01/23/14 – Nancy Youssef – The Scott Horton Show

by | Jan 23, 2014 | Interviews

McClatchy journalist Nancy Youssef discusses the suspicious landslide vote ushering in Egypt’s new liberalized constitution; the continuing crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; the military’s domination of Egypt’s politics and economy; and jihadist troubles in the Sinai.

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All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
Our next guest today is Nancy Youssef from McClatchyDC.com.
That's McClatchy Newspapers.
Republished, of course, in the Kansas City whatever, in the Miami Herald, and newspapers all across the country.
And is currently writing from Cairo.
Welcome back to the show, Nancy.
How are you doing?
Great to be with you.
Thanks for having me.
I appreciate you joining us.
And I'm right about that, right?
That you're in Cairo?
I'm in Cairo.
That's right.
Okay, good.
Just making sure.
I was sort of talking out of my hat, but I thought I was right.
So I'm glad that it turned out that I was.
Okay, good.
So, listen.
The Egyptian constitution, apparently, the people of Egypt really, really liked it.
It was ratified in a referendum by 98%.
Is that right?
Well, apparently, is a very important word of that sentence.
Because, really, no.
In that, yes, it was ratified by 98.1%.
And not only that, 20 million people nearly came out for it.
More than those who voted for ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's constitution a year ago.
But the big difference was that this year there weren't the monitors and independent observers that were there in past elections, where there were 6,000.
Last year, international monitors, this year there were only 200 at 16,000 polling stations.
And so that's the record that the Egyptian government has put out.
But there's no way to independently verify it.
And, in fact, there were quiet whispers that, in fact, what they were reporting was different than what some of those observers on the ground had seen.
What was interesting about the statistics is they all showed overwhelming approval, even in places like North Sinai, which is engaged in heavy gun battles with the government forces, and places like Fayyum, which were once considered strongholds of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Even in those areas, it showed overwhelming support.
Those who had voted, for example, in Fayyum, 89% for the Morsi constitution last year voted 95% this time for the military-backed constitution.
So it was either a rigged process, yes, or a resounding defeat of the Morsi and the Brotherhood brand of government.
Yeah.
That sounds to me like they got LBJ to help them rig that thing or something.
They have the graveyards all vote, too?
Well, that was speculation.
I have to tell you, I spoke to a monitor a few days before the election, and I asked him that question.
He said, they are voting, referring to the dead.
So who knows?
But there's no way to independently verify it because, you know, in the past, I would go to the vote and watch the ballots be counted.
This time, the judges were a lot more reluctant to let us in.
They'd hold their IDs for longer.
One judge would take a few hours to count the ballots.
The next one would take ten minutes in the same polling station.
And so it just didn't feel as open and as transparent as past elections had been.
Well, I mean, this was a war party talking point against Saddam Hussein, that his dictatorship was always ratified by 98 and 99 percent.
I mean, what a joke is that?
It's a lie on its face.
Nobody agrees.
You can't get people to agree what day of the week it is, 98 percent.
Come on.
Well, I'll tell you what's interesting about this.
You're right.
I mean, those were Mubarak figures.
A former presidential president, Hussein Mubarak.
Remember, he would win the election with 98 percent and similar figures.
The difference this time was because there had been so many arrests and such a feeling of fear among Egyptians about speaking out against the government, it's possible that a lot of people voted yes because the alternative wasn't there.
If you had a no pamphlet in your possession, you could have been arrested.
And the days leading up to the referendum, if you spoke out against the Constitution, you could have been arrested.
And this was against a massive government campaign urging people to vote yes.
It was relentless.
You couldn't get away from it on the highways with all the billboards.
You couldn't get away from it on television, on state radio.
And so I have to tell you, for many people, the feeling was you could either vote yes or you could get arrested, but you couldn't vote no.
And so that's what makes it very hard to assess what the true number is.
But it does contradict the very polarized figures that we have seen in past elections.
Morsi only won the election, 52-48, a year ago.
So it's hard to believe that there's been that dramatic a shift.
But is it possible the Brotherhood has lost support?
Absolutely.
And probable.
How much, we don't know.
And these figures aren't necessarily the most accurate way to get at that.
Right.
But now, so the Brotherhood didn't attempt to really spread the word that they wanted a boycott or anything like that?
Or the opposite of that?
Did they encourage people to try to show up if they could?
No, their official position was urging people to boycott.
