03/12/17 – Joost Hiltermann on Trump’s deluded reasoning for ramping up the fight in Yemen – The Scott Horton Show

For Pacifica Radio, March 12th, 2017.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is Anti-War Radio.
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Introducing Joost Hilterman.
He co-authored this great article at foreignpolicy.com called, The Houthis Are Not Hezbollah.
Welcome to the show, Joost, how are you doing?
I'm very well, thank you, Scott.
Thank you very much for doing the show here.
So, yes, this is a very important piece that you've written here, debunking a very important narrative concerning the current war, or really wars, being waged by various sides, including America on at least two sides in Yemen right now.
So, yeah, first of all, I guess, give us the thumbnail sketch of the Houthis and the Zaydis and the who's who up there in northern Yemen and what's going on with this war.
And then we'll get to the accusation that you're confronting here.
Right, well, the Houthis are a political movement that is clearly pro-Iran and pro-Hezbollah, anti-Israel, anti-United States, anti-West, anti-Saudi Arabia.
So, their political position is very clear.
It's a political movement.
But they're also a representative of, and I make clear it's not the representative of, but a representative of a larger community that are the Zaydis.
And Zaydis are basically Shia in Yemen.
But as Shia, they're very different from the Shia that you find in Iran and Iraq and Lebanon.
In fact, the Shia in Yemen are often called more Sunni than any other Shia in the Arab world or in the Muslim world.
While the Sunnis in Yemen are often called more Shia than any other Sunnis in the Muslim world.
So, as communities, they're very close together.
And it's very hard to see a lot of sectarianization in Yemen for that reason.
But politically, this group, the Houthis, it's a clan, really a family clan based in northern Yemen, has taken political control.
And they were part of a political process off and on 15 years ago.
Then they stepped out of the political process and started fighting with the central government, then of the then autocrat leader Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Then the Arab Spring happened in 2011.
They rejoined the political process.
Then that political process sort of got mired down and didn't yield any concrete results.
The Houthis got out again and reverted to arms.
And then two years ago, took over the capital, ousted the interim president, and tried to move throughout the country.
At which point they faced a military campaign by neighboring Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf, the Emirates, Gulf states, to oust them.
And we've since then seen a long war that is currently still mated.
Well, and I think the real punchline in all of this too, right, was that they formed an alliance with Saleh, who it turned out is a Zaydi.
And I'd been trying to pay attention to this stuff, you know, as close as I can from Texas over here for all these years.
And I knew about Saleh's various wars, four or six different attempted wars against the Houthis that he had waged.
But then it turns out that he wasn't a member of their political movement or their clan, as you say, but he was a Zaydi Shia from the north.
So it was close enough.
He turned right around, made a deal with them and brought some army divisions with him.
So, in fact, I want to ask you before we get to all the accusations about Iran and everything.
I mean, this doesn't sound ideal to me, but I'm just saying it kind of in the real world.
It seems like possibly a solution to the war would be to just put Saleh back on the throne.
Then if the Zaydis can deal with him and if Saudi and America dealt with him for decades, then, you know, it's and obviously Hadi could never be the president again.
They're never going to succeed in putting him back in power in Sana'a.
So why not just go ahead and let Saleh come back at this point?
Well, you're absolutely right that Ali Abdullah Saleh has the linchpin to a solution, but he may have he may be, you know, damaged goods may be very hard to get him back.
But there are alternatives.
He could still be a powerful force, as he undoubtedly will be behind the throne.
I mean, there's a son, but there's also other people within that community.
But you're absolutely right.
He is a Zaydi, but he's a secular Zaydi.
He's not in any way close to the Houthis.
And in fact, the Saudis were working with Saleh for a long time.
They've also worked with the Houthis.
They can work with the Zaydis.
It's not about religion at all.
It's all a very cynical political power play.
And in fact, before the change in when King Abdullah died and King Salman came to power in Saudi Arabia in early 2015, I think, yeah, the Saudis were conspiring almost with Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthis.
But then there was the change in Saudi Arabia and then the perspective changed.
And then the Houthis and Saleh basically threw them into each other's arms.
And now they are a very potent force because the Houthis are very strong fighters.
