10/16/13 – Reza Marashi – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is my show, The Scott Horton Show.
Next up is Reza Marashi.
He used to work in the State Department.
Now he's at NIAC, N-I-A-Council.org.
It's the National Iranian American Council.
They work to promote peace and good relations between that state and this one.
Welcome back to the show, Reza.
How are you doing?
I'm doing well.
Thank you for having me back.
So what's the good word?
Oh, the good word, if we're talking about my issue, is U.S.-Iran relations more generally.
More specifically, is that there was a positive round of negotiations between Iran and the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany.
The reason why they were positive is two key reasons, but let's just cut to the chase.
One, the Iranians and both the Americans moved a little bit further towards the middle, if you will.
They both compromised.
And to date, when one side's been willing to compromise, the other side really hasn't been.
What does that mean?
That means that the American side, together with the European allies, decided to have conversations with the Iranians about what this all might look like at the end of the negotiation process.
Up to this date, the Bush administration before and the Obama administration currently have so far avoided those kinds of conversations, and that made the Iranians very skittish for a whole host of reasons.
But then the Iranians themselves were also much more forthcoming about the details of their nuclear program and what they might be willing to do in terms of limitations on their program and what they might expect in return.
They were much more concrete.
All of this is very positive.
It injects momentum into the diplomatic process.
That doesn't mean that the problem can be solved overnight, but it does mean that we're finally getting down to business in a way that I don't think we've seen over the past four to five years.
So, in other words, the Iranian Chamberlains are doing their best to appease the American aggressor?
No, it's actually quite the opposite.
Quite the opposite.
The approach that hardliners and extremists, both in Tehran and in Washington, have taken up to date has only exacerbated the conflict, and it's made sanctions increase on Iran more and more when Iranian hardliners did extremist-type activities, and it's made Iran's nuclear program advance technologically, creating new facts on the ground, as American hardliners and extremists put more and more pressure on.
So, this cycle of escalation has created an incentive for both sides to walk back from the brink of a military confrontation that I think they'd independently seek to avoid.
All right, so now, I guess, can you give us the word from Geneva about, I mean, I guess they're saying everybody's getting along just great.
Can you tell us, you know, how far it is that, I don't really understand all the ins and outs of all this diplomacy stuff.
They've certainly come a lot further than just agreeing to have some talks, but they haven't really shaken hands on even the outline of the deal yet, really, have they?
Well, that's what they've been getting down to for the first time in a long time, is the outlines of what a deal might look like.
You know, both sides agreed to not leak details of the negotiations to the press, but what we've been able to gather so far from people in Geneva that were there during the negotiations, not in the room, but were there to talk to the negotiators after the fact, is that, you know, there was a willingness to compromise on core issues and have very frank discussions about these kinds of core issues that neither side was really willing to have prior, before it turned into a blame game where, you know, the Americans would blame the Iranians, the Iranians would blame the Americans.
But now, you know, both sides have kind of said, okay, enough is enough, let's see what we can do.
The reason why that's important is because when you're actually talking about the core issues that need to be discussed in order to resolve the conflict, then we're really going to be giving diplomacy the chance that it deserves, then that we're actually taking steps to check the box, for example, in ways that we didn't in the run-up to the Iraq War.
And some might even say the war in Afghanistan or NATO's invasion of Libya.
So doing this kind of due diligence is critical, and if it continues, like both the Iranians and the Americans deserve praise for what happened today.
And if it continues, then we should continue to praise them for taking the proper steps to find a peaceful solution.
Yeah, that's more or less what Greg Thielman wrote this morning, or maybe yesterday that I read, focusing more on the Iranians' lack of bluster and blame and, you know, like not pointing out inconvenient things like Israeli assassinations of their scientists and that kind of stuff, which I guess the way he put it, they were focusing really on talking with each other rather than on posturing for the external audience, that that is really the key.
Yeah, I think so.
I think what we're seeing now is the fact that Iran has politics, and you have a new president in Iran who has brought in a new cabinet to staff the various positions in different ministries, and these people have a different idea on how diplomacy should work and a different way, a different way that they prefer to interact with the world as representatives of the Iranian government.
That doesn't mean that problems can be solved overnight, but it does mean that it makes it a little bit easier for the process to move forward.
