08/12/08 – Brendan O’Neill – The Scott Horton Show

Hey, just because I call England like three times a week to interview these people doesn't mean I can still do it right on the first try.
44 or 20 or not 44 or not 20, I don't know what the hell I'm doing.
Anyway, this is Antiwar Radio and I did get ahold of Brendan O'Neill.
He's joining us on the phone right now from London.
He's the editor of Spiked Online.
It's spiked-online.com and he's got this new article which is called Georgia, the messy truth behind the morality tale and I thought actually, Brendan, we could sort of just start with the news today and get up to date on what's going on.
Basically, you know, background, we're talking about these tiny little countries around the Caucasus Mountains between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea north of Iraq and Turkey and all that.
Probably most Americans don't have any idea even where this is, really.
Yeah.
Oh, by the way, welcome to the show.
Good to talk to you again.
Hey, yes.
Good to be there.
I'm pleased to be on.
Sorry about that.
Not enough coffee.
Not enough sleep.
Okay.
So, basically, what happened?
Last Friday, fighting broke out.
Fill us in, you know, sketch details, you know, what's going on here.
Well, fighting broke out last Friday.
It was extremely quick and it turned violent very quickly.
It kind of exploded and lots of people said it exploded from nowhere.
And there was this real sense of shock in some parts of the West that something like this could have happened seemingly overnight.
But in truth, this kind of conflict has been building up for a long period of time since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Georgia along with other Soviet republics becoming an independent state.
There have been tensions between Georgia and Russia, particularly over South Ossetia and other small regions that want to be independent of Georgia.
And these tensions have been exploited and exacerbated by Washington in particular.
We know that America has effectively tried to transform Georgia into a kind of one of its satellite states in the east.
It pumped millions of dollars into the Georgian military.
It trains the Georgian military.
It has discussed the possibility of putting anti-missile radar systems in Georgia.
And it really is transforming Georgia almost into its kind of spy post in that part of the world.
And this has had a really damaging effect on the region because it's upped the ante between Georgia and Russia.
It's really kind of added a massive international political dimension to the tensions that existed between the newly independent Georgia and between its former masters in the Kremlin.
So I think all the surprise that people are talking about, about what's happened from Friday right through to today, when we seem to have had a short but extremely bloody war between Russia and Georgia over the territory of South Ossetia, I think people should not be as surprised as they are because this kind of thing has been coming for quite a long time.
Well, how many casualties have there been, do you know?
It's hard to tell.
The numbers kind of fluctuate from one press coverage to another.
The number I hear quite a lot is 3,000 to 4,000.
It seems a great number of the casualties are in South Ossetia itself, where Georgia has been launching attacks against Russian forces.
But also, as we know, Russia has taken to bombing Georgian towns, and it started to move into Georgia over the past two days, but now seems to be withdrawing and calling an end to its Georgian adventure.
Well, now, you say at the very beginning of this thing that to an uninterested observer who just kind of looks at the situation, you have tiny little Georgia up against the biggest country in the world, Russia.
And it seems pretty clear who's the underdog and who's the big bad guy, but then you say that we should hold our horses and not start passing out the white and black hats too soon.
Yes.
I think what's happened is that this conflict, this is a very complicated conflict.
And as I said, it's been brewing for a decade.
There's lots of different interests in the region.
There's small groups, there's two states involved, there's outside intervention, there's a lot of stuff going on there.
And what's happened since the war broke out is that Western commentators have tried to transform it into a simple morality tale.
And most of them have depicted it as plucky, independent Georgia standing up against the wicked evil bear of Russia.
And you have all these kind of Western commentators saying, you know, the West cannot stand idly by and watch as Georgia is drowned by Russia.
And others claiming that Georgia is a kind of a paragon of freedom and civilization in the East, and it is up to America to support it in its time of need.
And there's this real sense that Georgia is a kind of Western oriented, free, democratic, new experimental state in the East.
