All right, y'all, welcome back to Anti-War Radio.
I'm Scott Horton, and joining us on the phone is Roy Gutman from McClatchy Newspapers, Middle East correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers.
And he's on the phone from Istanbul, Turkey right now, I believe, and is reporting on the nuclear talks, or at least the agreement reached with Iran on having nuclear talks over the weekend.
Welcome back to the show.
Roy, how are you doing?
Oh, good, Scott.
How are you?
I'm doing great.
Really appreciate you joining us today.
Sure.
Pleasure.
Okay, so great article here, very informative.
I guess just to start, they met when?
On Saturday?
Or Friday and Saturday?
Oh, yeah.
There was like a full day of talks on Saturday.
It went from morning, the first talks started around nine in the morning local, and it went on until about seven or eight o'clock in the evening.
Yeah, yeah, that's what they say, from 10 to 12 hours worth of talks.
So that's very important.
And now, you basically start us off in the article talking about the Iranian side and how their representative had basically three big things to say about Iran's starting position before, I guess, if I understand it right, the Americans must agree, I guess, that they will discuss these issues.
And they had to agree to that in order to agree to have the further talks in May.
Is that right?
Yes.
I mean, they've sort of agreed on the basic principle that the Iranians cared about the most, which is the right to have peaceful nuclear energy and other uses of nuclear power, including medical uses, and that it's under the nonproliferation pact, and that this is an inherent right that they have.
Now, they read the right very specifically as to enrich uranium in order to have it for these purposes.
And the so-called P5, this is, you know, six major world powers, P5 plus one, the United States and three European countries, and Russia and China, they don't explicitly give Iran the right to enrich uranium.
But I think it's probably implicit in the fact that they say that the discussion is under the nonproliferation pact.
That means that, in effect, they do have that right.
And I think that for the Iranians to have that explicitly or even implicitly stated gave them a position that they could take home to probably their own public, which, you know, to say the international community has recognized that we have the right to do some of the things we've been doing.
And it seemed like they put at the forefront of their argument that, look, our Ayatollah has said, and he's, you know, the supreme religious and political leader in the country, he has said that it's a sin by Muhammad and Allah to have a nuke, to try to make a nuke, and that we just don't want them.
And I guess what's really notable about this, if I understand the issue correctly, is that the Westerners are no longer pretending that they didn't hear that, even though this was really announced back in 2005, and it's always been completely ignored and relegated to not even part of the argument at all.
This is now being taken, I don't know, necessarily at face value, but as an important part of this discussion anyway, right?
Well, it's a very interesting point.
It's something that jumped out at me as it's so surprising to hear in a discussion about arms control, you know, a religious doctrinal statement like a, which is what a fatwa is.
But it was not only Mr. Jalili, the Iranian negotiator who talked about it, but also senior American officials and senior European officials.
So somehow or other, and I think this must have been done in advance of the talks, there were probably discussions about the fact that they were going to make this a centerpiece for the discussion.
That's another thing that sort of, well, again, think of it from the perspective of the Iranians, which is a very important one, that, you know, there are different power centers in Iran, five or six, and of course there's also five or six on the international side.
And you need to have, or they need to have something that they can deliver to their own public as, and in this case it is the Western recognition of Ayatollah Khamenei's fatwa, or, you know, doctrinal statement, itself is a recognition of Iran's statement of intent, of, you know, statement of seriousness.
So this is not, even though it's, as you point out rightly, it's old news, the fact that they made it a subject of discussion makes it new, new news.
Yeah, well, and pretty important too, it's not that anybody should take a politician, or especially a theocrat, at his word, but, you know, obviously it's important, it has some value that he not change his mind about this, you know what I mean?
It would look really bad, it seems like he's staked out a very hard position, not that it's, in his opinion, not a good thing to pursue right now, but that it would be a grave sin against God to do so, it's pretty hard to take that back, so, not that he couldn't, not that he's honest at all, why should anybody believe him, he's a politician, but still, it does seem important that, you know, it would at least be difficult for him to change his mind about that without it having, you know, different political repercussions at home and abroad, you know?
Well exactly, and again, it's something that, in the Iranian context, has a different meaning than it might in a Western context, because, you know, you have religious rule there, and fatwas are a means of communicating what the instructions are to the public about how the country will be run and how they're supposed to run their lives, so, you know, when you make a fatwa sort of the subject of an international commitment, then, you know, it takes on weight that we wouldn't ordinarily think of, I think, in our own home context, and it sounds almost quirky in a way, you know, for a Western audience, but, you know, you've got to negotiate with the power you're negotiating with, you cannot turn them into a different country than they are, and you've got to try to work within the language that they choose, and see if you can find a common language, so that's what I think they did.
