10/14/16 – Mario Murillo – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, introducing Mario Murillo.
He is a professor and chair of the radio, television, and film department at Lawrence Herbert School of Communication at Hofstra University.
And he is the author of Voices of Resistance, Indigenous Media, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Colombia.
Welcome to the show.
How are you doing?
It's great to be with you.
Thanks a lot for having me.
I appreciate you doing this, especially after my technical difficulties last time.
You were very patient with me.
I appreciate that.
Not at all.
Very happy to have you on here.
And I got to tell you, it's just the most confounding thing I ever heard in my life, was there was a peace deal to end a civil war, and they held a popular referendum on it, and it was voted down.
How could that possibly be?
And of course, there's the whole backstory of the FARC and other groups as well in the civil war ongoing, a long time, generations long civil war with the Colombian government as a background.
So of course, we can get into all that.
But assuming that people know at least a little bit about it, is it okay if we just start with this referendum and how in the world a population with a chance at a fair vote voted down a peace agreement?
Yeah, I mean, the referendum, you know, I think my assessment of it subsequent to it, I wrote a piece for Huffington Post about it, that I think we put way too much weight on it.
And unfortunately, it does have weight because of the fact that now you have a situation where there's a lot of uncertainty as to how the country will move forward now that the peace agreement is sort of on hold, and perhaps will actually disrupt and be negated altogether.
But the bottom line is that if you look at the way the vote was held, and ultimately the number of voters that participated, first of all, we have an issue of very limited participation.
We had like 62% abstention rate.
So less than 38% of the eligible voters actually participated.
So right there, we have to say that that's not a reflection of the Colombian electorate, that in many ways, the public opinion polls prior to the election, to the referendum, were indicating that it was going to be a real easy vote for the yes, in other words, for the approval of the accord.
So probably that kept a lot of people out.
There was the issue of the storm, the Hurricane Matthew, that was hitting the Caribbean coast at the time, the same day that the referendum was happening.
That also apparently kept a lot of people out.
And considering that the Caribbean coast was totally in favor of the peace agreement, there was like 80% of those who did vote, it was about 80% in favor of the peace agreement.
That probably would have tilted it to the other way.
And then there's another issue that hasn't really been reported or discussed.
There was a piece in the Washington Post last week about it that raised issues as to whether or not it was even a no vote that won, considering that there was a margin of about 54,000.
It was like 50% to 49 point something percent.
It was a very narrow margin that they won by 53,000 votes, and that there was actually about 220,000 votes that were nullified, that were essentially considered broken votes or damaged votes, so they couldn't count them.
So you have four times as many votes that were discounted over the actual numbers of the differential.
So probably at least they should have said we should have a recount, if not a complete nullification of the results.
That was not raised and it was basically, you know, it's kind of more like an academic analysis subsequent to it.
But to answer your specific question about how is it possible that a public is going to say no to a peace accord.
But then we get into more complicated issues, which is how the no vote mobilized and organized, and in many ways disinformed the public to try to scare people away from voting in favor of the peace accord.
And also some of the political gaps that the yes vote, particularly the government of Juan Manuel Santos, carried out or did in the lead up to the vote.
So, you know, we can look at that a little bit and talk about how the right wing, the right wing in Colombia has a very strong track record of not feeding anything to the guerrillas.
That the campaign of fear and misinformation not only throughout the campaign to the plebiscite, but for the last four years as the government has negotiated with the FARC.
I mean, they've stopped at nothing to try to derail the peace process.
And in many ways they got their way because now they're front and center in what happens as we move forward, trying to resolve and trying to rescue what is left of the deal.
Yeah.
All right.
Now, so, yeah, let's talk more about that.
In fact, Uribe, the former president, was the leader of the no vote movement.
And that raises a very important question about America's involvement in this.
I believe, if I remember right from the news, that Obama, the White House at least, was saying that they were for peace and they thought that this was great, that finally the Colombian government and the FARC were going to work things out.
But that doesn't necessarily mean that he speaks for the military, the CIA, the NED or anybody else.
I'm not so sure to what degree he's even really the president anymore at this point.
And, you know, when the reports that they were really working out this deal first started coming out, I had someone write to me and ask me, could I please try to figure out what is the American role?
Are the Americans really going to let them have peace or are they just pretending and they're working to undermine it already?
And that was a few months ago.
So I know nothing.
I'm coming from a position of ignorance, but I'm looking at a situation where clearly America has supported the right wing and supported the war against the FARC all this time.