Ali Abdullah Saleh still has loyalty among the army, the significant sectors of the army.
So together they are a very powerful force in Yemen.
They are not happy bedfellows necessarily.
And if there's a post-conflict situation, I wonder how they will continue to last together.
And I have serious doubts about that, frankly.
But the opponents in Yemen are much weaker.
And as you said, Hadi, the interim president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, he is from the south.
So in the north, he's not trusted because he's from the south.
In the south, he's not trusted because he has been in power in the north.
So he's not wanted anywhere.
And the opposition is deeply fragmented.
It doesn't have access to weaponry except the few arms that Saudi Arabia ships to them.
So it's an impossible situation.
And the only way out is a political deal.
And the question is, you know, what form would it take?
And I think, as you said, it's very hard to imagine one that excludes any of these key actors, Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis, and of course the Saudis and the Emiratis, because, you know, these are the main belligerents.
And it's hard to see how a person like the interim president Hadi, how he would be able to survive politically in this situation, because, you know, he has had no real viable political role.
Well, I don't know if you saw this, but I really got some yucks from this yesterday in Reuters.
Al-Qaeda appeals for help to repel Houthis in central Yemen.
And it's the Al-Qaeda guys are complaining now and accusing America of coordinating our attacks with the Houthis.
Since we're fighting on both sides of this war, helping the Saudis bomb the Houthis, but also the CIA and JSOC targeting the Al-Qaeda guys who are benefiting from that war against the Houthis.
Well, at the same time we're fighting against both sides, we are in effect fighting for both sides and have both sides very upset at us over it too.
That's not the only place in the Middle East where this is happening.
In northern Syria is another one.
I mean, because that United States is fighting with both the PKK and with Turkey, who are archenemies.
In fact, the Bata Brigade has been there fighting on the same side with Hezbollah and Assad.
And we're still friends with the Bata Corps in Iraq.
These are all local tactical arrangements that are necessitated by, you know, whatever the US priority is.
And the US priority strategically is to fight primarily against Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and groups like that.
So you would think so, right?
Right.
But they also need to support allies such as Saudi Arabia against the Iranian influence.
And the trick in the whole Middle East is really, you know, who is the bigger enemy for the United States or for Saudi Arabia?
Is it Iran or is it the Islamic State?
In other words, is it the Shia Persian enemy with its proxies or is it the radicalism within?
Meaning on the radical Sunni side.
So Al-Qaeda and Islamic State.
Who is the more dangerous one?
Well, and this is what happens is the answer is a lie.
The answer is Iran is an ally of Al-Qaeda.
That's what they just claimed in their new, the latest version of the travel ban.
And they'll just revert to that.
I mean, just insane, of course.
When they say to that Mattis had a plan to, and this is where we get to the meat of your article here.
Mattis had a plan.
The Secretary of Defense wanted to board an Iranian ship that he was accusing of being an arms shipment to the Houthis in Yemen.
And then according to the New York Times, the only reason that the Trump administration did not go ahead was because it leaked.
Thank goodness.
And so therefore, whatever they said, they lost the element of surprise.
And that was that.
And they didn't do it.
But that could have started a war with Iran right there.
Maybe that's what they want.
Right.
And so, you know, if you want to, if you want to stop the Iranians from supplying weapons to the Houthis, then intercepting a shipment is a way to do it.
But the question is, do you want to pick a fight with Iran and do you want to pick a direct fight?
Do you want to pick a fight with the proxies, which may be, you know, a little bit less dangerous?
So so that that that is a question for for the United States military to ask.
Of course, I'm not going to weigh in on that.
I think there are better ways of managing these situations.
Military resort to military means is not necessarily the smartest thing to do.
All right.
So now I don't believe necessarily you refer to this in your article for memory.
I don't think that you do.
And I'm not sure if you're aware, but the great Gareth Porter has debunked the meat of the previous accusations of Iranian arms shipments to to the Houthis.
And it was, I guess, the U.N. that the accusations had been laundered through the United Nations at one point.
But it was one ship had some guns on it, but it was going to Somalia, not Yemen.
And the other ship didn't have any guns on it at all.
But they made it seem like, wow, two different ships of arms to the Houthis from Iran, blah, blah, blah.
