12/04/15 – Gareth Porter – The Scott Horton Show

by | Dec 4, 2015 | Interviews

Gareth Porter, an award-winning journalist and historian, discusses the IAEA’s final report on Iran’s nuclear program, and the agency’s refusal to admit past mistakes about bomb-testing at Parchin.

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All right, y'all, welcome back.
And now we got to move on because I'm late to get Gareth Porter on the show here.
He's got some news analysis for us.
That's the one good thing about Skype.
Well, the second good thing about Skype, other than the audio quality when it's working right, is I don't have to stop the show and go make a phone call.
I can just hit a button and it works just right.
Welcome back to the show, Gareth Porter.
How are you, sir?
Hi, Scott.
I'm fine.
Good to talk to you again.
This is actually not a record, but this is your third time on the show in a week, but on three very different subjects and very important ones.
I don't mind if you don't.
Gareth Porter, I've done over 4,000 interviews and 200 and I think now 31 or two or three or so of those are of him because he's great on everything.
He wrote the book, Manufactured Crisis, the truth beyond all the ridiculous hype about the Iranian civilian nuclear program, something like that.
So now, get this everybody, the International Atomic Energy Agency has finally released their report on Iran's possible military dimensions, otherwise known as the PMD file, all the accusations that Iran had been researching and or attempted to construct nuclear weapons.
And this is part of the nuclear deal is that the Iranians will cooperate with the IAEA on resolving all the last of these questions.
And they have.
And now this is the IAEA's report.
And guess what?
Gareth read it and has some criticism.
Welcome back.
Oh, I already said that.
So tell us, first of all, can you give us the basic overview?
Can you give us the Gareth Porter headline out of the IAEA PMD report here, Gareth?
Well, you know, this is a tough piece to write in the sense that there really are two entirely different levels on which it needs to be discussed.
At one level, to give some sense of the history of the whole issue for context and as well as, you know, what the significance of this document is.
But the other story is really what is spectacularly different about this document, this final assessment that reveals the inside of sort of the modus operandi of the IAEA, the dishonest modus operandi of the organization in dealing with the whole Iran nuclear issue.
And in order to do both of those, you really need a lot more than the normal size story.
And so it was really tough for me.
I had to make a choice here.
And I finally decided to focus on the latter, to focus on what I thought was, you know, the headline in terms of the issue that the IAEA spectacularly misrepresented that I think most of your listeners will be familiar with.
And that's the Parchin, the infamous bomb test cylinder of Parchin, what I call in my book the phantom bomb test cylinder of Parchin.
And how the IAEA handled that in this report is, in my view, a scandal.
And so I made the headline something to, you know, the effect that the IAEA defends discredited Parchin story, even even though it essentially backtracked.
I didn't actually put I didn't have space to put the backtrack in there.
But that that's part of the that's part of the of the lead.
So what I did was to really show that what the IAEA, the lie that the IAEA has added to its list on this issue is that that defended the the overall notion that it was right about the Parchin bomb cylinder.
Even though if you read it carefully, what you discover is that the IAEA actually backtracked on the key points that it had relied upon in the past to buttress the notion that this bomb cylinder, this phantom bomb cylinder actually existed.
On one hand, I document in this piece that the that the IAEA in its famous 2011 report where it made all these accusations based on intelligence claims by unidentified member states.
Yeah.
Yeah, exactly.
A clearing throat, meaning Israel plus Israel's friends.
What what the IAEA did in that 2011 report was to say that the the the unnamed member states had told it that this chamber of this this cylinder had been installed in 2011 to carry out hydrodynamic testing.
Now hydrodynamic testing means essentially simulated nuclear testing, which which does not use any nuclear material.
And so so this was, you know, quite a spectacular claim.
And what we find in the actual in the final report is that they don't even claim that anymore.
They now do not attribute the idea of of hydrodynamic hydrodynamic testing to these unknown unidentified member states.
And now they're basically admitting that this whole idea that the bomb chamber was put there for hydrodynamic testing was an inference from the dimensions of the chamber or from the dimensions of the cylinder.
I mean, this is this is an astonishing admission, even though it's a cylinder, the dimensions of what cylinder?
