03/25/15 – Seymour Hersh – The Scott Horton Show

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Introducing the great Seymour Hersh from the New Yorker magazine.
The man who broke the story of the My Lai Massacre back in 1969.
And now he's got a brand new one in the New Yorker about it called The Scene of the Crime.
About his recent return there.
Welcome back to the show, Cy.
How are you?
Okay.
Good, good.
Very happy to have you back on the show.
Now, Liss, we've got a really young audience here, and this whole thing happened even before I was born.
So can we start, please, with maybe just sort of a small review of exactly what was the My Lai Massacre?
Sure.
Actually, it's My Lai, but that's the way they pronounce it there, and everybody pronounces it My Lai.
But all that happened was we were in the middle of a – I'm a kid reporter in Washington, freelancer.
I worked for the AP in Washington, covering the Pentagon for a couple of years in 66 to 67, and sort of learned OJT on-the-job training, what a mess was going on in Vietnam.
The promotions, basically, in some areas, the area – in some areas where the fighting was very intense, promotions were based – you know, if you wanted to get from major to lieutenant colonel, lieutenant colonel to colonel, or even lieutenant to captain, it was all based on body count, how many kills you had.
And so you had an army, an American army that was in Vietnam, fighting in a culture it did not understand, against people whose language and skills and way of life was foreign to them.
Our boys weren't particularly well-trained in the subtleties of the Vietnamese, to put it mildly.
And so over time, inevitably, particularly since for most units in the war, they rarely ran up against regular soldiers.
The North Vietnamese weren't much of a – we were fighting a war.
We were fighting a war against what we thought was international communism.
The idea was that the North Vietnamese were communists and they wanted to take over the South.
We were supporting a very corrupt government in the South.
This is an old picture that happens to us an awful lot.
If you're anti-communist, no matter how despotic you are, we're with you.
And we got drawn more and more into the war.
It was going not well, never, never winnable.
But we were fighting a guerrilla war in a country we didn't understand with allies who weren't very dependable.
I mean, this is a picture we've seen again and again in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc.
And inevitably, the war is sort of more from a war against the enemy to a war against the people.
And so the climax, and particularly in the area where – My Lai was a small hamlet, sub-hamlet actually, in Quang Ngai province, which is in the northern part of South Vietnam.
Vietnam is now one country.
The North won the war in 1975.
But before then, it was divided in half.
There was an international conference in 1954 in which a division was made between North and South Korea.
And in the northern part of South Vietnam, there was a lot of support against the government.
Many of the – We call the people, the guerrillas we were fighting, the Viet Cong, for Vietnamese communists.
But many of them were nationalists.
They weren't interested in communism as much as they hated the South Vietnamese government.
There was also a religious component.
Many Vietnamese were Buddhists, and the controlling government was Catholic.
And so there was a series of complicated issues, wrong day, wrong side, wrong day.
Anyway, one day, there was a very violent war, and particularly in three provinces, Quang Ngai and Quang Tri and Quang Nam, which were basically marked – in some areas, they were marked on American maps in pink for communists, for red.
It's hard to believe now that we were so adamant and so ignorant, but we really thought that if we didn't stop communism, if the North Vietnamese communists took over the South, it would be the beginning of what we call the domino theory.
All of Southeast Asia would fall to the communists, et cetera, Thailand, et cetera, Laos, Cambodia.
And the only problem with that thinking, of course, is that Vietnam and China – and also it would mean that Chinese communism would also be very much more important.
All that stuff factored into our decision to put 500,000 men into the war.
We lost 58,000 in the war, and the Vietnamese in the war lost anywhere between one to two or more than three million.
And so one day in 1968, a group of American kids in a not very distinguished Army unit known as the Americal Division, sort of a third-rate division, they'd been in Vietnam.
They were draftees mostly, and they'd been trained in Hawaii.
They went to Vietnam at the beginning of 1968, maybe late 67.
They spent three months living in the boonies, not getting good food, not getting great showers.
They were humping it.
They were the expendables.
They were the bottom of the pit for us.
And the company lost about 20 men to snipers and bamboo pits, pits with bamboo sticks with poison on them, all sorts of stuff.
Never met the enemy.
Never had a set-piece fight.
Never saw, because they were fighting irregulars, you know.
They were fighting a war against, as we say, a guerrilla war.
