07/04/13 – Adam Morrow – The Scott Horton Show

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All right y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
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Okay, now next up is our friend Adam Morrow back on the line from Cairo, reporter for Interpress Service.
That's IPSnews.net, IPSnews.net, and he ain't the only great journalist at IPSnews.net either.
You should go and spend some time looking around there.
Welcome back, Adam.
How are you doing?
Good.
I'm doing okay, Scott.
How are you doing today?
I'm doing great.
So, how's things in Egypt these days?
Well, if anybody's following the news, they would know that Egypt's first ever democratically elected president was ousted by military decree yesterday, and basically has been effectively replaced with an interim head of state, who I think will remain in place for about six months before early presidential polls can be held, and he was drawn from the judiciary.
He's the head of Egypt's high constitutional court.
Now the move, needless to say, I mean, President Mohamed Morsi, who comes from the Muslim Brotherhood group, was elected almost one year ago in Egypt's, like I said, Egypt's first ever free presidential elections, and he won by a very narrow margin.
He very narrowly defeated a big Mubarak Arab official, a former prime minister named Ahmed Shafiq.
He beat him by about a 51 or 52 percent margin, but he did win in elections that were widely regarded as free and fair by the international community and by all observers.
So needless to say, this military coup, which I have to add, did come in tandem with massive, massive protests that involved millions of people taking to the streets in Cairo.
The change, nevertheless, has provoked outrage on the part of the Islamist, you know, the entire Islamist community here, who themselves are planning for mass rallies on Friday.
So people are sort of bracing for the reaction, you know.
What happened yesterday has sort of been met with, you know, it was praised by revolutionaries and remnants of the former regime, and stunned silence on the part of most other people.
And now, only today, are we beginning to see reactions to it.
There's reports of conflicts, of armed clashes breaking out in some of the governorates.
We're also having reports that the pro-Morsi demonstrators that have been in the streets of Cairo for the last several days in counter-rallies, that they are being attacked by unknown assailants, but with the blessing of the army.
They've basically been surrounded by the army, and they're sending in these thugs to harass them, in hopes of dispersing them.
So the tension is palpable.
People are waiting for the second foot, the second shoe to drop, basically, right now.
That's the situation we're in.
Oh man, oh man.
What a mess.
Okay, so.
Yeah, I mean, people are talking about, you know, you're hearing civil war getting bandied about.
A lot of people are talking about an Algeria, possible Algeria scenario.
You had one of the, by the way, leading Muslim Brotherhood figures are being arrested, and having travel bans imposed on them, which is quite incredible, considering their, you know, their party, the Freedom and Justice Party, is a fully legal party.
So it looks like the old regime is coming back, basically.
You know, a lot of people had hoped that this would, you know, that this would usher in, you know, some kind of third current, you know, that you'd end up with, that this would maybe result in, you know, bringing some kind of leftist or liberal president.
But people, it's widely believed here that, you know, this is basically, that this is basically an attempt by the old regime to come back again.
And how they did it was largely through the media, but the private media, which they still control.
And they've mobilized the masses like crazy on Sunday.
They've been pushing for this thing for months, these massive rallies, which, and they succeeded in getting millions of people out on the street against the democratically elected government.
So we'll see.
Wow.
Okay.
So first of all, obviously, there's a lot of follow-up questions just from that.
First of all, when we're talking about 33 million people protesting.
I would be extremely careful with the numbers.
It was definitely in the millions.
It was definitely in the millions.
And then people need to also.
Yeah.
33 does sound like a lot, doesn't it?
The whole numbers game ever since the, you know, ever since the January 25th.
Okay.
Well, but anyway.
All right.
Let's call it a tenth of that or something.
Still million.
Let's say 3 million people are aware.
If you can get that many people.
Is that the same as a CIA random mob from 1953 Iran or something like that?
Or that's there's seriously some people who do not want to wait for the next election.
They want rid of this guy now.
And they look at him as he had no mandate whatsoever other than to show up and be cool.
And instead he's tried to impose his own brand of Muslim brotherhood tyranny on everybody who helped him get power.
And they're saying no dice contract broken by you.
You're out by the millions.
They're saying that.
So are you saying now?
I don't know.
Elections outweigh that.
Well, okay.
First of all, I just wanted to say the whole numbers game.
You have to be very, very careful because both sides and I'm talking about both sides will have a tendency to exaggerate the numbers of people on the street.
Of course.
You're right.
I was real sloppy to use that number.
Thirty three million.
That was stupid.
I would be.
I would just approach these numbers with extreme caution because it's the sort of thing that's very difficult to gauge.
