All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show.
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All right, you guys, introducing Giorgio Caffiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics and a really great writer, an analyst on foreign policy, as they say.
This one is in trtworld.com.
It's called Molly Could Rewrite Russian-French Relations in the Sahel.
Welcome back to the show.
How you doing, Giorgio?
Scott, it's great to be with you.
I'm doing well.
Thank you so much for this chance to be back on your show.
Yeah, I love having you here, and you always write such great stuff.
In this case, we're talking about Mali, aka Hillary's war.
I mean, one of Hillary's wars, really Obama, of course, is the one who pulled the trigger in Libya.
And to start us off here, you guys recap very briefly how the war in Libya spread to Mali, which is the all-important background to the rest of this discussion here.
Yes.
So this brings us back 10 years, back to 2011.
There was the Arab Spring uprising in Libya, which internationalized and regionalized very quickly with a number of countries in NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council intervening directly in the Libyan crisis that was going on.
We all know how this ended with the destruction of Muammar Gaddafi's government and later a civil war that erupted in 2014.
But nonetheless, going back to 2011, as the Libyan regime was falling apart, there were various groups from around Africa, from many different African countries that had links to Gaddafi's government.
He was a patron of many separatist movements, anti-imperialist movements throughout the African continent and even beyond.
Nonetheless, one group that was tied to Gaddafi's government that was an ally of Gaddafi's regime were these Tuareg separatists from northern Mali who had been on the ground in Libya trying to help the Libyan government of the time survive.
Obviously, those efforts did not succeed and we know the government fell apart.
And so at that point, when it was really the endgame for Gaddafi in Libya, there were Tuareg separatists from northern Mali who returned to northern Mali from Libya.
However, they came back with a ton of weaponry that they picked up in Libya during this failed effort to prop up the Gaddafi government.
Back in northern Mali with this much greater amount of armed power, they managed to assert themselves very strongly and this became a crisis for the central government down in Bamako.
Because of the widespread anger toward the central Malian government for its failure to deal with the Tuareg issue up north, there was a coup in March of 2012.
And what also was going on at the same time was that the Tuaregs failed to maintain control of northern Mali, who were the ultimate victors, as well as a group of jihadists who were extremely hardline.
They took over northern two-thirds of the country, essentially hijacking, if you will, the Tuareg rebellion that gained a lot of momentum because of events in Libya.
And so the northern two-thirds of Mali came under the control of basically three militant jihadist groups, one of them being Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, which is the North African offshoot of Al-Qaeda, AQIM.
And there were, of course, some others.
And this led to some French military intervention that took place in early 2013, Operation Serval.
This definitely dislodged the jihadist forces, but it did not destroy them.
And there remains a huge problem with these hardline groups that are linked in some cases to Al-Qaeda, some cases to ISIS.
They continue to spill a lot of blood all over the Sahel.
And despite France's heavy-handed military intervention, Mali is still one of the countries in the Sahel that suffers very much from these extremely violent and dangerous groups that have been terrorizing people in northern Mali all these years.
Yeah.
Well, as Samantha Power said in her memoir, what, are we supposed to have a crystal ball and see what the future's supposed to be?
I mean, I don't know.
Still, we can start a war if we want.
No, that was exceptionally well told and exactly correct.
And we covered it on this show all through at the time, of course.
And step by step, you nailed it.
I just wanted to add one thing, which was that according to Stephen Zunes, the professor from the Bay Area there, he talked about how the government that was overthrown in the military coup of March 2012 was a former military leader, but a guy who had essentially taken off his uniform and put on a suit and tie and stood for election twice.
And seemingly meant to leave behind a democratic form of government as best he could, rather than just declare himself president for life and this kind of thing.
And so it was still just a chance, but there was, it seemed to Stephen Zunes anyway, before all this ever happened, he was already, you know, in tune with what was going on there.
And it seemed like the guy was really trying to make an effort to transition the government into something with regular elections.
And a presumption of popular sovereignty of some kind.