And we began to think that they were farmers by night and guerrillas at night, so the American soldiers began to start beating up farmers.
This particular group, Charlie Company, it was called.
And they were very poorly disciplined, really out of control.
In 1968, there was going to be a big attack.
We had intelligence in March of 68, March 16, that there was going to be a Viet Cong battalion, a real group of Viet Cong, lousy intelligence, it was always lousy intelligence, in this village called My Lai that was known to be pro-communist or pro-Viet Cong.
And so this company, part of a task force, there were two companies that went on the attack.
But Charlie Company, the one that did the atrocity, one of the companies that did it, Charlie Company was given a briefing that said, you're going to meet the enemy, take no prisoners, all the civilians will leave in the morning.
It was just phantasmagorical stuff.
I don't know where that intelligence briefing came from.
It was just lousy stuff.
But the kids, to their credit, these kids who didn't know much about anything, some of them, most of them, were high school kids.
Young, ignorant, had learned to hate the enemy because they never saw them.
They were frightened of them, but they also wanted to kill them.
They got up in the morning at 345, to their credit, they did their toking and they did their shooting up and they did their drinking, as guys did, although nobody wants to admit to it, and they got on choppers to go kill and be killed.
You've got to give them that much due.
They went there, and of course there was no enemy there.
There were just, oh, more than 500 women and children, some old men making breakfast.
They got there around before 7.
And for some reason, they just went nuts.
They rounded up people in some cases.
They executed more than 400 people.
Some escaped.
A lot of raping.
They just killed everybody.
It was a horrible mess, and it was known.
As the killing went on, various officers, ranging to the major general, a guy named Koster, in charge of the division, were circling above watching.
A deputy, the commanding general was a two-star.
His deputy, a guy named Young, was a one-star.
There was a colonel named Henderson who was in charge of, they were all in charge of units up the chain of command.
It goes from a platoon to company, in this case the task force, and then to a brigade, and then to a one-star general.
And they all watched.
I wrote two books about it, one about the incident itself called Meli 4 and one about the cover-up that I wrote.
That was two years later I wrote it.
I spent a lot of time on this.
But I just heard about it.
I was a kid reporter.
They just killed everybody that day and went on the next day.
That's the way it was.
And continued the war.
And everybody in the division, most people knew, their day was 407 men, women, and children slaughtered.
The task force had another company called Bravo which attacked a village, a sister village, about a mile and a half, maybe two miles less than that, away and killed 90, executed actually 97 people there.
So one task force of a couple of companies on one day killed 500 people.
It got passed.
It got covered up.
This was in March of 68.
In March of 69, one guy named Ronald Ridenour, a wonderful kid who was not in the unit, but he was a soldier, a reconnaissance soldier, had to fly over that area the next day over Meli and saw the smoke, I guess the leftover bodies, and knew what a mess it was.
Some of the bodies were buried then.
And he waited until he got out.
Everybody was afraid to do anything, you know, report war crimes.
There's no such thing as a war crime then, just mistakes.
And Ridenour wrote a letter that began an inquiry.
But I don't know, nothing much happened.
The Army was very slow going.
And finally that fall, 69, 18 months later, 18 months later, I'm a freelance reporter then.
As I said, I covered the Pentagon, but then I became, I worked in 1968 as the press secretary and speech writer for a guy named Gene McCarthy, who ran as an anti-war candidate against a sitting president for the presidential nomination.
He ran against Johnson and did well.
Almost defeated Johnson in New Hampshire, and Johnson quit because he knew the anti-war stuff was really bad.
And I did that, and I went off to be a freelancer and was writing and, you know, making a living, I guess.
Not much, but okay.
And in late 69, somebody called me with a tip about this, and I just sort of believed it.
I'd been following the war.
I knew how bad things were.
And from my years of covering the Pentagon for the AP, I also knew from some officers that a lot of murder was going on.
I just believed the story and eventually found my way to the infamous, famous Cali, who was sort of the leader of the killing.
Every officer in the company, where five or six lieutenants were killing, but Cali was the most outspoken and the most aggressive.
Had men gather people into ditches and then order them to kill.
And so I spent a lot of time, had a lot of trouble getting to Cali.
I finally found who the army, although they were prosecuting him and they were investigating him by this time because of the letter by Ridenour, it was all done very slowly.
