03/13/13 – Gary C. Gambill – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
My website is scotthorton.org.
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Next up is Gary C. Gamble.
He is Associate Fellow at the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum.
Welcome to the show.
How are you doing?
I'm well.
Well, good.
Very happy to have you here.
And you got a little bit of a collection going of articles here at the National Interest, and at least one at Foreign Policy, which is where I want to start.
Here's a headline you don't see very often.
Well, not where anybody sane writes things anyway.
Bush was right.
What was Bush right about?
Well, my argument was that the Bush administration reversed a longstanding American policy going back decades that involved supporting autocratic governments to the hilt, irrespective of whether they are democratic, irrespective of whether they respect the civil and political rights of their subjects.
And I argue that the Bush administration made serious changes in that policy, arguably not for the right reasons.
Its freedom agenda was designed in part to legitimize the Iraq War.
It was designed in part to defuse criticism of its lack of a policy toward the peace process.
But it did bring some results.
Egypt was kind of a flagship of that effort, and the Bush administration forced Egypt to release political dissidents, hold competitive multi-party elections.
And I think you could argue that if this policy had continued, or better yet, if it had been in place earlier, that the Arab Spring uprisings we see today that have morphed into radical Islamist movements, that the landing would have been softer, that a gradual transition to democracy might have been possible.
So, in other words, what you're saying is where most people have concluded that, well, the freedom agenda just meant we want regime change and the three dictatorships in the region we don't, or four that we don't control yet, right?
Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya.
You're saying that, no, they actually were undermining their own autocrats like in Egypt.
Right.
Yeah, that is the thing that's remarkable.
I mean, put it this way.
I wouldn't call Iraq part of the freedom agenda because, you know, we had our own reasons for going to Iraq.
The reason Egypt is important, and it's also true if you look at Bush administration policy towards Saudi Arabia to an extent, toward Jordan and other American allies, that this policy of pushing autocratic governments to reform was not directed only at the bad guys.
It was directed even at American allies.
And I really think you have to credit the administration with that because it contrasted with the Clinton administration and contrasted with the Obama administration up until the Arab uprisings broke out two years ago.
All right.
Now, I guess the way you put it in the article is that when Obama came into power, he really scaled this back.
He couldn't cancel it because it was a government program.
After all, it can't be canceled.
But he really scaled this back.
And so you say that by the time the revolution really did come to Egypt, it got completely out of hand?
Well, I wouldn't go so far as to say that the Obama administration pulling back the freedom agenda had an impact on the Arab Spring.
Again, I think the point of my article is that even if the Bush administration's effort was too little too late, it was absolutely the right effort and should have been done sooner.
Now, the Obama administration came into office believing correctly, perhaps, that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that that was the crux of transforming the region.
But once you solve that, then the autocratic regimes wouldn't have a rationale for depriving their citizens of rights, a rationale for these heavily bloated military budgets and all of that.
But the problem is that in order to get the peace process off the ground, the thinking was that the United States needed to cozy back up to Mubarak, needed to cozy back up to some of the dictators that it had alienated.
Right.
Well, and part of the problem was, and I do remember this from the Bush years, was just that Mubarak's getting old and he's going to fall down dead here sooner or later.
And I think they tried – I don't know if this was really so much an American project.
You mentioned it in your article, but it was certainly a Mubarak project to try to promote his son as the Arab parent.
But the whole – everybody balked at that.
And I don't know whether it was just because of who his son is or that he was his son at all.
Obama came into office.
Hosni Mubarak hadn't visited Washington in five years.
He came twice.
Gamal Mubarak, Hosni's son, who he was grooming as his successor, made a very high-profile visit to Washington, met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
So while I wouldn't say the Obama administration was supportive – in fact, it certainly was not supportive of Hosni Mubarak handing power to his son Gamal.
It certainly didn't try to emphatically direct Egypt away from that.
Well, and then now you're not saying at all, right, that the Americans really kind of were behind the Arab Spring after all and that kind of thing, like some people think.
