10/23/08 – Gareth Porter – The Scott Horton Show

All right, y'all, welcome back to Antiwar Radio.
It's Chaos 92.7 in Austin.
We're streaming live on the internet at chaosradioaustin.org and at antiwar.com slash radio.
Our next guest is the great Gareth Porter, my friend and regular guest on this show, journalist, independent historian, journalist for IPS News.
You can find all of your rights at antiwar.com slash Porter.
Welcome back to the show, Gareth.
Hi, Scott.
Thanks for having me once again.
It's great to have you here, and, well, you're my favorite for analyzing what the hell's going on in the world, and it looks here, according to your last article, final text of Iraq pact reveals a U.S. debacle.
I'm not sure if that's good or bad, but I am.
It got your attention, huh?
Yeah, that's right, and I know that I can count on, if there's a SOFA agreement, Gareth has read the whole thing and analyzed every bit of it and what it really means to me and my neighbors and the audience of my show, so I'm glad I can have you on here to tell us what you found.
What'd you find?
Well, I think the bottom line about this final draft text is that the story has not been covered in the mainstream media, but what we find here is that the United States not only has to get out in terms of combat troops by 2011, that was pretty much known by this week, but what was not known and what still has not been covered is that the idea of a residual force to train and support the Iraqi military, which the U.S. administration, the Bush administration, was telling reporters throughout the summer was definitely going to be assured in this text, in this agreement, is not really assured at all, and far from it.
The way the text is written makes it any residual force subject to an entirely new process which would revise the agreement and would require the approval of the Iraqi parliament.
Yeah, but the Fourth Amendment says they can't tap my phone without a warrant, too, so what?
Pardon?
Say that again?
I said the Fourth Amendment says they can't tap my phone without a warrant, so what?
What does that have to do with anything?
What is written on a piece of paper somewhere?
Well, I mean, the point here, of course, is that having to get something through the Iraqi parliament not only is not a simple matter, is not a done deal, at this point it's going to be very difficult to get anything through the Iraqi parliament that has to do with stationing U.S. troops in Iraq.
And so this is a very high hurdle for the United States to get over, one that, at this point, I would say the chances of the United States being able to get over are quite minimal.
It's interesting, isn't it, all the different checks and balances and separations of power in the Iraqi democracy you created, while George Bush just gets to do all of this by imperial fiat.
Well, that's a very interesting observation.
I think it's true that the Iraqi parliament, despite its weakness in many ways, suddenly emerges as a place where the viewpoint of particularly the Shiite majority community in that country is represented in a way that appears to be meaningful.
And I think the point here is that the Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf was so strongly opposed to legitimization of the U.S. military presence in Iraq that it exerted a very powerful influence not just, obviously, over the rank-and-file Shiites, which is very clear, but also on the politicians within the parliament itself, who have to run for re-election.
Well, now, here's the thing, too.
The government in the Green Zone, the Dawah Party and the Supreme Islamic Council, have been heavily dependent on American military power.
They would have never gotten the power in the first place, I don't think.
Would they have?
That's absolutely right.
And, of course, the whole background of this situation is that the Shiite political parties, which are, as we know, started in Iran and were supported by Iran, brought into Iraq by Iran, accompanying, following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, decided to cooperate with the United States on orders essentially from Iran in order to make sure that the Shiites could gain state power.
They played their cards very well in 2004, 2005, and did, in fact, take advantage of the U.S. military presence to gain state power in the 2005 elections, and again in late 2005.
So this was a masterstroke, strategically, on the part of the Shiite political leaders who were supported by Iran.
And once the United States had helped them get power, I think they tried to use the United States as much as they could to get the military wherewithal to be able to cope with the Sunnis.
And by 2008, they were in a position to start thinking about kicking the Americans out.
So they really are strong enough now, the Supreme Islamic Council, their Baader Brigade, their alliance with the Dawah Party, they, well, like George Bush said, they'll stand up, we'll stand down, and all that.
He's made them strong enough now that they don't need him anymore?
Well, I think it's a combination of, you know, I think they feel certainly a lot more confident about themselves in relation to the Sunnis than they did in 2003, 2004, 2005.
And at the same time, I mean, they are concerned that the United States is, in fact, supporting the Sunnis, and if the United States continues to maintain a military presence in the country, that it will be in a position to continue to coddle the Sunnis and provide support for them, and really make it more difficult for the Iraqi government, Shiite-dominated government, to carry out its own operations against the Sunnis successfully than would be the case otherwise.