It was a very surprising dialogue, and a public dialogue as well as a private dialogue, but I understand in the private conversations as well, that the Americans and others mentioned this fatwa to Mr. Jalili, and Mr. Jalili responded that this is the Iranian Republic of Iran, it is the religious doctrine, and it is the Iranian foreign policy and security policy.
And now, do I understand it right that just with the existence of these talks, the way they took place, and the way the positions are stated, it's no longer possible for it to be implicit like it seemed to be back in the original offer back in 2009, for example, it's now basically has to be an explicit position endorsed by the American government that we will recognize your rights under the NPT to enrich, even up to 20, we just really would prefer you don't, right, we just want you to keep it to 3.6% to make us feel better, and we want to have more intrusive inspections, for example, something like that, but they pretty much have to, they're in the position now of outright saying, yeah, go ahead and enrich as long as you keep it below 5%, is that about right?
Well, you know, the interesting thing is, in the last two years, the Iranians have built up a stockpile of both the 20% and the lower enriched uranium, the 3.5%.
And so they probably do not need, they probably have enough for their needs for several years to go.
And so it's possible that, you know, you could have some kind of a moratorium on their side.
All right, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, we got to hold it right there.
Everybody, it's Roy Gutman from McClatchy Newspapers on the phone from Istanbul, where there's progress in nuclear talks between America and Iran.
Believe that or not.
We'll be right back.
All right, y'all, welcome back.
It's anti-war radio.
I'm Scott Horton, and I'm online with Roy Gutman from McClatchy Newspapers, Horton from Istanbul, about the talks over the weekend with the Iranians, talks toward the holding of talks.
But they were constructive, said the State Department weenies.
And we'll take it, right?
That's pretty good news.
And what they agreed about was really, I guess, nothing explicit.
Other than that, they will meet in May.
But let's see, when we left off before the break, we were talking about my assertion that it seems like the Western countries are in the position now of having to overtly recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium.
You report in this article, Roy, that they didn't Saturday.
But basically, they also refuse to demand the halting of enrichment, which has been the demand, really, the official position of America and other Western powers for years now, right?
And they stopped short of that, as you report, because that would be sure to scuttle the talks.
And they did not want that to happen.
Yeah, I think that they were trying to create an environment for serious negotiations and to avoid any public demands that were going to get turned down.
And that would have scuttled the whole thing.
Now, you know, you could argue that if they had prepared it better, if they'd stayed longer, that they might have actually been able to come up with something.
And I, for the life of me, can't quite understand why they didn't at least agree with the Iranian side that everybody should tone down their rhetoric and stop any threats and proceed in a businesslike way.
It's something that after so much rhetoric and invective has been exchanged, it would have been a normal thing to do.
But they didn't even agree on that.
And I mean, maybe we shall see.
We'll see what they do.
Well, let's see if they do.
Maybe they'll just do it without explicit agreement.
So wait a minute.
I'm kind of confused.
So they met for 12 hours and the Iranians said a bunch of stuff and the Western powers basically just nodded and smiled.
But they refused to go along with any of it other than we'll meet you in six weeks, five weeks.
Well, I don't think that they were.
I think the Iranians presented some ideas.
I'm not sure precisely what they were.
But there were some nuances or some new twists on what they'd said before.
But I think what they were really doing the most was, you know, trying to create a forum next time around, which is about six weeks or five weeks from now, to really, you know, sit down and thrash out the issues and find a, you know, you hate the terminology, but step-by-step way of, you know, which means reciprocal concessions or reciprocal offers from both sides, you know, so that they can bring things back from the brink.
I mean, right now, up until Saturday, you know, you had to fear that there might well be a war with Iran, with Israel starting it, but, you know, everybody else would sooner or later be brought into it.
Because there was not just uncertainty about the Iranian position, but there was really no communication between the major powers and Iran.
And I think what has happened as of Saturday is they've started, you know, they've sort of agreed that we not only have to talk, but we really have to talk to the effect that we end this tension, that we resolve the issues, and that we do it now.
Well, it does take time to prepare.
So, you know, five or six weeks is probably quite reasonable.
It's almost a tight schedule to come up with a real plan that, you know, that they can work on and hopefully, you know, agree to in Baghdad.
Well, actually, I was going to bring up Netanyahu's denunciation of the whole thing, but hold that one for a second, because I really want to ask you whether you talk to the...
Well, you do say you talk to some State Department people there at the meeting, that kind of thing.
Are they, do you think, really taking this seriously?
Are they're going through the motions here?
Because after all, we've seen no progress at this for a long time in a row.