Because there was – it's strange when you see – well, there was a New York Times story about, yeah, the State Department was cozying up to this – at least what became the April 5th movement or whatever it was called, that kind of thing.
And so people were making that connection.
Well, that takes back to the Bush administration.
The Bush administration increased American aid to civil society groups.
And in Egypt it is true that some of the civil society groups that were influential early on in the uprising – because remember, it was really secular activists who got the mass protests off the ground.
Sure, some of them had absolutely been beneficiaries of State Department democracy promotion aid.
I don't think you can say that there was an American conspiracy to overthrow Mubarak, though.
Yeah.
Now, I mean, in fact, the way it played out, at least on the front page of the New York Times, was they really wanted to do everything they could to keep Mubarak as long as they could, and they only admitted defeat when they were completely defeated and said, well, we want Omar Suleiman, the head of the secret torture police, if we can't keep Mubarak.
Absolutely.
And, you know, to a large degree, the same thing happened in Syria.
It was six months after the start of the uprising before Obama finally said that President Bashar Assad must, quote, step aside.
And even that remark, you know, he didn't say step down.
There was sort of ambiguity even there.
And I don't think there was anything necessarily nefarious about it.
There's just a tendency to believe that working with an existing government is better than the unknown of having an existing government fall, even if it's only a lie.
Yeah.
Now, it always seemed to me, and I'm much more cynical than the average foreign policy analyst, I guess, but it seemed to me that when the Arab Spring broke out, that it was just too obvious.
It became the narrative.
You couldn't talk about the Arab Spring in any kind of brief way without it just being clear that, yeah, Uncle Sam is behind every bad guy in the region, every sultan, every dictator, every pretended, quote, unquote, president.
And so I thought that this was really the big reason that they did the war in Libya overall was for public relations, to try to confuse the issue that in this case, at least, America's on the side of the revolutionaries.
And then, of course, Gaddafi, he wasn't quite a Mubarak, right?
They brought him in from the cold, but he wasn't a loyal sock puppet.
He was expendable.
Well, nobody liked Gaddafi, so we weren't going to expend anyone, at least of all other Arab states, by helping overthrow Gaddafi.
Right.
But do you think anywhere near close to that, that that was pretty much the reason for it, was just to sort of confuse the issue, America's on the side of the little guy, like that time we liberated France from the Nazis, that kind of thing?
Right.
Yeah.
In the case of Libya, in fact, I think in the case of American policy during the Arab Spring in general, there's a recognition that whatever we might like to see happen, America can no longer be seen as supporting dictators against their subject.
It's just really bad.
I mean, it's not only morally bad, it's bad in the sense that pro-American autocratic regimes are the number one source of Islamic extremism because they shut down all other channels of political expression, representation, and so it's only the mosques that tend to incubate these radical protest movements.
Going back to Bush, the Bush administration's view was that, look, 15 or 16 out of the 19 9-11 hijackers were Saudi, another was Egyptian.
At the time, Al-Qaeda was dominated by Egyptians and Saudis, Pakistanis too, basically subjects of pro-American, subjects of countries that are led by pro-American regimes.
And so it's not really an accident that there were no Syrians involved in Al-Qaeda, no Iranians.
They didn't come from the usual suspects in terms of countries that we look at, that Bush called an axis of evil.
They came from our friends.
Right, and Bush did, as you're saying, he kind of started this democratization program at least a bit, and he did from time to time, even though he's really contradicting himself, they hate us only because of how good we are and that kind of thing, from time to time he really would admit that, yeah, the problem is previous administrations, not me, but somebody else, you know, Bill Clinton or somebody like that supported these dictators.
I forget her exact words, but said it very emphatically that, you know, decades of Americans looking the other way when Arab dictators abused their citizens didn't bring us security, it didn't bring the Arabs security, it didn't bring anybody anything.
It was absolutely an abominable policy.
And if you compare it to American policy toward other regions of the world, there's a great difference.
You know, one of the reasons sub-Saharan Africa has democratized in the last 10, 15 years, you have competitive multi-party elections around these countries, is because none of them can get a loan from the World Bank or other international finance institutions without having elections.
