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All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton, and our next guest is Adam Morrow from Interpress Service, live on the phone from Cairo, Egypt.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing?
Good, Scott.
Thanks.
Thanks.
Good to be back.
Good.
Well, very happy to have you here.
So I'll read you one short paragraph from Jason Ditz at news.antiwar.com here.
Massive numbers of protesters, by some estimates 100,000 or more, marched on Egypt's presidential palace in Cairo, storming the outer gates and entering the grounds of the compound, forcing President Mohamed Morsi to flee.
Wow.
So update us.
What's going on?
Sure.
Yeah.
Well, unprecedented chaos and the dangers of further escalations today.
I don't know if you're following by the minute, but we've got clashes have actually erupted between these protesters, these anti-Morsi protesters, and much larger groups of supporters of the president who have come out and hit the streets.
And the two of them have met in the precincts of the presidential palace.
And at least one or two deaths have been reported now.
There have been reports of stone throwing and then Molotov cocktails.
And now people are hearing – people are reporting shotgun blasts.
So things are looking extremely tenuous here right now.
After a period of sort of relative calm for the last couple of months, it looks like things are heating up again.
And really the future has never, never been less certain here in Egypt, unfortunately.
All right.
Now, I guess when we – when we talked last week – was it last week or two weeks ago?
I think it was last week.
Yeah, it was ten days ago maybe.
Yeah, yeah.
I guess the anti-Morsi protesters were starting to come out then.
And it was a wait and see what happens when the pro-Muslim Brotherhood guys come out, something like that.
Now, you're telling me that the anti-group showed up.
They stormed the palace, forced him out.
But then later the pro-Muslim Brotherhood factions showed up in even greater numbers?
That's right.
That's right.
Just to give a little bit of background, we had – about two weeks ago we had the announcement of – the president – we had the announcement of this constitutional declaration that basically gave – basically gave the president's decisions immunity from any sort of judicial challenge because he was afraid that the Supreme Constitutional Court here was about to pass more rulings against democratically elected institutions, including the Shura Council, as well as the Constituent Assembly, which had been tasked with writing a draft constitution.
A draft constitution which, by the way, is expected to be put before a popular referendum, supposedly is meant to go before a popular referendum on 15th December.
That announcement by the president, who felt that he had been pushed into a corner by a judiciary that many perceive as still being stocked with Mubarak loyalists, that declaration sort of galvanized the opposition, brought elements still loyal to the Mubarak regime together with liberal and leftist forces, and they came out in force big time about two weeks ago, about ten days ago, staged a massive, massive rally in Tahrir Square, staged a subsequent rally a couple of days later, and certainly brought at least 100,000 people into the square.
A couple of days later, though, on Saturday – that was last Saturday – you saw a counter-demonstration by Islamist forces and supporters of Mohamed Morsi, staging demonstrations in areas far from Tahrir Square.
They wanted to avoid clashes, they wanted to avoid escalations, so they staged a separate counter-demonstration near Cairo University, which was at least a million people from what I understand.
So he's certainly not without popular support.
Now, the latest developments you had – I think it was yesterday people started to move to the presidential palace.
You had another one of these massive anti-Morsi demonstrations move to the presidential palace.
You had police withdraw, you had the president leave the palace, you had reports of vandalism.
Like you said, these guys started crashing through gates and this sort of thing.
And then, finally, today you have yet another counter-demonstration by Islamists and supporters of the president converging on the presidential palace, apparently breaking up some sit-ins that had been going on there, and basically coming out in support of the president.
This has led to clashes now that are ongoing as we speak.
It looks like we can expect more violence.
The future of the constitutional referendum is up in the air.
You've had a couple resignations by presidential aides, by high-level presidential aides, coming out and basically abandoning Morsi.
And you've also had several judges coming out.
You've had large swaths of judges coming out saying that they would refuse to oversee the referendum.
So the president has never, ever been in a tighter situation.
He's only been in the presidency for six months now.
But this is certainly, by far and away, the biggest challenge he's had to face thus far.
Well, boy, there's so much to talk about going on here.