Well, they're talking about the dimensions of the dimensions of a cylinder that was designed by the the Ukrainian scientist who they identify as falsely as as somebody who worked in a bomb program and therefore was, in fact, a specialist on nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union.
I mean, he did work in the Soviet Union, but in fact, he was never a specialist on nuclear weapons, didn't know anything about nuclear weapons design or anything like that.
So what he did was to work on, as I think some of your listeners, many of your listeners will remember, he worked on nanodiamonds.
And so he had designed a nanodiamond production cylinder.
And and they cited, in fact, in their 2011 report, the fact that that in this publication, he had identified the dimensions of this cylinder.
And therefore, this was the basis for deciding that this was how big the the alleged cylinder at Parchin was.
So.
So this is just an astonishing series of bold assumptions that are passed off as fact.
And now.
But so Danilenko never did actually even make a chamber for the Iranians for nanodiamonds or anything else.
He had just designed one.
Is that it?
There's absolutely no evidence that he ever designed that he ever actually built a chamber for it.
No actual chamber, just they're going off of what they claim are the specs that that's right around in a circle with the assertions there.
I have one iota of evidence to suggest to support the idea that Danilenko actually constructed a chamber of any kind in Iran.
And now it's important here, too, and you get into Tungsten and all this and that.
And Robert Kelly, he's the former IAEA chief inspector.
And you can talk more about his credentials if you want, when we get back from the break.
But he did a report for SIPRI, S-I-P-R-I dot org, where he shows what this thing would have had to look like and be like if it had existed according to the claims and shows just how absolutely impossible it is to believe that that thing was built and then demolished and removed without everybody in the whole wide world knowing about it.
And I'll encourage everybody to go put their eyeballs on that study for SIPRI dot org.
And we'll be right back with the heroic Gareth Porter in just one second, y'all.
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All right, you guys, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton and all that I'm talking with the great Gareth Porter.
We're deep in the weeds on the new Iran report from the IAEA, the final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program, the PMD and Gareth and his new piece, which isn't out yet, but it will be very soon here.
It it's very in-depth on the claims, the very important claims about the Parchin military facility and hydrodynamic testing that was alleged to have taken place in a giant containment chamber that was alleged to have existed.
And now the IAEA is saying that they're still right, even though they're climbing down big time from, I guess, all of the different arguments that they had ever clung on to in order to argue the case for believing in this chamber and these tests.
So I'm not exactly sure where you want to pick it up here, Gareth, but I'll give the floor back to you.
You alluded to the to a SIPRI study by Bob Kelly, Robert Kelly.
And of course, he's done several things, you know, about the the infamous chamber at the bomb test chamber at Parchin, all of which have effectively debunked it in one way or another.
But the latest thing that he did in October for SIPRI is a short research note or discussion note in which he addressed this whole question of the use of tungsten as the substitute for nuclear material in hydrodynamic testing, which, you know, the 2011 report specifically mentioned tungsten as the candidate that they were told by their apparently by their unnamed member state sources was how the the the chamber would be used for hydrodynamic testing, that they would use tungsten, which was alleged to be similar in its characteristics to to uranium for that purpose.
Now, what Kelly did was to absolutely just explode this whole notion that tungsten could be used for hydrodynamic testing.
He shows that it's it's ridiculous.
It's it's stupid.
Basically, it's impossible that, you know, that you would use tungsten.
He points out that it can't be shaped, it can't be melted and shaped into the form that would be needed for hydrodynamic testing because of its fundamental characteristics, which are totally different from uranium and that the form in which it could be transformed into, which is a powder, requires an incredibly complex and expensive process that would be not worth it.
And furthermore, and even more importantly, you know, you wouldn't learn anything worthwhile from using tungsten because its characteristics are characteristics are so different from those of uranium.
So the whole idea he just completely debunks.
And this was published in mid-October, as I recall.
And what is so interesting here about the final assessment is that the IAEA no longer even mentions tungsten, implicitly acknowledging that that was bunk.
And I mean, they still mention hydrodynamic testing, but don't do any don't mention anything else about it.
