Sorry, I'm late.
I had to stop by the Wax Museum again and give the finger to FDR.
We know Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, is supporting the opposition in Syria.
Are we supporting Al-Qaeda in Syria?
It's a proud day for America.
And by God, we've kicked Vietnam syndrome once and for all.
Thank you very, very much.
I say it, I say it again, you've been hacked.
You've been took.
You've been hoodwinked.
These witnesses are trying to simply deny things that just about everybody else accepts as fact.
He came, he saw, he died.
We ain't killing they army, but we killing them.
We be on CNN like, say our name, been saying, say it three times.
The meeting of the largest armies in the history of the world.
Then there's going to be an invasion.
All right, you guys, introducing Doug Bondo.
Yeah, that's how you say it.
Everybody knows that.
From Cato and from the American Conservative Magazine and the National Interest.
Of course, a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.
Welcome back to the show, Doug.
How are you doing?
Happy to be on.
I'm happy to finally get your name right for the first time in my entire life.
And I'm very sorry for all the times I never did figure it out before.
No worries.
Most people get it wrong and I don't worry about it.
Well, you know, I had the second half right sometimes, but I never had the first half right until just now.
Doug Bondo, welcome to the show.
I feel like I'm meeting you again for the first time.
Boy, you're a great writer.
Thank you.
I have too many things to ask you about in too short a time.
First of all, tell us about the giant North Korea thingy you're doing at Cato tomorrow.
Well, we're holding a forum.
We've invited three people from three different humanitarian organizations that have worked in North Korea.
We thought that it'd be useful for people to actually hear from people who've been over there, who've worked there, who get to the countryside to talk about what North Korea is like.
Obviously, it's a problematic place, but it's important for people to understand there's a reality there.
They're real people.
There have been changes going on.
Most policymakers in Washington operate kind of in a vacuum.
Our hope is to bring some reality there.
They do act as though the Kim family are just born psychopaths.
Clearly, they are dictators and totalitarian ones, so there's a certain statist ethic that goes with that.
But at the same time, Donald Trump's government, when they first went to negotiate with them, they sure seemed to be playing up the whole, We know you're not your father.
You're not responsible for all of his decisions.
You can make a clean break with whichever part of the past you want, couldn't you, young man?
Kind of an attitude.
I wonder if you think that that'll go very far.
Well, I think that it makes sense to do that, in part because he isn't his father.
He's an evil guy.
Nobody should have any illusions that the current Kim is some closet liberal just waiting to create a libertarian paradise.
He's not.
This is a guy who's executed hundreds of officials.
He's quite ruthless.
He knows how to stay in power.
But it's obvious he wants economic development.
That's very serious.
He's done reforms, which are limited in terms of what they can do in that system.
But nevertheless, he wants economic growth.
He's also very good at the diplomatic game.
This is somebody who seems to enjoy the world stage.
So I think we see somebody who has some different objectives, so we should test him.
So to my mind, this is a possibility of change here that we haven't had for almost 70 years, essentially.
So why not give it a shot?
Yeah, I guess I didn't really frame that right.
Psycho is sort of beside the point, I guess, really.
He could have a lot of policy differences with his father that could lead to a lot of improvement in relations that have little to nothing to do with his personality other than his own need to reaffirm his own position, as you said, the same as anyone else in power.
No, I think that's right.
The point is, he wants to stay in power, so we shouldn't expect him to be a nice guy.
But that doesn't mean he wants war.
Indeed, the critical thing here is some people act as if he's some kind of a suicidal maniac, but he's not.
The thing we know without doubt about the Kims is they like to live well.
He's not interested in going out of this life in a radioactive funeral pyre in Pyongyang.
He wants his virgins in this world, not the next.
This is a guy who lives for the now.
And the good news with that is he doesn't want to get blown up.
He's not interested in starting a war.
He wants to make sure that one doesn't get started against him.
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One more question on this then.
I think there were a lot of reasons, really political reasons, more than diplomatic ones for the failure of the last meeting there in Vietnam.
But are you still hopeful for a resolution of even a peace treaty to officially end the war and a resolution to the so-called nuclear crisis here?
I certainly haven't given up hope.
Two weeks ago I spent the week in Seoul, South Korea talking to folks.
They're very nervous because for the most part the majority view anyway is that there's a real opportunity here.
We don't want to blow it.