Because from their perspective, if they put it in the process, they legitimized it.
And there was a feeling that this was going to pass either way.
So their version of events was, why legitimize it but participate in it?
At least if we stay out of it, we're not suggesting that this vote and this count and this process are legitimate.
And then, did it seem like in real life, those two days, that there really was a massive turnout?
And everybody who, you know, anything like the 20 million that you're talking about?
More of a turnout compared to election day a year ago when Morsi did barely win?
It's harder to tell this time because one of the things that had happened between those two elections is there were fewer polling stations.
So you never knew if the longer lines were because there were more people there or because more people were voting at particular polling stations.
Anecdotally, I can tell you, it didn't have the same fervor as past elections.
It didn't have the same suspense or optimism or curiosity or hope that this was going to lead to something.
Yeah, why stand in line for a fair complaint, right?
Yeah, and that was for some people.
Now, some people thought this was the past disability.
That maybe this Constitution wasn't perfect but we needed to get back on track.
Remember, the Morsi Constitution was suspended immediately after his ouster.
That we needed to set a framework going forward.
And for other people, this was a mandate on General Abdul-Sattar al-Sisi, the Minister of Defense, and really de facto leader of this country.
There wasn't an enthusiasm, I guess I'm saying, for the Constitution.
The vote ended up taking on other meanings.
The future of the country.
The prospect of Sisi running the presidency.
There was very little talk about the substance of the Constitution.
And when you talk to voters about it, they really couldn't tell you a lot about what they were voting for vis-a-vis the document itself.
It was just a matter of picking sides.
Well, so what is in the Constitution?
How different is it from the last couple?
Well, on paper, it offers more rights.
Some of the more interesting things is that the new president cannot change the Minister of Defense to again a Sisi for eight years, which was interesting.
It calls for respecting women's rights more.
It reads more liberally.
It continues to protect the military as an independent institution that is not as monitored by the government.
Rhetorically, it was a more refreshing document for those who wanted a democratic, more liberal state.
The problem was that in the weeks leading up to this, we've actually seen a government that's cracked down much more aggressively on political opponents, that's cracked down on those who speak out against them, and has also arrested an astonishing number of journalists.
And so, whether those words bear fruit in terms of how the government conducts itself remains to be seen.
Yeah, well, you know, I wonder, I guess a couple of things there, and unfortunately we'll probably only have time for maybe half an answer, but about the police state as it is, you know, versus their real political enemies like the Muslim Brotherhood.
But also just about the average, you know, government martial law reign of terror in Egypt as compared to how it was under Mubarak and or under Morsi.
Has there been any reform, any real reform of the perpetual state of emergency and the secret torture police and all of that?
Well, there hasn't been reforms in terms of the police state.
It's certainly there, and it really feels much more aggressive now, because from the government perspective, they are fighting a terrorist threat, one that threatens the stability of the country.
And for them, any action that's required to put that down needs to be carried out, because they're actually doing a nationalist duty.
And so, that message has resonated with a lot of Egyptians, and so there hasn't been major change.
But right now there isn't a kind of widespread demand of change, certainly not that of three years ago during the uprising or even during Morsi's period.
There's such a desperate want to return to some form of stability.
And many Egyptians are willing to accept the government's actions, whatever the cost, to get to some point of stability.
Yeah, you know, I frequently speak with Adam Morrow from Interpress Service, and this was his take, and then the New York Times actually ran an article along these lines that said that when they did overthrow Morsi last summer, that magically, all of a sudden, the beat cops started showing up for work and doing their jobs, and providing a modicum of basic security for the people of Cairo, which is something that had been completely lacking.
Basically, just their refusal to go along with the Muslim Brotherhood administration.
Was that your sense too?
Yes and no.
I mean, remember, these are police forces who've been trained for decades, that the Muslim Brotherhood is their biggest enemy, and the biggest threat to their country.
And so you can imagine the adjustment that would have happened for any police officer who'd been trained this for all of his career.
I'm sorry, Nancy, I have to interrupt you, and we have to take this break.
Can you hold on just a couple minutes?
We'll be back and do one more segment.
Absolutely.
It's Nancy Yusuf from McClatchy Newspapers.
That's McClatchyDC.com.
Officials accuse Muslim Brotherhood of trying to cripple Egypt.
Is at least one of the latest.
I'm not sure if that's the very latest.
Anyway, back after this.
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All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
It's the Scott Horton Show.
I'm him.