Unlike actual elections where you can actually tally up numbers and find out exactly how many people did stuff, these demonstrations, it's impossible to tell.
And also, you also had this, you know, you also had a lot of people going to the squares just to sort of see what was going on.
Do you know what I'm saying?
It was almost like a national holiday where you had a lot of families just showing up and just to just to just to see what was happening was a very festival atmosphere.
It drew a lot of people in that sense.
Not not everybody was, you know, were hardened political dissidents, you know, or activists or or people who really had that much of a grievance against the government.
I mean, it was a it was a like I said, there were a lot of families there that were just just there to sort of just sort of join in just for the fun of it.
You know, the weather was nice.
You know, there was there were there were bands playing and things like this.
So in that sense that, you know, it's very, very hard to gauge, unlike actual, you know, unlike the results of actual ballot boxes.
There's that.
It's also important to realize that Cairo is a city with more than 20 million people in it.
So so even if 20, you know, even if two million or three million or four million hit the streets, there's still another 16 million people who stayed at home that day who might not, you know, who didn't join the protests for whatever reason.
So that's another thing to bear in mind.
Yeah.
Well, no, I mean, you certainly have a point.
Well, so.
But then again, you know, as we've talked about over the years, because and for people who aren't too familiar, Adam Morrow, Interpreter, we've been talking with him at the at the worst every few months, a lot of times more often than that, ever since the Arab Spring broke out back two and a half years ago there.
And you have told us about how the Muslim Brotherhood really did a sloppy job of putting together that constitutional convention.
And they've instead of being gracious, they froze out everybody and gave them, you know, everybody else and wouldn't give them a chance to have any say whatsoever.
And so then those people responded by boycotting and and whatever, whatever he's been hardening their position since then.
So and, you know, for me, ballots, you're right.
They're easier to count.
But for me, that's the extent of of what you can say about it.
And there's nothing sacred about a ballot, necessarily, certainly not in a position in a situation where you've abolished a foreign backed dictatorship where Mubarak might as well have been from Virginia.
Right.
You get rid of him and then you the only people who are organized to really carry out any kind of campaign are the Muslim Brotherhood.
Right.
They were just barely tolerated as a separate sub-state kind of a group under Mubarak, but no one else was tolerate as a group at all.
Right.
They were they were actually formally outlawed under Mubarak and they were they were subject to to to regular security crackdowns.
They were frequently arrested and things like that.
They were the usual, not on a serial level where they were just all massacred completely.
Right.
No, no, no.
This is true.
This is true.
They were they were banned, but tolerated as how they were generally described under Mubarak.
All right.
Well, anyway, I'm not necessarily, you know, I'm puzzled.
Basically, I'm on whoever's side that the CIA is on the other side of.
Although I assume that the CIA is trying to be on everybody's side here as best they can and probably don't have too much control over what happens.
But I don't know.
Yeah, I think the powers that be, I think the powers that be will often have their people in both camps when you've got a conflict going.
I think as a general rule of thumb, I've found that both sides are usually co-opted.
But do they have a policy?
Do they have any idea what the hell they're doing or whose side do you think they're really pushing to win?
Anyone or what?
Who are we talking about?
The State Department, the CIA, the White House.
Right.
That's a very tricky question because, you know, both sides are accusing the other of sort of of being backed by the United States.
You know, the Muslim Brotherhood will say this.
This is a counterrevolution backed by America and Israel.
And the opposition is saying, oh, the Brotherhood has gotten into bed with Washington and is now taking its dictates from Washington.
But what I will tell you, Scott, though, is, you know, for decades, Islamist groups have been blamed for resorting to violence and not joining the political process and not playing the democratic game and this sort of thing.
And, you know, they've been censured and condemned and criticized by the West in a very condescending way for decades for not, you know, sort of not getting aboard, you know, the whole modern democratic political experiment.
And what's so tragic about this is that when they did finally, now that they have in Egypt and let's not forget that the Muslim Brotherhood denounced violence in the 1950s and has never been implicated in a violent act since then.
So they, you know, they played the game.
They won elections.
They made incredible mistakes.
I'm simply not trying to whitewash any mistakes they made.
And they even admitted on several occasions that they made horrific, horrendous missteps.
But that being said, they're entirely brand new to the notion of governance.
You know, this is a brand new thing.
And as well, they were also attacked from all quarters.
Since the moment Morsi walked into office, he's been fiercely attacked by all quarters.
They didn't give him any breathing space to try to do anything.
It was just nonstop attack.
If he moved to the left, he would be attacked.
If he moved to the right, the same people would attack him for moving to the right.
So I mean, it's kind of understandable.