And they're nervous and they're worried that the Trump administration may blow it.
But I think there's still time.
And I think that Kim wants change.
The South Koreans are very interested in taking this up.
President Trump, I think the challenge here is that he seems to be captive of his advisors.
The president, to his credit, started this whole process against the advice of people around him.
So I think there's still that chance that he's going to pick up on this and realize he's got to be willing to wheel and deal.
He likes to talk about being some dealmaker.
Well, he's going to have to do that.
And it can't just be, I want everything.
It's going to have to be, okay, what do we get?
What do we give?
And I think it's still possible.
So I haven't given up hope.
Well, it seems like the only conflict is they either have to give up all their nukes first and then we can negotiate.
Or maybe we'll get to that, we hope, as part of our negotiations on all kinds of questions.
And it seems like, obviously, one is the poison pill deal killer and meant to be so by the Bolton types.
And then there's what everybody knows.
The CVID is going to have to wait if it's going to ever happen at all.
The point is, he would be a fool to give up everything and then hope for the best.
And that's essentially what the administration's position is.
And that's not going to happen.
He's not a fool.
But I think that he may very well be willing to make deals.
And the point is, even if he's not, we'll then test him and find out.
The worst thing to do is to say, well, we shouldn't bother because we don't think he'll do anything.
Well, if you don't think he'll do anything, you're not going to lose anything by trying.
Again, if you think you have an opportunity, you go for it.
Take the chance.
And if it doesn't work out, it doesn't work out.
But if it's crazy to give it up, we've gotten a lot further.
A couple of years ago, missiles were flying all over.
The president was talking about fire and fury and going to war.
All of that's gone.
I mean, the South Koreans feel a lot better without that going on.
We should, too.
Right.
I do.
Well, that's good.
Yeah.
All right.
So let's talk about China.
You write great stuff about China.
I thought it was the national interest had the real big one here.
But here's one, the American conservative.
I'm sorry?
It was the American conservative, yeah.
Oh, it was the conservative.
Okay.
Yeah.
So here it is at Tech.
China isn't an enemy, and hawks shouldn't turn it into one.
It seems like, hey, the Americans know.
They remember that they were the ones who helped to convince the Chinese to abandon communism in the hopes that we could be friends.
And they are our second biggest trading partner after Canada, after all.
And they're not really challenging American dominance anywhere except right off of their own coast.
And yet, the Americans are really just panicking.
At the rise of China, they seem to believe that they're going to turn the whole planet red like an old John Birch map or something, and that, boy, if we don't check them now, this is going to get so out of hand, Doug.
Yeah, it's a very dangerous attitude.
I mean, look, a lot of bad things are going on in China.
I was there a month ago.
Actually, in July, I'll be there for two weeks for a couple of conferences, and I'll be working with students there with some other libertarians.
I mean, the point is we want to be involved, and in doing that, we can recognize there's bad stuff.
I mean, the current guy is a thug.
I mean, he's cracking down on a lot of things, and that's not good.
The problem is treating them as an enemy doesn't solve that.
I mean, treating them as an enemy makes all that stuff more likely to happen.
And the last thing you want to do is turn them into an enemy.
You can recognize there are problems here we're going to have to adjust, and we're going to have to work through stuff.
But if there's a country you don't want to be your enemy, it's China.
I mean, we have a much stronger military today.
We could, I guess, win a war, but the point is it wouldn't just be one war.
I mean, I think about Germany, when Germany, the U.S., Great Britain went at it, it wasn't just one time.
It was more than one.
We don't want that.
I mean, the world would be a far better place if the number one and number two powers can work together, and there's no reason we shouldn't, acknowledging they're going to have some disputes.
But your point is, and this is one that I've made and others have made, is they're not threatening to attack America.
I mean, all this talk of the danger of China, we have to recognize none of it has anything to do with attacking America.
They're not going to send a carrier task force to grab Hawaii.
That's simply not going to happen.
It's an issue of dominance in their own region, which, quite honestly, the Trump administration denounces that idea, except when it comes to Venezuela, at which point Bolton and Pompeo announce, well, this is in our neighborhood.
Well, that's kind of what the Chinese think.
It doesn't mean it's the right attitude, but it means we have to understand that we've done the same thing, too.
Take that into account as you negotiate.
Well, but if the U.S. Navy doesn't rule every sea lane on the planet, then might not the Chinese close those sea lanes?
