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All right, you guys, introducing Mark Perry.
He is a foreign policy analyst and author of The Most Dangerous Man in America, The Making of Douglas MacArthur.
His next book, The Pentagon's Wars, will be released in October.
I can't wait to read that.
What a broad title.
You can find him on Twitter at Mark Perry DC.
And check it out.
Usually you read Mark in Politico Magazine, but this one is for the American Conservative Magazine.
It's called Tillerson and Mattis Cleaning Up Kushner's Middle East Mess.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing, Mark?
It's great to be here.
Great to be here.
Thank you for having me on.
I really appreciate you joining us again.
So, what an important and complicated story.
I don't think it's a eyes glaze over boring type complicated though.
It's very intriguing to me.
Let me start with what may be a false premise and see if you can straighten me out here.
Everybody was more or less getting along okay, it seemed, until Donald Trump made his big trip to the Middle East.
And then something happened, apparently, because, I don't know, correlations and causations and all these things, but he came home and then the Saudis went on a tear against the Qataris and are even, I guess, threatening war.
Put a blockade on them and put out a list of demands which are obviously not made to be accepted, but made to be a failed ultimatum.
And so, I wonder if you could explain what in the world is going on over there.
What changed when Trump took the trip to Saudi Arabia?
People wish they knew, but apparently the Saudis think that he gave them the green light to be tough on Qatar.
And so, when he left, a couple days within his departure, June 5th, actually, they put a blockade on Qatar and they dropped diplomatic relations and they enlisted the United Arab Emirates and Egypt and Bahrain to join them in their blockade and quarantine.
And it's continued to this day.
And not only that, but Mr. Trump, on June 9th, about four days after the blockade was announced, seemed to approve it in a rose garden ceremony, pointing the finger at Qatar as supporting terrorists.
It's a mess.
It divides two of America's most important allies in the region, puts a lot of pressure on us.
It was totally unexpected by the United States, both by the State Department and Defense Department.
So, is there an identifiable faction?
Does this mean it's Bannon and Miller, or it's somebody else in the White House that's behind this?
Well, I'm not sure that anyone in the White House is behind it, but it's clear to me that the President's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and people around him support the Saudis and have been whispering in the President's ear to support the Saudis, which is, you might imagine, and quite predictably, has left a lot of Washington puzzled because the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense had hoped that what would result from the Saudi Arabia trip was a united front of Sunni and Arab nations standing together with the United States against terrorism.
And what the result has been instead is a diplomatic civil war between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
And Rex Tillerson, the Secretary of State, is trying mightily to resolve the problem and not having much luck.
Mm-hmm.
Yeah, a couple of different civil wars over there on the peninsula, but also in D.C. over who's in charge and who even thinks what there.
But now, so, back to the first point, Qatar is guilty of backing terrorists, guilty as hell.
But so's Saudi Arabia, and they've all been doing it under the umbrella of America's Central Intelligence Agency.
You can read in the New York Times.
It's been going on since 2011, backing the Jabhat al-Nusra, whatever it's called now, Tahrir al-Jabhat al-whatever, they keep changing the name of it.
But yeah, that's the American project, to work with the Saudis, the Qataris, and the Turks to support terrorists to fight against Assad's forces in Syria.
So what's the scandal?
Is it that the Trump administration has really made a decision to stop that, and they really want, they're insisting that the Saudis and Qataris stop that, or this is all just window dressing for the same covert action policy anyway?
The question that you ask, so what's going on, is pretty simple.
The President of the United States doesn't know what he's doing.
You're right.
The Saudis and the rest of the Sunni Arab world have been supporting terrorists, depending on who you think are terrorists.
The Emiratis and the Saudis accuse Qatar of supporting Hamas, which is true, but they're not terrorists.
And they accused them of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which is true, but it's very clear they're not terrorists.
Of course, people would disagree with me about Hamas, too.
And they've been supporting Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, but so, too, have the Saudis.
This is a family spat.
It's an important one, and it's an ugly one between the Saudis and the Qataris.
And we shouldn't be taking sides, but I think that the June 5th announcement from Saudi Arabia against Qatar is really forcing our hand.