It would be inevitable that he would make a couple, you know, multiple severe, you know, mistakes.
So that's not surprising.
What's of concern now is that the Islamists, and let's not forget that they won 75% of parliamentary seats in the parliamentary elections in 2011-2012.
So this is a massive constituency.
We are talking about the majority, you know.
And now they're going to feel that they no longer have any reason to participate in democracy after this, because they won the parliament, as I said earlier.
And then within four or five months, the military that was ruling the country at the time in the wake of Mubarak's ouster unilaterally dissolved the parliament.
So here's an example of, you know, a parliament that was democratically elected, again, with, you know, with monitors from outside basically vouching for its integrity.
And they won it.
And it was taken from them.
It was taken from them arbitrarily by the military.
They based the dissolution, their decision to dissolve the parliament on a judicial ruling.
It was basically a technicality on which they based their decision to dissolve the parliament.
So the Islamists have seen their parliament taken from them, and now they've seen the presidency taken from them.
And both of those things they won in free elections that were ruled to be fair.
So the upside of this is basically why, I mean, they're basically going to come to the conclusion, as some of us, as their right wing has always said, you know, the hardcore Islamist factions have always said democracy is a Western invention, is a bullshit Western invention that we, you know, that we, that we, you know, that we don't, that we shouldn't participate in.
And now basically those voices have been have been vindicated by what's just happened.
So the Islamists in general are now going to say, look, we don't really, why should we participate in elections after this?
If we win, they're just going to be stolen from us.
Which is a very, very dangerous, you know, which is a very, very sort of dangerous situation.
Yeah.
Well, that was what Zawahiri always criticized them for, was that they went for the trappings of Western democracy.
They were sellouts and traitors to the imperialists and whatever.
And now America is, well, somebody's policy anyway, the military's policy, as you're saying, seeming to vindicate that criticism that it's all good for nothing anyway.
Not like they'll let you respect your...
Exactly.
That's the point.
I mean, and they kind of can't, you know, you kind of have to agree with them.
I mean...
Well, but now they don't have their own SA force, right?
There is no Muslim Brotherhood militia for them to really organize to fight, is there?
They've been accused of having a militia.
I suspect they definitely have, you know, at least contingency plans for drawing up militias.
You know, I can't say with certainty that they actually have militias, but I mean, it's hard to say.
It's hard to say.
They've been accused of having an armed wing for a while, but there's never been any evidence of that.
That being said, I mean, they do have experience from decades ago of paramilitary activity, but it's very hard to say.
There are other groups, though.
There are other groups that are more hardcore, like the Gamma Islamaya group, which became one of their closest allies when Morsi was still in power, who do have a much more recent history of violence.
They only gave up...
The Gamma Islamaya only gave up violence officially in the late 1990s after the Luxor, after the massacre in Luxor, if you remember that, in 1997.
So there are, like I said, there are groups that do have a more recent history of violence than they do, who have shown that they aren't necessarily against, you know, adopting violent tactics.
So that's of concern.
And also, this is all coupled with just the incredible outrage that this has been met with by all the people who voted for Morsi.
You know, these people cast ballots for Morsi, and they've seen their, you know, they've seen their democratic choice basically taken from them arbitrarily by the military.
Well, and as we talked about a couple of days ago, there's severe economic problems going on, and there's a lot of problems with basic, you know, street-level security and that kind of thing.
No doubt.
Which has been a big problem.
Oh, I meant to ask you...
I just want to say on the...
Yeah, I'm sorry, go ahead.
No, no, no, you go ahead.
I'll save it.
Well, on the security thing, that has been a very long-standing grievance of the people is the sort of security vacuum, because if you remember in our earlier conversations, we mentioned that the police staged a...were withdrawn nationwide in the middle of an 18-day uprising against Mubarak in 2011, have never returned.
And this has been one of the things that Morsi has been unable to do, is to get the police back to deploy on the streets.
They basically have refused to listen to him.
You know, they basically refused to deploy, because they're all Mubarak-era guys who hate the Brotherhood, you know, who have spent decades cracking down on the Brotherhood.
And now all of a sudden, after the revolution, they're supposed to start taking orders from the same guys that they were imprisoning.
So they just basically have refused to hit the streets under Morsi.
And I expect now that you've had this coup, I expect to see the police back on the streets imminently.
I half expected to see them today.
I didn't.
But I'm sure tomorrow or the next day, we're going to start seeing the police hit the streets again.
And now, do you really see the whole thing as just, you know, the old regime coming back to power here, and the April 5th types, or whatever they call themselves, the pro-Hillary Clintonites, that they're just the useful idiots for the old military dictatorship?