And the question is, why would they do that?
I mean, the point is, they benefit more than anybody else from having to trade.
And there are a lot of navies out there.
Again, this weird notion we get in Washington is, only America.
Right?
I mean, you have kind of all these countries in NATO, but somehow it's only America that can deal with Russia.
You have all these countries in Asia, and oh, it's only America.
Well, the point is, that's a ridiculous attitude.
You know, what the Chinese want to do is make sure they don't get blockaded.
I mean, they have their own concerns.
At the moment, nobody out there is threatening to close sea lanes.
So it's one thing to have ships, so if that happens, you can work with folks and get them open.
It's another thing to act as if you have to threaten war against China, because it's trying to assert itself in what is very close quarters.
I mean, again, imagine if the Chinese Navy was floating off the East Coast into the Caribbean.
They were trying to dictate policy towards Cuba.
I mean, Americans would have a very different feel for things.
That's kind of where China is.
You know, something that keeps coming up is that you have all this air-sea battle plan for the Navy and the Marines and the Air Force, I guess, and you have the Army has their interests in Europe, really, and hawking it up toward Russia.
But in both cases, well, I guess we'll stick with China for a second.
The idea seems to be that we could have a conventional war with China, even though, in other words, it goes without saying that we got H-bombs and they got H-bombs, and that things could come to thermonuclear blows.
And yet, because it goes without saying, it goes unsaid for many, many conversations and apparently even battle plans in a row, where it almost turns into a pretension that nukes are not a possibility.
That we would just whoop their Navy and have fun doing it, and it'd be just like the nuketop gun coming out.
And what could possibly be the problem?
And that the risks of losing San Francisco aren't even on the chart.
Well, that is scary.
I mean, because there is this presumption that all the U.S. has to do is kind of make a statement and the rest of the world will kowtow to America, and that world is over if it ever existed.
It certainly doesn't exist today, and it's certainly not the Chinese attitude.
The Chinese are creating quite a competent military, and the point is, if you're fighting close to the Chinese coast, you know, they have land-based assets.
You know, they're a lot closer to land-based assets than our Navy would be.
And you know, what they're working on is deterrence, that is, they don't have 11 carrier groups.
I mean, they have, you know, one carrier in being, or two of them kind of, one another one underway.
You know, the point is, they want to try to sink ours.
Well, you know, it's a lot cheaper to use missiles than, you know, submarines to sink carriers in as to build a new carrier.
And our problem is that what happens with escalation?
I mean, the point is, you know, if they sink a carrier of ours, what do we do?
My guess is the president's going to feel he has to do something.
The most obvious thing is to launch airstrikes on the mainland.
But if you attack their mainland, you think they're going to sit there?
I mean, the problem here is it could very easily escalate very dramatically.
And the last thing you want to do is get into a potential for a nuclear exchange.
A number of years ago, one of their generals told a U.S. official, you're not going to risk Los Angeles for Taipei.
And that's really the issue, is that they don't want to risk, you know, their cities as well.
On the other hand, once you get into this kind of a struggle, and it's very nationalistic, everybody on both sides is saying we have to show that we're tough, we have to show our credibility.
You know, you can start escalating rapidly upward beyond what anyone wanted.
And you know, in almost all these cases, like with Iran, it's just so easy to just say, well, I mean, we don't even really have anything to fight about with them.
But in this case, we do.
And this is your buddy Ted Carpenter's piece, also from Cato, today at National Interest, is about the danger, forget the trade war, we're in danger of a real war over Taiwan.
And that you got hawks in China and hawks in Taiwan very recently, you know, escalating the rhetoric, and on something where America is, I guess, sort of pledged to come to the defense of Taiwan, which is sure to lose in any outright war with China, right?
No, that's right.
I mean, the tragedy here is that Taiwan actually is a very good place.
I mean, it's a kind of a capitalist, democratic society.
It has been, you know, it's never been ruled by the People's Republic of China.
You know, over the last century, it's only been technically under Chinese control, you know, right after World War II, before the nationalists fled from the mainland and went to Taiwan.
But the Chinese view this as China.
I mean, it was detached from China by Japan.
They don't view that conquest as being legitimate.
So you know, you have Taiwanese who don't view themselves in any way as being Chinese.
You have China that views this as an integral part of China.
There's no easy way that you'll get around this dispute where it is raw nationalism.
