06/17/13 – Muhammad Sahimi – The Scott Horton Show

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The Bill of Rights?
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Alright y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton and our first guest today is our good friend Mohammed Sahimi.
He's a professor of chemical engineering over there at USC.
But his real job is he's a media guy on the subject of Iranian politics here in America.
He's got a hell of an archive at antiwar.com.
A no longer updated one but still a very important archive at PBS Frontline's Tehran Bureau.
And I'm sorry Mohammed, I should have your new website pulled up here in front of me.
The Middle East Report thingamajig.
What's the URL again?
Welcome to the show.
Welcome to the show.
Good morning, Scott.
It is called Iran News and Middle East Report.
Right.
I'm going to Google that up.
Iran News and Middle East.
I'm a terrible typist.
Report.
Okay.
So yeah, here we go.
IMENews.com.
I knew that.
IMENews.com.
I, me, news.
There you go.
Alright.
And now we got your brand new piece here.
I've got it.
I don't know if it's up on the site yet.
It is regarding the Iranian election.
Will Washington respond positively to the Iranian people's aspirations after their presidential elections?
So first of all, the big news, I guess, is that Hassan Rouhani won and that he's a so-called moderate.
What exactly does that mean?
First of all, I guess, what does it mean for little d democracy in Iran?
And then secondly, tell me all about this guy.
Well, first of all, in Iranian elections that we have in Iran, all sorts of things can happen that are unexpected.
Iranian elections over the past three decades, with one or two exceptions, have never been actually free elections.
But they have actually been very competitive in the sense that you could not really, you know, predict who is going to win until you go through the campaign and see what happens.
And what happened on Friday is just one example of it.
Hassan Rouhani, who is a moderate conservative, he's not actually a reformist, as some people claim.
He's a moderate conservative, an ally of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and very close to the reformist president, former reformist president Mohammad Khatami.
He won the election.
And what happened was the Green Movement, which is the democratic movement in Iran, wanted Khatami to run in the election.
But in Iran, there is a constitutional body called the Guardian Council, and the council vets the candidate and has the authority to disqualify them from running.
Khatami wanted to run, but the hardliners who are totally opposed to Khatami and reformists and Green Movement threatened him that if he runs, he will be disqualified, and his close aides and senior aides may be even arrested.
So he declined to run.
What he did was he asked former President Rafsanjani to run, who is also a centrist close to Khatami and close to moderate conservatives.
And, of course, he's a two-term former president.
He has had all sorts of powerful positions within the Islamic Republic.
So at the last moment, he decided to run.
He did run.
He did announce his campaign.
But the Guardian Council disqualified him.
So what the two former presidents did was they said, let's make a coalition and have a unified candidate on the ballot.
There were two candidates.
One was Khatami's vice president, Mohammad Reza Araf, who is a university professor and a very good man.
I have met him in person.
I met him many, many years ago.
He got his Ph.
D. at Stanford.
He's an academic figure, a very, very good man.
And then Hassan Rouhani, who was Khatami's chief negotiator from 2003 to 2005.
Then the two former presidents decided that they would take a poll a few days to the election to see who is attracting more attention and who is more probable to get votes.
It turned out that Rouhani was the guy who had a better chance of winning simply because in the national interval presidential debates that they had in Iran, he performed extremely well.
He attacked Ahmadinejad and hardliners and others for putting Iran in the miserable situation that it currently is and promised that if he's elected, he will start a program of reconciliation and moderation and would open the doors to foreigners and try to reach a compromise with the United States and its allies over Iran's nuclear program.
And that resonated with people.
So Khatami asked his vice president, former vice president RF, to withdraw, and he quickly did that.
And then the two former presidents announced the unified support for Rouhani.
And because the two men are highly respected and popular in Iran, people got excited, and then that led to Rouhani's astounding landslide victory on Friday.
Well, now, so I guess in America, Khatami and Rafsanjani both had the reputation as reformers or I guess moderates, meaning guys who don't look that scary on TV compared to, say, the old Ayatollah or something like that.