It also makes it easier for the United States to move forward with the diplomatic process in ways that, frankly, it hasn't prior to these most recent talks.
It's going to be very interesting to see how this process moves forward, because both sides, you know, just because the extremists on both sides have been boxed in, it doesn't mean they've gone away.
And I think American negotiators and Iranian negotiators are well aware of the fact that they could potentially rear their ugly heads at any given time, so they're going to have to continue to be brave and take risks for peace.
That's going to be critical going forward.
Right.
Yeah.
Move quickly.
Well, so now, I mean, the bottom line on the American side, because isn't it correct that everybody in the whole world who's interested in the subject already knows the outline of the deal.
It's basically the same one that Obama offered him back in 2009, that Brazil and Turkey worked in 2010.
It's, you know, it doesn't have to be exact, but more or less, stop enriching to 20%, sign the additional protocol.
But that would require the Americans recognizing, at least de facto, if not officially stating it this way, it would mean them recognizing Iran's right to enrich uranium and leave the Natanz facility at least open for business and enriching uranium for their nuclear reactor, for their electricity program.
And for the long term, which I don't know if that would mean they'd have to just ignore their own Security Council resolution on the issue or repeal it or what, but that's the only real question here, right, is are the Americans willing to go ahead and recognize civilian enrichment at 3.6%, because I think the Iranians have been willing to make this deal all along, pretty much, at least since Obama came to power here.
I think you're raising really important points, and everything that you said is going to be a core tenant of what any confidence building measure or final deal, frankly, would end up looking like.
The only thing I would tack on the back end of what you just said is that the Iranians want to go a few steps further than everything that you outlined and say, where is this all going?
Where is this leading?
What kind of relationship do you want to have if we make this kind of deal?
Because what the Iranians aren't interested in is making the kind of compromises that we're asking them to make, and then we, of course, make a few compromises in return, but the relationship continues to be negative, and there continues to be this U.S.-Iran Cold War, if you will.
They want this to lead somewhere so that the overall relationship goes to a better place, not just the conflict over the nuclear program.
And that's what's most critical, because if we don't use this as a springboard to have that kind of conversation about what the endgame looks like, what does this all mean, and where is it all going, it's like the old saying goes, if you don't know where you're going, any road can take you there.
And that's very dangerous in diplomacy, so everything that you said about the technical details of Iran's program, everything that you said about what the United States would have to be willing to accept as it pertains to what Iran's program will look like, the technical details, the level of enrichment, number of centrifuges, you name it, across the board, inspections and verifications, all that stuff, 100 percent has to be there.
But also we have to know where the overall relationship between the U.S. and Iran is going.
You know, we can't be negotiating with Iran on the one hand and trying to overthrow the government on the other hand, right?
We're going to have to make a firm decision on what we want, and frankly so do the Iranians.
So that's the most optimistic thing that's emerged from Geneva so far, is they've finally started to have that kind of conversation.
Do you think the Iranians would settle for, we'll give you a real and serious nuclear deal, but we're going to still threaten you all the time, but just ignore it?
You know that kind of thing?
No, I don't think the Iranians would accept that.
And I can't tell you that any...
Because look, I want a permanent peace here, you know me.
I want to...
Absolutely.
I think that even from the point of view of the empire, the number one most important thing on the agenda ought to be to befriend the most important Shia power on earth right now.
Whatever.
Even from bad guy American imperialist point of view, that's my point of view, is make peace with Iran yesterday.
But I'm wondering, you know, if they would settle for, eh, we're not going to have too much of a future, but at least we're not going to have the nuclear issue to beat you over the head with anymore.
It will only beat you over the head over Hezbollah and smaller stuff, you know?
I don't know.
That's an excellent question, and that's the kind of stuff that the Iranians want to talk about as it pertains to what's the endgame.
What does this all look like when everything's been negotiated?
They want to negotiate on things not only limited to the nuclear program.
They want to talk about regional security, so that includes Hamas and Hezbollah.
That includes Afghanistan.
That includes Iraq.
That includes Syria.
They want to expand the agenda and expand the horizon.
They understand, though, and I think the United States understands as well, that the nuclear issue is probably the most pressing issue.
So if we make some progress on that and de-escalate tensions in that realm, then it opens up the possibility to take momentum from those negotiations and apply that momentum to talks over these other issues.
