that have some sort of spinoff better than, you know, digging holes in the ground.
Yeah.
And, you know, I noticed in your article, you cited a study by the government itself or a congressional, oh, the Pentagon's Office of Economic Adjustment here.
But I wanted to mention the Cato Institute.
Christopher Preble has done a lot of work on this, which I admit I didn't read in depth.
But I asked John Glaser over there and he sent me a bunch of links where Christopher Preble has shown, I guess, probably all the examples he could find of where military bases were closed and the local community benefited.
Take Austin, for example, they closed Bergstrom Air Force Base and turned it into a gigantic international airport.
Yeah, Chris Preble, this is a special interest of his.
He's visited a lot of places and done some case studies.
There may be a book that comes out of it, although he's a busy person.
So I'm not sure.
He's done a lot of detailed research to show that there's real opportunities if he can actually close down these things and do something more productive.
Yeah.
And in fact, you know, I don't know if you've ever been here, but for Austin listeners or people who've ever been here, if you've ever driven down Mopac, right at 38th Street and between 38th and 45th Street on the west side of town is a gigantic airport.
Camp Mabry, which is probably if it was housing developments or, you know, mixed, you know, residential and strip mall type things, it's probably worth 50 billion dollars or something.
I have no idea.
Some incredible amount of money.
And you know what's sitting there?
A gigantic running track on probably what would be the most expensive airport in the world.
And I'm not sure if you've ever been there, but it's probably the most expensive airport on probably what would be the most expensive land in Austin.
They're just sitting there sucking up money.
The question of whether Camp Mabry or, you know, private activity would be the better use of the land is not really a question at all.
It's just never asked, you know?
Yeah, yeah.
I mean, when the Pentagon, the Pentagon itself, argues that they've got a 20, 25 percent more base infrastructure than even they think they need.
25, is that a lot?
And they and they used to have a process to get rid of these things called Baker's Reliability and Closure, where they'd make a list, members had to vote up or down on the whole list.
They couldn't just save their little local place.
And that worked for a while to close some bases.
And for many years, Congress has refused to do that process.
So even the Pentagon, when it wants to close one of these things, runs up against this kind of pork barrel argument in Congress.
Yeah.
Well, it really is something else.
And, you know, just like you talk about, too, it's always fascinating to me how little they spend, as you compared them a minute ago to other lobbies and the amount of money that they pour in.
But they don't really need to.
I remember a story.
We might have talked about this back then, what, six, ten years ago or something.
I don't know.
Eight, ten years ago, about how Lockheed spent a measly 14 million dollars on lobbying one year.
And this is a company that takes home, what, hundreds of billions a year in contracts, right?
At the very minimum, tens a year.
Well, their last year was 75 billion, which was a huge jump from the prior year, which was, you know, just modest 40 or 50 billion, like bigger than the State Department.
And a lot of it seems to be they're just jacking up the F-35 program.
But also they make all aspects of military hardware.
So they're, you know, they're living high and mighty, even in the midst of the recession, the pandemic and all that.
They're actually increasing their revenues and profits.
And, you know, there was a, I don't think this is exactly on the question of nukes, but I guess maybe it was in there.
It's certainly, you know, nuke adjacent argument.
And that was this pretty good New York Times story about how under Trump, his trade representative, Pete Navarro, because of the trade tariffs and trade war with China, was hurting manufacturing so much.
They said, we've got to do something for manufacturing.
Well, you know what we can do?
We can kick a lot of money through the military.
And what happened was Navarro made a close relationship with the leaders of Raytheon and said, these are the guys who are, you know, and then one of the main things that they did, there's direct references in there where when the Senate was passing, I guess this was in the year earlier when the House passed the War Powers Resolution on Yemen, he worked with the White House to kill the Senate version, or maybe I have it the other way around.
But anyway, remember when they passed the war resolution the first time, only one house passed it the second time, both houses got it through.
But it was Raytheon and the White House that worked together to kill that just because of their vested interest in the genocide in Yemen, the treasonous genocide in Yemen.
To them, it's just a way to empty their inventories and then start over again.
Yeah, their CEO said they were getting about 5 percent of their revenues from sales to the Saudis, which on the one hand, you could say.
Couldn't they live without 5 percent of their revenue to keep people from being slaughtered?
But from their point of view, it's like.
Every billion counts, and they were you know, they had a former lobbyist who was in the State Department who gave the Saudis a clean bill of health, claiming that they didn't they weren't purposely targeting civilians in Yemen, which was didn't pass the laugh test.