And that was all ground to a halt because the military, guys who were trained by the United States, of course, were mad that the government was doing such an ineffectual job of protecting from this new jihadist menace coming out of the North.
And so they overthrew him to kick him out of the way to take control of the situation, which of course they didn't.
And they needed French help and all of that anyway.
There was, in other words, there was a decent shot that maybe there was going to be a less tyrannical system of government for the people of Mali, North and South.
And all of that was ground to a halt by this intervention by the jihadists, who were driven by the intervention by the Western powers, led by the United States, of course, in Libya.
Well, yeah, you know, it's certainly a great example of spillover effects in the Sahel region.
Borders are very, very porous.
Many state institutions have failed or are failing.
It's very easy for these transnational groups to move across borders and carry lots of weaponry and other things with them.
So it was sort of naive to think that the NATO intervention could have taken place in Libya without some of the countries in the neighborhood feeling the heat.
And I also, to your point about democracy in Mali, I think it's also important for us to understand that from the early 1990s up until 2012, there was this period of time in which Mali was one of the most successful African countries from the standpoint of democratic development.
It was a country that had achieved a lot in the early 1990s in terms of transitioning from one party rule into a democracy.
And Mali actually served as a good example to other countries in the continent in terms of how to make real progress when it came to democratic reforms.
So it's very unfortunate, as we look back on the past nine, ten years or so, to see how there have been some major problems when it comes to Malian democracy.
There have been these coups that have taken place, and there's sort of a big question mark on the future of democracy in this country.
All right.
Now we know that there have been, you know, supposedly deniable American forces caught there after the Obama government said they weren't sending anyone.
But there was the case of almost certain it was two Navy SEALs who murdered a Green Beret who found that they were stealing.
And then there was the Delta Force guys who got in a supposedly pickup truck wreck with their prostitutes and were revealed in that way.
The French, as you say, have been there fighting since, what, for the last, you know, eight years now, I guess, on and off.
And so, yeah, I mean, can you give us, like, what's the status update on how powerful these guys are and then get to the entering of the Wagner group, as you guys write it here?
Yeah, definitely.
So it's important to realize that Mali is one of France's former colonies in Africa, and the whole Sahel is really, for the most part, made up of countries that gained their independence from France.
So fast forward to 21st century, France is by far the most powerful outside actor in Mali and the majority of the Sahel.
France is definitely the dominant security player in the country.
So as we mentioned back in January 2013, France took this bold military action to try to liberate northern two thirds of Mali.
You know, I should always put the word liberate in quotes, because it always depends on whose perspective you have, but there were many people in Mali at the time who saw it as a liberation or an attempt to liberate northern Mali.
And among, in the eyes of many Malians back then in 2013, the French were seen as liberators when they took this military action against these extremely violent and hateful jihadist groups that took control of the northern two thirds of the country.
Over the years, the French have maintained a military presence in Mali and other countries in the Sahel where they're engaged in similar counterterrorism operations.
And what we've seen is French, anti-French sentiments on the rise.
This is the case in Mali as well as other countries close by.
And I think this is just sort of an outcome of the French staying for a long time and more people in the country believing that their time has come to leave.
They were welcome originally in 2013, but now, you know, I mean, next month is going to mark nine years since that operation began.
And there are also those in Mali who understandably frame this in sort of the context of resisting colonialism or today maybe we should say neocolonialism and the fact that France used to be Mali's colonial ruler is, you know, an extremely important factor when looking at the relationship between Bamako and Paris.
As anti-French sentiments have been growing and spreading throughout Mali, the Russians have in various ways been seeking to take advantage of these anti-French sentiments.
We see a number of, we've seen a number of Russian media outlets appeal to Malians who would like their country to become, if you will, truly independent.
And in September of this year, Reuters reported about a contract that the Malian state is signing with the Wagner Group or at least rumors of such.
Now, the Wagner Group is a Russian mercenary private company, which Western governments maintain is linked to the Kremlin.