And that's how you create real and lasting peace, but that's really the most positive thing that's come so far from these talks.
They scheduled a new round of talks to follow up, I believe it's November 7th and 8th, or 6th and 7th.
Basically, it's three weeks' time, and that's good, because what that allows both sides to do is to come back to their respective capitals, go over what was discussed, and then follow up with more concrete ideas or more concrete counter-proposals.
And that's the magic of diplomacy.
That's funny.
All right, well, so it seems like if Barack Obama really wants to try to do this and he's really telling John Kerry that, like, hell yeah, we've got to see this thing through kind of a thing, the worst he has to deal with is John McCain and Bill Kristol.
And he can handle them if he really wants to try.
That's our hardliners, right?
But what about the Iranian hardliners?
How tough is it?
And you can disagree with what I just said, by the way, all you feel like, by the way.
Say whatever you want.
But I'm more interested in who are the Iranian hardliners, and how difficult is it for Rouhani to do what he's doing, considering their domestic politics?
Well, it's certainly going to be difficult, and we should understand that, and we should walk into these negotiations with Iran clear-eyed about the fact that Rouhani, the president of Iran, is handling his hawks, but he hasn't gotten rid of them.
I think what's important to realize is that there's never been this much unity inside Iran's political system about pursuing negotiations with the United States and taking steps to improve the overall relationship.
When I say unity, I don't mean 100% unity, but there's never been this much cohesion in the Iranian political system.
Especially since 1979, Iran's politics have always been very factional, and different factions have always been attacking one another to try and get credit for any kind of improvement with Iran's relations with the outside world.
And frankly, some Iranian political factions are opposed to improving relations with the outside world, because they thrive in isolation.
Thankfully, Iranian extremists have been sidelined, perhaps only temporarily, but sidelined.
But there are key conservative factions and key conservative politicians inside of Iran, including the leader himself, Mr. Ali Khamenei, that are so far backing President Rouhani's initiatives vis-à-vis the United States.
So it's very difficult to torpedo the process, but not impossible, if the leader himself is backing it.
So the quicker that the Iranians can make process in the negotiations, and the quicker that they can deliver something tangible, the more political space they'll have to continue to pursue this path.
And I think that's why they're trying to move quickly.
Well, now, remind me, back a few months ago, when Rouhani was elected, he was not the guy that the Supreme Leader preferred at the time, correct?
By most accounts, no.
The leader himself always says that I don't have a preferred candidate, but I think most Iran analysts would tell you that his preferred candidate probably was the most hardline candidate of the handful that were approved to run.
But the individual who ended up winning was Rouhani, who ran as a more moderate and more pragmatic – and I use these terms, moderate and pragmatic, relative to the people he was running against.
You know, a moderate in the United States is very different than a moderate in Iran.
But the Iranian people went to the polls overwhelmingly and voted for this guy.
So much so that I think the leader himself, and other conservative politicians in Iran who maybe don't want the diplomatic process to move forward and improve, were forced to accept the results and give them a chance.
Because any authoritarian government is always going to be concerned that the disconnect between the government and the people becomes irreparable.
And because of the post-election crisis in 2009 in Iran never really got resolved, four years later people went to the polls and voted overwhelmingly.
I am personally of the opinion that hardliners in Iran realized that they could do some funny business with the elections once, but they couldn't get away with it twice.
And now, back when – let's see, in 2003, Rouhani played some role in the so-called Golden Offer – well, that's what Gordon Prather called it.
I don't know if there's a popular term for it, but it was the Iranian great peace offer that said, hey, we'll deal with our entire nuclear program, but we'll also deal with you on issues of Hezbollah, on issues of energy, and whatever you want.
Let's be friends, kind of a thing, and that was the one where even the Swiss diplomat that delivered the peace offer got in trouble over it, and Gareth Porter broke the story with the Leveretts as his – well, I guess it was Leverett and Mann then as his sources.
So anyway, I was just wondering if you could remind us, what was Rouhani's role there, and was it Khatami or was Rafsanjani was the president – it was Khatami at the time was the president, right?
That's right.