We're gonna try to mediate this dispute, but what the Saudis would like us to do is take their side.
So far, that hasn't happened.
So you're saying here that Kushner was influenced by his friend who's a prince from the UAE, is that it?
Yes, that's right.
He's been influenced by the United Arab Emirates ambassador to the United States, a man by the name of Otaibi, who really gambled that his closeness to Jared Kushner and Kushner's closeness to the president would make a real difference.
So when the president announced June 9th that he was pointing the finger at Qatar for supporting terrorists, Rex Tillerson was shocked.
And so was Jim Mattis, the Secretary of Defense.
It wasn't what they had expected.
It wasn't what they were told was going to happen.
They weren't told anything.
But it showed them that the guy who's really in charge of American foreign policy is Jared Kushner, who's the president's son-in-law.
So here we are.
We, as I was told by somebody who's very close to Tillerson, so here we are.
We are, we now have a second foreign policy being run out of the White House by the president's vacuous and unwitting and amateurish son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
All right, so, but now the consequences are already rolling downhill here, I guess it seems like, because now the Turks are, well, they said they're intervening.
I guess their parliament even approved it.
But have they actually gone ahead and sent troops to Qatar now?
600, approximately 600 Turkish troops have been deployed to Qatar to secure that nation's borders.
You know, honestly, what I think everyone is really fearful of and what the Saudis and the Emiratis would like is for there to be a coup, a palace coup in Qatar that would replace the current royal family with someone who the Saudis like.
This is really, this has been going on for years.
There was an attempted coup in 1996 supported by the Saudis.
So it truly is, as I described it a few minutes ago, it's truly a family spat, and we're right in the middle of it.
The other important thing here is, you know, crucial to understand is that the Qataris have actually pretty good relations with Iran.
The Saudis really can't tolerate that because they don't have relations at all with Iran and view Iran as a competitor, a geostrategic competitor in the region.
So, you know, the question is, and the throwdown here is, you know, who's gonna run Arab policy in the Persian Gulf?
Is it going to be Saudi Arabia or Qatar?
Is it going to be Saudi Arabia who really wants to poke Iran or is it gonna be Qatar who has good relations with them?
Well, and now, so here's the thing.
If you're Donald Trump, well, if you're anybody and you're the president of the United States, you have good reason to distrust the CIA and the State Department and the Defense Department and their agendas, which aren't necessarily the same agendas as whoever is the actual elected president and his appointees who are really in charge of setting policy, right?
And yet, it seems like he disagrees with them in all the worst ways instead of the good ones, you know?
So, for example, the new Seymour Hersh piece has them saying, and this confirms what Phil Giraldi, the former CIA officer, told me on April the 6th, the day of the Tomahawk attack on this show.
He said basically the whole story that Hersh tells about almost all of it anyway, about the de-confliction phone call beforehand and the drone surveillance and all of these things and how they knew for a fact it wasn't a sarin bomb right away, military and intelligence sources saying that.
And yet, according to Hersh's story, the part that Hersh really developed was that they told this to Trump and that he said, in effect, yeah, but I saw it on TV.
And so he's decided that he doesn't trust the permanent establishment to give him the right facts, but he disagrees with them in a way that makes things worse, not better.
So, you know, I don't know.
It just seems kind of ironic that, you know, here again he's saying, well, I don't know.
You know, the professionals are telling me that I gotta balance all these things and keep Qatar and Saudi on this and that level, but my son-in-law, who I really trust and like a lot, is telling me that Qatar is really the problem and that if only I let the Saudis clamp down on them.
So I'm gonna go with that, because, you know what I mean?
Because it's not what Tillerson is telling him to do, he says, okay, that makes more sense to me then.
And again, making things worse, not better.
When they wanna escalate in Afghanistan, he says, yeah, sure.
Or if they wanna pick a worse fight with Iran, at least, you know, hopefully he'll try to contain them on that, but it seems like they're in agreement on making stuff worse a lot of the times or when they are in disagreement, they're the ones who are trying to reel them in and he's even worse than them.
Well, we have a problem in the United States and that is, and it's not a shock to you, you just outlined why we've come to the conclusion that the president is clueless when it comes to foreign policy.