And I think you and I have joked in the past about how when it was Khatami or Rafsanjani in power, American media always focused on the Ayatollah because even though he's not as scary as the old Ayatollah, he's still scarier looking than these two.
But then once Ahmadinejad got elected, and he's such a big, fat, loud mouth and causing so much trouble and insulting everybody all the time and whatever, they decided they could focus on him because he's more of a lightning rod for criticism, I guess, than the Ayatollah.
Now they've got a new moderate president.
They're going to have to go back to the Ayatollah.
He's got the funnier hat, so he'll be easier to make look mean and scary on TV, I guess.
Well, that's true.
And in fact, in the last Iranian presidential election in 2009, Israeli officials made it clear that if they had a choice, they preferred Ahmadinejad to win the election, which he won in some way, although the elections, many believe, including myself, was rigged.
But as you said, they needed a guy like Ahmadinejad to be the lightning rod and to demonize Iran through the rhetoric that Ahmadinejad was using.
Now they have lost him.
Ahmadinejad is leaving the scene.
And in fact, this morning, he was summoned to the judiciary, which means the first indication that he will be taken to court after he leaves office in August.
Now Rouhani comes in.
He's a moderate in the sense that he wants better relationship with the outside world.
He wants more social and political freedom at home.
He wants to revive the economy.
And he says that while we can firmly defend Iran's national interest, we don't have to do it in a confrontational way that would isolate us from the rest of the world.
Regarding Syria, this morning in the press conference that he had earlier in Tehran time, he said that the fate of the Syrian people and Syrian nation must first and foremost be decided by Syrian people, not outside power, which might mean that Iran may decrease its involvement in Syrian affair.
Of course, that is provided that U.S. also does do the same thing, which is not likely.
But regarding nuclear negotiations, he promised this morning in Tehran that Iran will show much more transparency to the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding its nuclear infrastructure.
That would probably mean that Iran will allow many more visits by the IAEA to Iran's nuclear facility, including perhaps the Parchin site that has been very controversial.
At least it has been made controversial by the Western press.
And the very fact that he won in a landslide and he has a very good relationship with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and he was also supported by many moderate conservatives who were really tired of Ahmadinejad and his mismanagement of the economy and rhetorics regarding Israel, Holocaust, and the West, means that he has a base to work with.
And he is in a position to move Iran in a better direction and hopefully resolve some of these issues that Iran is currently facing.
Yeah, well, I like optimism and reasons for it.
And now when it comes to Rafsanjani and Khatami, I know that over here people tend to run these two together.
They're the moderates, meaning they're not necessarily moderate in their policies.
I don't really know, you know, point for point what their policies are.
But they're not as scary for Western diplomats for dealing with.
But one of them is a businessman, a kind of right-wing businessman.
And the other is more of a religious liberal reformer type.
They're actually very different from each other, these two.
And for them to come together in favor of Rouhani, is that a very big deal?
Is this like, you know, if George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton came together in favor of somebody, that kind of thing?
Or not that they're very different from each other, but seemingly.
They are not actually very different from each other in many ways.
Let me first say that here in the United States, we call somebody moderate if he has the United States interest at heart, first and foremost, or his own nation's interest.
Remember, we used to call Hosni Mubarak of Egypt also a moderate.
But Khatami and Rafsanjani are not moderate in that sense.
They are moderate when it comes to Iran's national interest.
They think that Iran should not be isolated and should not isolate itself by pursuing policies that would harm Iran's national interest.
Now, the Western powers may not like that because they actually want governments in Iran that toe their line and follow their interests first and foremost.
But Khatami and Rafsanjani are not in that mode.
There are differences between Rafsanjani and Khatami.
Khatami has always been a liberal, reform-minded cleric.
He has always been that way.
Rafsanjani was a pillar of the revolution.
He was instrumental in founding the Islamic Republic political system the way it is.
But over time, he has also realized that the system as it is now cannot survive for last if it cannot address Iranian people's aspiration, particularly the young people.