I do kind of read it that way, yeah.
I think this whole June 30th thing was planned long in advance.
I think there was a lot of preparation for it.
I'll tell you an interesting development that happened yesterday.
As soon as the military came out and made its announcement, deposing Morsi, all of the religious channels, and I'm talking about three or four prominent religious channels, were suddenly went off the air.
And that wasn't just the Muslim Brotherhood's channel.
That was three or four other channels as well that weren't Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated but were Islamist, were all suddenly blank.
And personnel in their media offices were arrested.
And a similar thing actually happened to Jazeera.
And Jazeera's live station here also was briefly shut down and had some of their cameras taken away from a pro-Morsi rally suddenly, because, as you know, Jazeera is out of Qatar, and Qatar was a supporter of the Brotherhood, and the channel, Al Jazeera, had been frequently criticized by revolutionaries for being pro-Muslim Brotherhood.
So my point is, all of these stations suddenly went off the air right after the announcement of Morsi's ouster, suggesting that this was a very well-planned, this whole thing was very well-planned.
And another thing that people have noticed also is how quickly the military was to intervene.
You know?
I mean, we would have thought that if there were huge incidences of violence, the military might deploy.
Yeah, I'd agree with that, too.
I noticed that, too.
Yeah, exactly.
You'd say, oh, you've got your 48 hours.
Like, who do you think you are?
George W. Bush or something?
Yeah, exactly.
Exactly.
I mean, there was no violence.
There were millions of people in the streets, absolutely.
But there were no, you know, there were no incidences of major clashes or anything that would really justify a sudden announcement by the military.
So that kind of took a lot of people by surprise.
It kind of freaked out a lot of the revolutionary, you know, leftist types as well, who suddenly became very suspicious.
You know, this sort of made them quite suspicious that this was, you know, that this had been maybe planned in advance and that this is, you know, this forebodes, you know, the possible return of the former regime.
So people are still trying to interpret what exactly what's going on.
So I think it's sort of the calm before the storm, where, you know, we're going to see the reaction in the next couple of days.
Well, now, so the generals came and did their coup and said, look, basically this guy just blew it so bad that we're going to start the democratic revolution all over again.
We're going to safeguard it from how bad these guys have been at it.
And we're going to hold another election in six months.
You don't take them at their word.
It doesn't sound right.
Mohammed Baradai, Mohammed Baradai, who I'm sure you know, has been elected as sort of the opposition spokesman now.
And he described it as a correction.
He described what just happened as a correction of the January 25th revolution.
Well, and, you know, he was on my list to ask you about.
But well, so first of all, do you trust that there's going to be an election?
I don't see any reason to believe that ElBaradei would win a fair election, although I like the guy just for debunking lies about Iran's nuclear program for years.
He deserved the Nobel Prize.
I think he won the Nobel Peace Prize, right, and deserved it in a good way.
Not that not in a Henry Kissinger, Barack Obama, ironic kind of Nobel Peace Prize way, but in a good kind.
But anyway, just because I like him doesn't mean that anybody in Egypt likes him, do they?
He doesn't have that much grassroots support.
He's liked amongst liberal and leftist circles a lot.
But he really doesn't, he doesn't have a lot of, he doesn't have mass swaths of grassroots support at all.
In fact, a lot of people see him as, you know, because he lived abroad for so long.
I guess he, where did he live in Switzerland, I think, or he, yeah, IAEA headquarters is in Vienna, right?
Yeah, yeah.
So and then if you've seen him, he's in the run up to the presidential elections, he sort of hit the street and pressed the push a little bit and went out to some of these local villages and stuff like that to sort of, you know, to sort of establish his popular credentials.
And if you if you if you look at some of his footage, the guy looks incredibly uncomfortable being around normal Egyptians.
It's kind of funny.
So he is he is he is kind of far removed from your from your average Egyptian.
So I actually he was just asked today, he was just asked to possibly assume the task of the post of prime minister temporarily, and he he turned it down, which is interesting.
He said he wanted to serve the nation in an unofficial capacity.
So so who knows?
Who knows?
He might he may be touted as a presidential candidate in the next elections.
But I'd like you said, I don't think I don't think he would he would stand a chance.
I think it would be a much more likely candidate will be the military's choice, which will probably be Ahmed Shafiq, who ran against Morsi one year ago and lost by a narrow margin, as I mentioned earlier.
I think he's been in the Emirates.
He's been he's been in Abu Dhabi for the last year, ever since he lost the election.
And basically, my prediction is that my prediction is that he's going to come back to Egypt amid incredible fanfare with tons of money for it with a lavish electoral campaign.
I think that's what's going to happen.