It was Khatami who was the president, Rouhani was the chief nuclear negotiator at the time – this is 10 years ago, by the way – that they put forward a document that expressed a willingness to discuss everything from Iraq to the nuclear program to terrorism, regional security, essentially every single thing that the U.S. government says, we have a problem with the Iranians because they do this.
The Iranians submitted a document and said, okay, we're willing to talk to you about it.
And not only did they say, we're willing to talk to you about the things that you don't like that we do, here's a list of stuff that we'd like to talk to you about that you do that we don't like.
And frankly, that's how diplomacy works.
And Rouhani was actually leading the nuclear negotiations at the time, which were separate from this grand bargain offer, if you will.
But what's important to remember is that Rouhani and Zarif – Javad Zarif, who is the foreign minister of Iran currently, he was the U.N. ambassador at the time, 10, 11 years ago – these two men were two of the critical actors that spearheaded both processes at the time, both processes being the grand bargain offer and then the separate process of negotiating with the European Union.
Rouhani was leading those negotiations.
So not only did the Bush administration refuse the grand bargain offer that the Iranians put forward, they also refused to accept a very reasonable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that the European Union negotiated with Rouhani at the time.
And if we look back at what the Iranians agreed to, it's far more minimal in terms of what their actual nuclear program would look like in terms of technology and substance than what we're going to end up having to live with today.
Sure.
Far more minimal.
Yeah.
Natanz wasn't even a hole in the ground in 2003.
Yeah.
So, you know, they were asking for a handful of centrifuges and enrichment on Iranian soil.
That's what they were asking for in 2003.
That's the essence of it.
You know, give or take a few things here or there.
It's going to be a lot more than that today.
The price that we're going to have to pay for a peaceful solution to Iran's nuclear program has increased exponentially over the past ten to eleven years, largely, but not entirely, but largely, because of the Bush administration's unwillingness to accept what the Europeans were able to negotiate with Iran at that time.
And this isn't my opinion.
The former foreign minister of the UK and another former European foreign minister are on the record saying all of this.
So, you know, what's past is prologue, as Shakespeare used to say, and we need to understand who we're dealing with at the other side of the negotiating table, and who we're dealing with now is somebody who's tried to do this before, before there were any of these sanctions on oil and gas and banking, right?
Before there was any of this pressure.
So, he has a demonstrated track record of wanting to do this, and he has the backing of key hardliners in Iran.
So, if we can't do it now with these guys, I question whether or not we really are interested in doing it.
Yeah.
Well, you know, whatever else is true about the regime there.
Same with Assad in Syria and Qaddafi in Libya.
They were useful allies in fighting Al Qaeda, and those are America's actual enemies.
All Iran ever did to America is declare independence.
Al Qaeda attacked and killed 3000 people, and that was after trying to sink one of our ships and bombing two of our embassies and bombing the barracks at Khobar Towers.
Those are actual enemies, and we're willing to support, if not outright support them, at least ship guns and money that end up in their hands as they fight a war in Syria now because the Syrian government is an ally of Iran, and we're actually backing our own enemies against Iran and its allies.
The only reason I can think of, obviously there's resentment over the Declaration of Independence of 79, but really it's because of Israel.
Israel's concerned about Hezbollah, and Syria and Iran back Hezbollah, and Iran backs Hezbollah by way of Syria.
Since we didn't take them up on their golden offer, where they were willing to deal with Hezbollah and force Hezbollah to become a political party without guns anymore, I guess we have to back Al Qaeda in Syria now.
This is the kind of mess that we get in for turning these opportunities down.
In fact, one more thing about this real quick, and then I'll shut up and you can say what you want about it, is that at the time of the golden offer, one of the things in there was, and we'll deal with you, we'll work together on Iraq.
Well, what did America do?
America didn't just fight a war for the Shiites in Iraq and to hand them the capital city, but specifically the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who was the hand-picked leader of Sistani and Khamenei.
This is the guy that they wanted Bush to put in power, and Bush tried to put him and his men in power as best he could, and the only thing that happened was Hakim ended up dying, and Sadr and his allies ended up, and the Dawa party ended up inheriting a bit more of the power, but basically George Bush's entire Iraq war project was to do exactly what the Ayatollah, I mean specifically what the Ayatollah Khamenei wanted him to do as far as the Supreme Islamic Council, etc., and yet wouldn't work with him on it at all, and so it was a complete disaster and almost a million people died.