You have to remember two-thirds of Iran's population is under the age of 35.
And with literacy rate being around 90% and Iran having largest number of bloggers per capita in the world and with two-thirds of the people connected to the Internet, this is a young, educated, dynamic country which you cannot really put a lot of constraints on.
So these two men actually recognize that Iran has to reform itself.
The political system has to reform itself.
And after eight terrible years of Ahmadinejad, I was one of the people that always opposed Ahmadinejad right from the beginning.
Iran is now ready to take a different path.
So when we talk about Khatami and Rafsanjani as moderate, we mean moderate within the Iranian context, not as some people, as some of other leaders in the Middle East that are called moderate because they are basically United States puppets.
King Abdullah of Jordan is also called a moderate, but he's basically a clown.
The fascist dictatorship of Saudi Arabia is also called moderate in this country because they are allies of the United States and they are funding and training the terrorists in Syria.
But Rafsanjani and Khatami are true moderates because they want to move their country along a better path and try to address some of the issues that Iran is facing.
Okay, now on the nuclear deal, I think everybody who's interested in this subject at all knows the basic outline of a nuclear deal, assuming the Americans and the Iranians are both honest players in this thing and really want one.
And that would be for the Iranians to accept the additional protocol, at least de facto, expanded inspections enough to assuage Hillary Clinton's feelings or whatever it is, I don't know.
And maybe just have, if they're going to do any 20% enrichment, have that done in Russia or in Turkey or somewhere else and import it, all this kind of stuff.
And then in return, the West would lift some sanctions, perhaps give a security guarantee that as long as they stay within the additional protocol and it's easy to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material and whatever, whatever.
So then the question is, since the Obama team has decided from the very beginning that they wanted to pretend that they wanted a deal but that they didn't really want a deal and they wanted to only sabotage acceptance by the Iranians of their offers all along, do you think that this is going to change that dynamic where now that Ahmadinejad is gone, that they can maybe turn over a new leaf and actually go ahead and work out the deal that everybody knows is already waiting there on the table for them?
Or is nothing really going to change on this side of the politics?
Well, one of the most interesting things that happened during the campaign in Iran about 10 days ago on Friday, June 7th, was the nationally televised presidential debates.
What happened during that debate was extremely interesting, and I actually mentioned in the article that I sent you and it will be soon posted.
In that debate, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Berlayati, who is now Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Khamenei and has been very, very close to the Supreme Leader for over four decades, strongly attacked Iran's current nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and the Ahmadinejad administration for their failed nuclear negotiations strategy.
He accused them of going to the negotiations instead of negotiating seriously, just talking in philosophical terms.
And he also revealed a very sensitive state secret, namely that he and Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani twice reached a tentative agreement with the European Union during the George W. Bush administration on how to resolve Iran's nuclear issue.
And they had reached – Berlayati himself had reached an agreement with former French President Nicolas Sarkozy when he went to Paris at Sarkozy's invitation and talked to him, and they basically agreed on a framework on what Iran can and cannot do.
And Larijani himself also, from 2005 to 2007, was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator.
He also had reached an agreement with the European Union foreign policy chief at that time, Javier Solana, about the same type of deal that Berlayati had.
But Berlayati disclosed on national television that both times the Ahmadinejad administration actually tried to stop the negotiations, not because they were not interested in reaching an agreement, but they wanted to reach the agreement themselves rather than someone from the Supreme Leader office.
Because all politicians in Iran realize that improving relationship with the United States is very popular with Iranian people, and they want to do that by themselves and not give any ground to their rival factions.
And it went back and forth a few times, didn't it, in the last couple of years, or well, I guess the last four years, where – again, I don't want to attribute motives to the Obamaites, that they were really trying, because I never saw evidence that they ever were really trying, but that at least on the Iranian side, it was the – Ayatollah screwed up the deal a couple of times because he didn't want Ahmadinejad to get the credit, and Ahmadinejad screwed up the deal a couple of times because he didn't want the Ayatollah getting the credit too, isn't that right?