And it must be protected from the old fashioned, violent Russian beast.
And that really doesn't add up.
Firstly, Georgia is not a very democratic, free nation.
It's become increasingly authoritarian.
The president there has taken to smashing his opposition over the past few years, criminalizing opposition parties, arresting oppositionists, and even closing down media outlets that are too critical.
And at the same time, I think it's important to recognize that while Russia has undoubtedly launched some terrible assaults over the past few days, some shocking, terrible assaults, it's acting not necessarily from an imperialist, old Russian standpoint, but rather from a kind of point of desperation.
It's this real attempt by Russia to preserve its integrity, to keep out what it sees as outside NATO influence.
And there is this sense of paranoia in Russia, which is understandable on one level that it's been surrounded by new Western friendly states, which are being supported and armed and pumped with money by Washington.
So I think increasingly, this conflict, this messy, bloody, complicated conflict has been transformed into a fairy tale, effectively, by commentators in the West, some of whom openly say, this is very complex, but now is not the time for complexities.
We must stick with a simple moral message.
I mean, they do openly state that.
Who said that?
Journalists for The Guardian argued, I'll try and find it here.
He argued that this is a very complex conflict.
The history behind Georgia's conflict is long and complex, but complexity is no excuse for abdicating moral judgment.
So roughly translated, don't let the facts get in the way of a good morality tale.
Yeah, that's really what he's saying, you know, it's complex, it's difficult, but we shouldn't let that stand in the way of moral judgment, which effectively means judging the Russians and hailing the West as the potential savior of Georgia.
So what really struck me about this incident was, firstly, the speed with which the violence spilled over and the horror of it was very shocking, but also then the speed with which it was almost instantly transformed into this morality tale where the West is depicted as the savior of the East and Russia is depicted as this evil state.
And what that suggests to me is that this was a ready-made script.
This was a ready-made morality tale that was simply cut and pasted by Western commentators onto this complicated conflict.
So what's happening is that not only do we have this disastrous war spilling over from in Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia, but also the humiliating transformation of that conflict into kind of an element of real politic amongst Western observers.
Well, yeah, everything is devolving quickly into metaphors and similes and people are saying that, well, this is just like Germany between the world wars, reconquering lost territory and that kind of thing.
Russia is just like Hitler.
Yes, absolutely.
And what's extraordinary is that some Western observers just cannot see how hypocritical they're being and they cannot even see their own double standards.
So, for example, they say, you know, it's unacceptable for Russia to try and dislocate South Ossetia from Georgia.
This is an unacceptable thing.
How dare they do this is outrageous.
You know, South Ossetia is a part of Georgia.
And they go on and on about this.
And they don't recognize that, in fact, they campaigned for something very similar in relation to Kosovo and Serbia.
You know, Western commentators, the very same Western commentators who are now slamming Russia for its actions over South Ossetia, were the same commentators who demanded that the West support Kosovo's separation from Serbia and supported the dislocation of this territory precisely in the name of protecting Kosovans from evil Serbs, which is how they described it.
So you have a situation where not only are Western commentators kind of reading this conflict in very childish, moralistic terms, but also they are so kind of away with the fairies that they don't recognize their own double standards in relation to this.
And when Russia does something, tries to do something similar to what the West did in relation to Kosovo and Serbia, which is to protect a small piece of land from an apparently evil state, they accuse it of being this kind of evil, terrible Eastern state.
And, you know, a few weeks ago they were championing precisely the same thing in relation to Kosovo and the West's role there.
Well, I'm afraid now that we're devolving into a morality tale about how immoral the press is.
So let's get into some of this complicated history.
My understanding is that sometime, I have no idea when, the Middle Ages or something, the Ossetian-Russian types came over the Caucasus Mountains and settled the foothills there on the south side, that they're not part of Georgian civilization, that they never really have been, that they had somewhat autonomy under the Soviet Union, and they've had basic autonomy since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
And now, isn't that the most ignorant Texan retelling of the history of the Georgian conflict that you could ever hear?
