03/30/15 – Tyler Cullis – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, you guys, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is my show, The Scott Horton Show, on the Liberty Radio Network, Monday through Friday, noon to 2.
And also you can find the full interview archive and the rest of it all at scotthorton.org.
Our next guest is Tyler Cullis from niacouncil.org.
That's the National Iranian American Council.
Welcome back to the show, Tyler.
How are you?
I'm good.
How are you doing?
I'm doing real good.
Appreciate you joining us here, especially on short notice, as you are.
Obviously, I don't know about you, but I'm all pins and needles over here, man, for this nuclear deal.
I know it's not, well, I don't know, it's not, am I right, it's not quite the final deal, but if they sign it, it's sort of a maybe lowercase f final deal here before they have a few more maybe technical details to work out.
But if they can come to an agreement today or tomorrow, then it's on.
We got a nuclear deal with Iran.
Is that correct?
Yeah, I mean, I think that's correct.
I mean, this is effectively the deal, in the same way that the Joint Plan of Action in November 2013 was the deal, and the technical annexes that followed it in the month after were kind of an afterthought.
You know, something similar will be the case here.
There is a deal to be had in the next couple of days, and then the negotiating parties can fill out the details.
But a deal for all intents or purposes is on the table, ready to be signed within the next couple of days.
All right.
Good deal.
And yeah, it's interesting.
I'm trying to follow as many of these journalists in Switzerland on Twitter as I can, and there's a mix of very positive statements, and I wouldn't say any very negative ones.
There are some that are trying to kind of downplay the optimism a little bit, but you're pretty confident they're ready to go at this point, huh?
I mean, you know, the anticipation for a deal is certainly reaching peak levels, and with that comes the hope that the parties will get a deal.
It comes with a lot of uncertainty.
You have a lot of people who want to fabricate a crisis at this late stage of the game.
But I mean, I think it's important to realize how far the parties have come since the summer of 2013, in which bilateral negotiations between Iran and the United States were viewed as historic, are now so banal.
They take place a few times every day in Lausanne.
But, you know, there's just two outstanding issues remaining that, if you took a long view at it, would be minor issues in the negotiations, and those have to do with the pace at which the United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran will be relieved, and the second being the scope of what Iran will be permitted in terms of research and development on more advanced and efficient centrifuges.
You know, those are two relatively minor details in the tangled web of all the details that need to be filled out.
So the parties have reached compromise on so many of the issues that I find it hard to believe that at this late stage those two minor items would pose an obstacle to the parties signing a deal.
Now, one of the things that the war party is making a big deal out of is that apparently the American side, and I guess the Americans are the hawks on this, anything will be good enough for Russia and China at this point, and I guess the French are no longer obstructing, they say, and the Brits and the Germans.
They're willing to go along with the Americans.
They have the harshest position staked out here to be resolved on behalf of Israel, really.
But the war party is saying, oh, no, they want to let the Iranians keep a centrifuge facility at Fordo, at Qom, the one that's buried under the mountain.
It'll be really hard to hit with high explosives if we ever feel like it.
Yeah, I mean, you know, this problem was something of an intractable one, but it seems to have been resolved, and I mean, what we've been hearing out of Lausanne was that the way it's resolved is that Iran would be allowed to continue operating a few hundred centrifuges.
However, uranium, uranium hexafluoride, would not be fed into the centrifuges.
Instead, you would put into them other chemical compounds that have a stable isotope that can be separated out.
So there would be some research and development occurring at Fordo, but it wouldn't be research and development that would pose a proliferation problem.
And, you know, I think that was kind of an ingenious solution.
People might scream about it because they see the headline, hundreds of centrifuges being allowed at Fordo, but the mere fact that centrifuges exist says nothing about whether they pose a proliferation problem or not.
If they're being fed chemical compounds other than uranium hexafluoride, then, you know, the proliferation concern is eased considerably.
So this is a win-win, I think, for the Iranians and for the Americans on the issue.
And, of course, it sure seems like the Iranians actually only built that Fordo facility and started enriching up to 20% there.
Well, I mean, I know they needed some 20% for their targets, for their medical isotope reactor that Nixon and Ford gave them back in the 70s.
But it seemed like mostly it was a bargaining chip.
They built it so that they could give it up or, you know, at least negotiate away the pretended scary part of it, that they were enriching a stockpile of uranium-235 up to 20%-235, even though it's got to be above 90% to be weapons-grade anyway.
But that became a big talking point for the war party here.
But it also became something like they were just building up a bargaining chip so that they could trade it away.
Is that about right, you think?
Yeah, I mean, I think that's correct.
I mean, I think that's the real success of these negotiations, is the fact that for the past decade, both parties undertook action to be used as bargaining chips.
For the United States, it was imposing more and more sanctions on Iran.
For the Iranians, it was developing their nuclear program in ways that were not necessarily necessitated, such as building at Fordow and enriching up to 20% and other items.
