Sorry I'm late.
I had to stop by the Whites Museum again and give the finger to FDR.
We know Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, is supporting the opposition in Syria.
Are we supporting Al-Qaeda in Syria?
It's a proud day for America.
And by God, we've kicked Vietnam syndrome once and for all.
Thank you very, very much.
I say it, I say it again, you've been had.
You've been took.
You've been hoodwinked.
These witnesses are trying to simply deny things that just about everybody else accepts as fact.
He came, he saw, he died.
We ain't killing they army, but we killing them.
We be on CNN like Say Our Name been saying, saying it three times.
The meeting of the largest armies in the history of the world.
Then there's going to be an invasion.
Alright, you guys on the line.
I've got Matthew Ho.
He was a Marine and then he worked for the State Department.
And then he became a whistleblower before the Afghan surge in the year 2009.
It had already really started, but before the big announcement in the final 30,000.
And he ratted out the war to the Washington Post.
Said this can't work.
It's not going to work.
Broke chain of command to do it and cause an uproar.
And then the surge happened and failed anyway, just like he said it would.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing, Matt?
Good, Scott.
Thanks for having me on again.
Really happy to have you here.
So I guess first of all, just tell us, what do you know about what's going on with the talks between Zalmay Khalilzad, the American neocon on one side and the Taliban on the other right now?
Yeah, I mean, I think most observers are pleasantly surprised at how the talks have continued.
That they haven't broken down as they have in the past.
They haven't failed.
You know, no one has walked away.
Right.
Unless something's happened in the last day or two that I'm not aware of.
And that all sides are trying, in my perspective, are trying to reach some type of deal.
And I think the best thing about that is that all sides have given up on the fantasy of the other sides capitulating.
So I think that the U.S. side, as well as the Taliban side, as well as all the other nations and organizations that are working as intermediaries and trying to move these talks along, like say the Russians or whoever.
I think everyone has moved past that fantasy that the other side is going to capitulate, that we're going to get everything we want, that we're going to win, that there is some type of way to victory.
And I think the Taliban have long held that, at least some elements of the Taliban have long held that view.
There's certainly been other elements of the Taliban that have wanted victory, that have believed in victory, that have believed, hey, look, our grandfathers and our fathers did this against the Soviets.
We can do this against the Americans.
You know, we withheld out against their surge.
We can hold on to victory here.
But there also seems to be a camp within the Taliban that has for a long time wanted peace.
And so it's good to see.
But at the same time, too, the war is, according to various estimates, the worst conflict in the world right now.
There's more violence occurring in Afghanistan now than at any other time in the last 17 years.
That is more deadly than the war in Yemen, more deadly right now than the war in Syria.
So it's, you know, cautious optimism that some form of ceasefire may come about of these talks and that may lead to some form of lasting peace, whatever that may look like.
But that's what we can't get ahead of ourselves here.
You see commentators talking about what's going to happen with the opium, what's going to happen with infrastructure, what's going to happen with the economy, what's going to happen with women's rights.
I mean, all those things are important, of course.
But you can't put the proverbial cart before the horse and that without a ceasefire, without some framework for peace and a lasting ceasefire, you're going to get nothing but more bloodshed and violence.
And you'll never get an improvement to the economy, improvement to women's rights and improvement to, you know, you know, ending the narcotics trade, et cetera.
All right.
Now, so maybe I'm worse on this than you, man, but I'm kind of looking at the talks could lead to a situation where the Americans and the Taliban agree on some terms.
Like we will get all the way out and no longer stand between you guys and the national unity government there.
As long as you swear that you don't let Zawahiri or anybody like that come back here and start attacking us or our allies out of there.
Now shake on it and go.
I can see that.
I can't see much of a compromise type situation between the current government and the Taliban.
In fact, apparently the Americans and the Taliban can't either because they're not even included in these talks at all.
And the Taliban's position is still that the Afghan unity government, their national unity government is completely illegitimate and is to be replaced by them once America is out of the way.
So.
How do you.
And look, the reason we're still here, right, is because no one's been able to figure out how to have some talks to resolve that peacefully on the way out.
Right.
Everybody's still worried about all the hell there is to pay.
And that's why everybody's staying.
Yeah.
You know, I mean, they.