Any other president, Barack Obama, for instance, would show up in Riyadh and if he ever got a whiff, whiff one, that there was going to be a falling out between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, he'd say, now children, get it straight and let's not do this.
Let's all be friends here and there's a price to pay for this kind of behavior.
But Trump's an amateur.
I mean, listen, you know, I respect the people who voted for him.
I understand why they voted for him.
But now that he's president of the United States, he has to step up.
He has to, you know, read a book, listen to an intelligence briefing, understand what's going on, act carefully, listen to his top advisors and not just his children or their spouses.
When you appoint somebody who's secretary of state, and frankly, I think Rex Tillerson will probably do a good job, but it's clear that he's not in charge and that's a problem.
I think we could have a very embarrassing situation here very quickly where Rex Tillerson decides he's had enough, doesn't want to do this anymore, and we're left without a secretary of state.
What we're left with is a president in the Senate law running American foreign policy and that's a catastrophe.
All right, hang on, we'll be right back after this.
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All right now, so what do you make of the story about in foreignpolicy.com where it was some White House neocons.
I don't think it was Bannon and his guys.
I think the way they put it was these were Obama holdovers and they were pushing for escalation in Syria, in Southern Syria, and Mattis told them no.
And according to the foreign policy piece, his analysis was this could lead to a very dangerous war with Iran, which he wants to avoid.
So I was very happy to hear that.
We talked before, your great piece that you wrote about Mattis' obsession with Iran.
Lord knows if it came down to it, he'd probably enjoy taking the fight to him, but at least now he's a voice of caution on that, apparently.
Is that consistent with what you're learning as well?
Yeah, I thought the foreign policy piece was quite good.
Excellent reporting.
You know, there's no doubt that Mattis views Iran as what he calls a malign influence in the region.
He doesn't trust them even a little bit, but that's a long ways away from wanting to go to war with them.
He doesn't.
What he wants to do is what Reagan did in the 1980s, provide a common, unified front of like-minded allies who will band together and maintain stable relations and push back gently, but push, push, push, back without going to war, and maintain a semblance of real unity of purpose.
That's what Mattis wants.
And he doesn't treat with the Iranians at all and doesn't like the Iranians, but that's quite different than having a war with them.
A war with the Iranians would be a tough bit of business.
And there are neocons, and as you point out in the White House, there are still holdover neoliberals who are interventionists, who are cruise missile liberals, let's call them, who would really like to take the Iranians on.
It's a preposterous point of view.
They make the assumption that somehow we'll be victorious in such a confrontation, and it's not at all clear that we will be.
Certainly, we can do a lot of damage for Iran, but regime change seems to me is off the table.
It's simply not going to happen.
Well, it was Tillerson who brought that up.
He said, peaceful regime change, whatever that means.
Sounds like the 53 coup d'etat.
That's not that peaceful, and certainly wouldn't work out as well this time as last time, and last time it turned out to be a disaster 25 years later.
Yeah, I wonder about, well, and that was the whole thing about Trump's, well, and you never know who's talking, right, but the Nancy Youssef piece in BuzzFeed has it that the White House said, oh, yeah, Assad is preparing another chemical attack.
You better not do it, Assad, and that over at the Pentagon, the response was, huh?
What's he talking about?
The generals had never even heard of this because clearly it was made up.
Nobody knows really what's going on, right?
Do you know what that was supposed to mean?
There's a lot of people who would like to rattle swords to show how tough they are.
It doesn't really work, and I think this was another instance of that.
Yeah, it just made everybody confused.
And it's clear also from my piece and the American conservative from the foreign policy piece, from the BuzzFeed piece, that communications between the White House and their own administration is somewhat lacking.
Nobody seems to be on the same page.
Nobody gets a heads up ahead of time of anything that's gonna be said or done.
And not just in America, but especially overseas, that kind of confusion really makes us look weak, and it makes people doubt our word.
So I think we're living in pretty dangerous times.
Everyone here, and I understand, is focused on Russiagate or Putingate or whether there's collusion between Trump and the Russians on the election.