Well, you know, I have to assume that they realize, as the president has been saying, that if they don't address this at the diplomatic level, that it could go out of control very quickly and turn into, you know, live combat with a country of 77 million people, which would be, you know, an utter disaster for the world.
It's something that has to be prevented.
So I think that they had that degree of seriousness in going into the talks.
Secondly, you know, if the hidden code word was the Ayatollahs Fatwa, they uttered that code word, both in private and in public.
And the third, and the other element, you know, the element of reciprocity, they talked about as well, reciprocity and step-by-step, and they basically talked about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact in a way that suggested that, yes, they will accept it as the basis for future relations.
So, you know, they said things that actually do have meaning, especially to the Iranians.
So I think in that sense, one can see that they had that much of a plan, that much of a preparation.
Well, I'm sorry for the silly question, but it actually is important in this country in this day and age, and that is, do you get the impression or do you know from the statements of our State Department people doing this negotiating that they believe one way or the other whether the Iranians are too religious and crazy to be negotiated with, or whether in fact they're just politicians from this one country and their agents, and that a deal could be worked out in human terms here?
Well, I mean, part of the question I don't want to go to, because, you know, and I realize the attitude and the view of the Iranians is one of, you know, stereotype and caricature almost, and it's very unfortunate.
But it goes back to the arrival of the religious regime, you know, in 1979, and so there's a long and a very bitter history of relations with Iran.
I think that everybody recognizes, certainly in the West, and I think the Iranians have indicated it as well.
I mean, listen, Mr. Jalili, among other things, did say that among the things Iran wants is a lifting of sanctions.
So there's a very pragmatic need that they have.
And I think the other thing that goes almost without saying is that the threats that have come, particularly and directly from Israel, have gotten their attention.
I think there's just no question, because he mentioned the threats, and he said, by the way, Iran will not bend to pressure or to threat.
But they certainly are taking note of them, because they are out there.
And so I think, you know, there is a reality test that they've had to go through, and I think they have shown that they are aware of the realities.
All right, now to the Prime Minister of Israel.
The L.A. Times blog reads Netanyahu accuses world powers of giving Iran freebie in talks.
You just gave them five free weeks of enrichment, as though they haven't been enriching this whole time and just opened a new plant and everything.
This five weeks is going to make all the difference, I guess.
But his point just being that he completely and totally disapproves of America attempting to negotiate this issue with the Iranians.
Do the people in Istanbul worry?
Did he ask anybody whether they're afraid that Israel's going to do something to screw this up?
Well, I think, in fact, most people believe that Mr. Netanyahu is going to give the international community the time they need, or at least a limited amount of time, before he does something which itself I think would be crazy, which is going to go to war.
I think that, you know, I don't know quite why he felt the need to make a statement like that.
Diplomacy does not happen instantaneously.
Diplomacy, after a long period of great tensions and on major issues, has to have its space and its time.
I think putting pressure on everybody is really unnecessary.
And, you know, quite frankly, when a statesman utters something that doesn't make sense in a pragmatic sense, what you usually do, I'm sure you do it, I know I do it, is look to the domestic political gain that he may get from something which otherwise sounds kind of irrational.
And I assume that, in other words, there's an element there of appealing to the domestic audience to show that he's really a tough guy and so on.
But it doesn't do any good on any other level.
Yeah.
Well, you know, I had completely missed this, and I keep saying this because I just feel so guilty about it that I had missed this, but Ray McGovern, the former CIA analyst and now a columnist, appeared on my radio show about a week and a half ago and pointed out that during the negotiations in October of 2009, Jandala, the terrorist group in Iranian Baluchistan, was attacking and killing Iranian army officers.
And this was what created the climate inside Iran that led to their end of the scuttling of the talks over the uranium swap back then.
And I think that's an element, Scott, no question.
But don't forget, one of the problems that occurred was President Obama came in with, I think, reasonably good intentions of giving diplomacy a chance.
But he had a very short window, and the Iranians, you know, every country has its political power centers, and you do have to get them on board before you do something.
I mean, the president has to get Congress on board.
He has to get sometimes the media or, you know, public opinion on board.
And the Iranians have five or six centers, and they're competing, and they're really out to knife each other sometimes.
You know, so it takes time to get them on board.
And because the United States doesn't have an embassy there, and because relations with other Western countries are very strained, and, you know, there's no real dialogue going on, it's hard to imagine how the American side, because even during the Cold War, we always were, the United States was always active in Russia in multiple ways, you know, with its embassy, through public affairs and everything.
But in Iran, we don't have that counterpart.
So I don't think President Obama had enough time or gave it enough time to make it work.
And then, you know, somebody in the Iranian organization basically, you know, destroyed this.
Now, a few months later, in the middle of 2010, Turkey and Brazil attempted to resurrect that plan from 2009, and they actually succeeded.