I guess, first of all, the most important thing is, from what you've described so far, with these different factions showing up at these protests, it doesn't sound like everybody's showing up with guns and that kind of thing, at least yet.
But what about the cops and the soldiers?
That's a very, very good question, and it's something that I feel has really gone under-reported here, because I'd just like to also say that the reporting of everything that's going on is so incredibly politicized here, at least in terms of the local press.
You know, you've got the entire country is polarized between the two sides, so it's very difficult to tell fact from fiction.
You know, violence will break out, and each side will immediately blame the other.
It's extremely difficult to verify who actually started things.
On top of that, you have the very strange behavior by police and security agencies, which has been a characteristic of the last couple of months, strongly suggesting that the presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood are far from being in control of security agencies and police.
You've had instances where their offices have been attacked, not the Muslim Brotherhood's offices, but the offices of its party, the Freedom and Justice Party, have been attacked by anti-Morsi protesters, and police never showed up to protect them.
They say that they called several times for police help, and the police simply never showed up to help them out.
So you have this very strange, you know, the police are sort of a wild card at this point.
You know, they've kind of gone rogue, and it's very hard to tell whose side they're on.
There are certainly very, very strong indications that they are not following instructions coming from the presidency, that they're disappearing at times when they're needed, that they're not around when, for example, they withdrew from the presidential palace, and these protesters just were sort of allowed to march into the gates.
So this is extremely worrisome.
And then on top of that, you definitely have the existence of some kind of third party.
It's very difficult to get a bead on exactly who they are.
There are definitely elements out there that are trying to sow chaos and trying to sow violence.
Even before the latest problems with this constitutional declaration two weeks ago, even before that, you had these running street battles with young kids, basically, totally politically unaffiliated, who would just sort of randomly attack police in downtown Cairo.
And there have been a lot of reports and a lot of evidence to suggest that these kids are being paid by someone, basically just to keep this low intensity instability going on.
So it's really a power kink right now.
It's very hard to tell what direction things are going to go, given all of the moving parts right now.
All right, now, you know me.
I don't know Arabic or anything, but I was reading Nancy Youssef in McClatchy, and she's a good reporter, and she had an analysis of the new Egyptian constitution, and it seemed like, you know, yeah, yeah, yeah, your rights are protected except where we choose otherwise, sort of like the U.S. Constitution and the rest of them, too, basically, right?
Other than ascertained by law, then that's the exception, of course, and all of this kind of deal.
So and apparently a good part of the population is looking at this new constitution as a pretty cynical power grab, right?
That's why they're out screaming about it is because they don't trust the referendum.
Maybe they don't have the votes to stop it, but they already hate it.
I mean, do you agree with, first of all, that assessment of their feeling about it, and then are you saying that would you agree that the constitution is actually a pretty cynical power grab on the part of Morsi and his friends?
Sure, sure.
Well, okay, well, the entire constitution drafting process from the very beginning has been dogged by controversy.
It was a hundred-member constituent assembly that was drawn up mainly by members of the parliament that had since been dissolved, that was dissolved only days before the presidential election, and you had these several walkouts by liberal and leftist members.
They were constantly walking out, and, I mean, to my mind, it looked like they just simply wanted to stall the process.
You know, you had 25 constituent assembly were these hardcore celibates, and they were willing to make several concessions on a number of issues, on a number of major social issues and otherwise, and yet the liberal and leftist members weren't really willing to sit down.
At least that's what appears to me.
I mean, I know a lot of people would probably take issue with that, saying that the Islamists were trying to dominate the drafting process, but it looked like a lot of these liberal and leftist members just really didn't give it a chance and just insisted on walking out, and then after walking out, turning around and saying, no, this constituent assembly is completely dominated by Islamists and is unrepresentative of wider Egyptian society.
So in a sense, I think that no matter what constitution they came up with, I think that the anti-Morsi people, the opponents, you know, Morsi's critics and stuff, no matter what constitution they eventually arrived at, they were going to have a problem.
They were going to reject it out of hand.
You know, when they had the chance to sort of stay in the assembly, work out their differences and to reach compromises, they chose not to.
