All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
Our next guest is Yosef Butt.
He is a nuclear physicist and serves as a scientific consultant to the Federation of American scientists in DC.
Welcome to the show.
How's it going?
Very, very well.
How are you?
I'm doing great.
Appreciate you joining us today.
Uh, everybody, the piece in the national interest is called debunking the missile defense myth.
And, uh, of course, um, we talked, uh, earlier in the week with Ray McGovern about the Russian threat, which he didn't take very seriously.
Uh, former CIA, Russia analyst, actually, uh, that they would actually do some kind of preemptive strike on our anti-missile missiles going into Poland.
Uh, he said, don't worry about that.
They know it's all just corporate welfare anyway, and they're not really too worried about it working either.
Um, uh, so that was good news, but then also there was, uh, this report came out, uh, by experts who were saying that this entire theory of Star Wars missile defense is really just as corrupt now as it was in the 1980s.
Is that basically right?
Uh, well, yeah, the, the architecture of the system that's being planned, uh, it's called the, it's called a mid-course missile defense.
So, uh, the interceptor tries to strike the nuclear warhead and during the middle phase of its flight, when it's actually in space, so the real Achilles heel in all this is that, uh, the enemy can put easily put decoys, they can put very cheap inflatable balloons.
And because it's the intercept takes place in space, the warhead and all these decoys will move together.
And, uh, given the sensors that the system has, which are infrared and radar, there's no real way to tell apart the real, uh, the real thing from the decoy.
So that's, that's, that's the problem.
And it's always been a problem with people, independent scientists, uh, have recognized it for decades, but, uh, so in other words, like when we see on a movie in a F 14 releases, a bunch of, uh, chaff or whatever to distract the heat seeking missile, that kind of thing, basically that's what you're talking about, have a bunch of distractive targets and the real warhead, the actual hydrogen bomb gets through.
Yeah, that that's right.
And it's actually even more effective than the chaff because, you know, the chaff at the F-16 releases, it's in air.
So like you could make some computer algorithm that could tell the real thing from the chaff because the chaff would be going slower because the intercept intercept takes place in space and we have a radar and infrared sensors.
There's no real way until the very last moment.
And then it's too late to, to tell apart, uh, the real, uh, warhead from, from the fake one.
Well, and there's interesting physics to me.
I mean, this is little kid stuff to you, but I like how you described the way all they really need is these little balloons.
And because we're talking about the vacuum of space, they go just as fast as the warhead.
It's not, you know, the friction doesn't stop them and make them just float still.
Um, but the point being that you're talking about, you know, pennies per distraction here, it'd be as easy as pie to launch a hundred balloons, to pretend to be a warhead.
Exactly.
Exactly.
And, you know, so, you know, the system is easy to defeat.
It's been, it's been known, uh, you know, this, this was a known problem for, for years and decades.
Um, you know, but on the other hand, you know, it will still, you know, the system will still perk up the years of folks and Russia and China.
Let's get to that in a second.
I want to talk more about the workability for a second here.
I got a friend named Gordon Prather and he used to make nuclear bombs, uh, for the U S government and, uh, was the chief scientist of the army and advisor to senators and all these things.
And what he told me was there is one kind of missile defense that is not just on its face of a laughable joke.
Uh, and that is basically what I guess layman would just call a neutron bomb, enhanced radiation, hydrogen bombs.
That if you, if, if the Russians were to launch their, uh, ICBMs at North America and you really wanted to try to stop them, you would try to meet them in space with these enhanced radiation devices that would attempt to blow out the circuitry of the incoming rockets.
And that, I guess for political correctness reasons, the one effective kind of real missile defense that you could even really have a shot at, at, uh, succeeding with is, uh, unavailable is would you agree with that?
Uh, not, not completely.
Uh, the, it's not number one, it's not just political correctness.
If you have a nuclear explosions in space to try to take out somebody's, uh, warhead, um, these, all these explosions will also affect your satellites.
We'll probably knock out a few of your own satellites and permanently destroy them.
So, uh, but there's other reasons not to do this, uh, but I would also disagree with the fact that that's the only, uh, real alternative and now Ted Postal at MIT, who I've worked with previously, uh, has suggested a boost phase system where you try to place your interceptors close to the countries of interest.