You know, similar reasons are why Latin America democratized.
The Middle East was the great exception.
You know, when Mubarak needed a loan from the IMF, there were no questions asked.
Certainly no questions asked about the way he governed his country.
And so that, you know, that did not serve Egyptians very well.
Right.
But, yeah, of course we see, though, that, you know, the Bush administration did nothing to push for democracy in Saudi Arabia.
We see Barack Obama double down on support for the tyranny in Bahrain, and they basically, I guess, they regime changed the very top of the dictatorship in Yemen and just replaced Saleh with, what, his cousin or his second cousin twice removed or whatever.
So their interest in spreading democracy, even to prevent the kind of blowback that kills Americans, has its limits, you know, at their other interests.
Of course.
Yeah.
All right, now, so let's talk a little bit about this Syrian civil war, because it just seems funny to me that everybody's still arguing about whether or not the U.S. government ought to be arming these guys when Phil Geraldi first reported back in December 2011 that there were two new findings, one on Iran, one on Syria, authorizing increased covert activity, and that the CIA was supporting and coordinating with the Turks, the Qataris, and the Saudis, and the Jordanians now, too, in training and arming and supporting these rebels.
And they talk about, well, we want to support the moderates instead of the extremists, but moderates don't shoot rifles and set off suicide bombs.
And so what are they talking about?
And I guess I have to concede that maybe they are sort of trying to not fund the suicide bomber and arm the suicide bomber brigades, but that is exactly what they're doing, isn't it?
Okay, a few things I would mention.
First of all, yes, the objective of trying to reduce the extremist element in the Syrian opposition, that is understandable, because Islamists have steadily taken the lead in the fight against Assad, which presumably means that when Assad falls, they'll take the lead in governing Syria.
Although a caveat is in order, it is the extremists that are winning the war against Assad, as you just said, that the suicide bombings, the IEDs, in fact, not even the suicide bombings, the suicidal attacks, you know, it is the Islamists who are swarming heavily fortified regime outposts, taking, you know, casualty ratios of five to one against them to overwhelm and seize some of these regime positions, especially in the last three or four months.
So, say what you want about the Islamists, if this was a secular democratic opposition, Assad would not be in as much trouble as he's in.
Second, though, the idea that anything we can do, certainly getting involved ourselves, is going to act as some sort of a palliative to moderate the Syrian opposition or strengthen moderate elements in the opposition is absurd.
I mean, when's the last time that our involvement in an external conflict helped bring the sides together or helped resolve it in an effective way?
So, I'm just very skeptical of the idea that anything we can do is going to change the basic trajectory where the conflict is setting.
Yeah, I mean, all this talk, I mean, for years now, it's the spring of 2013, you know, we're still talking about whether or not to arm the moderates and how much and whatever.
When the people doing the fighting, as you say, the ones getting the job done are the ones who are not afraid to die, you know?
Absolutely, absolutely.
And so, the fact that the Anne Marie slaughter and the Democratic Party side of this argument is even still entertained at all, I don't know, and especially since we know that, and you know what, I guess this is a subjective thing.
To me, if the U.S. government says to the Saudis, yeah, arm them, then that's the U.S. government arming them.
Because what are the Saudis and American sock puppets anyway?
It's no different than having the Israelis sell the Ayatollah missiles in the 1980s, like that lets Ronald Reagan off the hook for selling weapons to Iran that he got the Israelis to do it for him.
No, it's just one step of not very plausible deniability, and otherwise Barack Obama has been aiding out arming Al-Qaeda in Syria for three years, two years.
Well, the thing you have to understand is that the Saudis and the Qataris, basically they want influence in Syria's post-war political order.
The last thing they want is a secular democratic system, which not only will give them less influence, but might inspire their own subjects to demand the same.
They would much rather have a staunchly conservative religious element ruling Syria after the war ends, and they certainly don't have any problem with Al-Qaeda.
Again, partly because they want to arm the people who are doing the best job to overthrow Assad.