One of the things that we have that the U.S. has given up on is on the insistence that the Taliban or that the Taliban negotiate with the Afghan government.
So when I was talking about just before about very different sides giving up on their various fantasies.
Right.
That's one of them.
That was always one of one of the.
I remember when I was there, you know, no nine.
And we had some some people come in when I was up in Jalalabad.
Some interlocutors come in and say, hey, this is with Hizb Islami, you know, Gulbideen Hekmi artist outfit, which the Afghan government actually made peace with in 2015.
I think it was.
But in 2009, they had come in and said, hey, we want to we want to talk.
We want we want to end this thing with with with you and the Afghan government.
And the response at that point, our policy was the American policy was that it is strictly for the Afghan government to do this.
And the Afghan government wasn't going to do it because we were backing them up.
We were we were in the process of sending tens of thousands more troops there, tens of billions dollars more.
There is no way the Afghan government was going to talk peace at that point.
So the fact that we have recognized it and what we're standing in front of, too, with the Afghan government is an illegitimate government.
It is it is a it's a kleptocracy.
First of all, it's the, you know, continually rated as, if not the most corrupt government in the world, then the second or third or fourth most corrupt government in the world.
And it's also an illegitimate government.
I mean, none of the elections that have occurred in Afghanistan have been legitimate.
They have been incredibly fraudulent.
I mean, in this last presidential election was so bad that our secretary of state at the time, John Kerry, had to go out, go there and create a government that is extra constitutional for Afghanistan.
They created this this dual presidency, this this this, you know, alongside of Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah became the co-president or the CEO or whatever they were calling him at the time.
And so the whole thing is a farce anyway.
So for us to held on to this notion that the Afghan government was legitimate was just never going to with one of those things we had to abandon if we ever wanted the talks to go anywhere.
You know, this could very analogous, though, what you said, though, to what happened with the Soviets in 1989.
You know, they pull out and they get out and there's nothing occurs afterwards to bring about peace.
The rebel groups are still fighting the Afghan communist government.
And that goes on for another three years or so until the Soviet Union actually falls itself and all support for the Afghan government goes away.
And then you get an awful civil war, of course, after that.
So it is very analogous.
But what's also analogous, too, is if you look at what occurred in 2012, as the United States starts to withdraw its forces, we get down to by 2014 or so, 2015, we're down to, what, 5,000 troops in Afghanistan, 6,000 troops in Afghanistan.
And they're confined to their bases.
Airstrikes are at a six or seven year low point.
And that's for a variety of reasons, one of which is because we're doing a ton of airstrikes in Iraq and Syria at the time.
And so all that air power and all those bombs went there.
But, you know, I mean, so so that's also analogous of what happened.
You know, we pull our troops out and we don't do anything to bring about peace.
We don't do anything to set about parameters for a resolution to the conflict.
And so this mistake has been made in Afghanistan a number of times already.
Well, first of all, I mean, to say there's also to the bigger mistakes of actually going to war there and everything.
But the other mistakes of getting out without bringing about some resolution of peace, the Soviets did that.
And the United States certainly had a huge hand in that because we have what we wanted nothing to do with resolving the conflict in 1989.
We wanted victory.
We wanted to see the communists defeated.
So we continue to send, you know, weapons and support and everything to the Mujahideen for those years that the communist government was still in power and didn't do anything to bring about peace.
But again, like I said, we've seen this already in 2014, 2015, you know, where U.S. forces are at basically a pretty much a minimum, the lowest level they've been since 2002, 2003.
And what occurs is that without like a real honest effort, without some way forward through talks and negotiation, you don't get a settlement.
You don't get an end to the conflict.
You just have whoever has guns turning their guns on each other.
And I think what would happen, and I agree with you, Scott, if you do get this situation where the Afghan government collapses, well, then all those groups within the Afghan government that make up the Afghan government, all the different ethnic groups, all the different constituencies within the Afghan government that belong to different warlords, well, those guns are going to get turned on each other.
And this is actually the point that the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, John Sopko, just made in his most recent report, is that, look, you've got a 300,000-man Afghan army.
You've got, you know, tens and tens and thousands of men who are armed.
And if you have a dissolution of the conflict without some type of framework for peace, it is just going to fragment and break out into smaller conflicts, which is amazing to say, because if you really look at the Afghan war and you understand how it has been for the last however many decades, really, that it's already been a fragment.