My goal was to convince Cali, who was the fall guy, to plead guilty to manslaughter.
But he wasn't doing it.
I had a lawyer, and eventually I got into it and I found Cali, I found his lawyer, wrote a story that nobody wanted.
What else is new?
There was a little anti-war news agency called Dispatch News Service that was running stuff out of Vietnam and Southeast Asia that I'd written for as a freelancer.
I used to write for the Washington Post, Outlook section, their Sunday section, but I could sell...
I also wrote for the dispatch.
I would syndicate pieces and make some money.
That's what I was doing.
And I got into the story, got to Cali.
Nobody wanted it, as I said.
I took it to the dispatch and they put out...
In 5 weeks I wrote 5 stories about it, each one worse than the other.
And all the newspapers eventually started buying it.
They began to write their own story and it all was correct.
And I, you know, fame, fortune, glory.
I got all my prizes, all sorts of prizes.
But I went on because I knew that just writing about the massacre wasn't enough.
I knew that there had been a systematic cover-up.
And I wrote a second book about it actually for the New Yorker in 1972 that was excerpted, two long pieces.
So it was a horrible event.
The Army said...
The charge against Cali was initially that I found a piece of paper that said he was accused of killing 109 Oriental human beings.
Which is a really strange thing to say.
As if somehow 10 white human beings equals one Oriental.
As soon as I wrote it, the first story I did about Cali, the Army changed the charge to killing 109 or 111 humans.
Deleting the word Oriental.
Very racist idea.
But so was the war.
And so it was shocking to America.
You know, America...
The America that I grew up with.
I was in my early 30s in 1969.
We didn't know much about what really went on in war.
World War II was censored.
There was a wonderful book written by a Yale professor named Paul Fussell on the censorship, years earlier, on the censorship of World War II.
We didn't see pictures of American dead.
We didn't see pictures of the burned and maimed Germans and Japanese we killed.
We didn't see that.
We weren't allowed to see those pictures.
So we really didn't have a good sense of war.
And then, as luck would have it, when I began to write my stories about Meli, an Army photographer named Haverly, who'd been assigned to cover that mission, it was supposed to be a big event that day, also did shoot some pictures for the Army in black and white, but had a private camera with color, and he took the pictures of the massacre.
Unbelievable pictures that, when I wrote my story, he gave them to the Cleveland Blaine dealer.
And in the middle of my stories, all of a sudden, here came these pictures from Haverly about a ditch full of bodies and other atrocities, I mean, incredible murders, depicted, and there's nothing like a picture.
So that all added up to a great controversy in America, a lot of anger about whether the story should have been written, etc., etc.
But the mainstream press, to its credit, got into the story.
And so it was just great.
It professionally got me started, I guess, in a way, as a serious player.
But also, for the country, it was very shocking.
We always thought we fought wars a little better, a little differently than the Nips, the Japanese, and the Krauts, as we called them, in World War II.
Of course, the Holocaust was the Holocaust, but in combat, it turns out that all war is horrible.
All armies kill, all armies do brutal things, all armies hate the other people.
We've seen examples of that in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the atrocities.
And as some of your audience know, I'm the guy that wrote about the Abu Ghraib prison, the way we treated prisoners there, the nakedness and the sexual abuse and the horrible ways we tortured prisoners.
It's all part of a horrible, grimy package.
As awful as My Lai and traumatic as it was for America, as awful as Abu Ghraib was in 2004 for most Americans, and shocking, My Lai was probably even worse, because we really just didn't know how bad it was and how brutal we could be.
We always thought American boys had a higher standard.
So it's receded in memory now, although I will say this piece I did is being tweeted all over.
There's a lot of bounce to it.
There's a lot of sort of residual historical interest in it.
As you know, it's called Return to the Scene of the Crime.
Right.
Now, well, there's a lot to go over there, but I guess first of all, about the import of the story then, I mean, I guess I'm aware that a lot of the right kind of rallied around Cali and said it's no big deal, but I think you kind of make the point in the piece that this really was a big deal for the anti-war movement in the United States of America, that this was kind of a turning point, sort of like when they found out about the secret bombing of Cambodia, that kind of thing.
Well, you know, it's interesting, because I wrote this story in late 1969, November and December, and by 70, the campuses were going crazy.