Maybe war is good for some businesses at the expense of others and some vested interests who would rather keep the thing going, you know, at Langley or somewhere else.
I don't know.
What do you think?
Well, I think, you know, the role of the United States in Colombia is very complicated.
And, you know, I spell it out in my book that came out about 12 years ago, the Colombia and the United States war on rest and destabilization, which essentially points to something that you're alluding to, that the US strategy and US policy vis-a-vis Colombia for over 50 years, since even before the FARC even existed, was always a military kind of strategic approach, looking at the Colombian state as a kind of proxy for US interests as they do just about anywhere in the world, right?
That's more or less the way it's always been.
And what happens is that the US has always focused on military and strategic assistance and training and relationships with the Colombian government in whatever happens.
So it's evolved over the years.
And we look at the early part of the 1960s when the peasant movement was up in arms and there was making demands and they created these independent republics in the countryside to demand land reform and fight for justice and fight for human rights and fight for a kind of redistribution of the resources in the countryside.
And that's when the FARC emerged because the response of the government was essentially with the United States support, with the support of first Kennedy and then eventually the Johnson administration when the FARC emerged in 1964 was to carry out an all-out military assault on these quote-unquote independent republics that were taking place there.
And so the FARC leaders, and they've always pointed that out, that it had the government and the U.S. taking a different approach, a political approach back in the 1960s to resolving the demand and addressing the demands of the countryside and the peasantry, the FARC probably would not have existed.
Now we can, that's a lot of historical hindsight that perhaps doesn't hold water.
So I could accept that.
Well, that's a long stretch because there's all the factors that led to the emergence of the FARC.
But over the next 20 years, 15 years or so, the U.S. was so entrenched in this anti-communist kind of Cold War proxy battle in Latin America.
You know, the Cubans took power, Cuba and Fidel Castro took power in 59 and Cuba.
And there was revolutions emerging elsewhere, you know, certainly in the Southern Cone.
And you saw a lot of uprisings coming up everywhere in South America.
And you had the situation that was brewing in Central America that eventually it went out to all-out revolution in the 1970s and 80s.
And so the U.S. saw Colombia within that same prism and continued to support the Colombian military security apparatus back then to prop it up.
And in many ways, overlooking and completely ignoring the situation in the countryside where the military was carrying out egregious human rights violations.
And, you know, that has a long track record.
Eventually it evolved to the end of the Cold War when the United States started focusing more on the so-called drug war.
So you saw George H.W. Bush refer to the all-out war on drugs as a clear and present danger to the United States' interests.
So that they started, you know, instead of focusing on this anti-communist Cold War stance, it was a drug war stance, but it was the same response, military strategic alliances, training, assistance packages, et cetera.
And that was building up all the way up until the end of the 90s when under Clinton, they pushed the plan Colombia that by 2001 was essentially now couched in the war against terror.
But it was always more or less consistently a military strategy that was aimed first and foremost at securing and propping up the Colombian state security forces in the interest of U.S. economic and strategic interest in the region.
And so that's what we have now.
What happened in Colombia over the last 15 years was an all-out war between the United States and the FARC, and essentially the FARC lost, right?
You had 20,000 combatants back in 1999, 2000, when they had their presence all over the country and they had a very strong military presence.
And after that, with plan Colombia with $9.3 billion in military assistance over those next 15 years, and again, it evolved.
And with the strategic training and the intelligence information exchange and the technology transfers that were happening, the Colombian government, military essentially, carried out a war that was completely supported and backed by the United States.
And they decimated the FARC to the tune of now they have about 7,000, 8,000 combatants.
The numbers vary depending on what figures you look at.
So we're talking about 7,000 combatants in total.
So in 15 years, they decimated the FARC.
And so at this point for the United States, to answer your broader question, are they truly into peace?
I think the argument is now, well, yeah, the FARC is going to negotiate.
They're going to negotiate from a position of weakness.
They're actually signing off on a number of measures that make Colombia safe for moving comfortably into the globalization of the 21st century, which is going to obviously open up the doors for U.S. and other transnational mining interests and economic interests, transnational, we'll talk about multinational agribusiness and mining and energy companies and tourism and all sorts of other companies that now see that this could be a boon for economic success for these companies.
So I think the United States truly does want to see an end to the violence, but obviously under the conditions that are being set out by the establishment, without keeping into consideration some of the concerns that many of the social movements still have vis-a-vis really resolving the issues in the country and truly reaching a peace that's going to be long and lasting and that's going to be just for the majority of the people in Colombia.