But I think in many, many ways, the foreign policy issues we're facing are much more serious and much more, in many ways, scandalous and very dangerous for the country.
Well, you know, we've talked on this show mostly in terms of Russia, about sort of the belief systems at the Pentagon, you know, what these generals tell each other and that kind of thing.
And what I'm curious about, and you didn't write about this or anything, so sorry to put you on the spot, but I wonder if you have kind of a temperature you've taken on this question at all.
There seems to be a lot of talk about how, well, an action toward the Americans trying to figure out how to carve out a space in far Eastern Syria, maybe even on the Iraq border or something, because what's happened is, as a consequence of the Islamic State, which is a consequence of American and allied support for the so-called rebellion in Syria that we talked about before, well, the aftermath of that is that the Iranian and American-backed Iraqi government forces and Shiite militias are the ones rousting the Islamic State out of Mosul and then are presumed to be headed further west from there.
So now the Americans are panicking that, in effect, their policy has created this now complete land bridge all the way to Hezbollah, the Shiite crescent, without a Sunni space in between, so they want to put some Marines in there or some kind of thing.
And I guess, if you know details about that, that's fine, if you want to comment on that.
But mostly what I'm curious about is whether anyone at the Pentagon is saying, geez, we did it again.
Every time we try to limit the power of Iran, it always blows up in our face and we end up empowering Iran.
And now here we are trying to play mop-up, or that's not really the right word for it, but dealing with the consequences of our last intervention and our last intervention.
People always say, oh, ISIS is because of George W. Bush, and that's kind of right, of course, but it's also because of Barack Obama and his support for the jihad in Syria for all those years and Allied support.
And then, so now we're dealing with these consequences.
And I just wonder whether there's any, it's not like I'm a Maoist here or whatever, but there's gotta be some self-criticism at the Pentagon where at least these guys point fingers at each other or something, right?
Exactly right.
It depends on who you talk to.
I mean, there are a lot of Air Force officers I know who say, let's not do this again.
Let's not, once again, put our feet into the fire in the Middle East.
We did this back in 2003 with Iraq and we really got burned.
Then we got, we had to do the surge.
Now we've got ISIS, Syria's falling apart.
We've had the Arab Spring.
There's a dictatorship in Egypt.
We're not gonna get this right.
The people in the region are gonna have to get this right.
We're gonna have to leave them alone to get this right.
There's a lot of sentiment for that point of view in the Pentagon for us to end these serial interventions and to deep-six the idea that somehow we're gonna go in and manage through the use of force political relationships with people in the Middle East.
It's just not gonna work and it hasn't worked.
There's real sentiment for that in the Pentagon.
But the Pentagon is also a very conservative institution and there are people there who say, let's go in and solve the family business.
So I think generally the Pentagon's very divided about this.
There's a real strong sentiment for not going in nation-building.
That's why a lot of people in the Pentagon voted for Donald Trump.
It's because he said he was against nation-building and wanted to end those wars.
He got the majority, he got 80% of the military vote.
So there's a strong sentiment there.
But there's also a strong, you know, neoconservative, neoliberal kind of, let's go in and really teach these people a lesson.
They never tell you who these people are, what kind of lesson we're gonna treat them, but there is that sentiment.
So you get a little bit of both.
But if I had to guess, and it's a pretty well-informed guess, there is less and less desire on the part of the military to do these kinds of serial interventions, to once again have another confrontation in the Middle East that'll cost us blood and treasure and will not result in anything.
Well now, so you mentioned the Air Force.
I guess I would guess, I would have guessed, that maybe the Army and the Marines would be the more reluctant.
I mean, on one hand, it's a job for them to do, so there's a big incentive for a project.
But on the other hand, those are my Marines getting killed out there.
They take that kind of thing real seriously too, whether, at least some of the officers do, right?
About whether their men are dying for something or for nothing.
And then I guess I would imagine that the Air Force would be the ones who are most willing to intervene all the time because we're talking about bombing people who can't even shoot back at them and they get to fly their supersonic jets around and that's a lot of fun and really expensive.
And so I guess I just wonder if, is the split go along services like that?
It sounds like not.
