1/28/21 Gareth Porter: Biden’s Coercive Iran Policy Threatens New Regional Crisis

by | Jan 31, 2021 | Interviews

Gareth Porter discusses U.S. relations with Iran, especially the ways the policies of the Biden administration might differ from those of the Trump administration. Even though the JCPOA was one of the signature accomplishments of the Obama presidency, and even though Trump came under sharp criticism from Obama supporters for pulling out of the agreement, Porter does not consider it at all a sure thing that Biden will simply rejoin the deal as it stands. The narrative that many Obama officials put forward at the time was that Iran was forced to come to the table because of America’s superior negotiating position; in reality, explains Porter, it was Iran’s advancing military technology that forced the U.S. to negotiate with them. He thinks it’s likely that rather than simply repudiate Trump by rejoining the deal, Biden’s team will now seek some new negotiating advantage, likely based on the destructive and unjust sanctions put into place by the Trump administration.

Discussed on the show:

  • “Biden admin’s coercive Iran policy threatens serious new regional crisis” (The Grayzone)

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist on the national security state. He is the author of Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare and, with John Kiriakou, The CIA Insider’s Guide to the Iran Crisis. Follow him on Twitter @GarethPorter and listen to Gareth’s previous appearances on the Scott Horton Show.

This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods’ Liberty ClassroomExpandDesigns.com/ScottPhoto IQGreen Mill SupercriticalZippix Toothpicks; and Listen and Think Audio.

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For Pacifica Radio, January 31st, 2021.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is Anti-War Radio.
All right, y'all welcome to the show.
It is Anti-War Radio.
I'm your host, Scott Horton.
I'm the editorial director of antiwar.com and I'm the author of the new book, Enough Already, Time to End the War on Terrorism.
You can find my full interview archive, more than 5000 of them now, going back to 2003, at scotthorton.org and at youtube.com slash scott horton show.
All right, you guys on the line.
I've got the great Gareth Porter.
Of course, he is the author of the book on Iran's nuclear program.
It's called Manufactured Crisis.
And then his latest book is also on Iran.
It's really focusing on Trump's horrible maximum pressure campaign and the background to it's called the CIA Insider's Guide to the Iran Crisis.
But Gareth isn't CIA.
He never was.
The book is co-authored with John Kiriakou, the former CIA officer and torture whistleblower and prisoner, the only guy who went to jail for George Bush's torture program because he confirmed the names of some of the guilty.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing, Gareth?
Just hanging in there.
How are you?
Well, I'm glad you're hanging in there, buddy.
I appreciate it.
Yeah, it's been a very busy week.
We need to get some things straight here about Joe Biden and his Iran policy.
Geez, you have such an important article here at the Gray Zone, the gray zone dot com.
Of course, we reprint everything at original dot antiwar dot com slash Porter as well.
This one is called Biden admins.
Coercive Iran policy threatens serious new regional crisis.
And so.
Background, Obama made the nuclear deal with Iran, they were already in the nonproliferation treaty, but they added one 2015, summer 2015, they signed the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a.k.a.the nuclear deal, which restricted Iran's program and lifted American sanctions on this side.
But then in 2018, Donald Trump repudiated that deal, pulled us out of the deal.
Now, my understanding, Gareth, is that America is now essentially outside the deal entirely, quit the deal, whereas Iran is still inside the deal.
But they have stopped abiding by some of the restrictions in the deal, technically, which is actually allowed in the deal.
There's a page in there that says if the Americans break the deal, the Iranians can start can can cease abiding by some of the restrictions kind of a thing is actually negotiated in the thing.
But so am I right about that, that America needs to come back to the deal?
Iran still has the deal with the rest of the Security Council powers.
They just need to return to abiding by the actual stipulations of the deal itself.
Is that correct?
Scott, you are the only person broadcasting with regard to current events who understands this, I would imagine.
I'm not sure of that, but I can easily imagine that that's the case.
Yes, you have it right.