Fill me in.
What's really going on here?
Well, I think it's important to recognize that what this demonstrates is that there are a lot of national territories, ethnic groups, national groups around the former Soviet Union, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, certain Baltic states as well.
There's a lot of separatism and small groups vying for power and vying for influence.
I think it's important to recognize that in both instances, both in terms of the West and in terms of Russia itself, these small territories and states tend to be supported for quite cynical reasons.
I don't think the West is particularly interested in Georgia having national self-determination and being a free state and being truly democratic.
If they were interested in that, then they wouldn't have supported Georgia over the past few years as it clamped down on democracy and criminalized its opposition and so on.
Also, I don't think Russia is necessarily interested in preserving Ossetian culture and protecting South Ossetia and allowing it to reunite with North Ossetia.
I think by the same token, Russia is also exploiting some South Ossetians' desire for independence or cultural autonomy, as people refer to it these days.
I think Russia is also exploiting that as a way of undermining Georgia, as a way of targeting Georgia and weakening Georgia, and more importantly, as a way of getting one over on the West and on Washington in particular.
That region, the former Soviet republics more broadly, right from Ukraine to Georgia to Uzbekistan, all of those have become embroiled, tragically, in the war on terror and in a broader standoff between Washington and the Kremlin.
But Georgia in particular, Georgia and South Ossetia and that territory around that part of the Caucasus has really become bound up in a bigger, a greater game and a kind of attempt by Washington to extend its influence eastwards and then a rather desperate response by Russia to preserve its kind of integrity and to preserve its borders from what it sees as a kind of dangerous outside influence.
So it's true, as some of the commentary has pointed out, it's true that there are a lot of strange, interesting, weird, historical things going on here, lots of different nationalities which have kind of been in this part of the world for a long period of time.
But I think it's important to recognize that the claims for self-determination now are being exploited by both Washington and Moscow as a way of increasing their influence.
And as a result, what happens is that both the people of Georgia and the people of South Ossetia lose out in this process and become effectively the charges of more powerful outside forces.
Well now, with the so-called war on terror, when we're talking about the war on terror in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, that's simply code for the new Cold War and encircling Russia, right?
It is to a certain extent.
I think what's very interesting is that America has certainly tried to extend its influence into that region and it's done so under the guise of the war on terror.
So, you know, Georgia in particular has really been brought into Washington's fold.
It's become, you know, one of Washington's favorite states in that part of the world.
Even from the very beginning, too, right?
Wasn't it just in the very beginning of 2002 that they announced they were sending soldiers to some gorge in Georgia to fight Al Qaeda or something?
Yes, that's right.
And the ostensible aim was to protect Georgia and the world more broadly, and the West in particular, from Chechen terrorism.
So the threat of terrorism from Chechnya, from Al Qaeda elements potentially moving from Central Asia through to Chechnya, that was often used as the justification for America's increasing intervention in Georgia.
In Uzbekistan as well, you know, the American military has armed and trained the regime there, has effectively given them a blank check to clamp down on their opposition.
And what happens, I think, as a result of this extension of the war on terror eastwards into these various former Soviet republics is there are two impacts.
Firstly, it's tended to lead to more authoritarianism inside those former republics.
So, for example, in Georgia and Uzbekistan in particular, both regimes there have taken America's support as a green light to clamp down on their opponents.
Because these states are now presented as frontline states in the war on terror, key states in defending Western civilization from terrorism.
Their leaders tend to take that as a signal that they can do whatever they please to clamp down on anyone who threatens their power.
Right, that's what that guy Karamov does, right, in Uzbekistan?
Exactly, Karamov does that in particular in Uzbekistan.
He tends to present all oppositionists or particularly threatening oppositionists as Islamic militants who must be crushed.
And in 2005, when some people in Uzbekistan protested against his authoritarianism, his troops opened fire on them and there was a massacre in a part of Uzbekistan.
