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Okay, now Gareth Porter wrote a thing, and so he's our next guest on the show.
Hey Gareth, how's it going?
It's going well, thanks Scott.
Good to be on again.
You always write interesting stuff, man.
I really like this one.
People got to rewind back to 1998, the year of Lewinsky and the year of the Seinfeld finale and important milestones in American culture.
I think they phased out Crystal Pepsi finally.
Sorry, I'm plagiarizing The Simpsons and doing a terrible job of it.
Anyway, so just to get people's thinking caps on and get them remembering back 1998, the year of the Project for the New American Century's Rebuilding Our Defenses program.
And at the time, the president of Iran was a guy named Khatami, who I'm sure tortures people to death for fun all day, I don't know, but at least had a friendly face for the West and was more negotiate withable.
And in fact, I think we've talked about it on the show before, Gareth, the contrast where when it was Khatami who was the president, the war party always focused on Khamenei, the Ayatollah, the mean old Ayatollah.
He looks a lot like the old one and that kind of thing, you know.
But then when Ahmadinejad came into power, they decided that he was a way better poster child for the evil of Iran than the Ayatollah, who's actually not quite as irate as the one that did the revolution back in 79, Khamenei.
And so, you know, they want to marginalize anyone who looks like you could deal with them and always focus on, you know, who can be used to be the biggest enemy or pseudo-enemy.
And it looks like that's part of, you're telling part of that same story here.
That's an accurate depiction of the war party's general attitude and strategy toward Iran that has persisted over a number of years.
But of course, the political reality in the Clinton administration was a bit more complex than that, and that's part of the story that I did on this episode in 1998, in which the Khatami government invited a nuclear scientist in the United States, an Iranian, nuclear scientist at Oak Ridge National Lab, who had a family in Iran who had come over in high school, after finishing high school, and had gone to college in Tennessee and gone on to work at Oak Ridge.
And they invited him to organize a delegation of eminent nuclear scientists in the United States to go to Iran and study the nuclear program there, and come back with their own conclusions.
And he told me that it was very clear that he was completely free to pick whoever he wanted, that they could go wherever they wanted, they could talk to whomever they wanted, and that it was intended to basically allow them the most complete freedom possible to do their task.
And so he did in fact contact some eminent nuclear scientists, and I go into some detail about the evidence, including some emails that he was able to provide to me.
To make a long story short, just to get the basic storyline out, he ended up going to the State Department because these were scientists, almost all of whom had high security clearances, high-level security clearances, mainly with the Department of Energy, but some might have had them with other agencies.
And of course they could stand to lose their clearance if they did something that the U.S. government did not approve of.
Well, yeah, I mean, it seems like they would want to work with the U.S. government on a project like this, just as a matter of course, anyway, right?
I mean, that's clearly the way it would work.
The only way it would work was to have the cooperation of the U.S. government.
And so he went to the State Department desk officer for Iran, who at that point was Chris Stevens, who of course we now know as the person who became the ambassador to Libya in 2012, in early 2012, and was killed in the attack of September 11th.
But as desk officer for Iran, he had a couple of, two or three conversations with Behroud Nakai, Dr. Behroud Nakai, the Iranian who was the Oak Ridge National Laboratory nuclear scientist.
And at the end of those conversations, he said, well, this seems like a good idea, but you're going to have to go to the Defense Department and get their approval for this.
And gave Nakai the number for a deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East and South Asia.
And so he called up this woman, Alina Romanowski, and had a series of conversations with her, during which she steadfastly expressed opposition to the idea, was never in the least open-minded about it, despite the fact that he assured her that a DoD could pick the scientist, or even more than one scientist, as they wished as part of the delegation.
So as to be assured that they would be, they would have someone with the perspective of sufficient skepticism to be part of the delegation.
And also that there would be specialists on nuclear weapons who would be able to ask the right questions in regard to the issues that DoD was concerned about.
So you know, there was a good reason for someone who would be open to the idea of this group trying to find the truth, to say, well, that's an interesting idea, particularly if we could get some information that we don't have already about the nuclear program.
But anyway, DoD said no, and he had to pull the plug after nearly two months of working on this.
And I think that, you know, there's, this is a significant episode because it does reveal that there were apparently some different perspectives on this possibility of sending a nuclear specialist to Iran to look more deeply into the nuclear program and come up with an independent evaluation of it.
