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I am the Director of the Libertarian Institute, Editorial Director of Antiwar.com, author of the book Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan, and I've recorded more than 5,000 interviews going back to 2003, all of which are available at scotthorton.org.
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All right, you guys, introducing Nasser Arabi again, our reporter friend from Sanaa, Yemen.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you doing, Nasser?
Fine.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Happy to have you here.
I was looking at your website.
It's yemen.com slash now.com, Yemen Alon, and I'm trying to keep up with a little bit of the news, but I guess, can we start with any developments along the diplomatic front in terms of talks between the Houthis, the Saudis, anybody else?
I know that, I'm sure you probably know that Joe Biden has promised to end the Yemen war, but that his promises probably aren't worth very much, but I wonder if there's any really good news for him to be greeted with when he's sworn in, any kind of moves toward peace that he can really seize on and build upon there, do you think?
In fact, everyone is waiting for Biden to take the office and to be sworn in on 20th January, especially Mohammed bin Salman, who is, of course, the most important actor and player.
So he's waiting because, I mean, everybody is thinking of what Biden is going to do because he said a lot of things.
So nothing is being progressed on the ground because of this.
But one thing that can be said now is Mohammed bin Salman is, in particular, is trying to do, to unify, let me say, to unify the anti-Houthi factions.
Just trying, I'm saying.
So this is the only thing that we can say now.
There is, of course, the so-called Riyadh agreement between Hadi and the separatists in the South, the STC, the Transitional Southern Council.
This is the separatists.
Mohammed bin Salman, this week, told them, told Hadi and his government there in Riyadh to settle the problems and the issues so that they can come together on one front against Houthi.
But nothing so far has happened, of course.
I read that they had made that deal.
Does that mean that Hadi is now supposed to come back to Yemen?
He's going to try to base his government out of Aden?
Yes, Hadi will not come to Aden at all.
But his government, maybe, or part of his government, at least, may come to Aden because Mohammed bin Salman is exercising a lot of pressure on them to go to Aden because he wants to tell his allies that he has now one front against the Houthis.
And especially, of course, this is happening after the meeting, the meeting of bin Salman with Jared Kushner, who came and they talked about the normalization with Israel.
And they talked also about the possibility of designating the Houthi as a terrorist organization.
So Mohammed bin Salman is still hoping that this is going to happen because Mike Pompeo promised him that Houthi could or would be designated as a terrorist organization before January 20th, before the inauguration day.
So Mohammed bin Salman is working in this direction to make them or to pile up and to increase the pressure on Houthi.
And this is, of course, happening while the attacks on Saudi Arabia is increasing from Houthi.
At least four attacks on oil facilities were carried out last month, only last month, during one month, in Jeddah, and oil facilities on Shebz and on Jeddah port on the Red Sea.
So we can say that nothing is happening in Yemen.
They are going nowhere.
But we can say that the only thing that is changing in Yemen is now the worst humanitarian crisis that is the already worst humanitarian crisis.
It's getting even worse because of the adventures of bin Salman by intensifying the blockade and blocking the aids and also his trying now to designate Houthi.
If this happens, it will only make the humanitarian situation even worse.
But Houthis will not be affected because if it comes to money, they don't have money in the banks.
When it comes to Houthis traveling outside Yemen, they will not travel outside Yemen.
So it will boil down only to the humanitarian situation.
It will affect some people who, donors or aid agencies or some people who help now.
They may stop or may be blocked or at least obstructed or something like this.
So nothing is going to happen, even if they designate Houthi as a terrorist organization.
All the aid organizations are warning that if they do add them to the terrorist list, then that makes it essentially impossible for them to continue to deliver food aid because then all new kinds of rules are kicked into force that prevent them from even trying.
So the blockade, even without the blockade, it would be illegal for Oxfam or whoever to bring aid after they're added to the terrorist list, or at least be very difficult.
I think this is not going to happen.
But if it happens, it will be it will be with very little, if any, effect on Houthi.
And I mean, that's right.
You know, all of the aid organizations immediately, you know, hollered about this.
And my impression also was that they had backed down somewhat.
But, you know, as you say, Mike Pompeo is the one in charge, the Secretary of State.
And if anybody could get evil like that accomplished, it would be him.
He's been very effective at things like that.
And it's not too late.
You know, and yes, and I think the why behind this is they thought or they think now that it comes in the framework of the maximizing the maximum pressure, the already maximum pressure on Iran.
This is what why Pompeo is thinking it will, because they are, this is what they focus on.
They focus on Iran, they focus on the normalization, they focus on these things.
But unfortunately, these things have nothing to do with Yemen, with the situation, with the Houthis.
I mean, the reality, reality on the ground is completely different from from the way they think.
Well, and as far as, you know, all of these kinds of, you know, sanctions and economic pressures and so forth, what you were saying about how they don't really hurt the Houthis, they're the ones in power.
And OK, so they can't travel fine.
They weren't traveling anyway.
And you sanction their money in the bank account.
They didn't have any money in the bank account.
People who actually and if they do have money, they're the government, they can hide it in a way.
And, you know, we know that the Houthi at the top of the group there, they're staying fed, you know, their troops are staying fed.
But it's little old ladies and little baby girls are the ones who are laying down and dying.