And they made a whole narrative out of it.
But it wasn't true.
And so, you know, this war has been going for two years.
So if we're talking about three ships, I think it's three ships with weapons that were the destination, not even clear.
Probably Somalia, maybe the Houthis.
It's possible.
And let's assume that we're another two or three ships that went undetected.
That's not much, is it?
Compared to, for example, what the Saudis are getting from the United States to fight this war, which has flattened cities.
I mean, Saada in the north is no longer a city.
We have to remember these things.
Now, I'm not trying to take sides in this because I think the Saudis have a case as well.
But, you know, the issue is not about arms shipments.
There are some shipments over land as well via Oman, apparently.
But, again, these borders are porous.
But at the same time, we're not talking about sophisticated weaponry.
The main issue is to the extent that there is external support for the Houthis, two things.
One, it's mostly from Hezbollah and it comes in the form of military training, as far as we can tell.
And secondly, it has not made a qualitative difference in the war.
The Houthis are allied with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has the loyalty of large sectors of the army.
They have arsenals that they have captured.
They have arsenals that stayed loyal to, you know, with commanders that have stayed loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh.
That is what is making a difference in the war, not the external support.
The Houthis have gone to Tehran many times and asked for more because they needed help against the Saudi onslaught.
But Tehran has said no, you know, because Yemen is not that important to them.
It's far away.
It's not part of their overall strategy in the region.
Their overall strategy in the region is directed toward Israel.
They don't, I mean, they don't see Saudi Arabia as an enemy.
I have to say Saudi Arabia sees Iran as an enemy, but it's not necessarily the other way around.
For Iran, the enemy is Israel.
That is clear.
And so all their resources are directed toward Israel and their forward defense, as they call it, or the strategic depth, whatever you want to call it, by helping Hezbollah and other semi-proxies along the way in Iraq and in northern Iraq where I am now, right now.
Yeah, that's really important that they had asked the Iranians for guns and were told no.
Of course, Obama himself admitted that the Iranians had warned the Houthis not to sack the capital city because you're going to provoke a reaction out of the Saudis.
They even said why not to?
And it happened anyway.
You cite that in your article.
And this is, I guess, where we really get to the politics of the thing.
It's very hard to describe.
It's all categories and whatever.
You do it the best you can with language.
It's hard to make a real science out of it.
But you have this very deep relationship between Hezbollah and Iran.
And then people try to say that, well, it's the same thing with the Houthis.
In fact, the worst of the hawks say this is the rise of the new Persian Empire.
And this is the tentacles of the Iranian juggernaut reaching out and all of this kind of stuff in the most hyperbolic terms.
And so I guess I wonder, could you really describe the relationship between Nasrallah and the Ayatollah for one and then compare that to the situation with the Houthis?
You know, first of all, I should say, you know, if I'm in the Middle East right now, I'm in northern Iraq and going to northern Syria tomorrow.
You listen here to everybody and everybody has a narrative.
And it's always about the other and how the other has these maximum goals to control the entire region.
And if you look back at world history, you see that, you know, at one point there was an Assyrian empire that was not limited to Iraq, but was actually stretched all the way to Egypt.
So the Persians were all over the place.
You know, then it was the Greeks.
Then it was the Ottomans.
And, you know, and then in this and the and that narrative continues.
So now it's like the Israelis, you know, West Bank Gaza.
That's not enough.
They're going to take Jordan.
Then they're going to control the oil.
That is the narrative.
Vice versa.
Iran is is not content with staying within the nation state boundaries of Iran, but actually wants to expand its influence throughout the Muslim world, especially to Mecca and Medina, etc., etc.
And, you know, and the Arabs, of course, are also not limited.
You know, the origin started in the desert in Saudi Arabia.
And look at how they expanded.
So these narratives are always there and the fear is always there.
So when you say today Iran, you know, is present here and there through proxies, that means that therefore they want to to expand the Iranian empire.
That narrative exists.
But actually, we need to look at the realities on the ground because it's not that simple.
The objectives are quite different.
As I said earlier, the Iranian objective is clearly to protect itself against an Israeli attack.
They see themselves as threatened by Israel.