Even young people in China who hate censorship almost uniformly believe that Taiwan's part of China.
So this is huge.
I mean, the only way you can work this out is you try to diffuse it and say, you put it off for the future.
You know, just don't push this stuff.
Unfortunately, we see in the Taiwan people who want to push it.
We see people in China who want to push it.
Then the U.S. is in this situation of kind of half-promising to defend Taiwan.
What happens if the Chinese don't believe it and they attack, you know, the Taiwanese believe it and, you know, basically respond?
I mean, we're in the middle of it.
It could be frightening.
And then, I mean, is it just totally a black swan crazy thing, or this is a real risk?
As you say, it's really kind of an unresolvable problem here, other than, I mean, I don't hear anyone saying, well, let's have a bi-national, autonomous state.
It's either independence or the conquering, and we're just waiting to see which it's going to be.
Well, what's happening here is that the Taiwanese can accept essentially where they're at today, which is this kind of weird existence where they're independent but not recognized by many countries.
I mean, in the U.S., they have what is a quasi-embassy, but it's like, you know, it's TECRO.
It's the Taiwan Economic, you know, something or other.
Everybody kind of knows what it is, but there's no formal diplomats.
There's no formal ambassadors or anything.
They can live with that.
But on the Chinese side, growing impatience, wanting to resolve this, and we see, I think, that China's kind of giving up a bit.
You look what it's doing in Hong Kong, which is cracking down there, which is kind of scary.
It's always said to Taiwan, look at Hong Kong, we're happy to have two systems, one country.
So you're part of China, but you have autonomy, you don't have to worry about us.
But the Taiwanese now are looking at what's going on in Hong Kong, saying that model clearly won't work, because no longer in Hong Kong are we seeing this, you know, kind of double model.
You know, what we're seeing is kind of the Beijing is asserting itself.
And that tells me that the Chinese, to some degree, just don't care anymore.
They're getting tougher, and they want to apply that to Taiwan.
So that's what makes me very nervous, is that if China decides it's going to push hard, I think Taiwan will resist.
Then the question is, at what point is China willing to use military force?
We all hope it won't.
But, you know, look, we've had a civil war here.
I mean, the point is, nationalism causes people to do some really stupid things.
Yeah.
And including act like they're such macho tough guys, I got to get involved in other people's civil wars from way over here in the new world.
That's exactly right.
Yeah.
All right.
So here's the thing, man.
And this is the thing I know the least about that I should know much more about.
And that is the original crack up in the Balkans in the 90s.
And you have this great piece.
The latest Balkans breakdown is none of Washington's business.
And I was paying attention during the Kosovo war, but in the earlier part, I was still just skateboarding high school kid.
So I never learned until much later the story of Warren Zimmerman and the deal that could have been to prevent that whole war.
And you talk about that a bit in your article, and I was wondering if you could take us back to that real quick.
You know, one of the great tragedies was there was a moment where it might very well have ended early, as opposed to all the horrors that we had.
I mean, it was always going to be a bit messy.
I mean, Yugoslavia was this polyglot place held together by Tito, who was a dictator but not part of the Soviet bloc, per se.
And that was held in check in part because of threat of the Soviet Union.
They were nervous about the Soviets wanting to intervene there and take over.
So Yugoslavia held together.
And then Berlin Wall falls, Soviet Union disappears, and Tito dies.
Kind of all those forces internally in Yugoslavia just blew up.
So suddenly, I mean, while it's the majority, you know, the most people there were Serbian, and they dominated, there were Croats, there were Slovenes, there were Muslim Bosnians, there was Macedonia, there was also Montenegro, and you had Kosovo, which is ethnic Albanian, largely.
So all these different pieces started breaking up.
And the Serbs tried to hold it together unsuccessfully.
Bosnia became a very messy one, because Bosnia is made up of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
And there was a Lisbon Accord.
I mean, they actually negotiated something which the Muslims signed, as well as the Serbs and the Croats, agreeing to basically dissolve Bosnia, to say, fine, we don't have to have a war here.
You know, Muslims can escape, but they are not going to rule anybody else.
The U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, went and convinced the head of Bosnia to repudiate his signature, that he was going to insist that Bosnia stay one state.
So ethnic, you know, what they're saying is Muslims can secede from Yugoslavia, but Serbs and Croats are not allowed to secede from Bosnia.