But both parties have stepped back and realized, you know what, the escalatory cycle was only leading us to war.
What we need is something a bit different here.
And we've seen that happen.
The de-escalation, I think, has been a real success.
All right.
Now, in terms of the sanctions, we've got, I guess, three different sets of sanctions.
We've got American sanctions.
We've got EU sanctions.
And we've got UN sanctions.
And can you describe these at all?
Or can you describe what you know so far of what is to be lifted and how soon, if this deal is reached?
Yeah, I mean, for the Iranians, the United Nations Security Council sanctions mean a lot.
And they mean a lot because, for the Iranians, that was the introduction of this problem altogether.
The UN sanctions came first, first in 2006, then in 2007.
So before the U.S., secondary sanctions were imposed, before the EU sanctions had taken effect.
So for the Iranians, they have special meaning.
Their effect is little on the ground.
The real substantial sanctions are the ones imposed by the Americans, especially the ones that target foreign entities doing business in Iran.
So the extent to which the Iranians can win early relief from U.S. sanctions I think is the most important and most key.
And from what I've heard, the United States is willing to offer substantial economic relief at the front end of a deal.
And on that issue, I think the parties have come to a resolution.
I think it's only the United Nations Security Council sanctions that remain outstanding.
And that's really a symbolic issue rather than an issue in which the United States and its European partners are withholding from Iran actual economic relief.
Now, it's funny.
Stephen Walt wrote, I don't know, about a year ago or something about how ironic it was that everybody who's not concerned about Iran's nuclear program, because we recognize the truth that it's a civilian, safeguarded nuclear electricity program, and it's not a nuclear weapons threat in the first place, we're the ones who want a deal so bad.
And everybody who's pretending that there's a nuclear weapons threat here, they're the ones who are trying to undermine the deal because I guess they would prefer that Iran eventually end up with nuclear weapons.
But I wonder whether you think, we're almost out of time for this segment, but I wonder whether you think that if this deal falls through, that there's a real threat that Iran would then turn around and decide that maybe they do need nukes after all.
I mean, I think the threat is that both sides would return to the escalatory cycle.
And in doing so, Iran would be tempted to break out for a nuclear weapon in the same way that the United States would be tempted to go to war.
And thankfully, both parties have avoided that outcome thus far.
All right.
Now, we've got to hold it right here and take this break.
We'll be right back, everybody, with Tyler Cullis from the National Iranian American Council.
That's niacouncil.org.
Hey, I'm Scott Horton here.
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Welcome back.
I'm talking with Tyler Cullis from the National Iranian American Council.
That's niacouncil.org.
They're the peace lobby pushing for a deal between America and Iran on their civilian, already been safeguarded all along, electricity, nuclear electricity program.
And the negotiations ongoing in Switzerland right now.
Let me ask you a couple of things about these sanctions here, Tyler.
First of all, could you describe the effect of these so-called crippling sanctions on the people of Iran over the last few years, as the Obama administration especially has ratcheted them up, and I guess the UN too, has ratcheted them up in order to attempt to pressure the Iranians into doing this deal?
I think the most troubling effect of the sanctions, and also an intended effect in some regards, was really ostracizing Iran's banks from the global financial system in such a way that Iran was unable to export really basic commodities, such as medicines, parts to make their own medicines.
Since Iran produces a lot of its own medicines, it was unable to import some of the parts necessary to do so.
And that led to things like medical shortages, especially for some kinds of cancer treatments and other serious diseases that Iranians went without for a good period of time.
These issues were brought up in the UN Special Rapporteur's report time and again that Iran was unable to procure necessary medicines in the size that it needed.
And this had its effect, and the US didn't target Iran's ability to import medicine, but it was an unintended effect of ostracizing Iranian banks and making it almost impossible for Iranian importers to import goods from outside the country.
And now, boy, intended.
I mean, I know that they would have never outright said, yeah, you know what we should do is we should starve the Iranian people of medicine, the civilian population of this nation of millions, of chemotherapy, of other absolutely necessary drugs.
But they know that that's what's going to happen if they, for intents and purposes, shut down this kind of international trade.
And we've heard these reports now for, I don't know, at least a couple of years that this is one of the effects.
But I guess they just think, well, good.
If there is an area of fault, it's the fault that there was an easy solution to the issue.
And it was a solution that we at NIAC presented time and again, which is to create a direct financial channel between the United States and Iran for transactions permitted under US sanctions, which include humanitarian goods like medicine.
That would have resolved the problem overnight.
The fact that the administration and especially the US Treasury Department chose not to take that is troubling because it signals a kind of indifference to the problem.
And it shows, too, that it's pretty easy to imagine how businessmen would think, you know what, even if the kind of trade that I'm doing is not banned, I just don't want to mess with this at all.
Because going up against the US Treasury is suicide for any business on the planet.
So, you know what, we're just going to have to figure out something to do other than trading with the Iranians, even if it's stuff that's not on the boycott list whatsoever, correct?