There's no one, you know, it's not a two-sided conflict by any means.
I mean, this is really a conflict that exists horizontally and vertically among a massive number of groups.
But there is that danger, as you suggested, and as the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction has suggested, that, look, if you don't have a resolution for this conflict and the U.S. just leaves, then you're going to have the Afghan government collapsing and it's just shattering and fracturing into even more conflicts.
So it is a very delicate matter.
You know, and my first priority, of course, is for a ceasefire.
You can't have anything without a ceasefire.
And, of course, I want the United States to leave.
But there is also the real concern of, like, hey, look, if the U.S. just leaves, if we put everybody on a plane tomorrow and go, the fighting still goes on.
And all these Afghans, they keep suffering and they keep dying.
And what can be done about that?
And so that's, I think, where the talks are at right now.
Sorry, hang on just one second.
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And, you know, I guess I keep saying, well, jeez, why don't they go with a strong federalism program?
Let the Taliban rule Pashtunistan and let General Dostum rule the Uzbeks or however it works up there.
And, you know, the different Hazar groups and have, I mean, I guess they have their alliance, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and the Hazars and overlapping sovereignties and so forth in their parts of the country.
But why not essentially try to call the lines where they are now and leave them in pencil, not magic marker, so that we don't have to fight exactly over where the lines are, but try to have a peace on that basis.
And I guess the answer to that is because it's just my imagination that any one of these groups would settle for that.
Yeah.
They all still believe in we got to control the capital city because he who controls the capital city controls the country, even though that's not true.
And everybody knows that's not true anyway.
Yeah.
I mean, for all intents and purposes, for most of Afghanistan, Kabul might as well be on the moon.
But it still is the capital city.
And you still have people who have these, you still have the men who are in power and want power.
They know they have to control that in order to be recognized as being in power.
So it is.
It's a very, you have a very kind of 19th century European type of mentality here, or 18th century, I guess, of having to conquer a capital in order to be victorious.
And I think there is that sentiment there.
And as well, too, as what you said, in complete agreement, it does.
It seems like it'd be very easy to say, look, let's put in some United Nations peacekeepers, keep the Pashtuns away from the Uzbeks, have some type of distribution of international assistance so that everybody, the Hazaras, the Tajiks, whoever, they all get their fair share of reconstruction assistance.
But, you know, I mean, what's going to happen is that one group being led by a particular individual is going to want more than their fair share.
That's what happens.
So you have to have something firmer and stronger.
But at the same time, too, there are also a lot of people there.
I saw this 10 years ago, experienced it with men who were representing the Taliban saying, look, we're tired of fighting, but we're not going to surrender.
But we're tired of fighting.
We don't want our grandchildren to have to experience this.
So there is that exhaustion.
There is that desire for peace.
And, you know, I mean, ultimately, though, it is going to come down to it has to be an Afghan-led and Afghan-constructed peace plan.
If you have people from the outside just saying this is what's going to happen, that's not going to work.
It's just, you know, someone is not going to someone is going to perceive as being slighted.
Some group is going to perceive as not getting as much as another group.
And, you know, boundaries are going to be crossed.
And as well as, too, you have you have one of the big issues that I see is you have these groups that fall under the banner of Ghani's government now that as long as soon as they stop getting their cut, as soon as they stop getting their share, they are likely to turn their guns on whoever is getting that share.
And that's where you see this danger, this fragmentation of being so.
And this is, I think, what probably if you rolled the tape back to however many years, you, Scott, and myself and others who are on the show were saying is like, look, you just keep sending weapons to this country.
What do you think is going to occur with that?
What do you think is going to happen when you keep this country's already been at war for 30 years?
And then we escalated the war, built up the army, sent all kinds of weapons and ammunition and everything, fractured the country even more politically.
And now 10 years later, what do we think is going to happen if it all falls apart?
So it is.
It's a terribly, terribly awful situation.
The only the only lesson that comes out of it is that just don't do these wars for Christ's sake.
I mean, like, what do you expect is going to happen?
Yeah.
I mean, like there really is no good answer.
I mean, this is this is basically in 2019.
This is Scott Horton and Matt Ho and everybody else who's been saying this, basically giving a big I told you so.
You know, I told you not to do this.