But but it's so little known that, of course, politically in this country, it bears no relationship to how it's being handled by the U.S. government.
That's just the fact.
Right.
OK, so now if Donald Trump is the worst president ever and, you know, he's from outer space or from the far side of a Klan rally or something, and he came and did this most horrible thing by pulling us out of the Iran deal that our current president's previous president, he was the vice president.
Joe Biden was the vice president under Barack Obama when they passed this deal.
His entire national security staff comes from the Obama government.
His national security adviser was Hillary Clinton's right hand man who helped, as you say in the article, who helped get this thing going.
He's probably the worst one, the administration, Sullivan.
But he helped get this thing going back under Obama.
You got this guy, Robert Malley, who is less worse than a lot of hawks in D.C., I guess we could stipulate.
Right.
And all of these guys.
So why not just say if Donald Trump is the worst president ever and every single thing he ever did was the dumbest thing ever and especially repudiating the deal that these men negotiated.
Why not just go back to the deal, man?
Yeah, it's a very good question, isn't it?
And the answer, I'm sorry to say, is perfectly clear.
And that is that the the present Biden administration was has decided before it even began on January 20th that it was going to take advantage of the the Trump sanctions, which were very, very useful because it cut into Iran's oil exports so seriously that it constituted de facto, you know, from the get go a form of leverage that they could simply not pass up.
They could not give up.
I see.
Because this administration, like the Obama administration, has a an approach to dealing with Iran that is essentially that of coercive diplomacy.
Yes, diplomacy.
They're all for diplomacy with Iran.
That was the watchword of the the Obama administration from the beginning.
But it's it's coercive diplomacy that is dependent on having leverage.
That's the golden word for these people having leverage on Iran that will give the United States a leg up in its negotiations with Iran.
And so the idea of joining the JCPOA or rejoining the JCPOA without preconditions is off, simply not acceptable to the Biden administration for that reason, because they are so hung up about having leverage.
Now, you know, interestingly, some of the commentary on this issue over the last couple of days has made the claim that the Biden administration, you know, has the capability to sort of create sanctions at will, you know, bring them back.
And therefore they have they can create leverage.
But I don't think that the Biden administration wants to depend on creating new sanctions because that's too chancy under the JCPOA.
Of course, using the the sanctions created by the Trump administration is also clearly illegal under the JCPOA.
But that doesn't seem to be stopping them from assuming this stance from the beginning that, OK, we're going to sit down with them and we'll work out a deal.
We'll work out a new deal.
OK, but stronger.
I mean, is this all just a poison pill or do you think that somewhere there's a CIA analyst who swears that a little more like this and the Ayatollah is going to bend right over and sign all these new restrictions on his missiles and everything else?
Well, these people, these people who are now coming back from the Obama administration into the Biden administration to occupy key positions, including Jake Sullivan as the national security adviser and Tony Blinken as secretary of state, don't need any CIA.
We don't need no stinking CIA analysis.
They know what's going on because they were there.
They dealt with the Iranians.
They had the experience.
So they're depending on their own experience from 20, from 2013 through 2015 or up to the spring of 2015 as the guide to their policy.
Now, they believe that they understand how to deal with the Iranians and they believe in this idea of leverage.
So completely, they believed that they were going to win in 2015 through leverage.
But I think the actual result did not bear out their notion about how much power they had.
This is starting to make sense to me a bit, I guess.
I mean, it seems to me like the lesson of 2015 is see the Ayatollah, you know, maybe an unelected Ayatollah supreme leader, but he's a reasonable guy when it comes to making a reasonable compromise.
But what you're saying is, I think that these Democrats learned a different lesson, not that this guy's reasonable and we can figure out a way to do this, but that he's some kind of paper tiger that they can push him around, that at the end of the day, he's weak and will give in.
And so now they're going to try to do that same thing again with Pompeo and Trump sanctions here.
That's not the way they would word it, but I think, in fact, that is the analysis that really drives the Biden administration's policymaking on this.