So, you know, you could make it in South Korea or on ships off of North Korea.
And then so you hit them all, they're still on their way up.
Exactly, exactly.
When, when, when the, you know, you have a hot exhaust you chase for it's before they've released their decoys.
So, um, well, and that was the theory of the airborne laser, right?
Um, yeah, well, these would be actual interceptors.
So these would be missiles.
And when lasers have other problems, you know, uh, you know, propagating through the atmosphere and defocusing and the clouds, et cetera.
So, uh, you know, plus if you have a 747 that's loitering around the enemy country and wartime, it's probably a pretty easy target.
So there's problems with the laser system too.
And I'm not saying that the boost phase defense is something we should do, but, you know, um, it's something that, uh, that's potentially workable if we wanted to go down that road.
But, uh, on the other hand though, the system that they're working on now, basically, well, let me ask you this.
If it wasn't for the countermeasures, uh, do you still think it would work hitting the ballistic missiles on the way in, what's the difference?
Why should that be more difficult than chasing one on the way up, for example?
Well, the chasing on the way up, at least you have a hot exhaust, right?
Or, you know, and you have a big rocket now that's a much easier target than, uh, chasing a cold warhead in space, which is much smaller and much colder and harder to speak for.
Right.
Uh, but the other problem, uh, you know, let's say, you know, we didn't have this problem with decoys or whatever reason, uh, you know, the other thing is the enemy knows what, what defense you're setting up, so they will stockpile more missiles.
You know, uh, the system is never going to be a hundred percent effective.
They, you know, we'll always assume that some of the missiles will get through.
So, uh, you know, it's not really going to change our strategic calculations with respect to Iran or North Korea.
Uh, you know, it, it won't be suddenly our comfort level will go up to a hundred percent.
Even if we set up this system, assuming these countries get nuclear ICBM, we'll still, you know, we'll still be deterred.
We, we, you know, we won't hang our hat up and say, you know, uh, you know, we're, we're perfectly protected.
So it, even in the best case scenario, it, it, it doesn't give you a full, uh, warm fuzzy feeling.
Yeah.
I thought that was a very important point in the story where you say, even, you know, say, you know, the excuse for this usually is it's not about Russia.
It's about Iran.
They have to contain Iran and that, you know, under this, uh, uh, theory that someday they're going to make nukes over there or something like that.
So I think the example of what you're, I think what you were getting at there was they would only have just a couple and still we would not be satisfied that we had them ringed by a missile defense system.
We would still have to maintain every other bit of our containment posture or whatever you call it anyway.
Exactly.
Exactly.
It won't, it won't, it won't change anything.
If it does change anything, then we're in big trouble because it shouldn't change anything.
You know, we, we shouldn't ever feel that this system is a hundred percent effective because it won't ever be.
And, uh, you know, if, if it's really changing the political calculations of our leadership, then, then we're in even bigger trouble because, uh, it shouldn't give us a false sense of security.
And now would you agree with the Ray McGovern that the major overriding concern here with this missile defense system and, and its perpetuation is simply that there's a lot of public money in it for the corporations that perpetually work on the project?
I think there's a lot of intersecting, uh, concerns.
Uh, there, there's definitely lobbying from the firms that, that stand to profit.
There, uh, there's this dream of, of certain far right politicians that, you know, harking back to, to Reagan of, of, uh, providing perfect protection, which is a pipe dream in my opinion.
All right.
I'm sorry.
We have to hold it right there.
We'll be right back after this break.
Everybody with Yosef, but he wrote this great piece for the national interest, national interest.org.
It's called debunking the missile defense myth.
All right, y'all.
Welcome back to anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton and I'm talking with Yosef, but nuclear physicist and scientific consultant to the Federation of American scientists.
And he's the author of this piece at national interest.org.
Called debunking the missile defense myth.
And now, um, I wanted to ask you a little bit, unless I guess maybe we were interrupted by the break.
If you wanted to finish that thought, otherwise I wanted to ask you a little bit about the theory that the Pentagon or at least somebody in the Pentagon, maybe the ones making the decisions really are trying to pursue an end to the policy of mutually assured destruction and really gain a first overwhelming first strike capability against Russia.