I mean, like there were 100 reasons not to escalate the war in 09.
There were, you know, 100 more reasons not to begin the war in 2001.
You know, I mean, like there.
So what did we expect was going to happen?
And so you have to have a commitment by all outside powers not to make the situation worse anymore and allow the Afghans to work it out to a degree by themselves, because if you have any outside interference that one side sees as as dangerous or as nefarious or as as predatory, then, yeah, the whole thing falls apart again.
Yep.
And, you know, it is true and relevant that some of us did warn all along, as in from September 2001 on that there's no point in trying to invade and conquer and remake this country and install a new government and fight a whole war there, separate from the question about negotiating over bin Laden or fighting at Tora Bora or those things.
But the idea of installing the Karzai government, as America began to do in December of 2001, and moving forward with all that, there were plenty of people, including myself, who said to not do that for purely practical reasons, never mind the morality of it all, but just why this cannot work all the way back then.
And that's not just to hog a bunch of credit that I deserve, but it's also to show that, hey, I was just some cab driver, skateboarder, pirate radio scumbag, and I knew better.
Not I just had an opinion better.
I had good reasons to think this won't work and that I said all along.
And that goes for a lot of other people, too.
It's the only reason I was right about it was because there are a lot of other people getting it right.
And I was reading them and saying, yeah, I agree with that.
So, you know what I mean?
There's plenty of good advice out there.
So, in other words, none of the hawks this whole time have any excuse.
It's not like, just like with Iraq, where they go, oh, well, we all thought he had weapons.
Yeah, you all might have, but half the population of the country did not think that and certainly didn't think it was a good enough excuse to start a war if he did.
So how about that?
You know, they always try to revise that.
But it matters that people were right all along because it goes to show that the knowledge necessary to make that judgment was available all along.
It did not have to be this way.
Yeah, absolutely.
And the staggering thing is, is that there are people who are still willing to ignore that.
I mean, I think what happens with, you know, a guy like myself or, you know, Danny Davis, you know, Army Lieutenant Colonel who spoke out against the war in early 2012, is that you just keep seeing from these, you know, junior or middle level positions, you just keep seeing it's not even mistakes.
It's willfully ignoring information.
It's willfully ignoring facts.
It's willfully ignoring history.
Like there is no reason to assume that what is being suggested to be done in these wars is going to work.
And you keep seeing leaders choose to ignore that.
And I hate using the word mistake because it's much bigger than a mistake.
A mistake has the connotation that there was some honesty or some good intention behind it.
When you just see generals or admirals, you just had a general, I can't remember this guy's name, Admiral Farrow, I think his name is, talking about how an invasion of Venezuela by the United States may be necessary because sanctions may not work.
So you have, so in this case, again, you have men who are, and women too, who are willing to ignore the practical aspects of it.
Like you said, Scott, not the morality of it, you know, not the opinion of it, not the I'm going to gaze into my crystal ball and see what is going to come of this, but the practical reality of human relations that, you know, you cannot put a foreign force into someone else's country and think things are going to go your way.
Just, it has never worked for anybody.
I mean, I don't know if, there have been occupations that have been successful, but they have been brutally, brutally won by subjugation.
And we're not even capable of that.
So practically, why do we think that we can continue to do these things, whether it be Iran or whether it be Venezuela, you know, or whatnot.
As well as too, I mean, like we can expand this to even talk about, because NATO just had their 70th anniversary.
And, you know, so there was some conversation about this, not as much as, not critically as it should be, I guess, on the mainstream channels and everything, but, you know, I mean, one of the real dangers that I watch a lot of Al Jazeera English and they have a lot of great documentaries.
And one of them that is had a documentary because Lithuania just in the last couple of years has reinstated, has instituted a draft.
And so they did a documentary on these young Lithuanian men who have joined the Lithuanian army, have gone into the Lithuanian army.
And the scary thing about this is how willfully we have put ourselves between the Russians and say the Baltics, the Baltics who are people who have a history, who have a legitimate fear of Russia because they've been occupied and overrun and conquered by the Russians so many times over the last thousands of years.
You know, I mean, we have willingly put ourselves in that position of our empire, taking on these people on our side and putting them under our wing who have a real legitimate historic grievance against the Russians.
And the danger of that, the folly of that seems lost among so many people.