So what's the former president's problem then?
The former president, Uribe?
Yeah.
Well, that's a complicated question.
I know Uribe has a long history of having a very adamantly, I mean, he's the poster boy of anti-communism and anti-guerrilla discourse in Colombia.
He's got a strong kind of personal vendetta that he's had for decades.
His father was killed by the FARC in 1983 in a botched kidnapping attempt.
And since then, he's kind of held this personal kind of crusade that the FARC can't be negotiated with, that they're not waging a political guerrilla war, that they're waging a war on terror and they're a bunch of criminal bandits that needed to be liquidated on the military battlefield.
And I think he's always felt that, and he felt that there's no need for concessions, that you can't negotiate with terrorists.
And he's got a strong backing and a good percentage of the right wing in Colombia that feels the same way.
The large landowners that have traditionally been part of the problem in Colombia that support him, the, we're talking about sectors of paramilitarism that supposedly dismantled under Uribe in 2006, 2007, continue to have this strong anti-guerrilla sentiment.
There's a feeling that the guerrillas cannot be trusted, that they shouldn't be given any political space in the country, that they should be all put in jail.
And so that's the argument that Uribe has taken.
And to, unfortunately, it kind of resonated with at least a good percentage of the voters that voted down the peace accord a couple of Sundays ago.
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All right, so in other words, I shouldn't oversimplify and just assume that he's acting on America's behalf in undermining that.
I just figured he was loyal enough to the empire's agenda that he wouldn't really get in the way of theirs, you know?
Well, he's been loyal to the empire's agenda, and he was the closest friend in the Southern Hemisphere, in the Western Southern Hemisphere, that Bush, W. Bush, had over his eight years in office.
I mean, while the entire region was moving to the left, you had Chavez in Venezuela, you had Correa in Ecuador, you had the PT in Brazil, you had the Uruguayan and Paraguayan and a bunch of other countries, where Chile, you had a bunch of countries moving to the left, and the so-called pink tide in Latin America.
He was stuck there in the right, and he was the closest ally over those eight years during the Bush administration's war on terror.
And he actually embraced the language and the discourse of the Bush administration in his fight against the guerrillas.
And he had the support militarily, economically, even militarily, to carry out an all-out war that now he's being given credit as having won against the FARC, and that's why they're at the negotiating table in the first place, and that now the concessions are being given, are being had precisely because of the strategy carried out by Alvaro Uribe.
So, but I think, because I would imagine that there's a lot of disagreement behind closed doors in terms of Uribe's approach to trying to jettison the peace agreement, and people in the State Department and others who are saying, no, let's move this peace agreement forward, and let's try to, you know, now start consolidating, you know, our economic interests in a situation of so-called post-conflict.
Problem is, it's not going to be post-conflict because there's so many other factors of violence and political intolerance in the country that to talk about a post-conflict is extremely optimistic, if not completely naive.
Mm-hmm.
Well, I want to get back into that and the current state of FARC and all of that in a second, but one more thing about the election I wanted, the referendum I wanted to ask you about was this piece by Greg Grandin in The Nation, where he pointed out that Human Rights Watch was against the peace deal.
And, you know, I, of course, expect Amnesty International to push for every war in the world, but Human Rights Watch, they only usually support half the wars and oppose the other half or something like that.
But what in the world could have been Kenneth Roth and the Human Rights Watch's problem with this deal?
And again, he's a former State Department guy himself, so that was the thing that made me suspicious that America was really double dealing here when I read that.
Right.
Well, you know, the role of Human Rights Watch has always been suspect in Colombia, and it's also been very problematic.
I saw the piece from Greg Grandin.
I have a lot of respect for Greg Grandin and I think his work is impeccable and his analysis is very strong.
But one thing that he overlooks that he doesn't really address is the long history of Human Rights Watch in Colombia having to tiptoe and tap dance around the reports that they've put out denouncing Colombian atrocities, the Colombian state and paramilitary atrocities, and linked to U.S. interests.
And so, and it's ironic that Kenneth Roth and Vivango, the head of the Latin American Division of Human Rights Watch were the ones who were most adamantly supporting and questioning this peace deal, and I'll explain why, when for years they're always on the defensive.
And in fact, people like Uribe and other right-wing pundits and political leaders have always denounced him as a spokesperson for the FARC, precisely because of the criticisms that he's raised and the reports that the Human Rights Watch has put out about the massive atrocities carried out by paramilitary groups with close links to the Colombian state security forces.