If you remember, some of your young kids would even know that in May, there was a demonstration at Kent State University, and National Guardsmen actually shot four student demonstrators.
They panicked out.
And so it became a big thing in terms of the anti-war movement, this kind of atrocity, no question.
Absolutely.
And you're right.
There was a tremendous amount of visceral support, particularly in the South.
Cali was a Southern boy.
He'd been in Florida.
He went to junior college in Florida.
I think he was out of North Carolina.
In any case, Lieutenant Cali, who was the only one who spent time, 14 officers, ranging up to a two-star general, were accused of various problems, dereliction of duty.
But Cali was tried.
He went through a court-martial.
And in, I think, May of early, yeah, May, in the spring of 1971, a year and a half after the first stories, Cali was found guilty of the murder of 21 innocent civilians by his peers, by an army jury composed of senior officers, officers, not all seniors, but majors and lieutenant colonels, et cetera.
And so all of the feelings that many people had, that this was unfair, that Cali was only doing his job, and all this stuff about mass murder was an exaggeration, sort of disappeared.
My story had some impact, but the actual conviction of Cali.
After that, Richard Nixon, the war was over, basically.
Richard Nixon had been able, the president who replaced Johnson, Nixon had been able to rally what he called Middle America.
He would say, I need your support.
But after this, Middle America was gone.
They supported him on the war, and it turned out we were mass-murdering people.
So I think cognitively, yeah, what I wrote, but also the Army's prosecution of Cali and conviction.
That made it a dead man walking.
All right, now I just wanted to read this very small portion of the piece so that people understand here.
You say, 504 victims from 247 families.
24 families were obliterated.
Three generations murdered with no survivors.
Among the dead were 182 women, 17 of them pregnant.
173 children were executed, including 56 infants.
And 60 older men died as well, were killed as well.
A little bit of a taste of what that number really means when you say 407 killed.
Yeah, those are 407 individual human beings, all right.
Now, let me ask you about Cali and the actual massacre itself.
Obviously, as you say, he was the only one prosecuted for it.
But you mentioned the generals were flying around in the helicopters above, and in the story you say that at first they just had at least one group of villagers kind of rounded up and held under watch in the middle of a village for a while.
Cali walked away.
He came back and said, okay, kill them all.
And I wonder whether you think or do you know whether those orders came from anyone above him or not, or it was just he decided let's go ahead and do this?
Well, let's put it this way.
You know, that's an amazing moment because there was a young boy named Meedlo.
What helped, what made the story, and Paul Meedlo was somebody I heard about when I began to do the story because he was a farm kid from New Goshen, Indiana, got drafted.
I talked to his brother the other week before the story ran, and his brother told me that his brother was afraid of blood.
He was the last guy to go to war, but he was drafted and he went in.
And when they went into the village, there were three platoons.
Cali was the platoon leader of platoon, let's say, A, B, and C, the second and third platoons.
They just went around on others, not a big village, but they each had a section.
The other guys just went through house to house and just shot and raped and murdered.
Cali rounded up people and put them by a big ditch and told Paul Meedlo to take care of them.
So Meedlo and another young boy from Texas did what American kids do.
They had a bunch of kids and women they were supposed to take care of.
They gave the kids candy and they horsed around with them, played little games with them and told the woman where to sit.
And Cali came back and he said to Meedlo, what are you doing?
I told you to take care of them.
He said, well, I am.
He said, no, I mean waste them.
And Meedlo was stunned.
I didn't know this when I first did my reporting.
I only learned this when I went back to it.
I went back to My Lai.
I didn't want to go.
I had been to Vietnam as a journalist for the New York Times a couple of times during the war in Hanoi and Saigon, but I never wanted to go back to My Lai.
I just didn't want to.
But my family, for 30 years, had been pushing me hard.
Finally, I said, okay.
It's a great tourist place now, Vietnam.
And so we went and I spent a couple of days at the My Lai.
It was very tough to do, but I went to the village and it reminded me of all these things.
And Cali told Meedlo, waste them.
And Meedlo began to cry, but he did it.
He shot bullets into them.
And so, you know, all of this, as you said, is being observed by officers, all of whom in real time covered it up.
And the general whose name I mentioned, General Koster, by the time my stories got written a year and a half later after this event, was going to be promoted to a three-star lieutenant general and was at the time, get this, commandant of West Point, the military, the Army's elite military academy, where most of their future generals go through their college education and early military training.