I'm talking with Nancy Yusuf from McClatchy Newspapers, writing from Cairo, Egypt.
And before the damn commercial break interrupted us, we were talking about how the Muslim Brotherhood has always been a group that is the enemy of the state of Egypt, and that didn't really change when they were elected to power there for about a year or so.
Is that right, Nancy?
It was definitely a challenge that I think a lot of the security forces faced.
Certainly not uniformly.
There were police on the streets during Morsi's tenure, but the remnants of what we call here the beef state were certainly there and arguably pervasive.
And so I think it was a very difficult transition for them.
Now, when you talk to police officers, and in fact I just visited the police station yesterday in downtown Cairo, they will tell you that these political prisoners are a bigger enemy and a bigger threat to Egypt than the criminals that they have there, and they look upon them that way.
They'll openly tell you that.
And now, tell me this, because it seems so strange to me, well, and what do I know about Egypt, but just from a very vague kind of perspective here, it seems strange to me that the liberal, more socialist, labor union, April 5th movement types, decided that they would prefer to side with the military rather than making an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, if it was at all possible, because then at least what they would have in common was a future of elections that one could put a little bit of faith in, and you win some, you lose some, but there seemed to be a consensus that that's really what they wanted, and they sided with the military and decided they would prefer to have a military dictatorship as long as it kept the damn Muslim Brotherhood out of power.
And so, I wonder, just how bad was the Sharia law that they implemented in Egypt?
Were these guys the second coming of the Taliban, or what?
That's a great point, actually.
It's worth remembering that there was an alliance early on, Ahmadinejad, the April 6th founder, Right, back three years ago, the beginning, right.
That's right.
But there was a feeling that the Brotherhood treated the presidency, there are some presidents who think that they have to check in with their public all the time, and then there are others who think there's only one moment of accountability, and that's election day.
And Morsi was the latter.
There was a feeling amongst the Brotherhood they had won, they treated it as though they had won by 80% rather than the 52%, and they were openly unwilling to work and accommodate and work with liberals and other groups.
And for those liberals, they felt really betrayed.
They had stood together, they had helped usher in Morsi's presidency, and now their views weren't being taken into consideration.
And so it led to this growing anger towards the Brotherhood amongst liberals.
Then you had an economy that wasn't improving.
Frankly, Morsi made a lot of unbelievably stupid mistakes, wasn't very charismatic or nationalistic.
He only and often only spoke to those who voted for him, and there was a feeling he was polarizing the country.
And then millions took to the streets on June 30th, the one-year anniversary of his presidency.
And the military was the only institution that could have rescued, from many people's perspectives, the country from Morsi in the divisive and, frankly, incompetent way that he was running the country.
And so that's why it's been so hard for these guys to reunite, because they feel betrayed by them.
And now, a lot of these Brotherhood are in jail and are not able to lead, anyway, any sort of formidable opposition to what's happening here.
So those are, I think, the two factors that have come together that have made it very difficult for liberals and the Brotherhood to come together in any real way.
All right, now, so what about the role of the American Pentagon in this?
Because, of course, the U.S. is a world empire, and Egypt is one of our satellites, and their military has been very close to ours for a great many years.
But then again, those things can change somewhat.
Has the relationship changed in the last three years?
Has it changed back?
Yes and no.
I mean, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has, I believe, engaged in 34 phone calls with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and it certainly hasn't led to any substantial change that we can see on the ground here, in terms of not cracking down on political dissidence as much.
There has been some break in that military relationship, but the reality is that the military here is the strongest institution in place, and there is no real challenge to it.
And so the United States has continued to work and court that relationship and urge the Egyptians to take on a more democratic transitional process.
Secretary of State John Kerry released a statement after the referendum and couldn't even endorse the process because of all the concerns that we've discussed.
So you are seeing a break in terms of the rhetoric, in terms of the amount of time the U.S. government is pleading with the Egyptians to embrace a more democratic process, but at the end of the day, there is no alternative to them.
And they will remain a formidable force in this country for years to come.
Yeah, you know, I seem to remember from a couple of years back talking about this, or maybe three years back, about how the military, really those generals, they are the 1% who control the whole economy of Egypt, really, from all the tourism and whatever, agriculture and anything else.
It's all in their hands.
And so that makes them the center of all power throughout the society, really.
That's right.
And before all the events of the Arab Spring, it was considered the most nationalistic institution.
It was one of the few places in Egypt where somebody could rise from the limited means and become an influential figure in their country.