And so, you know, this is further evidence that, you know, they're a bit shamefaced about this privately, but they're not willing to admit that they were wrong.
Yeah.
Well, I should ask Gordon Prather about that.
I know he told me before that it's conceivable that they could use non-fissile uranium or even lead maybe for tests like that.
Not that they would do it in a chamber anyway, if they were testing an implosion system, they would do that outside, like in the bogus accusations about Marivon, not in a chamber like the bogus accusations about Parchin.
Right.
So that brings me to the other point that I make in this piece, you know, about the final assessment in relation to Parchin and similar issues, because, you know, the not the hydrodynamic testing, but another form of supposed nuclear related testing involving high explosives that the IAEA accused Iran of carrying out in its 2011 report is something that involves a technology that involves a multipoint detonation system or PMI.
And so, you know, this is much more complicated.
The IAEA argued or claimed that Iran again used the famous Ukrainian scientist engineer to help them rig up this technology that they could test, that they could use to see if they could detonate a nuclear weapon.
And the Iranians came back finally in the final phase of this cooperation and they documented the fact that, yes, they had a PMI technology under development, but they documented the fact that it was used for a conventional weapons application.
And they presented a lot of documentation to prove that.
And the IAEA does not challenge that that fact.
And so all they have as their final assessment on the whole question of this technology that they had previously blown up into such a huge issue of, you know, having having a program that looked like it was a nuclear weapons related program.
Now they say, yes, Iran did have this program, but the technology, well, they don't even say but that the technology has characteristics that are relevant to nuclear weapons.
I mean, that is, of course, a totally meaningless statement.
And that is another way in which they sort of get away with backtracking without having to admit it.
Well, and you've reported before that they were invited out to Merevon and refused to go because they know they're full of it.
Point I wanted to make, and you've anticipated it perfectly.
Yes, this this was in 2011.
The sort of keynote of their accusation was that that they had information from member states that, in fact, this technology, this so alleged nuclear weapons related technology was carried out.
The testing was carried out at a place called Merevon, a region of Merevon.
So so finally, in late 2014, the Iranians said, OK, fine, come, we'll let you have a one time visit to Merevon just to to see if, in fact, there's any evidence that such testing was carried out.
And, of course, as you say, the IAEA refused to go, even though this was the one place where, you know, they had identified specific tests that had been carried out, according to their, again, unidentified member state sources.
They refused to go and carry out an inspection or or to see, you know, to carry out any environmental sampling at the site.
And they never explained why.
They simply said, well, we don't think this would answer the questions.
So it's obviously extremely suspicious.
And it once again just underlines the dishonesty of the IAEA on this whole set of issues.
All right.
And now and nobody forget in case you never heard it to learn it now that it's in the WikiLeaks where Yuki Amano, the head of the IAEA, coming in, replacing Mohamed ElBaradei, said, hey, guys on Iran, I'm with you and your agenda, whatever you want out of me, that kind of thing.
So it's not just an accusation.
It's right there.
Thank you, Chelsea Manning, doing 35 years in the brig for our government sins, for revealing this information to us.
But it's there.
If anybody wants to check it in the State Department's own writing about our great victory and in putting this tool of ours in charge there and further and furthermore, just very quickly to add a point to that, one of my sources, former IAEA source who who has was in a position to to know this says that former colleagues told him that Amano had said privately that he had no choice but to issue the 2011 report with all these accusations because it was part of the deal under which he got U.S. support to be elected to the position of director general to replace ElBaradei to succeed ElBaradei.
Well, he had made that open.
I wonder what his ancestors think of that.
Ha ha.
They wouldn't be too proud if they were if they were samurai, as as by the way, he also told people in the IAEA that he was a samurai.
But but if his his Japanese ancestors were samurai, they would not be pleased with that.
Yeah.
Representing the Israelis a little far afield from their usual stomping grounds there, I guess.
All right.
Well, now, so back to Parchin for a second here, as long as I'm keeping you into the right.
They found two particles of uranium, Gareth, natural uranium, but still uranium with a capital U.
So how do you explain that, Mr.
Apologist?
Absolutely.