They got the Iranians to sign on.
And they went to the effort.
And the reason it worked at that point is because Turkey in particular, I think, went around to—they know all the power centers.
They've got an embassy there.
They talk with everybody.
And they found a way to get everybody, including Ayatollah Khamenei, on board.
And then when they came up with this plan, which was somewhat, you know, based on older figures, but still it was essentially the plan of Obama in 2009, the United States and the other Western countries rejected it.
So, you know, it was out of sync.
So, in other words, if you don't address Iran as Iran is, and the nature of the place and the power system there, then you're going to have a very hard time, you know, getting an agreement.
Yeah.
Well, that's certainly true.
And now, in 2009, I remember that there was one counteroffer which basically said, you know, we'll do the—we'll export our uranium to Russia.
We'll import finished fuel rods from France, which was, I think, the original proposal.
But they said, but you know what?
How about you go ahead and give us the finished fuel rods at the same time we're giving you our uranium?
Because the French, as Hilary Mann-Levert pointed out, the French had actually had screwed the Iranians on a nuclear deal like this back in the 1970s.
And so they had a real history with the French on this.
And they said, well, how about instead of just giving up all our uranium, we go ahead and make a trade?
It still would have been for the finished fuel rods.
And then at that point, it always gets murky to me.
Now I remember, thanks to Ray McGovern, I went back and researched it that, yeah, there's all the news stories about Jandala killing people and that kind of thing.
But there's really a dearth of information about how exactly it all broke down inside Iran.
Because I think I read conflicting reports about Khamenei wanted to do the deal more, or Ahmadinejad wanted to do the deal more, and which side had won out.
Can you kind of fill in the blanks on that at all?
Well, I have to admit to you, Scott, that I'm relatively new to covering this story in that I've followed it as an editor and as a reader for many years.
But I've just found myself, by virtue of being the assembled correspondent for McClatchy, this happening on my doorstep.
And I've tried my best to read up as well as I can, but I've still got more to do on the very history you're mentioning.
The one thing I can say is that the Iranians claim that they have not been given a serious listening to for the last decade.
And some of my colleagues who have watched this with really, really close attention over the years say that that's correct.
I have to myself check it out.
I think there is an argument that the Iranians can reasonably make that when they made offers, especially right after 9-11, in the year or two afterwards, they sent an offer to the Bush administration to discuss all issues and put everything on the table, all the allegations against them.
And the Bush administration basically dismissed it without even, I think, without even a formal response.
So there's a definite case that they have having reached out in the past.
But then when you go beyond that specific one, it gets very murky, because there are all sorts of accusations and counter-accusations, and it's quite a thicket.
Yeah, definitely.
Well, and then, of course, you always have John Dolan and M.E.K. running around and P.
Jack, too, making things more complicated.
And I guess that'll continue on as kind of the subtext to all these negotiations by the politicians and the mucky mucks, is that people are still getting killed over there.
Yeah, but listen, what's really vital here is to keep the priorities straight.
The thing is, you know, the international community has an interest in Iran not becoming a nuclear weapons power.
Iran actually has an interest in not becoming a nuclear weapons power.
I mean, it's partly a religious dogma, but it's also what it does to the neighborhood, because everybody else is going to want a nuclear weapon then, and the threat of war with not just Israel but other countries.
So there's a really major moment here, which it's hard to imagine in the presidential election year that you could actually achieve, you know, a major breakthrough on an issue of security like this.
But it's something that, in fact, I think President Obama has very little choice about.
He's got to go forward with it.
He's got to somehow reduce the tensions and, by the way, reduce our gasoline prices in the process, let's hope, but also to solve the problem, because there's no point in papering this over.
It would be a huge mistake to paper it over.
You need real progress, and quite frankly, we need to have the United States and everybody else need to have a real dialogue with Iran on next to everything.
We need to have a presence in Tehran.
We need to invite the Iranians to have a major presence in the United States.
We need to have their journalists coming to the United States.
We need to have our journalists going to Iran.
We need to end this kind of freeze, which can only lead down a very dark road to a very terrible outcome.
Hey, that's what Dick Cheney said in 1998.
So I think he's the definition of a hawk, and he said, you know what?
Iranians are people.
We can do business with them.
That was back when he was the CEO of a company that was trying to do business with them, but still.
And how that changed when he came into office.
Right.
Well, he had a free military at his disposal.
What, was he going to not use it?
All right.
Well, I'm sorry.
We're over time.
Thank you so much for your time, as always, Roy.
Okay, Scott.
Great to talk to you.
Roy Gutman, everybody.
Reporter for McClatchy Newspapers in Istanbul on the Iranian Nuclear Talks.