And I think that itself, even within these states, never mind international instability, that can be seen as a product of the war on terror, where Washington effectively empowers these quite unstable, shaky former Soviet republics to use the guise of fighting terrorism to assert their authority more comprehensively.
And I think that's been pretty disastrous for people in Georgia and for people in Uzbekistan in particular.
And then the second impact of America's terrorization of these states, as I've called it, which is Washington's transformation of these states into outposts in the war on terror, is that it's intensified instability in world affairs more broadly, and particularly instability in the East, because there has been since 1990 and 1991, in fact, going back before 1991, and before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the dying years of the Soviet Union, there was a fair amount of tension between these republics and the Kremlin.
In the 80s, you know, these kind of countries were starting to rediscover their national identities and their cultural heritage.
And, you know, the tension between those states and Moscow really began in the 80s, and then became worse when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
And I think what America has done through transforming these states into kind of effectively outposts in the war on terror is that it's intensified that conflict between Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and other areas, the conflict between those states and between Moscow.
And I think what happens is that, you know, it imbues the standoff between these former republics and Moscow with a real kind of end of the world urgency.
So all of a sudden, these states are friends of the West, they're fighting to preserve Western civilization, they're fighting against the evil Eastern enemy, i.e.
Al Qaeda and terrorism.
And that really means that they kind of clash with Russia much more openly.
So I think that that has been the twofold impact of the exportation of the war on terror eastwards.
Firstly, it's increased authoritarianism there, and it's destabilized the region further.
So I think behind the simple morality tale about Georgia standing up to Russia, we need to recognize that the role of the West here has been extremely disrupted.
Okay, now, going back to the Soviet Union days, I learned some perspective reading John Laughlin at LewRockwell.com this morning, when he's writing about socialism, socialism, I can never say it right.
Yeah.
Anyway, how he talked about one of the legacies of the Leninist system was in making all these bogus so called republics so that it could basically pretend like it was a voluntary union of socialist republics, not just an evil empire based out of Moscow.
And in doing so, they created a situation that when the Soviet Union fell, and all these states gained their independence, you have all these countries that are half or more ethnic Russian, like in Ukraine, you have half the country is pro Russian half the country's the other way.
And you have that in border states all around the former Soviet Union, people basically left behind, so to speak.
Yes, I think that that's very true.
I think a lot of this kind of comes from the historical precedent and how these states were arranged and how they were developed over the decades.
I also think it's important to recognize that that split which does exist, I mean, for example, there's a very clear split in Ukraine between the section of the population that's closer to Russia, which tends to favor relations with Russia, and the section of the population that's close to Europe, which tends to favor close to cooperation with the EU and Washington and the West more broadly.
So part of that is the kind of way in which these states were shaped and formed historically, but it's also, I think, reflects very real political divisions and disagreements between the direction, the future direction of these countries.
And because many of these former Soviet republics have been so comprehensively sucked into the East West divide, and what you refer to as the new Cold War, you know, the standoff between America and Russia, although it seems to me to be a much flimsier, lamer, kind of more unpredictable Cold War than the one that exists previously.
But because these former republics have been so sucked into that, effectively, it's the only game in town, the only political question that exists is, should we side with the West or should we side with Russia?
And so you find that there are very, very deep divisions on precisely that question.
So for example, in Ukraine, in the elections of 2003, 2004, and then the so called Orange Revolution of 2005, there was effectively a split between one candidate who was supported by Russia, and who wanted to side with Russia, and another candidate who was backed by the West and who wanted to move westwards.
And that's another tragic aspect of this kind of the way in which these former Soviet republics have fared over the past decade or more since the collapse of the Soviet Union, because they're so swamped by that kind of West East divide and the continual attempt to gain one up, you know, the West and the East to kind of win over against each other.
Politics is kind of frozen in those countries, and real urgent political questions kind of become subsumed beneath the question of whether the state should face west or the state should face east.
And so you have all these various political groups rising, which orient themselves very much towards Washington, or Moscow.