And he's going to be greeted at the airport by millions and millions and millions of pro Mubarak people and others and and will will possibly win any future election unless a popular Islamist, you know, candidate.
But but that's conjecture.
All of that is conjecture.
Well, and as you say, factions are getting madder and madder at each other and they're starting to identify each other as enemies, not those other nice people they disagree with politically.
Oh, and that kind of thing.
And that sure does not bode well for the future of a peaceful election in six months.
Yeah, I've never seen the levels of polarization that I've seen here.
I mean, I've been here for 16 or 17 years.
I've never seen the, you know, the kind of heated discourse, the sort of hatred of each side has for the other at this point, the unbelievable polarization, which is like you like you said, does not bode well.
And a big part of that, a big part of that is has been the influence of the media, of these satellite channels on both sides, where you have Islamist channels which will accuse these liberals and leftists of being infidels to the private channels, which are owned by, you know, largely owned by people who are closely associated with the former regime have been no better, have been no better and have also instigated against the president, instigated against Islamists, has been no better in terms of, you know, in terms of the sort of, you know, propaganda and incitement that they've been spewing out over the course of the last year.
Yeah.
So, yeah, it's extremely polarized.
Yeah.
Well, I mean, this is the whole thing, you know, when you use the word little d democracy, that's supposed to imply a little bit more than simply regular elections.
And, you know, it's supposed to sort of go without saying that the tolerance of the other's victory is would be tolerable because they won't have the power to abuse you.
Right.
We're only fighting over who's in charge of making sure everything's fair around here rather than right, rather than just a competition for the power of the state to beat everybody else over the head with, which can be a very zero sum game in a very bloody game.
And now, you know, I'm a libertarian, so I see democracy as just, you know, warmed over war anyway and not not that warmed over, really, because if you think of all the police violence that really exists and and all the different horrors and depredations of our government, short of war, but still.
Right.
Well, look, you know, in to sum up, I, I truly believe it would have been better for Egypt if all of this energy that had gone into the Sunday, Sunday's protests and demonstrations and marches and the Sunday and Monday and Tuesday, all of these massive, massive rallies and these millions of people out on the streets, it would have been I think it would have been much better ultimately for the country if all of that energy had gone towards electoral campaigning and, you know, the normal democratic path.
And if the Brotherhood had performed so dismally and again, it made tons of mistakes that it should be punished for, it should be punished for, but it should be punished for them at the at the at the ballot boxes.
You know, I, you know, my wish is that all of this energy had gone towards, you know, basically voting them, capturing parliament, stealing, taking parliament from them, taking legislative authority for the from them.
And parliamentary elections were scheduled to happen within six months or so.
So so they did have that that route available to them.
But, you know, in post-revolution Egypt, everything seems to revolve around mass public mobilization.
Now, everybody seems to be far more interested in hitting the streets and the shaggy slogans and staging million man marches and all of this stuff.
And I, you know, and I just think that things can be very sloppy and very, you know, can easily get out of control when you have an environment like that.
Mm hmm.
Well, and, you know, as we it's been a while since we really focused on this, but just real quick, it was the case that the state really controlled the whole economy there anyway.
Right.
Especially the military.
And there's not much pluralism in terms of economic power spread throughout the country.
So that makes it very difficult to decentralize when it's not quite communism or anything, but it's very centralized power and wealth in the state.
Yeah, yeah, that's true.
There were massive disparities.
You've got this, you know, something like more than half of a population living on or below the poverty line.
And then you had you had a small clique of people, a small elite that were all very close to the regime making incredible amounts of money, you know.
Yeah.
All right.
Now, I just want to thank you again for coming on the show, Adam.
It's great knowing that I can always count on you to give us a level headed view of what's going on in the streets over there.
Sure, sure.
My friend, I'm sure, I'm sure.
Somebody, somebody could make a book just out of the transcripts if you're in my interviews at this time, you know?
Right.
And I'm sure I'm just saying I'm sure that it won't be too long before we have another conversation, before something else big happens and we have another conversation.
I'm sure it'll probably be next week, my friend.
Right.
If not earlier.
Right.
OK, thanks very much.
I sure appreciate it.
Sure.
Thanks, Scott.
Talk to you soon.
All right, everybody.
That is the great Adam Morrow from Interpress Service.
Ipsnews.net.
Ipsnews.net.
Thanks, everybody, for listening.
We'll be back here tomorrow, 11 to 1 Texas time, 12 to 2 Eastern.
At No Agenda Radio, scotthorton.org, talkstreamlive.com.
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They'll take care of all your custom printing for your bandier business at the bumper sticker dot com.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.