Exactly, and that's basically what Velayati confirmed on national TV, because up until then, all these things that you and I knew were basically based, at least in part, on speculations and reading between lines.
But Velayati actually confirmed it on national TV.
And now we should not neglect to mention that the Israeli Mossad had the Jandala Al-Qaedaite suicide bombers kidnap and execute some Iranian generals right in the midst of the October 2009 meetings that gave – I forget if it was Ahmadinejad or the Ayatollah that scotched the deal that time, but gave them all the ammo in the world they needed to do so.
Oh, that's actually true, and you have to remember that.
Oh, but Israel, they're our best ally in the Middle East.
Oh, of course.
They don't want any deal between Iran and the United States.
And it's not just Israelis.
It's also Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia does not want any deal between Iran and the United States.
Here we often talk about Israel's lobby, which is, of course, most powerful, but there is also a very quiet but powerful lobby, and that is Saudi Arabia's lobby.
And they don't want any deal either.
And in fact, as you and I both know, the WikiLeaks document that they're publicized indicated that the king of Saudi Arabia had urged the United States to attack Iran, to cut off the head of the snake, as he called Iran.
So they also don't want any deal.
In Iran, there are also elements that don't want any deal.
Hardline Revolutionary Guard generals also don't want any deal with the United States because they're very suspicious of the United States.
But the point I'm trying to make is that because Velayati, who is senior foreign policy advisor to Khamenei and has been very close to him – in fact, he was Khamenei's choice for prime minister in the 1980s, but that was blocked by Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of revolution at that time.
Because he is very close to Khamenei and because a lot of people perceive Saeed Jalili, the nuclear negotiator, as Khamenei's candidate in the election, it is just unimaginable in Iranian politics that Velayati would disclose such a highly sensitive state secret and attack Jalili and Ahmadinejad in front of the whole nation without authorization from Khamenei.
Which in Iran is interpreted as meaning that Khamenei wants to blame the failure of nuclear negotiations on Ahmadinejad and his nuclear negotiator and start a new path to resolving the impasse over Iran's nuclear program.
So now we have the ball in Washington's court because now we have a moderate Iranian president who has very good relations with Khamenei.
There is even a Wikipedia page about the book where he actually described what had happened during his term as nuclear negotiator between Iran and three European countries.
He has always been a sort of security guy in Iran.
Even though he's a cleric, he has always had important security positions.
He was Secretary General of Iran's National Security Council.
He was chief nuclear negotiator during the Iran and Iraq war.
He was deputy commander of all armed forces where he was running everything at the war headquarters.
So he's a guy who knows security issues very well.
He knows the nuclear issues very well.
He is a moderate but tough negotiator.
European diplomats at that time always described him as tough but very fair.
So if Washington is actually interested in reaching a settlement with Iran regarding his nuclear program, that would protect Iran's legitimate rights but also address the legitimate concerns, not those fake and fabricated ones.
The legitimate concerns, if there are any, that Western power has, this is the time to do it.
And if they don't do it now, they may never be able to do it because the stage, in my view, is set.
Iranians elected a president who has good relations with the supreme leader.
He won in a landslide which indicated that the nation wants a change of direction for the country, particularly its relationship with the outside world.
And therefore it is now up to Washington and his allies to decide whether they actually want to reach a settlement.
Now Mohammad, tell me this.
If I understand you right, you're saying that Jalili who – in fact if anybody in the audience is familiar with any Iranian diplomat at all or any Iranian political character other than the supreme leader and the Ayatollah and the former president or soon-to-be former president Ahmadinejad, it might be Jalili because occasionally he'll be interviewed on the morning show or something like that when he's in town at the UN.
You're telling me that the Ayatollah hung him out to dry basically by telling the guy who ended up winning, go ahead and attack him for his lousy job that he did working with Ahmadinejad on the nuclear issue.
And really, Jalili, if I remember the Leverett's book right, he was kind of damaged goods anyway because he's got corrupt family members who are busted on tape taking bribes and that kind of thing.
So he's an easy guy to go ahead and hang out to dry on the nuclear issue.