Right, because just like Cheney destroying Brewster Jennings, it's all about keeping the government from having too much actual information to rely upon.
That way it's easier to liaise in a war, basically, or at least into this Cold War conflict we've had since then for, you know, what now, 14 years since then.
I didn't say that the certain parts of the U.S. government, in this case DoD, you know, did not want information to, that could potentially challenge the official view of the Clinton administration, which is that Iran wants to have nuclear weapons and that their quest for nuclear, for Iranian enrichment is simply a cover for that aim.
And to the extent that, you know, they had reason to think that they could come back with a viewpoint that would in fact challenge that view, DoD was clearly opposed.
And what's interesting is that you did not get that opposition from the State Department at that point, and I think that is a very good indication that there were more, there was more than one view of this issue in the Clinton administration.
As we know now, of course, the Clinton administration did go on to try to reach an accommodation with the Khatami government that had to do with, you know, some kind of face-to-face talks.
At that point, the Supreme Leader was not prepared to entertain the idea of face-to-face official talks between the two countries, so the timing was bad for that idea.
But certainly there's reason to believe that there was not a single point of view on this possibility of sending a scientist, nuclear scientist delegation to Iran, and with the obvious prospect that they might come back with a different perspective, a different explanation for what was going on than the Clinton administration was putting forward at that point.
Wasn't it 1998, the same year that Dick Cheney went to Australia, which is sort of overseas, I don't know if it counts to him, but that's kind of treason, right, to go abroad to criticize your own government?
If you ask Dick Cheney, not me, but that's what the War Party always says.
You know what, I'm not familiar with that episode.
I don't recall what he said.
The Iranians are people, too.
Why can't we do business with them?
Okay, I see what you mean.
How come Bill Clinton won't lift these draconian sanctions?
I believe you're right, that he was taking that position in 1998, that sanctions don't work and that there's no reason for us to put ourselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Europeans in doing business with Iran.
By Jason Leopold, our next guest on the show, and the guy that you originally wrote this article for, right, over at Truthout, is that right?
Well, he was not an editor of Truthout, but I did write it for Truthout, yes.
Oh, no, sorry, it wasn't originally for Truthout, it was published at Truthout, it was originally for IPS, sorry.
Oh, I see.
I'm sorry, I thought it was originally a Truthout piece.
No, it was originally for IPS.
I just like all the coincidences.
But yeah, anyway, first thing that comes up is Jason Leopold, and then the quote is, let me make a generalized statement about a trend I see in the U.S. Congress.
I find disturbing.
It applies not only with respect to the Iranian situation, but a number of others as well.
I think we Americans sometimes make mistakes.
There seems to be an assumption that somehow we know what's best for everybody else, and we're going to use our economic clout to get everybody else to live the way we would like.
This is great, this is great irony.
Somebody needs to tweet about that, maybe I'll do it.
In fact, here's more specifically on that exact topic.
I think we'd be better off if we, in fact, backed off those sanctions, didn't try to impose secondary boycotts on companies trying to do business over there, and instead started to rebuild those relationships.
That's Dick Cheney, 1998 in Sydney, Australia.
Cheney is a poster boy for the idea that economic interests do indeed control U.S. foreign policy and national security policy, I must say.
No question about that.
Isn't that funny?
And of course he sounds like a regular Adam Smith debunking mercantilism.
Absolutely.
Making his case too.
Boy, I guess things are different when you become the Vice President, and then you own an entire Pentagon to use to do whatever you want with it.
Indeed, indeed.
Then you have other motives as well coming in, which are motives having to do with power, and that's the other side of the story.
All right, well anyway, so now I understand that you got, okay, maybe some CFR types in the State Department, I'm overly generalizing this, but then you got some more PNAC types over in the Pentagon, and they're not so much interested in the opportunity to build any bridges with Iran, circa 1998, and okay, but what about the White House?
Did Bill Clinton and the National Security Council not have a position on this, or what?
We're talking about William Cohen, and who was the Secretary of State at the time?
That was Madeleine Albright.
Oh yes, of course.
So and she turned out to be, you know, very much willing to cross the line and start talking nice with Iran, and I would just point out that it's not necessary, and I don't think you meant this literally, but I just want to point out that you don't have to be a PNAC type to have held the position that we're describing here in the DOD, which would be that basically Iran is our adversary, and we're going to keep it that way, because that had become really a fundamental, you know, political institutional interest of the military services in general and the DOD bureaucracy.