It really embodied Egyptian nationalism in the face of a government that didn't always respond to them, the civilian government, that is.
It was the most Egyptian thing in place, all while having an economy.
Their military economy, nobody even knows what percent of Egyptian GDP it accounts for, because they don't have to release anything publicly about their financing.
But they have gas stations, they provide products, they have businesses.
So they are the nexus of not only the Egyptian security and Egyptian government, but the Egyptian economy.
Alright, well, so what do you see as the kind of medium-term future of their democracy here?
I mean, they've got this new constitution.
Do you think they're going to, or the elections for the new parliament, the new president, are they going to be anything like fair?
I guess they're just going to exclude the political right from running?
Or how's that work?
Well, the big question that's kept Egypt in suspense right now is whether Sisi is going to run for presidency.
And if he does, the presumption is that he wins.
And if he doesn't, nobody can really name somebody who could step in and fill that slot.
And so everything sort of hinges on that question, whether he runs.
And from there, we'll have some sense of where the country goes.
I am feeling the smallest signs of a break in terms of the wholehearted endorsement that the government has had for the return of the military.
For those who are starting to fear what's happening in our country, are we returning to a police state?
I think one of the reasons that Egyptians were willing to endorse the military's return is that there was always this feeling in their minds that since 2011, we can take to the streets.
That despite everything that's happened, the street hasn't been taken from them.
And I think there's a feeling that if the government goes too far, they can still speak up.
And I think that's where Egyptians' sort of hope in the future lies.
And so we'll see how the military balances its governing in the face of this crackdown, and how much Egyptians consider acceptable and necessary to return to a stable state.
And now, could you tell us a little bit about what's going on in the Sinai Peninsula?
Who are those guys?
Well, I should point out that Sinai has always been a part of Egypt.
They don't even get most government services other than water.
And there have been jihadists there.
Part of it is ideology, and part of it is just it's become the business there, trading through the tunnels to Gaza and whatnot.
And under Morsi, there was a feeling that the government was much more lenient on those residents in West Sinai.
And once Morsi was ousted, the military cracked down quite heavily on them, and has rounded up thousands of people.
The problem is there, we're seeing potentially the re-emergence of jihadist elements who once were attacking Israel and now are saying that our target is the Egyptian government.
You'll note in September, there was the assassination attempt on the minister's interior, and there's a suspicion that they are sending arms and explosives throughout the country to try to destabilize it in this increased battle with the government.
I wonder whether you think it's possible that maybe younger and angrier members of the Muslim Brotherhood or would-be members of the Muslim Brotherhood are going to end up fighting in insurgencies and joining forces with the kind of people you're describing in the Sinai Peninsula since they've been frozen out of politics so badly.
It is something I worry about.
We're writing a story today about women detainees who were arrested for protesting, and you talk to them and you meet with them, and you can feel this increased anger.
Their feeling is, you know, we tried the democratic process and it was taken from us.
We tried protesting and it was taken away from us.
And you can feel this growing anger and jihadist rhetoric and talk that they need to get back.
And not to retaliate on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, but for their brother, their uncle, their father, their son who's been arrested for their own arrest.
That it's become much more personal because we're talking about thousands of people who've been arrested since Morsi's ouster, so it's no longer about ideology, I think, for a lot of those, but really personal vendettas.
And the potential for that to turn into something violent, you certainly feel the undercurrent of that in Egypt today.
See, I'm a reverse truther.
I think the Americans work for al-Qaeda, and that everything we do is just meant to make them look right about us, and boost their recruitment.
I don't know about...
I couldn't say about that.
I mean, I can only tell you that I think the government and its relentless push to go after jihadists and to return things back to a status quo where the rules were sort of understood and the Brotherhood was kept on the ground, that they've been so aggressive that there's a potential for reverberations and retaliation.
And in the long term, certainly in the short, medium term as we go in the few months ahead, the ground seems fertile for a sort of persistent instability.
Now, how you frame that, whether it's a war or an insurgency or occasional violence, is yet to be seen.
Yeah.
Well, let's hope it stays minimal.
All right.
Well, thank you very much for your time.
I sure appreciate it.
Very much.
My pleasure.
Sorry, I said very much twice back-to-back like that.
It sounded stupid.
But anyway, I meant it.
Very much.
Nancy Yousef reporting for McClatchy Newspapers from Cairo, Egypt.
We'll be right back after this.
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