It's not all them specifically trying to strengthen religious extremists, but that is the net impact of their involvement in the conflict, and I don't think the United States is doing enough to force its Arab allies to act more responsibly.
The best thing the Saudis could do is to knock off all of the extremist Sunni clerics who are given the voice in government-owned Saudi media networks like Al Arabiya TV.
If the Saudis really wanted to reduce religious extremism in Syria, they know how to do it.
They're just not going to do it.
Yeah, and now, I mean, the question, well, there's a couple of things here, I guess.
First of all, is Assad even really in danger of losing power at this point?
And then secondly, do you think that the Saudi regime really is aiming toward the breakup of Syria rather than the takeover of the whole thing at this point?
Well, no, the Saudis don't want the breakup of Syria.
If anything, Syria is about 75% Sunni Arab, and then there are a scattering of Alawite, Druze, and other minorities in Syria.
And being orthodox Sunnis, the Saudis absolutely don't want a breakup of Syria.
In fact, they don't even want a federalization of Syria.
They don't want any sort of representational rights for minorities in Syria.
And that's basically what the Sunni Islamist extremists in Syria are saying.
Now, on the question of is Assad finished, he absolutely is.
Just demographically, the fact that Sunni Arabs outnumber Alawites about 5 to 1, the fact that the Arab states supporting the opposition are richer, stronger, and more influential than Assad's allies, tells me that Assad can't win.
The rebels are eventually going to defeat Assad.
Now, he may pull his forces into the Alawite heartland along the coast of Syria and try to establish an Alawite mini-state of some sort.
And there's some evidence that Hezbollah's involvement in Syria recently, the Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah's involvement in Syria recently, is designed to help clear the path between Damascus and that region.
But another issue that I think U.S. policymakers neglect to understand is that just the other day, Kerry keeps talking about how we need to send Assad a message, he needs to see the writing on the wall.
It's not about Assad anymore.
The war is not going to end when Assad falls.
It's just going to become more multipolar with external actors supporting their own proxies.
Which is why we shouldn't get involved.
This is going to be a chronic sort of Lebanon situation.
The Lebanonization of Syria is a new buzzword.
It's going to be a chronic problem for years to come.
And the best way I think we can sort of help direct that sort of more positive outcome is by staying on the sidelines, acting as an honest broker.
When the two sides are ready to come together, we can jump in and mediate and sweeten the pot by offering them post-war aid.
There are a huge number of things we can do.
But going in and arming combatants is certainly not the answer.
Well, and the American government has, haven't they, taken the position of the rebels that you don't have to talk to Assad, that it's okay for you to insist that he has to go first before anybody talks to him?
They may have now, but for the first six months of the uprising, the Obama administration was trying to press the opposition into talking with Assad.
And that was kind of a mistake, because there are plenty of people in the opposition who would be willing to talk to Assad and willing to reach an agreement with him that doesn't involve him stepping down.
The problem is that they can't speak for the extremists who aren't going to observe a ceasefire and who are going to do everything to thwart any kind of compromise solution.
Right now, I think there's almost zero chance of a negotiated solution to the Syrian conflict.
And to the extent that there is a chance, it would have to come through outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran coming to some sort of understanding.
And, of course, I don't think anyone sees that happening anytime soon.
All right, now, I talked with Patrick Coburn.
I guess he was last there about a month and a half or two ago, something like that.
And he was saying that while Assad still controls all the cities and the rebellions certainly controls a lot of the countryside, but he doesn't seem like he's going anywhere anytime soon, although, like you're saying, stacked up against him on the other side, it's not quite full-scale NATO intervention like in Libya where they've got complete American or French air cover and that kind of thing.
And it's not a clear march from east to west like it was in Libya.
It's not going to be that easy.
But I guess you're just saying, are you predicting kind of a – or can you give us a timetable on when you think it's going to be that Assad's regime falls?
If I could take a stab at it, I would say that Damascus is likely to fall in six months to a year, and I would think the conflict will endure for quite a while after that.