You're saying Air Force officers are taking the position that I would have thought that the ground forces would be taking.
Well, I think that what the Air Force reflects is the constant talk about taking on Iran.
And when it comes to taking on Iran, it's gonna be the Air Force that does it.
And because there's not gonna be a ground campaign.
We're not gonna send Marines into Iran to overthrow the regime, unless we wanna just kill a lot of Marines and not succeed.
We're gonna, it's gonna be an air campaign and they don't wanna do it.
It's costly, it's bloody.
It's, you know, and the Air Force could be very effective at this kind of thing, but it's costly, it's bloody, and it probably won't work eventually.
I mean, we'll kill a lot of people and we'll eliminate a lot of military, Iranian military assets, but we're not gonna change the regime from the air.
So what I'm reflecting is a feeling on the part of the Air Force that we cannot continue to kind of cede a war against Iran.
And, you know, in the Marines and the Army, on the other hand, they remember Iraq and they remember the problems that Iran caused us in Iraq.
So they're a little bit more, you know, anti-Iranian.
You see that in Mattis' comments.
I think, you know, I think overall, and maybe I'm repeating myself and I apologize, but I think overall, the military's very hesitant to get involved in another confrontation, another war in the Middle East.
It doesn't know that we're already fighting.
We are in Afghanistan, we're in Iraq, and there's no end in sight to any of that.
And that's a real problem for the military.
Yeah, that's really too bad, the part about the Army and the Marines have that grudge from Iraq War II, when really Iraq War II was fought for the Iranians.
And Mattis was the spear of that invasion, right?
Getting rid of Saddam, which is exactly what the Ayatollah wanted.
And then, you know.
That's right, that's right.
And it was really even the most pro-Iranian factions, the Dawa Party and the Skiri among the Shiites that America backed at the expense of Sadr, who was really the Iraqi nationalist, who wasn't the Shiite sectarian until they chased him into Iran.
Anyway, forget the real history of Iraq War II.
Let me ask you this.
What about the current escalation in Afghanistan?
They've been putting it off and kicking the can down the road, and there's actually been a couple of reports here and there, little bitty paragraphs in disparate reports that say that maybe Trump knows better than this and is a bit reluctant to do this.
And somebody told Eli Lake that he was complaining that Alexander the Great couldn't do it and the Russians and the British couldn't do it, which is exactly the kind of cliche that I want him saying and thinking, right?
But then they still, I think, pretty consistently say that in a couple of weeks here, Mattis is going to announce that it's going to be between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers, I guess, sent to Bagram.
Do you know anything more about that?
Well, I mean, you know, I do believe reports that the president, that President Trump is very skeptical about additional troops in Afghanistan.
Because that hasn't worked.
And it probably isn't going to work.
I mean, what are we going to accomplish?
As for what Mattis is going to do, I mean, you know, as one senior military officer told me a couple of weeks ago, he said, oh, they're looking at options.
And I said, yeah, what does that mean?
He said, well, you know, big, medium, and small.
Those are the options.
So, you know, lots of troops.
Some troops or very few troops.
That's it, those are the only options.
All this talk about, you know, we're going to do a strategic rethink and come up with something new.
There isn't anything new here.
There isn't anything new under the sun.
You're either going to go with, you know, 100,000 troops, or you're going to go with 4,000 troops or none at all.
And what are they going to do?
They're going to do 4,000 troops and hope for the best.
It isn't going to particularly work because nothing has worked.
It's Afghanistan.
And, you know, I think here that Obama's kind of intuition about that place were right.
He was willing to go along with, you know, a surge in Afghanistan, but only up to a point.
And after that point, if it didn't work, he was going to get us out.
He damn near did it, and we should probably be out.
People say, well, terrorism will take root in Afghanistan.
Well, how long should we be there?
50 years, 70 years, 100 years?
I mean, it's ridiculous.
It's not going to work.
And we're not responsible for rebuilding the Afghan nation.
The Afghans are, and they'd probably do a better job without us there.
But here we are, again, rethinking a strategy.
And my tendency is to believe that neither Trump nor Mattis really want to go big on this at all.