They chose to leave, and now they're complaining bitterly about a lot of the causes in the constitution.
That being said, I also think there's a lot to suggest that if it was put to a vote, that it would pass overwhelmingly.
Like they had a constitutional referendum last year, if you remember, to which the people followed the Islamist lead and voted overwhelmingly in support of it.
They said yes to it.
So I think Morsi's opponents right now know that if this thing does go to a vote, if they manage to ride out the current wave of problems and actually do manage to get it to a popular referendum on December 15th, which is only 10 days away, that it stands a very good chance of being overwhelmingly endorsed.
I mean maybe by 60 or 70 percent.
Maybe not overwhelmingly, but maybe by 60 or 70 percent margin.
Well, yeah, that would count as a super majority, pretty big deal.
That being said, there is certainly no doubt there are certainly elements of the constitution that are open to criticism.
The problem is the polarization is so deep that there's been very little room for compromise.
There's been very little readiness to compromise.
And in a more general sense, it sort of goes along with this whole idea that even from the very beginning, despite having won a popular mandate in Egypt's first ever free presidential elections, Morsi and his administration were really never given the chance.
I've even heard Morsi's opponents admit this, basically saying that he and his administration were never really properly given a chance.
I mean obstacles were put up in front of them at absolutely every turn.
Just like I said earlier, police not implementing his decisions.
These state institutions dragging their feet in implementing his decisions.
So it's really, it's very hard to tell.
It's very hard to tell, Scott.
Well, you know, I guess the worst way to look at this is it sounds a little bit like Iraq in 2005, where the Sunnis basically boycotted the election and then they lost everything.
And that was what really precipitated the civil war more than anything else was the democracy.
I know in this case, it's not a Sunni-Shiite divide the way it was in Iraq and that kind of thing.
It wasn't a fight for the capital city in the way that the Iraq war was.
It's a very different situation, but it still could be very dangerous when you have major minorities sit out the process, lose big and then lose even bigger than that later.
You know, they lose out on the forming of the constitution.
They lose out on the new government that comes to power under the constitution.
They might start fighting about that, you know.
Right.
Not just protesting.
I hate to see that.
Well, it did come off as very unreasonable.
This idea that they, you know, this refusal to sort of sit down as long as it took to hammer out a constitution that was mutually acceptable to all sides.
You know, all sides had to make concessions.
The celibates, you know, the celibates in the constituent assembly certainly made several concessions as I made earlier.
And it seemed like if the process had been given a legitimate chance, if people had genuinely sat down and tried to work things out, they could have come up with a mutually acceptable national charter.
But like I said, you had these two rounds of walkouts.
There were two different constituent assemblies.
The first one was struck down by court order.
A second one was set up, and then the liberals and leftists again walked out, leaving them basically no choice.
I mean, leaving them basically no choice but to finish the constitution.
I can tell you that the vast majority of Egyptians do want stability more than anything else.
They would want to see all of this.
You know, you have this very emotional, highly charged political class hitting the streets all the time and occasionally engaging in these classes.
But, you know, this vast silent majority really wants all of this stuff behind them, wants to see an end to all of this post-revolution political turbulence, and just, you know, get things going back to normal again so people can get back to work, so the economy can get back up and running again, which is absolutely of paramount importance, you know, so tourism can start functioning again.
So you do have a lot.
Again, you do have this really, really big silent majority that nobody's really hearing of.
You know, you're just hearing of these supercharged Islamists and the supercharged opposition who are probably, you know, at the end of the day, who are probably in a minority overall, when, again, you talk to the average Egyptian on the street, and they're like, look, you know, this has just gone on long enough.
Let's just pass a constitution.
Let's just get a functioning parliament going.
And this is another thing that should be pointed out, that Morsi's contentious declaration from two weeks ago that he's going to empower over the judiciary that made his decisions immune from judicial challenge, that declaration will be canceled as soon as a constitution is approved.
Well, that's what he said anyway, right?
And no parliamentary elections are held.
That's what he's promised anyway.
Sure, sure.