And that's because they can't take over the rebels.
They can't take over the state as it exists.
They've got to completely conquer everybody who's resisted so far and create a brand-new one of their own.
They do in the sense that there are – the problem isn't just Assad.
There are thousands of people in the Alawite-dominated military security apparatus and others who have collaborated with the regime that are not going to be safe in Syria after the Sunni Islamist rebels take over.
And this elite has very firm control over their own sectarian communities, over the Alawite community.
And so the Alawites are going to fight to the death.
And so the war is only going to end when one side physically overpowers and disarms the other.
That's my view.
And so when you consider that, that the war can only end when one side physically overpowers and disarms the other, that can only mean the opposition.
Demographically, it's just inconceivable that somehow the fortunes of the war are going to turn in Assad's favor.
He may be able to slow down the collapse.
He certainly lasted longer than I might have predicted two years ago.
But two years ago, I would have told you, once the protests in March, April of 2011, once they reached a point where the regime couldn't stop them without killing people, Assad was finished.
Because the more he killed people, the more people were on the sidelines during the rebellion.
So for Assad, there's really no answer.
I think Assad has to be thinking about life after Syria, so to speak.
Is he going to try to create an Iranian-supplied Alawite enclave in Latakia province along the coast?
Is he going to go and exile in Russia?
Although I don't think that's likely.
But he's two, three years from now.
I don't think Assad's going to be president of Syria, certainly.
All right.
Now, among the rebels, when they say the moderates, does that mean the Muslim Brotherhood?
What?
Because I guess they're conservatives, which makes them less radical than the radicals.
Although these are just words.
They are.
I mean, there's two sort of branches of Sunni Islamism in the Arab world today.
One is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, and it dates back decades, back to the 1920s in Egypt.
And while it used to be very radical, it's not.
The Muslim Brotherhood in most Arab countries is focused very much on political power, socioeconomic progress.
Even the issue of Israel is kind of secondary, usually, to the Muslim Brotherhood.
On the other hand, you have Salafi jihadists or Wahhabi Muslims, as the Saudi variant is called, like al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi.
These people are very different.
They don't care about national political gains.
All they want is to convert the rest of the Muslim world to their version of faith and create a pan-Islamic state.
And so, you know, I guess moderate is sort of a relative term.
It really depends on the field you're talking about.
But, yeah, I would call the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood relatively moderate compared to Jabhat al-Nusra and some of these other Gulf Arab-funded groups that are emerging now.
Yeah, I guess I'm thinking moderate in terms of, say, for example, the Christian and Druze and other minority groups, the Shiites and other minority groups in the country.
Moderate typically means compliant with American government interests.
But I don't usually think along those lines.
Right, yeah.
So one person is moderate.
But, yeah, I mean, even on that, certainly, you know, if you look at the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, they aren't out to, you know, enslave Egyptian Coptic Christians or anything.
Right.
Now, Salafi jihadists are very different, you know, in Iraq.
I mean, it seems like every couple of weeks we see a Shiite shrine, suicide bomb by Sunni extremists.
These are all the radical jihadist sort of current.
Right.
Our allies in Syria are our old enemies from Iraq.
And that's partly why so many Alawites are rallying behind Assad, because they know what's in store for them.
Right.
Yeah.
Isn't it funny to see Nouri al-Maliki, who is allied with Iran and Assad, asking for American help to protect him from our allies, al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria?
Right.
It's amazing that this goes on.
You know, I just really want to see someone on cable TV news mention it once.
You know, just see, does anybody care even?
I don't know.
At least get a laugh out of it or something.
Right.
All right.
Well, listen, I really appreciate your time.
And I'm going to keep reading what you write, because I like it.
It's good stuff.
Great.
It's my pleasure.
Thanks very much.
Everybody, that is Gary C. Gamble.
He is an associate fellow at the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum.
And he writes at nationalinterest.org, the national interest, and, of course, foreignpolicy.com.
That's it for the show.
I'm over time.
I've got to go.
See you tomorrow.
Thanks, Gary.
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