All right, so let me follow up just to make sure there.
As far as the three options, you know that?
You're reporting that it's 100,000 or 4,000, or that's your just kind of ballpark estimate?
I don't think anyone is considering 100,000.
But I mean, as far as the three options, because the same they did to Obama, right?
Too hot, too cold, and just right, or whatever.
Do you know the exact numbers on the different plans?
The one, no.
The one I've, you know, I think that there are some people in the military who want 15 to 20,000, and believe that 15 to 20,000 would, you know, number one, send a signal, as they say, number two, really clean it up fast, and make it clear to everyone that, you know, we're very serious about this, and that it would succeed, whatever that is, whatever that means.
And, but I think that the real option here is probably about 4,000.
Maybe another 4,000 enablers, as they call them, logistical people.
But I'll bet, I will bet, I'd be willing to bet that when Mattis makes the announcement, or whoever makes the announcement, we'll send another 4,000 troops to Afghanistan, and probably for a limited period of time.
That's what the talk is in Washington, and I think that's what will happen.
All right, so here's my fear.
The argument seems obvious, that what the hell good are 4,000 troops gonna do?
So, of course, my spin is, so just forget the whole thing, right?
But the obvious other way to turn that around, if you're General Jack Keane, for example, or if you're General McMaster, is, look, if we're gonna do four, we oughta go ahead and do 20.
And then I guess I also wonder, when I hear them talking about 20, or Jack Keane even said, I think, 50 on Fox News, the retired general, but influential guy there, I wondered whether that actually reflects some level of panic, that not only, yeah, what good is 4,000 gonna do shrug, but hey, what good is 4,000 gonna do?
We need more than that, or else what?
You know, the Taliban seem to be on nothing but the upswing all over the South and the East, and even the West, I guess, at this point.
I don't think we could win the war in Afghanistan, depending on how you define win.
But I guess, do you think, I'm sorry, I should ask my questions better.
Do you think that they actually are afraid that they're gonna lose it?
That maybe that's reflected in some of those higher troop numbers that they're using trial balloons to talk about there?
It's already lost.
It's already lost.
You know, the 4,000 troops are there to kinda spur on, I think that, I believe this is their thinking.
The 4,000 troops are gonna go there, not to win.
The 4,000 troops are gonna go there to signal the Taliban that we're serious about staying until there's a negotiated settlement, and they need to come to the table.
And I'm not sure 4,000 will do that, but I'm not sure 400,000 will do that.
Right.
And I, you know, if there's gonna be a negotiated settlement, let's get to it, and if the Taliban are not interested in a negotiated settlement, then let's get out.
And people say to me, well, then you'll lose Afghanistan to the Taliban.
Well, you'll lose Afghanistan to the Taliban.
You know, at some point, this country's gotta say, these wars aren't worth fighting because they're not, they cannot be won.
And a fundamental level, they're from there.
That's, I mean, that is the pillar of counterinsurgency.
The first lesson is, they're from there, and we're not.
And that is always the hardest thing to overcome.
And we haven't been able to overcome it.
And counterinsurgencies haven't been able to overcome it ever.
So, you know, let's figure out what's, not what's in the interest of Afghanistan, but what's in the interest of the United States of America.
What's in the interest of the United States of America is for us to get out of these wars and stop spending the money that we're spending on them.
That's what's in the interest of the United States of America.
Now, I mean, I'm just simply giving you my opinion, but I do think that my opinion is reflected in circles in the military who say, listen, we did our best.
It didn't work out to the degree that we wanted it to, but there's not much more we can do.
Let's bring them home.
And we bring them home.
All right, y'all.
That's Mark Perry.
Check him out in The American Conservative this time, theamericanconservative.com.
And the article is Tillerson and Mattis Cleaning Up Kushner's Middle East Mess.
And he's got a new book coming out in the fall, The Pentagon's Wars.
Thanks very much again, Mark.
Appreciate it.
Always my pleasure.
Thanks a million.
All right, you guys, that's the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
Check out the full archives at scotthorton.org, at libertarianinstitute.org as well.
And follow me on Twitter, at Scott Horton Show.
Thanks.