But since, you know, in post-revolution Egypt, you do always have the opportunity where if the president remains unpromised like that, that people go, you know, have the Tahrir Square option.
And, you know, the leaders here are very, very aware that, you know, if from now on, after January 25, 2011, if enough people have a problem politically, they still always have the option of hitting the streets again.
Yeah.
Well, yeah, there's that too.
Well, and, you know, there's the whole thing too about, I mean, if it's really true that the majority of the population of the country really does support the Muslim Brotherhood and this constitution and the government, I mean, assuming the constitution is put up for vote and is ratified.
It's not necessarily to support the Muslim Brotherhood, but there is the idea that, you know, that this guy was elected in Egypt's first ever, you know, this is the first time Egyptians have chosen their, you know, their head of state in the history of Egyptian civilization, which is an incredible, incredible landmark.
So there is this idea that he does enjoy popular legitimacy because of elections.
And, you know, there's also the idea that, you know, a lot of people went out and they voted in parliamentary elections late last year.
They voted for their people.
A lot of money was spent on campaigning, a lot of time and effort.
And then the judiciary, you know, just ruled against the constitutionality of the parliament and had that dissolved.
So, I mean, there was a legal reason behind it, but also, I mean, the ruling also only applied to one-third of the parliament, so there was this idea that it was one-third and held re-elections again, but instead they stuck to the elected parliament.
And that's, you know, people don't like that.
People don't like going out after a revolution, electing an institution or electing a head of state, and then seeing that elected institution or elected head of state overturned or challenged by an unelected judiciary from Bohoruk era.
Yeah.
Well, you know, assuming that the constitution is put into effect and Morsi does give up the powers that he promised to give up, which I'm skeptical of any politician ever doing that in any circumstance.
So I guess, you know, we'll see how much maybe he will have to in order to continue getting by in the world.
But then, you know, these people who have walked out and refused to participate in the constitution, it seems like it's going to depend on the people who have won out to be gracious and give them a third and a fourth chance and a fifth chance, and maybe the constitution does need some rewriting, and maybe they need to, you know, extend a little bit of more than they have to in order to, you know, bring these people on board eventually.
Oh, sure.
It's better than having people in.
I agree completely.
It's absolutely essential to go that extra mile and to sort of reach out, even after you've vanquished your enemy, to keep him on board.
I agree completely.
And I mean, cases can be made for or against, you know, the efforts that Morsi has made in order to get people on board.
I got to say, I read his interview at Time magazine, and the guy seemed like a total kook to me.
Now, maybe part of it is just English as a second language, but no, because some of it was translated, too.
And he seemed like, you know, he was pretty bonkers.
I don't know, like, what all that means.
He didn't seem downright evil.
I mean, he's a politician after all, but he seemed like kind of a nut, honestly.
Well, okay, some of that can be attributed to translation, because they did translate what he said literally, and it did sound a little bit.
Some of it they said was him talking in English, but, of course, you know, he's not from here.
Right.
Okay.
Okay.
Bear in mind that he was not, he's sort of the accidental president.
You know, he's Egypt's accidental president, you know, because if you remember the brotherhood originally wanted the guy named Khalil Khashoggi to be their presidential candidate.
And he's very charismatic, and he's a great speaker, et cetera, et cetera.
And they couldn't, because certain legal issues prevented them from fielding him as their presidential candidate, so they ended up fielding Mohamed Morsi, who certainly doesn't have the appeal that their choice had.
That being said, though, he does speak in a way, he speaks like normal Egyptians.
He doesn't speak like a politician.
And I think that has gone some way.
You know, people used to say that about George W. Bush.
I couldn't really understand why, because he just sounded mentally challenged.
I mean, he had trouble putting together a sentence, that guy George Bush.
And I think his whole folksy, you know, Texan thing is kind of contrived, whereas Morsi is more legitimate.
Morsi really does have a sort of, is sort of of the people, you know.
And I think that does work in his favor to some extent.
And at the same time, it does open him up to criticism from his detractors when he says something silly.
At the same time, though, I don't think it's entirely fair to judge someone who's speaking in a language that isn't their first language.