And I think that robs people in those areas of having a genuine political debate about the future direction of their country and how they want things to turn out.
And instead, people feel drawn towards the parties that support the West or the parties that support the East.
So I think there isn't a historic element there.
But I also think that that divide has been exacerbated by the effective fight over these former Soviet republics, but between Washington and Moscow.
And it really robs people in those territories.
Ukraine is a very good example.
Georgia is a good example too.
It robs them of having any true say over their own destiny.
Right, yeah.
I always wonder about that.
What it would be like to live in a country that is simply a satellite of some imperial power, and where my government knows that all they can do is try to negotiate with the Dark Lord as best they can.
But other than that, they're basically stuck.
I think that would suck.
Yes.
I think it would.
And also, it's very flimsy.
People's attitudes can change as well, I think, depending on what happens.
The Ukraine is a very good example of this.
Everyone was talking about the Orange Revolution in 2005, when people went out on the streets, and there was rock concerts, and there was laser displays, and all these Western journalists were there saying, look at these people who want to turn over, get rid of their evil president, because the guy who was leading them then was a Soviet-backed official.
And there was this great celebration of the Orange Revolution and how wonderful it was.
Then what happens is the leader stands down under pressure from this Orange Revolution.
The West declares it as a great victory.
The people have spoken.
The people have won.
This revolution has turned out an evil Soviet-backed leader.
And then within three or four months...
Well, Russian-backed.
Close enough, though, right?
Yes, Russian-backed.
According to the narrative, though, they might as well still be the USSR, so go ahead.
Absolutely.
And Yanukovych, his name was Yanukovych, who was kind of thrown out of power, and Yushchenko, who was the West-favored candidate, took over, and everyone was saying, yes, this is the victory we all demanded.
And then, you know, in three or four or five months' time, Yushchenko's government kind of fizzles out.
It loses any momentum.
There are big splits within it.
You know, there's the standoff between Yushchenko and his officials, and then he ends up sacking his entire cabinet, and then his government collapses.
They have further elections, and what happens?
The evil guy, the evil Russian-backed guy, Yanukovych, is re-elected with a convincing majority.
I think he got about 35% of the vote in comparison to about 15% and 10% for the newly split Western parties.
So it also shows things are very unpredictable.
So in Ukraine in 2005, you have an orange revolution that supposedly overthrows the evil Russian-backed president, and then, you know, less than a year later, the West's guy is voted out, and the Russian's guy is voted back in.
So it really, it not only robs people of having any kind of meaningful say over their lives, but it also means that, you know, things are very unpredictable, and they can change very quickly, depending on which side of the satellite is doing a more convincing job of intervening and setting the agenda.
Yeah.
Interesting footnote to that one, too, is that Yushchenko's campaign manager came out recently and said, oh, all those problems with his face were health problems that he had, and we decided to blame the Russians for poisoning him, but we knew we were lying all along.
And then Yushchenko turned around and blamed him, said, oh, well, it was my campaign manager poisoning me on behalf of the KGB.
And I think everybody just laughed at that point, right?
Yeah.
I mean, that's when you realize it's become a bit of a joke.
Because if you remember when Yushchenko was allegedly poisoned and his face kind of was distorted, it became part of this real international script, you know, this idea that there is this kind of huge divide between the pure good West and the evil East, which even poisons and disfigures his enemies.
And then, you know, the reality always turns out to be a bit more complicated and far less exciting.
Let me ask you about oil pipelines.
I think this matters when it comes to Ukraine as well as Georgia.
I know down in Georgia they have what Justin Armando calls the pipeline from hell that runs from Baku in Azerbaijan, I think, across to Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea, runs through Georgia only, what, 100 miles or something from the southern border of South Ossetia?
Yeah.
Yes.
I'm not as interested in the pipeline as other people are.
I mean, I think the pipeline is obviously very important, and it shows how that part of the world is increasing in its importance in different ways.