So I mean, that really transcends the line between the neoconservative view and something else within the U.S. national security elite.
It was a much more widely held, much more fundamental interest at that point.
But is it right that you would have had to been more of an old-school type counsel on foreign relations, Arabist sort of person, to want to deal and want to have a different policy?
Well, that's a very good question.
What would it take to incline a member of the U.S. national security state to say, no, you know, it's time for us to entertain a different possibility here.
And I'm not exactly sure where that line would have been within the U.S. government in 1998.
I'm not clear on...
You know, I don't think counsel on foreign relations would be the right way to define, you know, what might be the nature of the political viewpoint of someone who would be willing to talk with Iran, not just talk with Iran, but to be willing to give them the possibility of not wanting to go for nuclear weapons, that that was a possibility at that point.
I think that it would be...
I'm basically thinking of the Shadowcast, without any specific information, but I'm thinking about that article that ran at Salon.com back in 2003, or maybe, no, I think it was 2002 before the war, and it was called, it was by Anonymous, and it was called, The State Department's Extreme Makeover, and it was about how these thugs, Wumser and Bolton, had come over and started firing everybody, encouraging everybody, and screaming in everybody's face, and undoing what the establishment had done, and creating their new one.
You know, taking the Cheney network and ensconcing their view against all of their subordinates, whose inertia was headed another way.
Yeah, and that's an important insight, and I think the point there is that there were a lot of officials in policy-making positions, as well as working-level people, who would be open-minded about this, rather than closed-minded, and that's because the State Department doesn't have the same vested interest as the Pentagon does in having Iran as an enemy.
I mean, they could be more open-minded, because they don't have that same degree of immediate vested interest.
So, I think that's the key point about the difference between them, at that point.
Okay, cool, that suits me.
And you asked about the White House.
I mean, I think the answer to that is that the White House would have been more open at that point.
As we can see, within a year or two, they did in fact begin to, you know, try to make some initiatives to open up to Iran.
I don't think this decision was made in the White House.
I think that it was made in the Pentagon.
This was not a decision that probably ascended to the level, went to the level that it was necessary to take to the White House, although, you know, that could have been a judgment call.
But my guess is that the Pentagon, you know, had the authority to make this decision without getting White House approval.
Yeah, well, and that's too bad.
And I guess it's too bad, too, I forgot if you mentioned this already in this interview, but you do mention in the article that the lady who, I guess, was the point man on this, not necessarily the real decider, but the person getting the blame in the article for it, she works at USAID now, and so she can't comment on her old job at the DOD.
I don't know if that's really a rule or not, but it would have been nice to have her explanation.
I mean, I suspect that it's not hard and fast, but that's probably, people are probably encouraged not to get into the news media on things that happened when they were in a different position.
I imagine that's right.
So yeah, I think she was, she was not the policy makers on this stuff, and she was not the decision maker.
But it's interesting, at the same time, a piece of biographical information about Alina Romanowski, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.
She had been the Israel desk officer at the Pentagon for five years, from 2001, excuse me, sorry, 1991 to 1995, which is an awfully long time for an individual to hold that position.
She had also learned Hebrew at Tel Aviv University, and so, you know, it raises the interesting question whether, you know, she did in fact have a special interest in Israel and was, you know, defending the interests of the U.S.
-Israeli alliance in such a way as to be, you know, in that position for five years, and that that was one of the reasons why she was promoted to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary for that entire region.
Geez, I mean, I guess you say the White House didn't necessarily have to be in on it.
Did Generals and people higher than the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy, that's who she was, right?
In fifth spot?
Would it have to have been somebody higher than her?
Did William Cohen have to necessarily know about it, even?
Cohen, more likely than not, would have known about it, but I know I'm not absolutely sure about that.
But it was certainly, it would have been at the level of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, rather than at the regional level, which was what she was at.
Right, yeah.
All right, well, it's funny because, you know, when you look back at it, you think, well, geez, that's before they ever even, you know, brought a bulldozer to Natanz, man.
That's before, you know, we had an inside track on where we could have been sitting at a table talking about nuclear things, or maybe not even feeling the need to talk about nuclear things this whole time, if that was really what the policymakers were after, you know, was a resolution to this so-called crisis.