And then of course, even if they don't intend on actually using it, that puts Russia on a higher stage of alert and makes their trigger finger itchier, at least so they say.
And I wonder what you think about that.
Yeah, let me just briefly go back to what we were discussing before.
So, uh, you had asked about the interests that are perpetuating the missile defense, uh, system.
And, uh, you know, besides the, uh, corporations, the center profit, the certain far right, uh, politicians who have this dream, uh, circa Reagan era.
And, uh, I think the third element that needs to be considered is NATO itself.
Uh, NATO lost its mission essentially after the end of the cold war.
And, uh, that, that huge bureaucracy, unfortunately still grinding on and missile defense comes in and fits very well, but you know, something that they can all cooperate on, they can all hold hands and, and do, do feel like they're important and do something.
So, uh, in my view, it's, it's, it's a perfect storm of these three powerful interest, uh, interest groups.
And, uh, is Romania threatened by Iran?
Is Poland really threatened by Iran?
It's, uh, it's a little farfetched.
So I think, you know, and now even the, some of the European firms are getting in on the action, Astrium proposed to the French government to, to, uh, make a new missile defense interceptor and fails the, and Dutch radar companies also interested in supplying upgrades to their, uh, destroyer radars.
So there's plenty of interest groups and I wouldn't pin the blame on any one, unfortunately.
Right.
Yeah.
Good enough people in to create a consensus there, but you know, what you just said goes to really my, my other question there about, um, you know, is Iran really a threat to Poland?
No.
And in fact, when George Bush said that it was post Katrina by that point, and everybody just laughed out loud at him.
Everybody knew it was about Russia, didn't they?
Uh, well, I mean, I wouldn't, you know, again, I think it's not about Russia either.
I think it's about these three, three interest groups and sort of a thread that binds them together.
You know, what isn't NATO about Russia?
Well, NATO is about, well, at least was about Russia and now they, they're trying to invent a new thing.
So I don't think they're actually aiming the system, uh, with the Russia in mind, but it's, uh, it's, it's going that way because, uh, because of the nature of NATO.
So, uh, yeah, I mean, there's some, uh, complications.
But so it's not really about though, trying to gain that overwhelming force first strike capability against the Russians?
I wouldn't say that because I think even, I think everybody understands that the system won't be that effective and will, uh, will never, uh, really to, to its expectations.
And that's been shown in, you know, even in their own rig tests, I've never really succeeded against a test with countermeasures on them and decoys.
So, uh, just as long as they don't start believing their own lies, right?
Exactly.
Which would, which would be actually the, the, the thing that I'd be concerned with is, is if Pentagon, uh, folks start influencing the political decision makers into, uh, thinking that we have a system that protects us, which we definitely don't.
Well, now it was funny because, um, you know, uh, well, as you say, you have interest in search of a pretext and whatever the Russians, I don't know if they were kind of half joking or what they really expected out of this, but they said, you know what, if this isn't about us, why don't we join into the project?
And it'll be a whole missile defense system of the Northern hemisphere.
And those talks broke down somehow, I think, because, uh, they were not welcomed, uh, by Britain and America and France.
Correct?
Exactly.
Exactly.
I think, uh, you know, the narrative in the West mostly is that Russia is adamantly opposed to missile defense.
But if you listen to what they say, just, uh, just as you said, uh, you know, they're, they'd be very interested to cooperate on like fully cooperate on a, on a missile defense system.
And I was just at the Moscow meeting, which happened a week ago or so.
And, uh, you know, they, uh, again, brought up the issue of, uh, cooperation and, you know, they'd be happy to cooperate in a fully transparent manner, but, uh, you know, NATO doesn't want that either.
So, uh, you know, the, the cold war lingers on, on both sides.
Yeah.
Well, um, I don't know, just for, uh, if we all know it's kind of a shady pretext anyway, what if it was actually used as a pretext to, well, see, I hate to do this, I would rather just have, you know, open trade and private relations, but it, you know, if this is a place where we can be closer friends with the Russians by integrating them on a project like this, uh, you know, maybe that'd be a great way to make us better friends than we have been.