So it was a huge frigging mess for the military, plus the fact that so many senior officers were obviously aware of it.
The story was, even though all, many knew what was going on and many knew how bad it was in real time, there were one helicopter pilot saw what was going on and landed and actually had his gunners put their guns on Lieutenant Cali.
He was going to throw a grenade into a ditch full of people.
And instead he put his head, they trained, traded, they're broadcasting this.
It's on the airwaves, it's on the radios, in the headquarters, and everybody else listening can hear this conversation.
He tells Cali if he makes a move to go another move, he's going to kill him.
He's going to have his gunners open up on him, and he takes the Vietnamese hiding in a ditch and flies them out.
It was a small gunship.
He flew, made a couple of trips to fly them out to safety, the civilians.
All of this was reported.
All of this was a mess.
And yet, a day later, the official report on the front page of the New York Times as relayed by the command in Saigon was, big victory in the village of My Lai, they called it Ping Phil.
128 Vietnamese, Viet Cong killed, three weapons captured, all on the front page.
So it was just, it's just a mess.
Hugh Thompson, Jr., that helicopter pilot, and that's what really stopped the massacre at that point, right, was his intervention?
Well, it was sort of, they were done massacring.
There weren't many left because, you know, 100 people or so escaped and fled, but the others had just killed.
It was hard to believe because Army units had gone through the village before and, you know, not done this.
But this, one of the things you have to know is that there was nothing of this scale before, killing 60, 40, 80, 100, as happened in the sister village, was going on all the time.
Right.
Going on all the time.
That was one of the things I wanted to ask you about.
There's this new book by Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves.
Sure.
And he talks about this.
Nick did the book a couple of years ago.
Right, right.
And, yeah, not that new, but relatively new, where he's gone through and he got all the documents from the Army war crime investigations.
That's where he found it.
He says My Lai is exceptional because it became such a big story because of Hersh's reporting and because it was so many people killed just in one spot.
But otherwise, people should understand that the Vietnam War is basically a My Lai massacre every day.
Well, you know, Nick wrote about other horrific areas in the Mekong Delta and elsewhere, other areas where they were incredible.
Here's the issue.
The issue was, and this is something that Nick writes about, too, is the issue was that in Vietnam there just was no such thing as a war crime, apparently.
You know, there was a violation of rules.
But the idea that you would walk into a village and slaughter everybody, well, that wasn't a war crime.
That was just a mistake, over-aggression.
And there was something that emerged from the war called the MGR, the Mere Group Rule, which was a basic defense if you were caught killing somebody.
So the Vietnamese, well, they were merely a group.
Mere Group Rule it was called.
It was an informal sort of explanation.
And so if you're a company commander, let's say, and you're a captain, you want to make major and this is the only life you're going to have, you know, on the outside you're not going to be able to cut it.
You didn't get through college, but here the Army's helped you out and made you a captain.
And your guys have gone off and killed everybody.
You had two options.
You could begin a war crimes investigation and ruin your career and everybody in the chain of command, or you could simply do the best you can, cover it up, and find some number to report that's high like 128 via Kong that will help your career.
And that's what happened.
That was the choice that happened.
I'm afraid to say the same kind of stuff.
We're not talking about the same degree of killing.
But on a day-to-day basis, there certainly hasn't been enough prosecutions of war crimes or suspected war crimes in Iraq in the Afghan war.
A lot of bad stuff happens.
It happens in all wars.
There's nothing special about Americans in that.
And, you know, we'd like to think there is, but there isn't.
You know, we have a lot of good little guys, good guys who fight the war right.
But this particular division, the American L Division, was known throughout the Army as not being el primo, being sort of a dumping ground.
And their small unit leadership was just horrible.
It was just a disgrace.
And, you know, I hate to say it, but, you know, you can shape one of the things about young boys in the military, you can shape them in such a way that if you're not at all interested in the rules and fighting honorably and fighting correctly, you can shape it in such a way that a melee is almost inevitable.
And so that's what happened.
We had really a collapse of leadership in the Army.
And I think to the Army's credit, by the end of the 1970s, the war ended in 75, our active participation ended in 73.
But by 78, 79, they had some better leadership.