I'm glad you've you've come back to that, circled back to it, because that is another link here, another way in which the IAEA essentially misrepresented the issue of what they know and what they found at Parchin.
They have a footnote to the text, a footnote to a statement in which they attack the Iranian explanation for what the actual purpose of the building at Parchin at that site at Parchin was, which was to store not unused vats or drums of chemicals that they were used for explosive experiments there.
And they attacked that.
And in the footnote to to their statement that they found, you know, no evidence of that would show that there were chemicals stored there.
And of course, that in itself is misleading because there's no reason to believe that they would have found evidence simply because drums of chemicals were stored there.
They wouldn't necessarily find any evidence that they were there.
But the footnote, as you point out, admits that they found no evidence of of of uranium that they could link to a nuclear program.
They found two particles, which was simply not an indication of that there was anything that there's any actual man-made or man-changed uranium that was there in in the site.
And that is significant because.
Wait, you're saying in plain English here, you're saying two particles proves the negative.
It doesn't establish the aha anything.
It only shows what there's not.
That's all there is that they essentially admit that in their footnote.
But what they do not say is that the significance, the real significance of that finding is that there was no hydrodynamic testing because to do so, they know the Iranians had they been involved in something like that, they would have had to use uranium, natural uranium.
And and that would have shown up in the environmental sample if if they had carried out an explosion using natural uranium, that would have shown up.
All right.
What about lead?
Did they test for lead at all?
Again, I'm just going on hearsay, but it's the very best hearsay.
The great Gordon Prather said he thinks that it's conceivable that someone could do implosion system testing with lead or never.
I never heard anything about that.
I'm trusting Bob Kelly on this.
He is, as far as I'm concerned, among, you know, the handful of top specialists on intelligence on nuclear weapons programs.
So mentions that at all.
Yeah, no, I doesn't either.
No, no.
All right.
Well, as long as they're not used as one of their bogus arguments, I guess it doesn't matter.
Yeah.
All right, well, so in other words, they really climbed down from all the accusations, but just still at the end sort of stubbornly said, we refuse to admit we're wrong.
But anyway, let's go let's move ahead anyway.
The PMD issue is closed.
Is that right?
Well, look, Scott, I mean, what they did in this report on on both of these issues and on other issues is that they they use a lot of very clever, cleverly formulated language, which is ambiguous and which makes it sound superficially like they you know, they're finding reaffirms their initial their initial finding in 2011.
But in fact, if you if you read it very carefully in the context of what of what they say specifically, it doesn't do that at all.
And I think there are a lot of if I'd had, you know, four thousand words or three thousand words in which to to cover all this and the time to do so, I could have given other examples of exactly how they did it.
But that's really the modus operandi that they use in order to to escape from what is essentially a debacle for the IAEA politically.
Yeah.
All right.
Listen, so I I hope then we can expect another piece or two from you on the rest of the report.
Well, you know, I I'm not committing myself to that.
Go ahead.
Because there's so much stuff going on in the Middle East that really has to be addressed.
And I don't know if I can get anybody to publish a piece like that.
You know, tell you tell you the truth.
That's a question mark.
Well, look, I mean, if nobody will publish it, we'll at least put it on antiwar.com.
But we won't give you any money.
Right.
And you know, I've got a way in balance my my time and energy at this point.
I understand.
I understand.
But all right.
Well, there you go.
I hope that I'll tell you what.
Do me a favor and reread it one more time and see if you're not inspired to go ahead and spill out a few more paragraphs.
Well, I mean, I'll still be thinking about that.
And, you know, I can't say that I won't do something.
Absolutely.
I just I can't at this point.
I just don't know.
All right.
Well, listen, man, you're great.
I appreciate this one is going to run at Middle East.
I am I right?
No, this is a truth.
This is the truth.
OK, it's IAEA final report defends discredited Parchin cylinder claims by the great Gareth Porter.
Be out today.
I mean, my my sense is that it'll be out today.
OK, good deal.
And that's truth out dot org by the great Gareth Porter, author of Manufactured Crisis, the truth behind the Iranian nuclear scare.
Thanks again, Gareth.
Really appreciate it.
Thank you, Scott.
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