And the Kremlin maintains that Wagner Group is a totally private company that is not controlled by the Russian government.
This organization, the Wagner Group, was active in a number of other conflicts such as Ukraine, Syria.
They've also been in a number of African countries, Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya.
And now, according to some of these reports and these rumors, the situation in Mali is where they are going to intervene next.
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Am I wrong here, Giorgio, that they're on America's side in Libya and in Mali here?
The Wagner group?
Yeah.
So in Libya they were supporting General Khalifa Haftar during the Libyan civil war and they continue to have a presence in Libya.
Some people think the U.S. sort of played both sides in the civil war.
And Trump, of course, gave his congratulations to Haftar at the start of his 2019 offensive on Tripoli.
But at least officially speaking, the U.S. has been supportive of the U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli that Haftar was fighting.
So that might actually be an example of the U.S. and Wagner group being at odds with each other.
In Mali, though, the U.S. is very concerned about the possibility of Wagner group playing a role in terms of helping the central government in Bamako deal with the crisis of terrorism.
When Anthony Blinken was out in Africa last month, one of the countries he went to was Senegal.
And he specifically addressed this Russian mercenary group, saying that the U.S. would certainly not welcome them having any sort of activities take place inside Mali.
And now, just to be clear here, it's not because—I don't want to be too prejudicial about this, but I don't think, Giorgio, it's not because, like in Syria and Yemen, they're just on the terrorist side.
It's that they want the French and their own deniable forces in there doing the fighting rather than the Russians edging them out and taking their place fighting against the jihadists here and then gaining overall influence in the country.
Is that correct?
Yeah.
I agree.
This has to do with questions about Russia's overall Africa foreign policy and Moscow's ambitions across the continent.
The French definitely see the Sahel as a region where France should be the dominant outside power, and French officials have been very bold in terms of responding to these reports and these rumors of a deal between the junta in Mali and this Russian group.
Officials from Paris have sent very strong warnings to Mali, telling them that the West African country would find itself very isolated if Wagner Group is going to come in and help out with the counterterrorism operations.
Of course, Mali is very rich with many natural resources, and the mercenary group, according to these reports and rumors, is going to receive, would receive compensation in the form of access to certain natural resources in the country.
So that is a really important factor we have to keep in mind when talking about reasons why Western countries such as France and the United States are extremely troubled by the possibility of the Russians coming into Mali and successfully exploiting a wedge between the Malian state and society on one side and France and other Western countries on the other.
And you say that, I mean, I guess so far French companies aren't getting kicked out or anything, but that's what they're afraid of, is that the Russians are going to gain so much influence that they're able to really exclude the French.
Do you think that that's likely?
I think we need to be cautious when trying to assess what's really going on between Russia and Mali.
I think there is a risk of reading into things too much.
I don't want to dismiss the significance of these concerns that French officials have about the Wagner group, but I don't see this organization, this mercenary group, replacing France as the dominant power in Mali anytime soon.
I think they could gain some influence at France's expense, but again, I don't think the Russians will be replacing the French anytime soon when it comes to this role in Mali.
I think what Russia might want to keep on doing and what I think it could do is sort of use Mali when it comes to sort of war of narratives and to sort of continue trying to make soft power gains in Mali through media and other forms.
You know, when the Malian leaders deny that there's such a contract that they signed with this Russian mercenary group, but they have also made it very clear that Mali is a sovereign nation that has the rights to enter into security agreements with whichever powers it chooses and that Mali does not need to get a permission slip signed in Paris before it enters some sort of a contract with some other country or company.
Russia supports Mali very much.
Russia has a strong relationship with Mali going back, you know, to the Cold War when the Soviet Union had a strong relationship with Mali and Russian diplomats emphasize that the Malian leadership has every right to make whatever decisions it makes.
And then of course Russia's line is that the Wagner group is not, you know, linked to the Kremlin.
It's a private company and that this is a matter between a private Russian company and the Malian government and nothing that the Kremlin is required to address.