Yeah, I mean, that's absolutely true.
And that's what makes absurd some of the statements from Iran hawks that the sanctions regime has collapsed during the negotiations.
If you talk to a European exporter who exported goods to Iran in 2005, they're totally uninterested in resuming business and trade with Iran because of the effect of US secondary sanctions.
They know the kind of enforcement power that the US Treasury Department has, and there's real reticence to engage in that kind of trade.
All right, now, so what about the – can you break down about Obama's waivers and which sanctions?
I mean, I guess the EU and the UN sanctions are sort of a separate issue here.
But then on the US sanctions, there are some that Obama can temporarily waive, but he can't completely repeal by himself.
And then there are others that he absolutely needs Congress to repeal, correct?
Yeah, so he needs Congress to repeal the sanctions.
He can.
I think this is the perspective of the White House, is that the White House has a lot of room to maneuver.
So each sanctions legislation has granted the president authority to suspend the operation of sanctions.
So that's one thing that we can expect.
He will start by suspending the operation of the sanctions.
He can also license otherwise prohibited transactions, which is both an express and an implied power granted to the president.
And he can take parties off what is known as the specially designated nationals list.
So this is a list that takes into account parties for which trade is prohibited.
By removing Iranian entities from that list, parties in Europe and Asia can start trading with them once again.
So these are, you know, from the perspective of the White House, these are substantial powers.
And Congress will have a role at the later stages of a deal in which repeal is necessary.
But until that time, the expectation is that this will be significant economic relief offered to the Iranians.
Well, I guess the hope is that once they got the deal, then that really shifts all the politics to the president's side here.
And especially because it's not just a bilateral deal.
We're talking about the entire United Nations, the permanent membership of the Security Council, plus Germany.
And, you know, blessed and ratified by United Nations Security Council resolution on top and all this.
And so at that point, even though the Republicans control both houses and they put Israel first, obviously, on all of these things, it'll be much harder for them to resist the president to try to threaten to override his veto and this kind of thing, right?
Yeah, I mean, I think it's going to be really hard.
I mean, we've seen polling already in which the American people, by almost two to one numbers, will support a nuclear deal of the kind that the president is negotiating with Iran.
Even Republicans by a super majority support these talks, right?
Yeah, exactly.
I mean, you know, this is, you know, there's a bipartisan consensus in favor of the deal being negotiated.
And, you know, I mean, especially once the administration has a deal and feels comfortable enough to sell that deal, you know, it's going to be a game changer.
So, you know, we're looking forward to tomorrow in the hopes that a deal is reached and we can start to see the White House do that kind of outreach and start aggressively, you know, defending this deal before Congress and before the public.
Right on.
OK.
Now, so on the other side of this, the I guess one of the one of the keys is the Iranians are going to open up non-nuclear facilities to inspections by the IAEA.
Is that right?
Or what what what can you describe the expansion of the sanctions that are of the inspections that are expected here?
I mean, it is unclear the scope of the inspections and verification regime.
It will undoubtedly include, you know, you'll you'll undoubtedly see inspections akin to that was permitted under the additional protocol to the IAEA.
They'll probably be some additional protocol plus type inspections.
I wouldn't expect Iran to agree to snap inspections of facilities that are military sites for the sensible reason that, you know, Iran does not want international inspectors going around it around its military facilities.
I mean, but to be honest, I don't think this is a real I think the Iranians have have demonstrated that they're interested in showing transparency over their nuclear program.
And I, you know, I think this is an issue that at least in discussions I've had with both parties that, you know, this isn't this this will not be a sticking point in the talks at all.
Great.
And now.
So, yeah, I mean, we've seen recently where the IAEA said that they had some concerns about some possible outdoor implosion system testing in western Iran out at Maravan.
And the Iranians said, hey, come on out.
And this is separate from these negotiations.
They said, come on out and take a look.
And the IAEA refused their invitation.
So it doesn't seem like they're worried about hiding anything at this point.
Yeah, I mean, you know, I think the trouble is that the IAEA has, in some respects, took up work for which it is not well suited.
It does accounting.
It takes stock of nuclear materials inside of a country and determines whether the reported amount of those nuclear materials is the same as what they're finding on the ground.
So when it, you know, when it alleges that Iran is possibly engaged in there's possible military dimensions to Iran's program at undisclosed locations, you know, this isn't the IAEA's specialty.
And I think they've got themselves stuck in a mess where they're going to have to resolve the questions on TMDs to save face, but hopefully to do so without causing a disruption in whatever negotiation is agreed to.
All right, everybody, that's Tyler Cullis from the National Iranian American Council.
Thanks to you and Reza and Trita and everybody for all your great work on this issue, Tyler.
I really appreciate it.
Yeah, thanks for having me.
And your time on the show as well.
All right, y'all, niacouncil.org.
Cross your fingers.
Let's see if we can get this thing done.
I'll be back here tomorrow at noon Eastern time.
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