So, I mean, they're looking at a trade-off here, between the advantages and disadvantages of continuing to have a significant U.S. military presence there.
Because, after all, Sauder has joined their alliance before, and could again, that kind of thing.
Their real, only organized opposition is the sons of Iraq.
Yeah, and of course, this policy of opposing U.S. military presence has this major side benefit to them, that with the Iranian help, they are able to neutralize Sauder.
Now, you know, the reasons that Sauder has decided to stand down militarily are undoubtedly more complex.
But there's no doubt that part of this is his having a deal with Iran, under which the Mahdi army is supposed to avoid carrying out any offensive operations.
It's only supposed to operate in defense of its own troops against attack from outside.
But I think the Iranians helped convince Sauder, earlier this year, that he could gain more in terms of his objective of getting the United States out of there, by joining in the diplomatic political resistance to the American presence, than by carrying out military resistance.
And that certainly is exactly what has happened.
Yeah, it seems like it really has played out that way.
So wow, when you hear 2011 in this agreement, then, you think that all of the Americans, you say in this article, not just quote-unquote combat forces, which means whatever number Barack Obama comes up with, or whatever, and leave the rest, that actually all of the American military might have to really get out of that country by 2011, one way or the other.
Hell or high water.
Well, I think that there is a political process, a sort of momentum, if you will, that is now underway that is going to make it difficult to put the brakes on and turn this around, and say in six months or eight months or a year from now, well, we've changed our mind.
We now want the Americans to stay on.
I think that the degree to which the popular resistance and opposition as well as the Shiite clerical opposition to the military presence has gained such power within the political system, such resonance within the political system, that has really changed the political dynamic.
My guess is that, yes, this is an irreversible process.
I could be wrong, and history always has surprises for us, but that's the way it looks right now, at least.
Well, wouldn't it just last week, Mottadal Sater, I don't know, I guess the way the newspaper calls it, it was Sater's decision, but in any case, hundreds of thousands of people, is that right?
Were out in the street chanting, out, out, Occupier, last week?
Yes.
You know, if you go to the website of Raya Jarrar, who's an Iraqi exile in the United States, an Iraqi-American now, I think it's fair to say.
Raya in the middle.
Raya in the middle.
He has pictures of this protest demonstration against U.S. military presence, which are absolutely astounding in terms of what you see there, in terms of the crowd.
It well may be that it's more than a million people in this protest demonstration.
It would appear to make it the largest political demonstration in Iraq's history.
Well, so now, what of the sons of Iraq?
Because October 1st was the deadline, and supposedly America was going to stop paying them, and the Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki and the Dawah party was going to begin paying them, and integrating these former Sunni insurgent militias into the Iraqi security forces.
Is that happening?
No.
I mean, as far as I'm aware, there's really no significant move toward this integration, and in fact, there was never any intention to integrate more than a very small, relative handful of the Sunni sons of Iraq.
Not on the part of the Americans or the Iraqis?
No, on the part of the Iraqi government and the al-Maliki regime.
They never intended to do that.
You know, according to reports that we got from Colin Karl of the Center for New American Security, who visited there in August, I guess it was, there was talk even of the, that the al-Maliki regime was thinking about sort of basically getting into a fight with the sons of Iraq, which may or may not be really the intention, but the signals that they were sending were extremely hostile to the sons of Iraq, and there are a number of reports indicating that the present regime really views this as a Trojan horse, which you know, they would certainly prefer to have outside the tent rather than inside the tent.
They're more comfortable being very clear that they are potential enemies rather than potential friends.
Do you think that the presidential candidates and their teams of foreign policy advisors would, you know, ultimately end up being their cabinet and their Pentagon deputy secretaries of whatever and that kind of thing?
Do you think that on both sides, that their intent on keeping Iraq forever, is there, do you think maybe in the Obama administration they even entertain the possibility of actually leaving this country and not owning it?
Well, I don't have any inside dope at this point on the thinking of the Obama team, but I have to believe that there is sufficient realism in that group that they are now really thinking in terms of at least having planned for an accelerated exit from Iraq.
I mean, this is a situation that cries out for revising dramatically the assumptions and therefore the planning for withdrawal of U.S. troops.
You know, it's very, it seems very likely at this point that there's not going to be any agreement coming out before the end of this year, the December 31st deadline for the U.N. mandate.
That is to say, to replace the U.N. mandate for U.S. military presence.
And in that case, it would seem that the U.S. troops would be confined to their bases at the very least.