So he's always been the target of the right in Colombia, which is ironic that at this stage of the game, he is now posed and presented as this kind of right-wing stooge that's being used by Uribe and by the NoVote to denounce the peace agreement.
So to a certain extent, he did do that, and it's surprising that he politically, they got themselves into that mess.
Their main point was the concerns about impunity on all sides.
So there were concerns, you know, because this is one of the distortions and misrepresentations, or at least a faulty frame that the U.S. media continues to put.
And I think it's really echoing the Colombian media in many ways.
And that's that the impunity issue only pertains to the Colombian FARC rebels, the guerrillas, the so-called subversives who are up in arms against the state, and that these guys are gonna get away scot-free.
But the provisions also, the issue of transitional justice also addresses the atrocities and the violations of human rights and the crimes carried out by state security forces and others, paramilitaries, right?
And so if there was going to be a certain kind of appeasement or kind of a resolution of a peace deal that's going to not punish the many, many countless crimes carried out by state security forces, that should be problematic for anybody who's looking for questions of justice.
Now, I mean, the whole theory and the whole approach to transitional justice is completely different.
So let's not even get into a discussion about that.
But there's reason to be critical.
And victims who were victimized by the Colombian state security forces also have issue with the fact that a lot of these soldiers and officers that were involved in atrocities in Colombia might have not paid the justice that they deserve.
For example, the horrific seven years of what they call false positives, which I'm not sure if you're aware of, but the false positive scandal that was happening under the Uribe administration while he was fighting this war against the guerrillas.
And it was actually overseen by, ironically, the current president.
Juan Manuel Santos was the defense minister under Uribe's presidency, who the recently named Nobel Peace Prize winner, right?
He carried out and he was overseeing and he was never directly implicated in it, but he was connected.
He was the head of the Defense Department, essentially the defense ministry in Colombia during this false positive scandal.
Now, what's the false positive scandal?
This was essentially the Colombian government, the Colombian military forces going into poor communities in the south of Bogotá and other poor areas in Medellin and the big cities, recruiting young, poor, displaced youth, 17, 18, 19-year-olds, enticing them to quote-unquote jobs, taking them into the countryside and essentially killing them, massacring them and dressing them up as guerrillas and putting them out there and saying that these were war trophies.
As you see, we are winning this war.
Look how many combatants we're getting.
At first it was 100 we heard about, then we heard about another 150.
And before you know it, we found out that there were over 3,000 victims of this state-sponsored terror that was being carried out.
So the question is, do these people go away scot-free?
Do they get away scot-free?
Now, there's been a number of prosecutions and investigations into that and it's building up and there's a number of people who have already been implicated in it.
So the cases go pretty high up, including the former army commander who was a close ally of Uribe, who's now facing time.
But the question is, should those people be given lenient treatment as well?
And I think one of the things that Human Rights Watch was trying to point out is that these issues have to be resolved, right?
I'm not trying to defend Human Rights Watch.
I'm just putting it into a context because I think Grandin's piece, although it does shine a light on a problematic approach that Human Rights Watch took, I think politically going out there so much, you know, because ultimately the right wing used that to their advantage.
So, I mean, in a situation like that, I think they could have been a little more delicate and a little more strategic in the way they approached it because ultimately it did turn out to be kind of a denunciation of the peace process, even though it was really trying to raise an issue that others didn't quite get.
Right.
Yeah, and of course it is an important issue, but it's a question of how you weigh it.
I mean, if this is the only peace deal you got, which is worse?
Keeping the war going and creating the space for more war crimes into the future or trying to go ahead and at least put a halt to the madness now.
And I guess that goes to the point of the weakness of the FARC's position now, as you called it before, where they had to sign on to this complete immunity and impunity.
And no, I hadn't even heard about that false positives thing, but it sounds like a U.S. government program to me, honestly.
But I guess, you know, close enough for body count work, whatever you got to do, right?
It sounds like a story out of Nick Turse's Vietnam book.
Yeah, well, yeah, these tactics have been used before.
Yeah, yeah.
But I mean, that's really the thing here, right?
Is I even read a thing where some of these Skype, some of the FARC people were quoted saying, well, hell, we don't really care if the thing was voted down or not.
We give up.
We don't want to fight anymore.
Sorry, we're coming in.
Don't shoot us.
We're coming in.
And basically, there's no more left to fight.
So what the hell?
And but then again, I don't know if those people were speaking for all the rest of them.
What do you think about that?
Well, I think this is the angle and the frame that I've been trying to.
I mean, I've been talking.