Well, it doesn't make any sense.
But the U.S. supported that position.
And that triggered this horrendous, really the worst of the civil wars within was within Bosnia, because you had three fighting groups.
And while the Croats and Serbs hated each other, you know, they hated the Muslims more.
I mean, it was an ugly, ugly fight.
And you know, things could have broken down.
But a lot of people look back on that, and it really was a moment, if the Muslims had agreed that they could separate, I think you probably would have had a peaceful separation there.
And that pretty much would have stopped the bloodshed, as opposed to what we got.
Well, of course, the only lesson that anybody ever learned from that is that Bill Clinton didn't do enough, and America didn't do enough to save the people.
And the proof of that is the body count.
And every dead body is the fault of a lack of American intervention before they fell down.
No, it's amazing, is every problem out there should be, you know, would have been solved if we had intervened, or if we'd intervened more, if we'd only put in more troops or bomb more countries or killed more people.
I mean, you know, there's never a case where they look at it and say, oh, maybe that was a bad idea.
I mean, you have Samantha Powers, who's complaining, all these people are looking at Iraq and don't want us to do things we need to do today.
Well, yeah.
I mean, you know, any sensible person looks at Iraq and realizes it was a catastrophe.
Sensible people should look at that and say, maybe we shouldn't do that again.
You know, neocons and the interventionists all say, oh my, that just proves we need to put in twice as many troops next time.
You know, we'll do Iran right, because we know what happened in Iraq.
I mean, that's kind of the attitude out there, and it's a scary one.
And what's funny, too, about Power, she was the one who mongered the war in Libya, because she was tired of doing do-gooder, rinky-dink stuff, like working on silly old Sunni-Shia reconciliation in Iraq, circa 2011, when it mattered the most.
But anyway, hey, at least she got her war in Libya, which turned out great, dog, right?
Oh, yeah.
Another great success.
Absolutely fabulous.
Wonderful.
Oh, man.
All right, so listen, one more thing.
You've been traveling the world.
I was texting you or emailing you or something, and you said you're sitting down to dinner with some defense officials in, was it Latvia or Lithuania?
It was Lithuania.
So tell me all about your trip to the Baltics and around there, and what all you learned, and especially your conversations with these folks, and I guess specifically, I'm interested in whether they think that Russia is going to invade any day now.
Well, obviously, Lithuania is a pretty good place.
I mean, these are folks who broke away from the Soviet Union.
You know, it's a relatively small population.
They were the first ones to secede from the Soviet Union, so they helped precipitate the breakup of the evil empire.
I went to a fabulous museum there.
I actually wrote this up.
It was in the National Review Online, if people are interested, last week.
Oh, great.
I would have never seen it there.
I'll go look.
But they have a wonderful museum that kind of looks at how they suffered under the Nazis and under the communists, and I mean, they went through hell.
I mean, the point is, Jews were slaughtered under the Nazis, other people went to jail, the communists came in, anybody who believed in Lithuania as an independent country, they're arrested.
I mean, I talked to a military officer, I mean, serving today, and he remembers his father in the 1970s having been arrested for kind of producing, you know, in those days, like mimeograph machines and stuff, producing literature for Lithuanian independence.
So this is very real to these people.
Now, they don't actually think that Russia's going to attack tomorrow, but they are nervous.
I don't think it's going to happen.
I mean, Putin's a nasty guy, but I think, you know, he's a rational guy, it'd be very stupid to do it.
I do understand why they're worried, in the sense that you consider their history, they've been through this before.
You know, they were freed from the Russian empire at the end of World War I, and then in 1940, Joseph Stalin shows up and says, you know, I have a deal that you can't turn down.
You know, the offer you can't refuse, you're going to have military bases there, and by the way, you're going to become part of the Soviet Union again.
And they realized if they fought, they'd be slaughtered, you know, and enrolls the Red Army.
You know, so they've seen the movie, they don't like it.
And I don't blame them.
I mean, you know, good folks.
But yeah, I think that luckily, it's not going to happen.
But the nervousness is there.
All right.
What about accusations that Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states are discriminated against?
Is that Latvia more than Lithuania or Estonia or something?
Lithuania has a relatively small population of ethnic Russians.
I mean, are they discriminated against officially in any way?
Not that I'm aware of today.
I mean, one of the advantages of having a relatively small minority is in some sense, it doesn't cause you any trouble.