And so it goes back just like what you said before about the practicality of it.
Is it practical to do these things?
No, it's not.
It doesn't work.
And the reality is that how do you then end it?
Which once it starts going, I mean, once you've gotten in Afghanistan, great case in point, it's now 2019.
And we're, Jesus, Scott, you and I are, we're putting our hopes on Zalmay Khalilzad.
Right?
I mean, like, you know, I mean, that's how bad this is, right?
So here you and I are talking, hoping that Zalmay Khalilzad is going to be the guy to bring peace or bring about some type of framework or a settlement or something like that.
So it really is.
The absurdity of it all is, you know, and this is, you know, again, I was reminded because tax day is coming up.
I need to, I'm a, I'm a war tax resister.
So I'll give out my plug for war tax resistance.
Because as long as, you know, as long as our government continues not just engaging more, but prepare for it and to think it's an actual, it's an actual practical step to solve anything, I won't give any, I won't pay my taxes.
You know, I mean, like that, that's just one small.
Now, Matt Ho not paying his taxes is not going to stop the American war machine, of course.
But, you know, at least it's, it's, it's some way I can say, I'm not going, going along with this any longer.
But, but it is, you know, and just, I heard, again, I heard this morning that this, these words from this American admiral about Venezuela and just really, you know, just really, gosh, there are always going to be men and women who, and again, it's, it's not a mistake.
They know what they're doing.
They're choosing to ignore all the evidence, all the history, all the knowledge in order to get something, whether it be power or legacy or promotion or what have you.
Sorry, hang on just one second.
Hey everybody, buy my book, Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan.
And it's available all over the place in EPUB format.
And of course in paperback and Kindle at amazon.com.
And you can also get the audio book version at audible.com.
If you want a signed copy, check out scotthorton.org slash donate and help arrange that for you there.
It's Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan.
Find out all about it at foolserrand.us.
And, you know, it still goes to the larger social psychology of the thing, man.
This society somehow has to just be broken of the association between anti-war and tie-dye and Janice Joplin and 1960s pot smoking hippies.
Ain't got a damn thing to do with it at all.
And yet that's just the brainwash.
That's the way everyone looks at it.
All tough guys know that you got to do tough guy stuff and a bunch of wimps don't want to fight.
So what's new?
And then that's it.
That's the whole thing.
And instead of saying, no, no, no, here's this entire faction of tough guys who are too smart to believe in these lies anymore, get it straight.
That's the narrative we need.
Without that, we're cooked.
And we're nowhere near that for whatever reason.
I mean, even with a Republican president who was elected denouncing this stuff, it still can't seem to really change the overall narrative of the thing.
And there's still so many hawks on the right, too, demonizing the Muslim enemy all day and this and that.
It's enough to – just like with Trump himself, right?
He's one-third Rand Paul.
I won't say Ron, but he's mostly just Andrew Jackson, let's go kick some butt.
And that overrides his unwillingness to waste money or whatever he was thinking before.
And what has bothered me the last 10 years that I've been a part of the anti-war peace community or whatever is that more business leaders are not involved in this.
More business leaders do not speak out about this.
War has only benefited the war-making apparatus of this country.
It's benefited universities because we've put a ton of money into universities because of research and development.
I think it's about $60 billion this year.
Each year goes to universities for research and development for the military or national security purposes.
So the universities are making money off of this.
And then the weapons companies, of course, and I'm assuming maybe a couple of Madison Avenue advertising firms because we spend – because we can't even – the Army can't even make its goals.
The U.S. Marine Corps, when I was in the Marines, we used to pride ourselves on the fact that we never paid enlistment bonuses or we never failed to make our quota in terms of recruitment.
And now the Marine Corps is shelling out enlistment bonuses, including for the infantry, which I don't think it had ever done before.
So we've got this nation that is devoting, what, 60 – it's going to be – with a three-quarter trillion dollar defense budget, what, it's going to be about 60 cents on the dollar now if every income tax dollar goes to the Defense Department.
Not including nuclear weapons or veterans or the State Department or Homeland Security or the CIA or any of that stuff.
It's going to be about 60 cents of every tax dollar goes to the Defense Department.
And so who benefits from this?
Certainly not the majority of American businesses.
Certainly not the majority of American municipalities.