And by the way, let's not forget that President Bush himself told al-Maliki sometime last summer in a video teleconference according to the report that we get from Colin Kahl, he got it in turn from U.S. officials obviously, that if there was no agreement, the United States would have to withdraw its troops from Iraq by January 1st.
Now, you know, obviously there was a sort of a political leverage intent in that statement, trying to intimidate al-Maliki.
But at the same time, there is good reason for re-evaluating the whole idea of leaving troops there, if there is no legal basis for the troops.
And if the political dynamics there appear, are as negative toward the presence of U.S. troops as they now appear.
So this was not entirely necessarily a vacuous statement without any intention to seriously consider that option behind it.
Well, I saw a headline, I think it might have been yesterday or late last night, that the Russian Foreign Minister, Lagorov, I think his name is, has said that he would support, that Russia would support a new U.N. mandate in December when this one runs out.
Well, that is a factor, of course, that I think the Iraqi government is counting on that they would have some support in the Security Council for a U.N. mandate to replace the present one, at least on a temporary basis.
And of course, they would hope that the mandate would be supportive of the position that the Iraqi government is taking with regard to, you know, regulating the presence of the U.S. troops in a fairly tight manner.
And I think there's no doubt that the Russians, the Chinese, would be very sympathetic to that.
Well, you know, call me cynical.
Go ahead, call me cynical.
I think you're a cynic.
Oh, thanks.
How's that?
You know, I'm reading this thing, I was just talking with Michael Shoyer here a minute ago about this story in the Washington Post about how the Al-Qaeda guys want McCain to win and love this foreign policy.
And now I'm using my imagination and I'm picturing Sergey Lavrov and the rest of the guys sitting around in the Kremlin saying, oh, yes, we'll support the mandate to keep you in Iraq, because, of course, for the very same reasons, the bleed-until-bankruptcy plan, America's continued occupation of Iraq, just at least to the degree that it's to our own detriment, is to Russia's benefit.
Well, not only that, of course, you're absolutely right that they would perhaps see this as a way of continued sort of slow weakening of the United States in its relationship to other world powers.
But in addition to that, there is also the very real possibility that the Russians could gain, get some bargaining leverage with the United States on issues that they care about the most.
If the United States is dependent on them, even to have a U.N. mandate for U.S. troops for a given short period of time, whether it's one year or six months or two years or whatever, this would give the Russians and indeed the Chinese additional leverage on the United States on issues such as, let's say, Georgia, Ukraine, and for the Chinese, on economic issues, issues of economic relations with the United States.
Now, well, let me ask you about Iran.
Obviously, Bush is wallowing in the 20s of, you know, in his approval ratings now.
The Sunday Times in London, which had broken the story that Bush had given the Israelis an amber light to prepare for war, came out, I guess, last month, saying that, in fact, he had told them, no, you may not bomb Iran.
And everybody's kind of breathed a sigh of relief, I think, including you and I, that the risk of Israel and or America starting a war against Iran has perhaps subsided for now.
But what do you think about the waning months of the Bush term after the election and then the danger of such a thing under a McCain or an Obama administration?
I do think that it has really drained away for obvious reasons.
That is to say, the United States' inability, unwillingness to support it, to participate in it, that has become so dramatically clear that the Israelis, as much as they hate to do so, have had to admit that this is not a viable option.
The best evidence of just how far Israel is from really contemplating seriously any strike against Iran is the recent interview that Olmert gave to an Israeli newspaper that was reported by Trita Parsi in a recent column in Tony Caron's website.
And he basically said that Israel has to be realistic and that it cannot do with Iran, as he put it, what it can do with Lebanon, Hamas, and other forces within the boundaries of Israel.
That is to say, it cannot simply use force.
He didn't use those exact words, but it was very clear that that's what he meant.
So this is a remarkable admission from a government that has trumpeted the threat of military action against Iran for many months.
And I think it does really mark the end of this era of the Israeli military threat against Iran.
And I think this represents another element in what is shaping up to be a historic opportunity, a turning point for an Obama administration, presuming for the moment that that's what we're going to get.
That is to say that there is an opportunity to really overcome the Israeli obstacle to a serious effort at engaging Iraq diplomatically and basically kicking over the traces of this idea that we have to threaten Iran with military force in order to get a meaningful agreement with.
In fact, I think the opposite is the case.
And one would hope that that degree of realism would prevail in the next administration, that they would begin by saying the military option is off the table.
The regime change option is off the table.
We recognize that those were wrong-headed policies pursued by a wrong-headed administration.
We're not going to go down that road.
We're going to start anew, afresh, with a different perspective.