And some of the younger officers recognized that, you know, I used to go speak to them after I did the melee stories in the books.
I would go talk to renegade Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels and Majors who wanted to change the system and change the way it worked.
And there were a group of dissidents in the Army who did get some change.
They got better leadership.
So it did get better.
But inevitably, when you're in the kind of war we are, the same sort of, you know, it's not as if we have much of a learning curve.
When you're in Iraq or you're in Afghanistan, you're fighting in a country and you don't know the language and you're not particularly coached in the culture, you don't really, you know, we have tremendous problems with our soldiers who, in the Arab world, you don't go into a house without being invited.
You don't go into the women's quarters without, you know, you just don't go.
You're not invited.
You're not there.
And you simply don't go through their personal effects.
You don't go looking for whatever they look, guns, by tossing through clothes in the women's quarters.
You know, we just do culturally despotic things that turn people.
Bad enough we bomb them, bad enough we have drones, but in the field we do so many things that aren't conducive to gaining support, even from people who might otherwise be interested in seeing people like Saddam.
You know, Saddam Hussein get overthrown.
We ended up just creating a great animus towards us.
Now, can you tell us… I'm going to have to go on two minutes.
Is that all right?
Okay, yeah, sure.
Let me ask you, I guess, just one more question then, finally.
Is it really right that Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara knew all along that the war was pointless and hopeless?
Well, certainly Johnson didn't want to know that.
McNamara, I think, I do write about quite a bit about McNamara in the end.
I see him as a tragic figure.
He's somebody who thought loyalty to the president was the most important element of his career, his life, his job as Secretary of Defense, and not loyalty to the reality.
He did tell the president in private things were going badly, and by 1967 he actually was fired by Johnson, I think it's fair to say, most likely.
We're not 100% sure exactly what happened, but I think he told Johnson at some point in 1967 we had to stop the bombing, stop sending more boys there, it's useless.
But he never said a word publicly.
And so in the end, I write about him quite critically.
Even though he was tortured in the end, I don't think he ever really opened up about what he knew and what he didn't tell us, sort of a misguided sense of loyalty.
It was sad.
It was sad.
So he certainly knew.
I think Johnson just thought he had to win the war.
It's so much so terrible about our leadership that we get into this notion that a president can only be a great president if he wins a war.
Jack Kennedy, that was a thought Jack Kennedy had.
Great presidents, he once told a Harvard historian, who were the great presidents, Roosevelt and Lincoln, and what do they have?
They had wars.
That was true.
He told that to Herbert Donald Duncan.
And I wrote about this once, and I think it was Herbert, I'm not sure, Herbert David Duncan.
Anyway, this was in his first year as the president, and eventually there he goes into Vietnam.
I'm one of those people who don't believe that if Kennedy had been assassinated, I don't believe that Kennedy would have ended the war if he'd been assassinated.
I think he would have tried to tough it up.
But Johnson certainly thought the only way to go was to expand the war.
And for all the good things he did on the civil rights and other issues, his legacy is always going to be horrific because of what he did in Vietnam.
All right.
Well, thank you very much for your time.
Hey, Scott.
Bye-bye.
Good to talk to you.
Good to talk to you too, sir.
All right, so that is the great Seymour Hersh, the author of My Life 4, Me Life 4, a report on the massacre and its aftermath, and cover-up, the Army's secret investigation of the massacre at Me Life 4, and, of course, many other books, including Chain of Command, The Road from 9-11 to Abu Ghraib.
The new piece is at thenewyorker.com.
It's called The Scene of the Crime.
Hey, Al Scott Horton here to tell you about this great new book by Michael Swanson, The War State.
In The War State, Swanson examines how Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy both expanded and fought to limit the rise of the new national security state after World War II.
If this nation is ever to live up to its creed of liberty and prosperity for everyone, we are going to have to abolish the empire.
Know your enemy.
Get The War State by Michael Swanson.
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Just click the book in the right margin at scotthorton.org or thewarstate.com.
Hey, Al Scott Horton here for The Future of Freedom, the monthly journal of The Future of Freedom Foundation at fff.org slash subscribe.
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Hey, Al Scott Horton here for wallstreetwindow.com.
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It's hard to know how to protect your savings and earn a good return in an economy like this.
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Follow along on paper and see for yourself.wallstreetwindow.com Thanks for watching.