But I think in some ways the pipeline has become a little bit of a red herring, because the key thing for me is the short-termist, unanchored kind of sentiment behind Western and Russian intervention in these parts of the world.
And it often strikes me that Washington has no doubt tried very hard to transform these states into friendly states.
It's offered them millions and millions of pounds of arms and training, co-opted them very much into the war on terror.
But it seems to me to be a very kind of, it's a very misguided policy.
It's one that's going to come back to haunt Washington, I think, and we can already see that in the way in which it's actually increased instability rather than making the world more stable.
And I think increasingly Washington is carrying out foreign policy interventions that are going to harm its long-term interests.
It doesn't seem to be thinking things through in any clear fashion.
So I'm not entirely convinced that the intervention there is this kind of super-economical, clear attempt to preserve economic interests and oil interests in particular.
I think it's more unpredictable and incoherent than that, and as a result more dangerous.
So I think the pipeline no doubt feeds into the broader international discussion about Georgia and that territory more broadly.
But I think it's not the be-all and end-all of the West's interest in the region.
I think there's something in a sense more morally profound and incoherent about the West's attempt to win over some of these states.
Well, and you know that's a major theme of the article too here is about how this is just the most haphazard attempt at empire building.
It seems like either there's too many chiefs in the cockpit fighting over controls of the dang thing, or there's nobody running the thing, or I don't know exactly what.
But I'm reminded of one thing when we talk about all this alliance building on the borders of Russia, and they're talking about maybe this is dead in the water now, but they were talking about bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO both this December.
And this reminds me of something Pat Buchanan asked a rhetorical question on this show a few weeks back.
He said, okay, you look at all our NATO war guarantees to these former Soviet republics, the Baltic states and so forth.
Well, what if we had a militarist regime that came to power in Russia and decided that they were going to reconquer the Baltic states?
What are we going to do about it?
Are we really going to, you know, sacrifice our country and all of Western Europe and everything in order to protect Latvia and Estonia?
I'm sorry, we're not.
Presumably not even Dick Cheney would get us into a nuclear war with Russia over that.
So why are we even doing this in the first place?
It just seems so dangerous, counterproductive.
Yeah, I think that's true.
And I think it strikes a lot of people as being dangerous and counterproductive.
And they're trying to work out why does Washington do this?
You know, it's really interesting to me because if you remember when Bush and his cohort were running for election nine or 10 years ago, they often said that they would focus on American problems, that they would stop kind of, you know, going around the world, you know, as we know, behind the scenes, they were talking about the project for an American century and new forms of intervention.
But they did say that they would focus more on American issues and American problems within the United States.
But there is something about the crisis of purpose, I suppose, and the crisis of legitimacy in Washington at the moment, which means that it's continually pulled towards the international sphere.
It's continually drawn away from America itself, where political problems and social problems seem insurmountable to the officials who run Washington.
And it's drawn towards international arenas, where things seem, seem to them at least, more clear cut, more black and white, there's good and there's evil.
There's America, which seems pure.
And then there's Saddam, Al Qaeda, and Russia, which seem evil.
So it's very interesting to me that even American presidents who say we're going to stay at home, we're going to stay put, we're going to fix America, as soon as they get into power, as soon as they face reality, they're drawn towards the international sphere.
And as you say, they continually carry out interventions that are self destructive and dangerous, and which will come back to haunt them.
And we've seen that over the past 25 years, you know, firstly, in the creation of Mujahideen in Afghanistan, you know, which has created a huge number of problems, not only for America, but for many other countries, the creation of new Mujahideen in Bosnia, in 1992 to 1995, when under Clinton's green light, numerous Islamic militants moved to Bosnia and fought with the Bosnian Muslim army, which was being armed, as we know, by the Clinton administration.
And then the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have left these two countries as gaping holes, you know, Hamid Karzai just about has control over Kabul, but you know, not over any other note that he doesn't have convincing control over any other part of Afghanistan.