Of course, Israel finds itself threatened by Iran.
I mean, it's mutual, it's reciprocal.
But from the Iranian perspective, they feel threatened.
So what they got by luck and chance in the early 1980s was a chance to organize a militia in Lebanon that arose because of the Israeli invasion in 1982 of Lebanon, southern Lebanon.
And this militia was Hezbollah.
That was one political expression of the Shia people in Lebanon.
There were other parties as well.
But this one was aided, armed by Iran, which was then three years into the Islamic revolution, which happened in 1979.
So there was a revolutionary fervor and there was military aid sent to Hezbollah.
So Hezbollah became this militia.
But Hezbollah also, maybe like the Houthis from the beginning, while they stood up to external aggression in this case from their perspective against Israel, they also had very much a domestic agenda.
Because the Houthis, sorry, not the Houthis, the Shia in Lebanon always felt that they were politically underrepresented.
And Hezbollah helped them gain political power.
And they did it by standing up militarily to Israel, which gave them popularity throughout Lebanon.
So it's a difficult relationship between a patron and a proxy, where the proxy also has its own agenda and doesn't necessarily always listen to the patron.
But over time, Hezbollah and Iran have grown very close.
And when the Syria war started in 2011, 2012, and when Hezbollah entered that war in 2012, that relationship became very, very tight.
Because for both of them, in order to keep their arms corridor between Iran and Hezbollah, they needed the regime in Syria to survive.
So now they're fighting for the same objective.
So they're very closely linked.
But it's all about Iran and Israel.
The Houthis in Yemen is an entirely different story.
All right.
So, well, and just how different is it?
I mean, you're saying that while the Iranians don't have much of an interest in backing the Houthis anyway, and it's interesting you say that the Houthis actually even went to Tehran and asked for material help and were denied.
But could you go back in the history of it a little bit?
I'm sure somebody at AEI would say that, oh, no, the Iranians have been behind the Houthi movement or at least, you know, Zaydi Shia communities in Yemen all along.
Well, you know, since the emergence of the Houthis, they've had a very explicit anti-Israel and anti-U.S. rhetoric.
And the Iranians have loved it, of course.
I mean, this is great to Iran, but that doesn't mean that they're giving military support to the Houthis.
They just said, you know, fine, say what you know, this matches with our interests.
So when the Houthis took Sana'a in late 2014, the capital, apparently, but we've had this now from various officials, including the Houthis, including the Iranians, but also UN and others on the ground in Yemen.
The Iranians told them that was a stupid thing, would be, not was, would be a stupid thing to do.
Don't do it.
That's not what you should do.
And the Houthis flatly ignored them.
Then it happened again.
Once the Houthis had taken Sana'a, they decided in early, in March, February of 2015, to move south towards Aden on the Gulf of Aden.
And again, the Iranians told them not to do it.
And rightly so, because this was a total overextension of Houthi power.
I mean, Ali Abdullah Saleh has support in the south, but the Houthis certainly don't, because they're Zaydis, and in the south there are no Zaydis.
They're all Sunnis.
And then, of course, the Houthis were pushed out in the end.
They couldn't hold it.
So the Iranians were right.
The Houthis flatly ignored them.
So, you know, as a proxy, they're not really behaving as a proxy.
We have seen no real military aid so far going from Iran to the Houthis.
But we've heard Iranian rhetoric in support of the Houthis.
Absolutely.
You know, but for the Iranians, this is like in soccer, you know, scoring an own goal by the Saudis.
They say, thank you very much.
They pocket it.
They say, thanks for doing that.
No, we've gained strategic advantage here, which we weren't even seeking.
You know, I think the Saudis really have gotten themselves in a corner, and they need to find a way out.
And the only way out, the only viable way out, is a political way out.
But they are banking on a Trump administration and a General Mattis in the Pentagon, who are sort of knee-jerk anti-Iran and are willing to seek a military confrontation.
But the problem in Yemen is not going to be solved by that, because the Houthis are not an Iranian proxy.
They are actually a Yemeni actor.
They are a radical actor.
You know, they are good fighters, but they are very poor administrators.
You know, they cannot really rule.
But that is also an advantage to those who want to put them back in the box.