So like I said, there's a lot of, you know, emphasis on these ideas of Malian independence and sovereignty, and I think Russia is keen to support Mali diplomatically and also in terms of some security domains.
But again, I think probably we could have this discussion a few years down the line and by that point I think France will still remain the dominant force in Mali and the Sahel.
And now, by your reckoning, does it make any difference to the average American whatsoever?
I think after the 9-11 attacks there was a lot more concern in the U.S. about terrorist threats to the United States, and of course the Sahel was one region in the world where the U.S. started to carry out more anti-terrorism operations in the aftermath of 9-11.
But to be honest with you, I really doubt that most people in America have any idea that, you know, Timbuktu is anything other than a word and a famous expression.
I think what goes on in northern Mali is so far removed from the minds of most American citizens right now.
Well, and as we talked about, all the jihadists got there from Libya where America took their side against Gaddafi and created this entire mess.
And as also discussed, the reason the Wagner group is there is it's not like they're there to support al-Qaeda, they're there to kill these guys too.
So as far as American security, if you stretch to say that, you know, any bin Ladenite anywhere is a threat to the United States, which is a big stretch, but, you know, even if you accept that or if you're concerned about the local menace of the jihadists here, we're talking about who gets to take the lead in fighting them and then who gets to benefit economically from access to resources or whatever.
But that's a fight between the Russians and the French that I don't give a damn about.
Even if you waterboarded me, I don't think I could care at all which country's company gets the contract to mine whatever it is out there.
You know, it's ridiculous.
Yeah.
You know, you make a good point that in certain ways there definitely is some common cause here.
Neither Washington, Paris, nor Moscow would like to see the Malian state collapse again with scores of jihadist militias taking over a huge amount of territory in the Sahel.
That's what we saw in 2012 and I don't think there's any government in the world that has an interest in seeing a repeat of that.
But you know, the French, an important point I did not bring up earlier, I'd like to raise now.
The French have been talking about their plans for reducing their military footprint in Mali and the Sahel.
The French believe that they have made huge investments in this region since 2013 and that things have not necessarily paid off so well.
And when this became apparent, the Malian leadership accused France of abandoning the country, which the French officials responded quite angrily.
So I think it's important, as you imply, for us to think about how the French might, you know, at the risk of sounding naive, I think we should consider the possibility of France seeing a Russian role in Mali as something that's not extremely negative and to realize that maybe down the line there could be some cooperation between France and Russia that is productive in the Sahel and can help local governments take on jihadist groups more effectively.
And I would go as far as saying when we look at the extent to which France has been much softer, if you will, on Russia compared to Western governments, you know, the Macron administration has emphasized that they see Russia not as an enemy, but as a rival, which is very different from how you hear some other Western governments talk about Russia.
I think we can be open to the possibility of there being some sort of a shared understanding between Paris and Moscow in the future when it comes to Mali and perhaps other parts of the Sahel.
Yeah.
All right, well, it's a fine mess, but, you know, as you say, there's no reason really why these people can't get along.
And it seems like the less intervention by the United States in it all, the better for both sides or all sides, I should say.
Well, yeah, I mean, for now, the Biden administration is going to probably do quite a bit to push back against any sort of Russian efforts to gain greater influence in Mali.
The fact that, you know, Blinken was raising this issue while in Senegal last month, I think underscores how concerned the White House is.
I'm sure the White House will probably support French measures taken against Russia because of these conflicting interests in Mali.
Yeah.
All right, well, listen, man, I really appreciate you coming back on the show.
You do such great work, Giorgio, appreciate it a lot.
Thank you so much.
It's always a pleasure.
All right, you guys.
That is Giorgio Caffiero writing in TRT World, Mali could rewrite Russian-French relations in the Sahel.
And check him out at Gulf State Analytics.
He's also on Twitter.
The Scott Horton Show, Antiwar Radio, can be heard on KPFK 90.7 FM in L.A., APSradio.com, Antiwar.com, ScottHorton.org, and LibertarianInstitute.org.