Well, I mean, you know, what's interesting to me is, you know, there undoubtedly was an argument here that, I mean, as I report in this story, the argument from the Pentagon was, well, they will deceive you.
The Iranians won't tell you the truth, you won't be able to find the truth, you'll be deceived.
And Berard Nakai, Dr. Nakai, the nuclear scientist, said, well, you know, it's not going to be so easy to fool these people.
They're going to be very well prepared.
They're going to have people on the delegation who are specialists on nuclear weapons.
These are people who are very sophisticated.
They're going to be ready to ask the right questions and so forth.
And so it does raise the question, you know, what might have been learned on this trip?
And I'm guessing that one of the things that could have been learned, certainly as a matter of informed speculation, was that the scientists who took the trip could come back and say, look, we have very good reason to believe that the Iranians are on the verge of having both an uranium conversion plant in construction and a uranium enrichment plant in construction.
So, you know, we think that they have some momentum here towards a real capability to enrich uranium.
And, you know, at the same time, I think that it was entirely possible and, in fact, likely that they would have decided that the program did, in fact, have a profile that was reasonably aligned with the stated claim, the stated purpose of the program, which was for electric power for Iran.
And so I think that they both would have come back with information that would have added to the intelligence available on the program and that they would have had a perspective that would have helped give more nuance, to say the least, to the U.S. government and would have supported the thinking within the White House to take an initiative toward Iran.
So I think that it could have made a difference politically.
Well, now, what about them if the experts had gleaned that there's, you know, going to be a uranium conversion facility and an enrichment plant?
What about that would indicate that it's all for electricity, not for weapons?
Well, I'm not saying that that automatically indicates that.
What I'm saying is that they would have been able to ask the right questions.
That would have been, in fact, their sweet zone, you know, their strength of the of the delegation, that they would have known what questions to ask that would have given them important clues as to whether the Iranians were on the level that this was, in fact, something for nuclear power, for, you know, civilian power.
They would have been well positioned for that.
That's what I'm saying.
Right.
Well, now, am I just assuming too much to assume that the CIA runs the IAEA anyway and that they have American intelligence agents inside Iran looking at their nuclear stuff all the time?
No?
Or somebody works?
Yeah, I think you're right on the second part, that the CIA had people with contacts inside Iran who were, you know, in a position to know something.
Certainly in 1998 they did, and I'll have another story to tell you about that in a moment.
But on the first part of it, that they ran the IAEA, that would not have been accurate, certainly not in 1998.
Although the IAEA was well known for having been, you know, having intelligence agents on the staff of the western embassies in Vienna, which were involved with IAEA affairs.
I mean, there were plenty of CIA people working in Vienna, no question about that, just to get information out of IAEA.
Well, and the UN inspectors in Iraq oftentimes were just there, some of them anyway, planning the assassination of Saddam Hussein.
It had nothing to do with looking for anything, you know, back in the 90s.
So I just figured, I mean, the Iranians have been safeguarded this whole time.
There never was an area where they were not safeguarded, and yet introducing nuclear material into any machine anywhere in Persia, as far as anybody knows, this whole time, right?
Well, that's right, and that brings me to the little story that I wanted to add to this.
And that is that in 2000-2001, we have information from a former CIA operative, an intelligence agent whose job was to get information from human intelligence sources in Iran about the nuclear program, obviously as his first priority.
He did, in fact, this former CIA agent had a contact who he regarded as being very, very credible, and apparently there were others who thought the source was credible as well, who told the CIA agent in 2001 that, I'm sorry, in 2000, I think it was late 2000, that there was no secret covert nuclear weapons program, as of course the U.S. government at that point was publicly suggesting and privately suspected.
And what happened was that the higher-ups in the CIA, that person's boss at the counterproliferation office in the CIA, would not circulate that report, which of course, you know, was politically extremely significant, but significant in its implications, to policymakers and people in the White House and so forth.
They refused to do so, saying that this was out of line with the view that the CIA, the assessment the CIA had adopted about this question.
And so, I think that this gives us a very interesting insight into the way in which...
Is that how it works at the CIA, really?
Yes.
This new intelligence contradicts what we've already concluded.
Like, they officially say that.
That's right.
That was what this agent pleaded in a court document, which I have.
The case was being heard by a court in somewhere around 2005, 2006, as I recall.