Yeah, well, that's true, and especially as reported by Time magazine.
You can't trust them.
Exactly, that's another thing.
Like, I was wondering, I read some of the transcripts as well, and I was kind of shocked by how silly he sounded in many cases.
But I also wonder if, you know, I don't trust these mainstream media organizations at all.
I think it might have been in their interest to try to make him look silly.
And I wonder if they weren't just sort of, you know, just sort of taught.
Like, he didn't realize that what he was saying was going to run in their newspaper.
I wonder, you know, talking about Planet of the Apes, like, that sounded to me like they were just, you know, kind of shooting the shit there for a while, and they just wrote down everything he said and ended up publishing it.
So I don't trust their move either.
That's a good point.
All right.
Well, we're already over time, but can I ask you a couple more things here real quick?
Yeah, sure.
Okay.
So the United States seems to be getting along just fine with Qatar and Saudi Arabia and their support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni revolutionaries or rebels, anyway, in Syria right now.
And, of course, we've talked before about the semi-ancient history of CIA friendliness with the Muslim Brotherhood back in, you know, at least the 70s, that kind of thing, whatever.
But it seems like, and, of course, you know, he's got a pretty conciliatory tone.
He certainly doesn't seem to be trying to strike a very independent from, you know, now hear this, we have a new more independent from America policy than before sort of a tone, you know, nothing like that.
True.
And they're accepting a huge $5 billion loan from the IMF, too, which is also questionable.
Right.
There you go.
Well, basically, and I think we may have talked about this from the very beginning, which is that Egypt is terribly dependent on American wheat for the people to eat.
And so that's about the end of that.
No political government there.
I mean, it's part of being a small state compared to a superpower is, you know, you're either outright enemy of the empire or you've got to go along.
And in this case, they basically have to go along.
But I just wonder whether, well, hell, you know, go ahead and be as cynical as you can.
Do you think that Egypt has gained any independence from the empire at all since the fall of Mubarak?
Or is everything pretty much Muslim Brotherhood might as well be the old military regime as far as that goes?
Well, there are two lines of thought on this.
One of them is that the Brotherhood is, in fact, co-opted and is working in cahoots with the United States to, you know, to implement this post-revolution turnover where it would seem that things would change and it would seem that Egypt would be the maker of its own destiny when, in fact, the deal had actually been struck and Egypt would sort of be allowed to do certain things up to a certain point, you know, that they would be allowed to function and appear independent as long as they didn't cross certain red lines that had been set for them by the U.S.
Now, that's one line of thought that's been embraced by many of Morsi's detractors, that, you know, that these guys aren't sincere about, you know, about taking on America and, you know, and serving the will of the Egyptian people as opposed to Washington's dictates like Mubarak used to do.
Now, at the same time, though, you know, a case could be made that America and possibly Israel are part of this counter-revolution that's part of all this anti-Morsi activity that's going on.
Like I said before, there's a lot of indications that there are – I'd say it's beyond indications.
I would say there's certainly evidence that there are elements here in Egypt that are working desperately to destabilize Egypt and make him look bad, make his administration look like a failure from the very beginning.
And, I mean, now, is that being conducted by just these rogue Mubarak loyalists who still exist, who just want to, you know, who just want to take down the Brotherhood, or is this something that's being supported by abroad, specifically by the U.S. or the CIA, or, you know, in the case of Iran, post-1970s, you know, is this a counter-revolution that's basically being administered or directed from the U.S.M.C.?
I don't know why.
And this still remains, you know, this remains a big question mark.
I suspect the latter.
I suspect the latter is the case.
I suspect the Muslim Brotherhood may be co-opted to a certain degree.
I mean, maybe they have, you know, maybe they have some questionable elements inside of it, but that for the most part, it is legitimate.
It is a legitimate reflection of the popular will here, and that is something that is unacceptable to the empire, especially in a country as important to Egypt geostrategically.
This is another thing people tend to forget, that Egypt is totally different from Tunisia and totally different from most other Arab states in that it is by far the biggest in terms of population, that it controls the Suez Canal, which is of, you know, vital importance to, you know, global, you know, to navies and to commercial traffic.