I've been doing a lot of talks and invited to do a lot of interviews over the last few weeks.
And this is the issue that I've been trying to draw attention to, because it's not really discussed in any practically any of the coverage.
You really have to dig deep into alternative media, particularly in Colombia, because you don't see it at all here in the US, is that the peace, the majority of the progressive movement.
And in fact, you see them in the streets now after the vote down of the peace agreement happened.
You saw the people go out and protest and mobilize and say, no way, peace has to happen.
We want peace.
You've seen students, you've seen indigenous organizations, you've seen trade unions.
I mean, the Bogota has been, the capital has been occupied, if you will, like a big, large scale occupy movement in terms of the central square with the national churches and the national senators in the center of Bogota.
It's been pretty much occupied for the past week as acts of civil disobedience and of protest and street theater.
People are angry about what happened and they want a peace agreement, especially in the progressive movement, the social movement.
And the argument is that we need to put a stop to this violence.
We need to end at least this one conflict between the government and the FARC.
So they generally support it.
The problem is that there's a lot of issues that need to be resolved that aren't necessarily being addressed by the peace agreement.
And one of the things that concerns, for example, indigenous, Afro-Colombian and the peasant movement in particular is that what does this peace agreement do for the countryside?
How are people in the countryside going to really be, you know, the issues of the countryside that were the initiation of this war in the first place?
I mean, the war started because of the unbelievably unjust distribution of land, the complete lack of development and lack of attention to rural poverty in the country.
And that's what sparked the war in the first place, the uprisings in the 1960s.
And they have roots even deeper, further back, going further back, which we don't have to get into.
So how are they going to be addressed?
Now, the peace accord's first issue, the first theme or agenda item out of five agenda items was the issue of land reform and the countryside.
And if you read it, there's a lot of positive, constructive things that they talk about in terms of return of lands to people who've been displaced, which is part of a piece of legislation that goes even further back before the peace agreement, talks about developing infrastructure, creating much more of a state presence in the countryside, which includes health care, which includes a better education system, which includes transportation and communication systems to allow people to work.
They also talk about the possibility of expanding credits and supporting rural agriculture and some autonomous projects.
At the same time, though, the Santos government and the powers that be in Colombia have been pushing forward a lot of kind of reversals in terms of protection for collective land titles, particularly in the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations.
And they've been opening up these territories to privatization.
They've been selling these lands, opening it up to single crop, mass scale agriculture in the African palm in the northwest of the country.
We're talking about the ethanol, corn growing, mass scale corn crops that are really directed towards the ethanol production.
And that's not what the Campesinato, the peasantry in Colombia is looking for, because it leads to more displacement and it leads to more economic kind of injustice, economic disproportionate distribution of economic gains in the countryside.
The other issue is whether or not the resources of the Colombian state are going to truly get into the countryside, as they say.
I mean, there's all this talk about a peace dividend.
Once we don't have to fight the war against the FARC, we can direct some of those resources towards these development projects.
And there's concern that that's never been the case.
The Colombian state has always made promises and other accords that they've never fulfilled.
So what's going to happen?
You'll have a lot of disgruntled FARC members who are in there, who will be demobilized, but you have other groups, armed groups that will kind of fill in that vacuum of violence and insecurity.
So there's a lot of uncertainty about that.
And I think the peasant movement and the indigenous movement are trying to draw attention to the fact that this peace agreement, yes, it has to be signed, but it's not necessarily going to resolve all these issues, that we have to find other ways.
And the state and the government has to find other ways to draw attention to these concerns.
And I think this comes back to the point that essentially the Colombian popular movement was not part of this negotiation.
This was a negotiation between the government and the FARC rebels, and the rest of the population just kind of sat by and were told what was going on.
And I think this has, this is part of the problem with implementing some of the measures in the accord.
Right.
All right.
I'm sorry.
I'm running so late.
I got to go.
But thank you so much for coming on the show.
I really appreciate it.
I hope it makes sense.
Yeah, yeah.
No, I learned a lot.
I'm sure everyone's going to appreciate it quite a bit.
Thank you very much.
Well, thank you.
All right, so that is Mario Murillo.
He is a professor and chair of the RTF department in the Lawrence Herbert School of Communication at Hofstra University.
And well, there was this article that Sam Husseini sent out that was from, I don't have it here anymore.
It was from Third World Traveler.
But anyway, just type in Mario Murillo and Columbia and you'll find a ton of great stuff online there.
So thanks, everybody.
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Thanks.
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