You know, everybody's always talking about how we need a reset with them.
Right.
Right.
Uh, you know, uh, I think it would be great to cooperate with them, but I'd say if we're going down that road, what we really need to do is, uh, you know, think of systems that work, think of things that increase our security and cooperate on those like buying up their nuclear material.
Yeah.
Well, you know, we could do that.
We could, uh, you know, we could think up, get their technical experts together, get the technical experts from the US together and think of a system that might actually address, uh, the real threat to space.
Um, so, you know, cooperation is great, but, you know, just blindly cooperating on a unworkable missile defense is not the way to go in my view.
Yeah.
Well, and, you know, I guess that was really the reason for the non-proliferation treaty, it says anyway, was to help spread the peaceful use of nuclear technology around the world.
And it is 2012, which is, you know, the future compared to the past, obviously.
And, uh, shouldn't we already have a way to use nuclear power to do something besides heat water to turn steam turbines and stuff like that?
It seems like you could do some real fancy stuff with nuclear power and create a whole lot of electricity for every town, no?
By now?
Oh, sure.
I mean, I suppose, uh, it's, it's possible, you know, but there again, a lot of, uh, a lot of vested interests have, uh, have stopped the, you know, the free market running the way, the way it should, you know, for instance, we have large insurance subsidies for the, uh, energy, nuclear energy, uh, corporation.
So that, that's a disincentive for them to address their safety issues.
Now, um, you know, if those were removed, perhaps, uh, you know, some free market agents would come in and think about safer, uh, maybe smaller reactors that could, uh, that could fill in the gap, but what we're essentially doing is subsidizing something.
That's, uh, you know, that's safe for the most part, but when I'm safe, you know, it crashes catastrophically.
So, um, you know, you know, in short, you know, private insurance would never underwrite, uh, nuclear reactors as they are right now.
The only reason that they do it is because the government subsidizes it.
So, um, I think, you know, if you had an even playing field, we'd see a lot of, a lot of interesting things happen in nuclear and renewable, a lot of, a lot of innovation might happen.
All right.
Guess maybe is it, you think just because people hear the word nuclear and they just get scared and they don't want anything to develop further and they don't want it to be any easier for some guy to figure out how to enrich things in his basement and that kind of stuff?
Oh, well, I mean, uh, you know, there's definitely a certain, uh, stigma to, to, uh, nuclear, but, uh, as I mentioned, there's, there's a reason behind that.
And, uh, so, you know, there's potential ways that it could be resolved, but you know, there's structural forces in play right now that prevent, uh, prevent innovation in nuclear energy and renewable.
Now, uh, I don't know, I guess, do you believe that there's any kind of defense from an incoming ballistic missile?
Cause the Chinese were trumpeting about how they could kill our carriers with a single shot and they don't need nukes, but they, all they need is ballistic missiles and we don't have any way to defend our ships from something dropping on their head.
Well, uh, you know, sure there's, uh, you know, the SM three missiles were initially, uh, thought of to, uh, to protect, uh, the, uh, our navies and, uh, that there are ways to protect against that.
And then, you know, sure protection against tactical or battlefield system does make complete sense.
But, uh, you know, the fallacy is where you think that you can neutralize another person, nuclear weapons, and it's just not, uh, it's not going to happen because let's say even if your system got very, very sophisticated, they can change the delivery method.
And for, for many reasons, you'd actually like them to use ballistic missiles because it has a clear point of origin.
Like we can tell with our satellites where any ballistic missile launch came from, so, you know, if they have nukes, you want them to put down ballistic missiles, strange as it may sound.
So, uh, you know, you don't definitely don't want them to be put them in a boat and sail them over or something like that, because, you know, then you'd have should be being obliterated and you have no idea where it came from.
Right.
All right.
Well, uh, I gotta let you go.
Sorry.
I already kept you over time, but I really appreciate your time on the show today.
Yosef, it's been very interesting.
Thank you very much.
Everybody.
That's Yosef Butt from the Federation for American scientists.
Uh, he's a nuclear physicist and a consultant to them.
And I guess that's FAS.org.
This piece is national interest.org debunking the missile defense myth.
And we'll be back here in a minute.