And Iraq is this kind of dangerous, bloody, terroristic vacuum in the Middle East, because, you know, Washington and London removed the government without thinking about what would take its place.
And now we have a situation in the former Soviet republics, where the continual arming and goading of these republics by Washington, the kind of flirtation between Washington and these kind of mixed up, directionless republics has created a really volatile situation within those states, and also more internationally.
So again, and again, over the past 25 years, almost everywhere, where Washington and its sidekick London has intervened, they have just created terrible problems for the people in those countries, as we know, who've been killed in their thousands, but also huge problems for themselves.
So it's very intriguing.
I find it amazing that Washington and London in particular are continually drawn to the international arena where they feel that they can make clear cut moral statements and demonstrate their sense of purpose and legitimacy.
But at the same time, they create situations that come back to haunt them, and which undermine their authority and which cause violence around the world.
Do you think maybe we could just give the Empire back to you guys?
We didn't do a very good job of it either.
Let's not forget, you know, prior to America, if we were having this conversation 60 or 70 years ago, we would be complaining as violently about the British as we are now complaining about the Americans.
I think empires in general, I'm sure you'll agree, are a bad idea.
Because, you know, they undermine people's autonomy, they undermine democracy, they undermine sovereignty, and they cause conflict and division.
We've seen that right through the British Empire and now under the new forms of kind of chaotic, meaningless, pointless Western intervention that's spreading around the world.
So I think the key is for Western leaders to forget any idea of empire and to forget continually seeking new foreign fields in which they can intervene, and instead to face up to their own political crisis and to discuss and grapple with it honestly, rather than trying to project it onto the international sphere where they think it can be worked out more easily.
Well, you know, one thing I would really like for America to have the moral authority of, I don't know, say Switzerland or something, I guess they don't even issue statements at all, but I would like America to be able to say, hey, Georgia, Russia, stop the killing, what are you doing, stop the violence.
But we see what happened this week when America says that.
Vladimir Putin quite credibly responded, of course Saddam Hussein ought to have been hanged for destroying several Shiite villages, and the incumbent Georgian leaders who raised ten Ascension villages at once, who ran over elderly people and children with tanks, who burned civilians alive in their sheds, these leaders must be taken under protection.
And so we have no moral authority to say anything to anyone about anything at this point.
Yeah, I never cease to be amazed at the way in which Washington and London and their numerous supporters assume that they have the moral authority to tell other states how to behave.
It's just, sometimes I'm dumbfounded.
You know, I saw Bush in his TV statement, you know, he said about Russia's attack on Georgia, this kind of thing cannot be allowed in the 21st century.
You know, this is the guy who wrote the checks for the Iraq war, sent in the bombers, sent in the soldiers, and left the country devastated and left 400,000 people dead.
And you just think, where on earth does he get the bold-faced cheek to tell another state that it mustn't ever intervene into sovereign territory?
And, you know, you see the same thing all the time.
You know, for example, you see campaigners like Mia Farrow and George Clooney and others calling on George Bush and Gordon Brown to tell the Chinese they must stop funding the government in Khartoum, because it's, you know, it's helping to fund their genocide in Darfur.
And again and again, the West is called upon to exercise its moral authority in the East and in Africa and around the world.
And no one seems to recognize that, you know, the West has no moral authority.
It simply has none.
You know, the West has no right to lecture Russia, China, or anyone else about their actions around the world, because, you know, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq and before that in Kosovo and Bosnia and before that in Somalia, you know, the West over the past 10 or 15 years has continually intervened in other states' affairs and continually made the situations there worse.
So I think we should stop calling on Washington and London to sort out anyone else's affairs and instead to get their own house in order first.
All right, everybody.
That's Brendan O'Neill.
He's the editor of Spiked Online.
That's spiked-online.com.
And the article is on antiwar.com today.
It's called Georgia, the messy truth behind the morality tale.
Thank you very much for your time today, Brendan.
Thank you.
I appreciate it.