I mean, so as we see it, as we see the consequences of these wars in terms of the investment in our own people, in our own society, as well as too – one of my favorite stats, Scott, I bring up all the time is depending upon which magazine you look at, Money magazine or the USA Today or whatever, all of them – I shouldn't say which because all of them say that the wealthiest part of the United States, is Washington, D.C.
Right.
And you and I – it used to not be that way.
It used to be Silicon Valley.
It was, I think, New York for a while.
For a while it was Tulsa and Dallas because of the oil, you know, go back 60s.
But now, 6 out of 10, 7 out of 12 counties of the richest counties, the wealthiest counties in the United States are Washington, D.C. counties.
That's right.
You know, Kelly Vlahos had this great piece a year or two ago about how they're just taking the bulldozer to these perfectly nice suburbs full of upper middle class homes and just decimating all of them to build upper, upper middle class McMansions on those very same spots and how it just goes on for acres and acres and miles at a time in all directions.
And you can just see it – if you're not in on it, you can see it as this massive distortion in our economy based, again, as you're saying, on the warfare state itself.
Yeah.
I mean, exactly.
You see, whether it's in Maryland or here where I live in Virginia, just corridors and corridors of 13-story, 14-story, 15-story buildings that accommodate the war machine.
Some of it's for the prime contractors like General Dynamics or Boeing or Raytheon.
But then others are for all the subcontractors for that.
And then you have all the insulates.
And then you have all the ancillary.
They remind me of those little fish that swim around the outside of the sharks, you know, to grab the nuggets.
Right.
When a shark eats a tuna or whatever it eats, you know, and these little fish eat the little pieces of the tuna.
Yeah, eat the barnacles off their backs and stuff.
Yeah, exactly.
But then you have that.
So you have all the hotels.
You have all the restaurants.
You have all the banks that suck up.
And it is massive.
And now here where I live in, you know, Virginia, Amazon is coming in.
And everyone constructs or views Amazon as being the place where you order the stuff where it's cheaper and you get it in two days.
But Amazon has a huge, huge business with the Defense Department and with the CIA.
I mean, massive.
I mean, tens and tens of billions of dollars.
And with the Washington Post.
And with the Washington Post.
And I mean, so it's just another aspect of the war machine that's coming in.
It's not an advancement of our society.
It's not an advancement of our economy.
It's just an enlargement of this Leviathan, you know.
And one of the things for us, and I don't live in Arlington County anymore.
I live in Fairfax.
But Arlington is giving billions of tax breaks to Amazon.
And those billions of tax breaks don't come for free.
The property tax, the people who own houses and condos and such are going to be paying more in Arlington so that Amazon can do better business with the Defense Department and with the CIA and with other parts of the government.
I mean, the whole thing is just – you know, it's – and you and I are on different sides of the political spear here, Scott.
But it's something that's so apparent that this is just not – regardless of what your political ideology is, regardless of how you think the U.S. should be structured economically or society or by its government.
The – I mean, just staring you right in the face is that what we have is ruinous.
I mean, it's going to lead to – and it has led to greater inequality and a lack of investment in people and infrastructure and education and healthcare and everything else, all for the dominance of the American empire and the American war machine.
All right, man.
Where do people find you online, Matt?
Oh, MatthewHo.com.
MatthewHo.com.
And you're at the Center for what again?
Center for International Policy.
All right.
There's so many of them.
I can't keep it straight anymore.
I know.
Yeah.
I mainly hang out in my house with my dogs and my cats though.
So that's where I'm mainly – yeah.
And write great stuff.
So yeah.
I work also with – I primarily do most of my work with Veterans for Peace.
Okay, great.
Yeah.
I'm glad I stayed one moment longer to let you say that.
Okay.
All right.
Thank you again for coming on the show and talking about this stuff with us, man.
I really appreciate it a lot.
You bet, Scott.
Thank you.
All right, you guys.
That is the great Matthew Ho, former Marine, former State Department in Iraq and then Afghanistan.
Turn whistleblower and peace nick for us now.
All right, y'all.
Thanks.
Find me at libertarianinstitute.org, at scotthorton.org, antiwar.com, and reddit.com slash scotthortonshow.
Oh, yeah.
And read my book, Fool's Errand, Timed and the War in Afghanistan at foolserrand.us.