It is a belief in the inherent power of the U.S. government, not inherent from the get go, but inherent in the situation that the U.S. government has of being able to to rely on really powerful economic sanctions.
And, you know, here's the here's the real.
Well, look, six years ago, six years ago, you said all these men believe that their sanctions have forced Iran into the deal.
But that's not really true.
It's sort of like they believe their own line.
But what really happened, you said then was Iran improved their technology to a degree that they forced Obama to the table is what really happened.
But they didn't learn that lesson.
They think that they did this through Treasury Department coercion.
And that's why they're trying to replicate their alleged success along those same lines.
Right.
Absolutely.
Because if they don't really believe in that idea that Treasury Department sanctions can be workable on on Iran, then they are powerless.
And that is so unacceptable to these people that it is simply not going to be a part of their thinking.
And so this is a situation where the United States has lost its military advantage over Iran to the point where that's off the table.
They know it.
I mean, that's that's been off the table for a long time now for the Democrats.
And I think even for the Trump administration, de facto, I mean, in terms of Trump himself, you know, being unwilling to chance the war with with Iran.
But and for the Pentagon, they understand that they do not have the kind of military advantage over Iran anymore that allows them to really play around with threatening war.
But I think the Democrats still believe that they have the equivalent of that military advantage in the Trump sanctions and in sanctions that they would create if it weren't illegal under the JCPOA.
OK, but that's why I think they're they're really tied up to the Trump sanctions.
They feel the need to use them.
And that means not going directly back into the JCPOA.
It means trying to get the Iranians to sit down with them for a long talk that would involve a new deal.
And and the Iranians do want to make changes in the JCPOA.
I mean, they they believe that the snapback sanctions should be withdrawn.
They don't like them.
And that could be a point of negotiation at some point, but only after the United States rejoins.
Yeah, man, and now so from the other side of the ledger here, from the Iranian point of view, you know, snapback sanctions and this that they're not going to trade that for new limitations on missile ranges and all these things that are completely outside of or for that matter, their relationship with Hezbollah or any of these other things that the Americans want to add to the deal.
Right.
It depends.
I mean, I would not rule out a set of negotiations between the United States and Iran over the the missile program in the following sense, that the Iranians are perfectly willing to reach a formal agreement that they would not have missiles over a certain length, but at a price they want to get something really tangible in return.
They're not going to give that up for nothing.
Right.
And now they've learned that any deal a president makes can just be canceled by the next one.
So that's a real problem, isn't it?
It is a real problem.
I agree.
I mean, that that does limit the degree to which the United States can rely on diplomacy with Iran to a relatively narrow range of things and only with in a deal that allows the Iranians to reverse things themselves.
I think that's that's probably what we're dealing with here in terms of the potential range of agreements between the United States and Iran at this point.
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Oh, man.
All right.
Well, I guess that's more optimistic than I was considering it.
I mean, I just thought that the Ayatollah would say, go to hell.
We're not changing anything you want back in the deal.
We already have a deal.
But I guess you're saying, you know what, there are some changes that they would like to see enough that maybe there could be a trade here for some, you know, basis for future negotiation.
But now, do you think that really we got to get back in the deal first or I'm sorry, go ahead.
But we have to be in the deal first.
Right.
And that means that the demand that the U.S. rejoin, followed by Iran, you know, immediately starting the process and giving, you know, timelines for its ending, its actions which are now out of compliance with the JCPOA would immediately begin.
So that's that's the deal that the Iranians are now offering, or that's the arrangement for resuming the the JCPOA in full in full power.
Right.
But so, I mean, I guess this is already settled.
Do you think there's still a debate inside the administration about what they're doing here?
I mean, they're trying to make this guy Malley the special representative or emissary or whatever they're going to call him there.
And the Israel lobby screaming their head off about it.
There's no doubt in my mind that their their policy is fixed in terms of this phase.
They are going to try this.
Yeah.
And, you know, see what what happens.