And I think that would set the table for a much more fruitful opportunity for talks with Iran.
Well, you know, it's funny because we already have an agreement with them.
It's called the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
And in fact, they have an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which, quote, safeguards all their nuclear facilities.
And we know they're not making nuclear bombs anyway.
So this entire line about the danger of Iran has been nothing but a pile of lies for the last 15 years, 20 years anyway.
Yes, it's an astonishing phenomenon that the entire national security elite, the entire political elite of the United States, has gone along with the idea that we must act on the assumption that Iran is desperately trying to get nuclear weapons, despite all of the evidence to the contrary, and despite the fact that the National Intelligence Estimate has concluded that they are not pursuing nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons capability at this point.
And that, to me, you know, presents us with the best evidence that we could ever ask for the reality that the national security elite of the United States is basically moved by whatever supports the need to maintain a designated enemy, rather than by any regard for the truth.
That's the fundamental principle on which this national security elite operates.
And speaking of which...
For them to move away from that, you know, I don't want to minimize the difficulty of having that happen.
I think that it would be a big, big change, and one that is going to be resisted very quietly, but very effectively, from within the national security bureaucracy and among all of those ex-democratic officials who are now going to be flooding back into Washington and into the administration, if Obama wins.
Well, you know, a couple, well, a Republican and a Democrat, Dan Coats, two former Senators, Chuck Robb and Dan Coats, they're in the Washington Post today, you know, pushing this theory of the danger of Iran's nuclear capability.
And, you know, you're right, it really is, I think your word was astonishing a minute ago, it really is incredible that we can literally have, on Monday, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency saying, look, they don't even have enough mined uranium, unrefined, to ever, you know, turn into a nuclear weapon.
They don't even have enough of the basic ingredients to even get this done.
And then, you know, on Thursday, we can have this in the Washington Post, just pretending that that reality doesn't exist at all.
Yes, and of course, I mean, I wish someone would tell me why anyone, in their right mind, would pay any attention to what Dan Coats and Chuck Robb say about anything.
I mean, why would they have the slightest credibility on this kind of issue?
There's no reason whatsoever to believe anything that they say.
Yeah.
Well, let's see.
And neither one of them has any credentials, whatever.
All right, can I ask you, just in the last couple of minutes here, just on a basic level, how close to completely falling apart is the state of Pakistan?
You know, I love that quote from Walter Lippmann, the most difficult thing of all to predict is when something's going to happen.
You know, it's very hard to say, you know, how far along Pakistan is.
And of course, it depends exactly what you mean by falling apart.
There are various stages of that and various meanings of that.
And certainly, it is falling apart in a general sense that the society is running down, the economy is failing.
You know, it's been a failed society, a failed state, and a failed society in so many ways over the decade that, you know, in some ways, it's already happened.
So I think one has to sort of unpack that concept of a failed state or falling apart, and really, you know, be more precise about what specific issue we're talking about.
You know, if the question is, you know, are the Islamic militants on the verge of being able to strangle Islamabad?
Probably not in the near future.
I guess I was thinking more in terms of when the people are going to just completely withdraw their consent for the government because it's cooperating with us and warring against their own country.
Yeah, I mean, I would say that that's still more ambiguous at this point.
You know, that there is a very large constituency for obviously a democratic system in Pakistan, despite the corrupt and inept quality, character of the governments one after another that have come into power under that system.
Certainly, it is more popular than the military dictatorships that have held power in Pakistan, and that is a positive for any government as it comes into power.
So there's a degree of tolerance and acceptance that goes with that.
You know, it's funny because Michael Shoyer was just saying probably the best case scenario for us would be for the military to take over the country again.
But really, that ignores, doesn't it, the basic legitimacy of the state?
This is a trade-off.
I mean, Mike is undoubtedly thinking of the point that the military is more capable.
It's probably the only entity in the country that's capable of actually carrying out any program that it decides to carry out.
And that's true at this point.
So, I mean, that's a very strong argument.
But on the other hand, there is a very powerful political opposition to the military dictatorship, to any military dictatorship, for obvious reasons.
And so that is a countervailing reality.
And, you know, in a way, you know, we're damned either way by political problems, very deep political problems and political crisis.
Yeah.
Could have been Ron Paul, man.
Oh, well.
All right.
Listen, I really appreciate your time and insight on the show, as always, Gareth.
Thanks very much for having me, Kent Scott.
All right, folks, that's Gareth Porter, IPS News, antiwar.com slash Porter.
And we'll be right back.