And last but not least, it's a confrontation state, you know, a so-called confrontation state with Israel in that it shares a border with Israel and for that reason cannot be allowed under any circumstances to go its own way.
But again, it's hard to, it's really hard to tell with information and news reporting so unreliable, so politicized, it's very difficult to tell.
Okay, and now lastly, we haven't really focused on this that much since the very beginning, but it seems implicit in this conversation that you think that the storming of the palace there and Morsi having to flee is really just a temporary thing and really represents no big deal long term to his government.
This is another thing.
I was saying before about the unprecedented chaos and danger and everything looming over Egypt.
It's extremely scary.
At the same time, it is true that the situation will be contained, that they will ride this out and that they will manage to put the referendum to vote, the constitution to a referendum, and that it will pass.
And then they will then subsequently, within one or two months, they will hold fresh legislative elections and they will have a functioning government.
That is possible.
That's what I'm hoping for.
But as of now, very hard to say.
One thing is certain is if violence continues and more people are killed, Morsi's detractors and critics will definitely hold him accountable and things will get more difficult.
It's definitely within his interest to contain violence, to contain clashes.
The problem now is, though, you have this large segment of Islamists and Morsi supporters who saw the recent march on the presidential palace, they saw that as extremely provocative and really, really wanted to hit the streets to support their elected president.
So you can't control.
And when you're talking about hundreds of thousands and even millions of people, it is very hard to control everybody.
So all it takes is sort of one Molotov cocktail or something like that, or the death of a child or something like that, to really, really galvanize the other side.
And then you've totally lost control.
And then you've got dozens and then scores and then possibly hundreds of killed.
And then the military steps in and you've got the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces running the show yet again.
Well, you know, I've got to tell you, man, and what the hell do I know?
I'm in the middle of Texas on the other side of the planet.
But at least from here, for the last almost two years now, it has seemed that contrary to the situation in a lot of the other places in the region, that the people of Egypt, they really have a chance at this, that they actually have been really good at keeping the violence to an absolute minimum.
I don't know if you guys...
Despite the nationwide withdrawal of police and this incredible security vacuum, it is definitely a testament to man's good nature how smooth things have been here.
There haven't been enormous spikes in crime.
You haven't seen random violence and that sort of thing.
This is a very good point.
They have managed to hold it together up until now, despite the turbulence and despite the security vacuum.
So, yeah, I mean, I guess people, you're right, they can find reasons to fight and things like this can spiral out of control.
But it seems like they've got to also understand the same thing that you said, that, hey man, the future of the modicum of self-rule that you've won for yourselves is in jeopardy here, you know?
Don't make it, even if you're really pissed off, don't make it that much worse by letting it turn into massive violence, you know?
Well, what's really tragic is now you have a large swath of the population, increasing numbers of people who are basically looking at this and saying, you know, this revolution wasn't worth it with all of this, nothing's gotten better, things are just getting more dangerous at this point, maybe things were better under Mubarak.
And that would be really, really tragic.
And we all saw that when Shafi'i, when Ahmad Shafi'i, who was Mubarak's last minister, was almost elected in presidential run-offs this summer.
I mean, Morsi only narrowly defeated him by, I think, a million votes.
So that would be the ultimate tragedy if, after two years of all this, Egyptians or the majority of Egyptians just said, you know, look, you know, Mubarak sucked, but, you know, at least there was a modicum of stability with him.
And that would be, you know, that would be the worst possible outcome.
Absolutely.
All right.
Well, listen, man, I really appreciate having access to everything you know about this, Adam.
It's always great.
Yeah, thanks.
I wish I, you know, I wish I could give you stuff in sort of more, you know, with more clarity, but again, it's really hard to get behind the truth of what's going on when temperatures are running so, so high and the scene is so, so politicized and polarized.
All right.
Thanks very much, Adam.
Okay, Scott.
Talk to you next time.
That's Adam Morrow, everybody, from Interpress Service.
That's IPSnews.net.
IPSnews.net.
Just click on Middle East section there for the great Adam Morrow reporting live from Cairo.
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