I mean, we'll just see how long it takes for them to discover that that's a nonstarter.
And then they're back to the drawing board to figure out what their next step is.
I don't think they have a next step.
Yeah.
You know, I guess it's it just seems so silly to me, like a childish that they think that what just showing good faith, that's weakness.
We can't do that.
When this is the same team that very proudly negotiated the deal just six years ago.
And again, sorry to be repetitive here, but it was the aberration Donald Trump that came and got rid of it.
Why would they not just go ahead and say, yeah, of course, look, here's some good faith.
We're reentering the deal.
And now how about you show some good faith and let's talk about missiles and whatever.
Is it really?
You know, the I told Donald Trump, let the Ayatollah get the last word in shooting missiles at that base, you know, a year ago and went ahead and let it be there.
Thank God.
Right.
He shouldn't have assassinated Soleimani in the first place, but he let the Ayatollah get the last word on that missile volley and said, OK, well, fine, we'll leave it at that.
Nobody died.
And so if Donald Trump can do that, then Biden can reenter the deal.
What's the big deal?
The Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu said no.
Benjamin Netanyahu's government threatened war if Biden gets back in the deal.
Is that what he's afraid of?
Or couldn't he just call Netanyahu and say no?
And then that would be the end of that.
I'm glad you've posed that issue.
I think it's a very important question to examine.
And I do think that there's a clear answer to this.
And it goes to the heart of the identity of the national security elite.
OK.
I mean, Jake Sullivan, Tony Blinken and the rest are certified members of the national security elite.
They have a certain view of themselves and the role they play in history.
And that role is one that enjoys the feeling of the sensation of having power.
That is at the heart of it.
Got that right.
No question.
Yeah.
That's that's as much that is as much the reward or more the reward for these people than any monetary award could possibly match.
No question.
And no question about that.
And you know what?
I'm sorry to interrupt, but I just have to say everybody read your Orwell.
It's right there.
O'Brien explains all this to Winston as he's torturing him.
Power is not a means.
It is an end.
It's the whole point.
That's what it's all about.
Control over other men.
Absolutely right.
It goes.
Oh, and you know what?
I'll add one more.
I met a millionaire one time in my cab in like nineteen ninety eight and I was given him my new world order conspiracy theory stuff.
And he said to me, he goes, listen, I'm really rich and I know a lot of really rich, powerful people.
I've been around.
And let me tell you something about all of these men that you're talking about.
They just want attention, just like anybody else.
You go to a cocktail party in Georgetown.
And the deal is, if I can be seen having a drink with George Shultz, then maybe Donald Trump, I mean, or Henry Kissinger would see me having a drink with Shultz.
And then that would be my ticket to have a drink with him.
And then if I can talk with him, then maybe I get.
And this is just like the preppy kids in high school and their little culture.
And that's all it is.
Same thing, just with, you know, obviously more at stake.
But on the personal level, they just want their peers to tell them they're doing a good job.
Same as me.
Same as you.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So so this is this is a challenge to me as as somebody who's now working on a book analyzing the national security state and the Pentagon's power and role over the decades of the Cold War and since to to be able to analyze not just the bureaucratic, the institutional bureaucratic elements that make up the motivation of the Pentagon and these other national security institutions, but also the personal role, the role that personal power plays in all this, because it's such a big part of the satisfaction of their of their roles in in topping at the top of the Pentagon, the armed services and the CIA and so forth.
All right.
Now, Gareth, let me ask you real quick about the Yemen policy here, too, because this is a big deal.
They come in and they've been promising all year they're going to end the war in Yemen.
This is, of course, tied up with Iranian policy because the theory goes that the Houthis are backed by Iran and therefore that's why we have to have this war in the first place.
And they said they would end it and then they come out with these half measures.
In fact, let's start with this.
Just last week, just what, two days before the inauguration, Mike Pompeo put the Houthis on the terrorist list and all the NGOs in the world screamed bloody murder about it and said, you're basically outlawing our ability to deliver food aid to these starving people.