He was also involved in trying to do an emergency maneuver to keep Congress from blocking some bomb sales to the Saudis.
So they had that.
Then, of course, they had Mark Esper, the former head of government relations, his secretary of defense, you know, the current defense secretary came off the board of Raytheon.
So they're you know, they've got all kinds of hooks into the government.
But the Navarro angle was was very Trumpian because it was all about Trump's, you know, I'm for manufacturing, I'm for the American working class, all that stuff.
When in fact, pretty much everything he did on that front was counterproductive, of course, or was a promise that was never kept, you know.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And then all they do is just trade lives like it ain't nothing.
Just business, all within the rules of the game, and so not even really to be questioned.
Well, if you if you ask them, I think Amnesty did this like a survey of like, do you have any?
Essentially, they were saying, do you have a conscience?
So what they said was, you know, do you have procedures to decide if it makes sense to sell the country X, given how they're going to use the weapons?
And, you know, half of them didn't answer.
The other half said, well, we just follow what the government, you know, tells us to do.
And the government vets these things.
But of course, they're interpenetrated with the government and they're helping produce the policies and make it easier for them to sell this stuff.
They make it sound like they're just like an innocent bystander.
It's like, well, the government says it's OK and we're a business.
So we're going to do it.
But as in the Raytheon case, they're right in there making these policies happen and and distorting even what the government might otherwise do.
Yeah, absolutely right.
In fact, I have that exact quote and set of quotes and arguments in my new book about them saying, hey, you know, Uncle Sam's driving the car, man.
They decide the policy here to protect the country.
And so we're just here to do our best.
You know, according to that, they turn right around and tell Uncle Sam all day what must be done, you know, and and even, you know, they'll primary your congressman if he doesn't play along like the Israel lobby.
You know, they work hard at this.
Yeah, yeah.
No, they have they have a very efficient and powerful machine politically.
And, you know, even I talked to a staffer who worked for somebody in leadership who didn't have a lot of defense stuff in their state, but, you know, he said he spent 20 percent of his time just fending off lobbyists for the arms industry.
So, you know, they've got to cover because they in any given year, they could have anywhere from 700 to a thousand lobbyists.
So, you know, in a fat year, almost two for every member of Congress.
So they really can they can blanket the hill as needed.
And then, you know, they get the unions in the industry to join them.
So, for example, the machinists who build the F-35 are now pushing very heavily to go full speed ahead and even faster than the Pentagon wants on the F-35.
And a lot of that is, you know, it's jobs for their members, their union jobs.
There's not a lot of those around.
But there's also these exaggerated numbers that get thrown around, you know, 250,000 jobs on the F-35 might be a third of that.
You know, but it's sort of this funny math where they say, well, if you count the coffee shop and you count the, you know, the rubber plantation that made the tires and, you know, they sort of expanded out to every possible relationship and then they just double or triple that and they come up with these numbers, you know.
Yeah, the whole thing is completely crazy.
And, you know, Trump famously said, well, the Saudis are spending four hundred and fifty billion dollars on weapons.
And then I'm almost certain it was your work that showed that.
Yeah, no, it's they spend more like what, three or four billion a year on American weapons, which, again, is a lot if you're getting it.
But in the scheme of things, as far as America's GDP, I mean, that's equal to one county in Florida.
The hell is that?
That's nothing.
Yeah, no, the national economy gets, you know, basically a blip out of it.
But if you're counting money for Raytheon, then it amounts to something.
Yeah, that's what a scam.
I'll tell you what, America's military industrial complex, if humanity survives, then it'll be a hell of a story, you know, in history, how the Americans set their system up this way.
It's just unbelievable.
Yeah, Eisenhower would be rolling over in his grave if he saw how it's developed over all these years, you know.
All right, well, listen, I can't tell you how much I appreciate your work.
I quote you all the time.
I quote you heavily in my book, of course.
And we run you all the time at Antiwar dot com.
And I just think you're one of the most important writers on Pentagon issues in America.
So thank you.
Well, thank you.
I really appreciate it.
All right, you guys, that is William D.
Hartung.
He's at Arms Control dot org with Inside the ICBM Lobby.
Special interests or the national interest.
The Scott Horton Show, Antiwar Radio can be heard on KPFK 90.7 FM in L.A.
APS Radio dot com, Antiwar dot com, Scott Horton dot org and Libertarian Institute dot org.