You know, seek a political solution where the Houthis are part of it.
It's an inclusive solution.
And bring in other parties who are better equipped to manage the place, to administer it, to govern it, to rule the people.
And then things will sort themselves out.
But, you know, and the Saudis have been dealing with the Houthis all along.
It's not like they, in their rhetoric, they say, this is Iran.
But in effect, they've been negotiating with them.
They've worked with them in the past.
They funded them.
You know, this is, even the Saudis know that the Houthis are not like Hezbollah.
But the problem is that the more they attack them, and the more they encourage the Americans to attack them, the more the Houthis are going to find themselves on the defensive and going to go back to Tehran to say, now we really need the weapons.
And sooner or later, the Iranians are going to give them to them.
It's a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Yeah.
All right.
Now, so let me ask you about the population down near Aden then on the coast.
Do they really support Hadi or he's all they've got or not even that or what?
No, no, no.
Hadi has very little popular support in the country because, again, he is a man who is from a particular area in the south where he was born.
But he has been a northern politician in many ways.
So in the south, where you have a secessionist movement called the Hirak, basically called the movement, which is a movement for either greater autonomy or federalism or actual secession.
There are different shades within that movement.
And these are the socialists?
And these are the descendants of the original Socialist Republic of South Yemen.
But, you know, that is already, you know, 30 years ago.
So I can't find it.
I can't find the clip anymore.
But I saw a great clip of a Yemeni fighter with an AK-47 saying, oh, Al-Qaeda this and the Houthis that.
I say, Viva Hugo Chavez.
Which I thought was really notable.
Like, wow, these guys, you know, this is its own separate faction for sure.
I need to learn.
They're the group in Yemen I know least about.
That's for sure.
Well, I would just say that the south, all the political groups are deeply fragmented.
It's highly diverse.
So you will find just about anything there.
But you will not find Zaydis there.
Now, Hadi is not popular because he's just not associated with any of those movements.
And he has also, you know, his own clan around there.
And they've alienated themselves.
The other problem with Hadi is that he has aligned himself with another large group there, which is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
And this is the Islah Party, the Reform Party.
And they've been a political player in Yemen also for a long time.
They're a legitimate player.
They're a good player in many ways.
But they are part of this alliance that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting.
But the problem is Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE, they hate the Muslim Brotherhood.
So here they are supporting the Hadi alliance, the main component of which is an enemy of them.
And so you're giving space to more radical actors such as al-Qaeda and increasingly the Islamic State, though I think al-Qaeda still has the run of the place, to operate.
And so what we've seen instead is that al-Qaeda has become stronger and stronger on the ground.
Well, and even if you go back at least halfway through the war or so, or maybe two years ago, almost two years ago, they were making major gains on the ground.
I admit I haven't been able to keep up with it.
But at one point they had taken a town or two.
They had taken a military base and a weapons magazine and a port and started taxing everybody at the port.
And they were doing better than ever.
Yeah.
They took the port of Mukalla in the province of Hadramaut, which is, by the way, the province where Osama bin Laden came from, where the bin Laden family comes from.
They became Saudis later, but they are originally from Yemen, from Hadramaut.
So al-Qaeda took in April 2015, they took the port of Mukalla.
They didn't really have to fight.
They made a local deal because the situation was there was a vacuum of power.
And they were very smart because they, instead of killing people and lording it over people, they basically handed power to a local group and said, sort of, you take care of the administration of this town and we're here.
It's ours.
And they started indeed taking advantage and profiting from trade through the port.
Then a year later, exactly a year later, the United Arab Emirates decided that enough was enough.
They couldn't have al-Qaeda controlling such a swath of territory and gaining from the revenues of the trade.
So they started pushing militarily.
They had ground troops.
Saudi Arabia doesn't, but the UAE does have ground troops in Yemen and started pushing.
And again, without a fight, al-Qaeda left.
And so there was no destruction.
There were no casualties.
Mukalla is now in basically Yemeni hands with UAE protection.
But al-Qaeda was not defeated.
It's just it's gone back, you know, melted into the countryside where, you know, in Hadhramaut and in other provinces in the south.
So they're very much there.