What are you doing?
And then the Biden people come in and say, well, we're going to review that when Pompeo just did it a week ago.
In fact, at the time they came into power just three, four days ago, they could have simply said, well, we're just undoing that.
Screw that.
It was Pompeo's last minute crazy thing that everybody thought was crazy at the time.
And then not only did they not just undo it, they only kind of half-ass undid it.
And the NGOs said, well, we're still not going until the review is done because we're afraid of the trouble that we could get in.
So it didn't help.
And this this sort of half measures, as I think you accurately call it, is even more outrageous, given the fact that the man that they have put in the Pentagon, Lloyd Austin, was the one who had worked with the Houthis on helping them, giving them intelligence so they could better strike al-Qaeda people.
Right.
So, I mean, you know, you have somebody at the highest level in the most sensitive position of the national security sector of the Biden administration who knows the Houthis well and and is perfectly clear that they are not somebody who you can just, you know, pass off as terrorist or something like that.
So so this is this is another case of having to pay the piper in terms of their relationships with their Middle East allies.
Right.
I mean, that's all there is to it.
It's just they are not free to do what they know is right.
I mean, these are people who who are genuinely feeling guilty about their role in having enabled the Saudi war against the Yemeni people.
There's no doubt about that.
Right.
These people.
I mean, I think Blinken has said so explicitly.
Yeah.
And Malley to rally.
Malley wrote this giant thing for The Atlantic about, man, we don't know what the hell we were thinking at the time.
And we're so sorry and wish we hadn't done this.
Yeah.
Which it was ridiculous to read.
It's actually a hilarious read if you you know, his explanation for how it happened.
But at least he was being honest that like, yeah, we really do regret that.
And so let me ask you this, because this comes up in the book and I try to explain it the best I can.
I know that the Saudis buy a lot of U.S. government debt.
Right.
And I know that they, for example, I guess, could lean on their friends in Bahrain to kick us out of our Navy base if they wanted to or something like this.
But it's funny, like it really almost seems like the Americans are just absolutely in the thrall under the control of the Saudis to such a degree in every administration.
And I understand the power of the Israel lobby.
I don't understand the power of the Saudi lobby and its level of, you know, its ability to dictate to the U.S. government what our policy is going to be or as we talked about back then.
And as I cover in the book, their ability to finance the Sunni insurgency that's killing Americans during Iraq war two and have George Bush not say a word about it other than I'm so sorry, your majesty, that the CIA prevented me from starting a war with Iran for you.
What is going on here?
Well, I think you touched on it yourself in the introductory remark to to your point, which which was a reference to the fact that the Saudis do, in fact, have leverage, huge leverage.
Control is really closer to the reality over the government of Bahrain, which, of course, is the U.S. naval base in the Middle East and is a prized possession of the U.S. military and the Pentagon.
And that is leverage, which is not only real, but according to the memoirs of Robert Gates, the Saudis used it back in what was it, 2011, 2012, I guess, to get the U.S. to back off any suggestion of criticism of the government of Bahrain over its, you know, horrible massacre of protesters, you know, democracy movement in Bahrain in 2011.
Yeah.
And and the U.S. government promptly saluted and stopped.
So, you know, we know that that that leverage has been effective with a democratic administration before.
And I have no doubt that it's effective today.
I mean, all the all the Saudis have to do is, you know, just utter a few words and the U.S., you know, again, stands up and salutes.
Yeah, man, I'm so sorry.
We're out of time.
I love talking with you, Gareth.
You are the best.
And everybody knows that it's the great Gareth Porter.
He's at the Grayzone Project.
This article is called Biden Admins Coercive Iran Policy Threatens Serious New Regional Crisis.
Thank you, sir.
Appreciate a lot.
Thank you, Scott.
All right, Sean, that has been anti-war radio for this morning.
I'm your host, Scott Horton, the editorial director of Antiwar dot com and author of the new book Enough Already, Time to End the War on Terrorism.
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