I think that the Bush administration strategically made so many mistakes in the Middle East from beginning to end, and the Obama administration has continued a lot of them, I'll be the first to admit, but I want to give the Obama administration credit now, because they've taken a few steps.
We should acknowledge good behavior, we should reinforce good behavior, right, when we see it from our political leaders, and I think Barack Obama and John Kerry and Chuck Hagel are three men who genuinely want to solve this peacefully.
I disagree with some of the ways they've gone about it over the past five years, but I think their bottom line is the same as you and mine.
If it doesn't get solved, at the end of the day we're going to have to look very carefully at what mucked up the process, but the fact that they're trying and they're willing to talk about an endgame with the Iranians, about what the relationship will look like at the end, provides the opportunity, far from guaranteed, but an opportunity the first time in decades to maybe move away from some of the stuff that you were just talking about, about how America strategically makes mistakes in the Middle East, and perhaps get it right.
Far be it from making promises that that's going to be the case, because I understand how difficult it is, but if we have a window of opportunity and our political leaders are pursuing it, then we should reinforce that good behavior and let them know that as American citizens, we're the majority.
The people that support them in using diplomacy and peaceful methods, we're the majority and we have their back.
So hopefully this will continue, but your concerns are warranted, because the historical reference point that you just made, it's there, it happened, and until we start to act a little bit differently in that part of the world, I don't see how we're going to be able to change the paradigm.
Well, I certainly agree with you that, well, you could never get me to praise a president, but I certainly am able to recognize that if it had been McCain or Romney in this situation, they wouldn't be talking with the Iranians like this at all.
They would be both much worse on this, so it could be worse if that's not the highest praise.
It's the best they'll get out of me, but no, I mean, this is a real big deal, and honestly, I can tell that the Saudis want what they want, and the arms dealers probably prefer that the Saudis are afraid of the Iranians, and of course the Israelis are afraid of a single atom of uranium existing anywhere in Persia at any time and that kind of thing.
But other than that, it doesn't seem like there's any real purpose in America's Cold War with Iran, other than a grudge from when I was too young, you know, when I was in, what, preschool.
You know what I mean?
It's ridiculous.
Yeah, you know, I think a lot of people would agree with you that it's reached the point of ridiculousness.
It's long since.
We're way past the point of ridiculous in terms of the U.S.-Iran relationship, and both sides deserve blame for poisoning the well.
You know, one goes, then the next goes.
A lot of people have made their careers out of proving how nasty they can be to the other side, but I think now where we're at is we have an opportunity to move away from that, and the best way to move away from that, and frankly, I would argue, personally, the only way to move away from that is courageous leaders that are willing to take risks for peace.
You look at this part of the world, more specifically the Middle East and the world more generally, things aren't going so well, not just for the United States, but for a lot of countries.
It's going to be very tough for Barack Obama to get a foreign policy win.
Iran provides a possibility.
They've aligned themselves for a deal, and I would hope that the President of the United States would use the same kind of political fortitude to push back against the Congress and other extremists to at least see if it's possible, to probe and test this possibility.
So far, so good, but it's going to take a lot more of what we've seen through this week.
Well, it's interesting, the discrepancy between the polls of the masses of Americans.
I think it was 75% said that they are in support of these talks, and then still the squeaky wheels up there are still squeaking.
So you're right, it's going to take the Americans making their voices heard that we support the President's position on this, and no matter what you think of the health care thing, and Obama because of it, or whatever, you've still got to support these peace talks with Iran no matter what, and let them know that.
Yeah, absolutely, I agree.
If you're not backing peace talks, then the real question is, what are you backing?
And that's an inconvenient question that a lot of people like to dance around or just outright ignore.
Hey, even Rand Paul, while calling for more sanctions somehow, is saying, let's make this deal, or let's make some kind of...
He's saying something about let's negotiate, I don't know what, but I'll take it, you know?
I'll take it, too.
Hey, thanks very much for your time again on the show, Reza, I appreciate it.
Thanks for having me.
Take care.
All right, everybody, that's Reza Mirashi, he's a former State Department guy, and now at the NIAC, that's NIACouncil.org, NIACouncil.org, working for peace between America and Iran.
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