So if I understand that right, tell me that.
And then secondly, are you telling me that people in Washington, D.C. understand that as well, that this is a very clear sign that the Ayatollah wants a nuclear deal?
Well, I'm not sure whether Washington understands it or not, but let me say regarding Jalili, you were almost completely right except for one minor detail.
It wasn't him who had a corrupt family.
It was Iran's Speaker of Parliament, Larijani.
Oh, Larijani, I'm sorry.
See, I'm not good at memorizing these different guys.
Apologies there.
But what you said about Jalili was mostly correct.
During the presidential campaign, he showed that he's a very rigid, ideological guy, and he has very strict views of everything.
And that basically turned the nation off.
A lot of people, as I said, thought that he was a communist candidate.
But communist senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, who was also a candidate in the race but didn't get a high number of votes, revealed that or attacked Jalili and Ahmadinejad for failure of nuclear negotiations.
We have to remember that every political faction in Iran, from left to right, from reformist to conservative, they all agree that Iran should preserve its nuclear program.
So the question is not whether one faction wants it and one faction doesn't want it.
The question is how to resolve the dispute with the outside world, the 5 plus 1 group, and the International Atomic Energy Agency about the nature of Iran's nuclear program.
The fact of the matter is, in my view, and I have said this on your program many, many times, that Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency over the last decade.
In fact, for example, Hans Billig and Mohamed ElBaradei, two former director generals of the agency, have said many, many times that Iran has been far more cooperative than many other members of IAEA.
But of course, we have Israel lobby, we have Saudi Arabia lobby, we have no conservative, we have the war party.
All these elements don't want any negotiated deal with Iran, which is why they do their best to scuttle any agreement.
And of course, Iran has its own hard-line, too, that don't want any agreement.
Now, some people believe that President Obama, when he came into office, was very serious about reaching a deal with Iran.
I don't see it that way.
I don't think Obama was really serious about it.
He made a half-hearted attempt at the very beginning, but he quickly abandoned it.
And since then, he has put together an international coalition with the U.S. and his partner in Europe to impose some of the toughest sanctions on Iranian people that have hurt millions of Iranians.
Now, let me point out this.
When Rouhani won the election on Saturday, the White House issued a statement saying, you know, we applaud the courage of Iranian people to express their views.
And Secretary of State John Kerry said the same thing.
Yes, but these words are just hollow and meaningless when you, on one hand, applaud Iranian people's courage in expressing their views, and at the same time, you keep imposing tougher and tougher and tougher sanctions on their country, trying to destroy their infrastructure and their way of life.
Ten days before the Iranian elections, the U.S. announced new, even tougher sanctions on Iran.
So these are just words and not deeds that the White House and State Department have.
As I said, the ball is now in Washington's court.
If there is any good time for reaching an agreement with Iran, that's now.
We have a moderate president.
The Supreme Leader has indicated that he wants to reach a deal.
The president has won a land slide.
He has good relations with the Supreme Leader.
He is an expert on security issues and nuclear issues, and he has expressed his willingness to move Iran in a more transparent way to allow more visits by International Atomic Energy Agency.
The only condition he set this morning in a press conference in Tehran was that no new sanctions must be imposed on Iran for Iran to demonstrate its willingness to be more open and try to reach an agreement.
So that remains to be seen whether Washington will go along with it or not.
All right.
I'm sorry.
We're over time, and I've got to go, but thank you so much for your time, Ahmad.
It's great to talk to you again.
Thank you for having me on your program.
I really appreciate it.
I learned a lot today, and we will be following up very soon.
That is the great Mohammad Sahimi.
He teaches chemical engineering at USC, but he keeps the website imenews.com.
That's Iran News and Middle East Reports, and you can find his archive at antiwar.com, including his new one, which I'm sure will be running tomorrow.
Will Washington respond positively to the Iranian people's aspirations after their presidential elections?
Great stuff from Mohammad Sahimi.
We'll be right back with what's-his-name from the ACLU right after this.
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