They're just biding their time, gaining support because they actually tried to help the local population, which has had no governance from the center.
You know, people will support anyone who's helping them providing services, right?
So as long as al-Qaeda is not cutting off heads or doing things like what the Islamic State is doing, people will put up with them.
And this is what's giving them their strength.
They're operating in an administrative, political and security vacuum where there are no services.
And people say, thank you very much.
You know, at least you're here.
This is this is the real danger because eventually these this group does have a transnational agenda and they may prepare attacks on the United States.
And, you know, we've seen it in the past.
So, you know, that is the risk.
Hey, these are the guys who tried to blow up a jetliner over Detroit, which if it had worked, imagine if it had worked for just a second.
Right.
Precisely.
It's very dangerous.
So how do you deal with a problem like that?
Well, you can send some special forces.
You can drone attacks this, drone attacks that.
But that usually decapitates some leaders.
But it doesn't make any difference.
Well, so that's really my question for you.
Right.
Is, you know, Obama came into power in 2009 and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is already a problem.
But then, I mean, really, even that Detroit attack took place after six weeks straight of drone strikes on the part of the U.S.
So chicken egg kind of thing there.
Sort of obvious who really was picking that fight.
But maybe they would have done it anyway.
I don't know.
But point being, eight years of drone strikes against them and some special forces, you know, on the ground missions, special ops guys type missions here and there, has only made it worse and worse and worse.
And now never even mind for a minute the war for the last two years that were basically, even in the words of an American general quoted in Politico magazine, we're flying as al-Qaeda's air force.
But never even mind that.
If you rewind two years where Obama had been fighting and fighting and fighting against these guys with the JSOC and the CIA drones and all that, it seemed to do nothing but grow.
They seemed to do nothing but get stronger and stronger.
Now we've outright been fighting for them.
Now Trump is already escalating and saying, you know, the fact that this one SEAL died is not deterring a major escalation now against al-Qaeda, not just in Yemen, but in Syria, Iraq, North Africa and wherever.
They're going after it, sending in the Marines wherever they can.
But I wonder if you think that, you know, judging the strength of al-Qaeda in Yemen, do you think that, you know, a few special forces missions in there could really do some quote unquote good, you know, from the point of view of the American military?
Or is it just going to make matters worse in the most obvious blowback kind of a way, do you think?
The best case scenario is that it will make no difference whatsoever.
The worst case scenario is it will make things worse.
The thing is, groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, wherever in the Middle East and North Africa or anywhere in the Muslim world for that matter, they breed on poor governance and actual conflict.
So they emerge in situations of poor governance.
They say, look at the corrupt rulers.
They're often Muslim rulers, but they're secular or they're just corrupt.
So they get some following.
Then when conflict breaks out, as it did after the collapse of the Arab Spring in many places, then they have a vacuum in which they can operate.
Now, al-Qaeda and Islamic State have done it in different ways.
Al-Qaeda has been, first of all, has a much clearer ideology, much more rooted in religion than the Islamic State, which is basically a bunch of thieves who have come together and claim to be religious and are very brutal.
Al-Qaeda is actually trying to govern.
I'm not trying to give them a good rap because they're not a nice group.
But you have to understand how they operate if you want to defeat them.
And so you need to end the conflicts, the political conflicts between the larger powers that are going on in Yemen and in Syria and other places.
And then you need to have some kind of inclusive governance where most parties, but not these groups, are included and actually able to provide services to people where people feel that they are safe and where they can send their kids to school and they come back alive, where they can find jobs.
These are huge challenges.
But the failure to address this is what is giving these groups their oxygen.
And that is what is the real danger, that they will grow simply because instead of finding solutions, everybody is fighting each other and letting these groups grow.
And some drones and some attacks on leaders that are successful are not going to make any width of difference.
All right, Shaul.
That is Joost Hilterman.
And he is co-author of this very important article at foreignpolicy.com.
It's called The Houthis Are Not Hezbollah.
With April Longley Alley, February 27.
Thank you very much for your time.
I really appreciate it.
It's my pleasure.
Thanks a lot, Scott.
And good luck to you.
All right.
Talk to you again.
Okay, Joost Hilterman, foreignpolicy.com.
Very important article.
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