In the other Baltics, with bigger populations, it has been more of an issue.
And I think, you know, legitimately so that, I mean, it was one of those of, especially after they broke away, their view was a lot of the ethnic Russians had kind of been moved in as part of Sovietization.
So you're running into that suddenly clash of, do we view you as legitimate citizens or not?
I think a lot of that has eased over the years.
The important thing about the ethnic Russians, even in the Baltics, is while there's an identification culturally with Russia, for the most part, none of them want to be part of Russia.
And that's actually a difference, say, of Crimea, where the evidence is the majority of Crimeans did want to join Russia.
There's no evidence that the Baltic states that they want to join Russia.
And that's another reason why I think Russian action is very unlikely.
You invade and you suddenly find the people you're claiming to protect are against you.
I mean, that's kind of embarrassing.
It doesn't help things for you.
But I think that things have gotten better in that case.
And they also recognize outright discrimination and that kind of a thing gives an excuse to Moscow, which they don't want to give.
So it's a better situation today than it was, say, 20 years ago.
Well, in terms of geopolitics, literally speaking, geographical type politics, is there any reason that Russia would want to dominate those Baltic states?
They'd have more and better and special access to the sea or to further dominate and influence Poland or to steal their oil or anything?
Oh, I mean, look, I suppose you could look at the geography and say, wouldn't it be nice if we had those territories back because we'd have more coastline and we could kind of hook up with Kaliningrad.
You know, they've got this section that's kind of left over from Prussia after World War Two.
Everything got shuffled around.
So they ended up with what years ago was Königsberg.
And right now it's isolated.
And if they had the Baltics, it'd be hooked together.
But look, the advantages for Russia are just quite small.
I mean, the population of Lithuania is about three million.
I mean, it's not as if these are massive populations.
You know, the territory is nice and open and there's farmland and stuff, but it's not as if it's filled with wealth that you can kind of loot and hand out to your friends.
And the costs would be catastrophic.
I mean, at the very least, they would be economically isolated.
I mean, Europe and the U.S. would put total sanctions on, probably total embargo.
And I think very likely they'd be in a war.
I mean, the reality is they're part of NATO.
You know, the Article 5 commitment applies.
Even the U.S., I don't think, is going to say, well, it doesn't matter.
We signed the treaty and you're part of it.
We're not going to do it.
I think the reality is NATO would go to war and the Russians would lose.
And they know that.
I mean, it's just, you know, and everybody would lose if we got into a nuclear exchange.
But on a conventional side, the Russians can't stand up to the U.S. and the Europeans combined.
So from Putin's standpoint, I think he gains something by kind of creating threats and stuff of kind of unsettling the Europeans.
But acting on them would not be in his interest.
So I don't think it's going to happen.
Well, and you've written before that the Germans don't seem too unsettled because they still won't spend what America demands on their armed forces and this kind of thing.
No, the best test of whether there's a threat to Europe and what they think about it is their military spending.
You know, I mean, Spain spends under 1%.
Italy, Spain.
You know, Italy spends that kind of a number.
I mean, the point is, you know, the Europeans obviously don't feel particularly threatened.
They do not perceive that a revived Red Army is going to be showing up at their doorstep.
Yeah.
All right.
Listen, thank you so much for your time on the show, Doug.
People tell me you're the best guy we got.
And I say, no, it's Doug Bondo is the best guy we have by far.
So thank you.
I appreciate that.
Yeah, absolutely.
All right.
That is Doug Bondo.
He is at the Cato Institute.
He is at the National Interest, where he wrote this one.
We didn't get a chance to talk about, but you guys are going to love it.
It's called Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy, the Albright Doctrine.
And he's also, of course, at the American Conservative Magazine.
And we run them all the time in the viewpoints at antiwar.com.
So you like supporting antiwar radio hosts.
That makes sense.
Here's how you can do that.
Go to scotthorton.org slash donate.
And there's all kinds of options to do so and all kinds of different kickbacks at different levels.
Of course, take PayPal, Patreon, and all different kinds of digital currencies and all of those sorts of things.
And anybody who signs up by way of Patreon or PayPal to donate $5 a month to the show will automatically get keys to the Reddit room, my own private Reddit group that I have.
Quite a few members now and lots of fun in there every day.
So check out all about that at scotthorton.org slash donate.
And thanks.