And there was a court document, which is heavily redacted, but it did show, and the former agent's lawyer expanded on this, that he was told by the CIA that they would not circulate his report, you know, beyond, I guess, just the report to the people who are responsible for deciding who would get reports and in what form.
And furthermore, later on, he was told that he should separate himself from that source.
He should no longer have any relationship with that source.
They didn't want him getting more information from the source.
So, it's a very revealing episode, in my view, about the way this worked.
Well, and it turned out, and some of these didn't even break until the very end of the Bush years.
There were two of them that came out, I think, in 2007 or 2008, that they had very high-level people in Iraq who were talking directly to the CIA and saying we had nothing.
Indeed, indeed.
I mean, the high-level sources were all saying, no, we don't have any nuclear weapons program.
There's no such thing.
I mean, and we're talking very highest level, like, sat at the table with Hussein in the room when he's...
The head of the intelligence agency, how's that for high-level?
The head of Saddam's intelligence agency was reporting to us.
So, I mean, at least we understand the the M.O., right?
It's see no good, speak no good, hear no good.
That's the American way.
We only want to know of crises.
That's right, and by the way, this is perhaps the moment for me to announce to your listeners that I have signed a contract to write a book on the Iranian nuclear program, and I'm calling it Manufactured Crisis, the Secret History of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
And one of the chapters will be devoted to the way in which U.S. intelligence was distorted systematically by politics and by the position that was being taken by successive administrations, that we consider Iran to want to have nuclear weapons, and that's what we want the intelligence to show.
Cool.
Can I check the galleys for typos and stuff?
I want the advanced copy as soon as it's ready.
We know what it's going to say.
We can arrange for that.
Great.
Man, that's so exciting.
I can't wait to read.
I hope that one makes a big splash.
We'll do everything we can for it here.
Some sort of splash, that's all.
Hey, no, it counts.
I mean, this is really important.
See, here's the thing about this that people might not understand.
It's ridiculous, and it's crazy, and everybody knows it, and they have for years, and the Pentagon doesn't really want it, and they really haven't for years, and there's a lot going against the chance of having a war with Iran.
On the other side of that, the Likud party crazy nationalists in Israel and their neoconservative allies here in the United States of America will never give up, and so we have to keep fighting them because they want war.
Well, I agree with you, you know, on the final conclusion that particularly the neocons in the United States want war, and I think that's the real enemy.
That's the enemy number one, certainly, on the issue of Iran in terms of the dangers they pose.
I'm less convinced, as you know, that the Likud party is interested in attacking.
I don't think that that's really a big danger.
I don't think that's going to happen.
I don't think that was ever the plan, and that's much more complicated.
I don't know, though, I mean, if you got into, if you could, you know, really get Netanyahu to speak honestly, and hey, if you really could get America to do it for you, wouldn't you?
He would say yes, of course, right?
I mean, what you're talking about, he won't do it himself.
No doubt about it.
He wants the Americans to do it, and the neocons would like the Americans to do it, no question about it.
Oh, yeah, that's what I meant.
Yeah, I didn't mean that I think that Israel will chance a unilateral thing and just, I mean, they could drag a sink in and scream, but I don't think that one's likely.
No, but I mean, we both thought that that was the danger earlier this year, and I think that there was, that there was, you know, that was a danger to the degree that U.S. politics could tilt dramatically in that direction, and it turned out not to happen.
In fact, we found that the exact opposite happened.
Right, but see, the neocons could still win over, you know, I don't know, win over, but win inside the state apparatus here in America and have their war eventually anyway.
Yeah, that's the danger, and that's what we have to be on guard against and work on.
Well, and the good news is that everything they say is a damnable lie and easily disproven just by going to antiwar.com/Porter, because you just destroy every false assertion, which is every assertion that the war party makes, and so, you know, as all good people know, there's no real reason that we have to have a war with anybody, only lies, and so things like you writing a book about why it's all lies and here's what the real truth is, is extremely important.
That's the most important thing of all.
Well, I agree with you on that, Scott, and I intend to try to turn this out as fast as I can.
Right on.
Well, I'll be here to read it and talk with you about it.
As always, thank you very much, Garrett.
I appreciate it.
Everybody, that is the heroic Gareth Porter, Interpret Service, IPSnews.net, antiwar.com/Porter, and of course, truthout.org.
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