Exactly.
Exactly.
Yes.
This is the people who are going to be affected.
Yes.
The poor, the blockaded people.
Yes, yes.
This is this the problem.
And this never works, by the way, you know, in terms of like, say, for example, they tried to do this in Iraq in the 1990s.
If we make the people so hungry, somehow they'll rise up and overthrow Saddam now that they're even weaker in comparison to him than they've ever been.
So go ahead and keep starving them until they're so desperate that they die trying to overthrow the guy they can't possibly overthrow.
And then this is the same policy here.
Not that it's working, not that it could possibly work.
And yet here we are.
We're six years into the war now.
Exactly.
And Houthi is getting stronger and stronger and they know it very well.
I mean, the last the last attack on Jeddah boat was powerful and completely different.
And, you know, I mean, it was very damaging on that ship because of the sophisticated things they have now.
So it's only absurd thinking this way.
Yeah.
And, you know, I think part of it, this sounds like maybe a silly point, Nasser, but I think maybe it's actually meaningful, is that in the media here in America, they still constantly refer to the Houthis as rebels, even though they seized control of the capital city and at least the north of the country.
I mean, they seized more than that for a while there, but they have controlled at least half more than half the country and its population and its cities for six years.
And yet they're still called rebels in a way that makes it sound like they're still outside of the capital city and are being kept at bay somehow or something like this.
In other words, it mixes the message and makes it where they don't have to recognize an answer to the fact that they are trying to oust a regime from power and that it's not working.
Instead, they're fighting these rebels, you know.
Not only this, Scott, not only the not only rebels and what what sounds what can be understood from these words, but also on the ground.
I mean, they know that the government in Sana'a is much, much better than the so-called Hadi government, which has no place except in Riyadh.
I mean, I told you last in the last interview that the dollar is 600 riyals, the dollar is for 600 in Sana'a and in Eden it is 1000 and it's still going up.
This is just one example, not to mention the insecurity, the bombings, the assassinations, the looting and killing people if they are from the north or something like this.
So there are a lot of problems that they can't fix, a lot of problems.
There is you can't even say there is a semi-government in Eden.
But here it is it is a government and it is functioning and it's only the words that that the media falsely claim about rebels, about militias, about militants, about all these things.
But they never they never give a good example of what what they look like, what they can do, what what what better they can do.
Right.
No, nothing.
Right.
I mean, and that's the whole thing, right?
Is if they're rebels, then it's an entirely different question than if they are the government and we're trying to end that.
And I don't know, maybe we could negotiate with them.
I don't know.
It's just an entirely different question, right?
It's like if we're, you know, exactly, we could be talking about an entirely separate country at this point.
In other words, you know, it's like this make-believe place where the Houthis have not yet taken the capital city.
It's only all these things, the war in Yemen is based on two things in the mind of Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, although, of course, although they are different.
Mohammed bin Salman is thinking of of Iran and of his his economy, how to make how to make economy not independent or not dependent on the on the oil.
So how to diversify, as you say, how to to to make all these things.
So but he thought wrongly that the beginning should be in Yemen.
And he's still thinking this way, that fighting Iran and diversifying the Saudi economy should start from Yemen, from from making a government, a stooge government or a puppet government in Yemen that is subordinate, that is working with with him.
And this is not right because it's I mean, it doesn't work this way at all, because six years is has proved enough and told us that if he comes or if he talks to Houthis and to Yemenis in a good way, in a goodwill, he would do much better.
But unfortunately, he never he never thinks this way at all.
Hold on just one second.
Be right back.
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You know, I'm curious about that.
I actually you probably know this, but I had only just learned that Ben Rhodes, who worked for Obama, said that actually it was Mohammed bin Zayed from the UAE who had come trying to, in his words, sell them on the idea of the war before Mohammed bin Salman did.
It was really the UAE who really took the lead on this back in 2015.
And I think this is right.
I think this is right.
But but now he now he's better.
Mohammed bin Zayed is better than I mean, Mohammed bin Zayed realized and understood and he and Mohammed bin Zayed at least the drawdown, at least withdraw his troops from Yemen.
Well, I was going to ask you about that.
I mean, he kept his militia, right?
He pulled his main forces out.
But what exactly is the UAE's policy in Yemen now then?
Now, he's of course he realized that that they are going nowhere by by keeping or by fighting in Yemen.
But of course, he got what he wanted.
So he had now some he established some militants and militias in Aden, about 100,000 missionaries and militants who they call the security belts and all these things in Aden and Hadhramaut in the eastern provinces.
And he's now controlling the south and east of Yemen under this name.
And what he wants now and what he wanted in the past is only the boats, the boat of Aden, the boat of Bilhaf and the boat of Mukalla and also Bab al-Mandab.
So he wants to be in the seas because he thinks that this is good for Dubai to make to to to keep it good and to keep it active.
So now he's in a problem with Mohammed bin Salman.
He wants Mohammed bin Salman to to stop.
But bin Salman says, no, I haven't finished because if you finished, I haven't.
So in other words, if I understand you right, Nessa, what you're saying is and, you know, for the audience, please try and picture Yemen at the, you know, bottom left corner of the Arabian Peninsula there.
What they call South Yemen usually includes the entire east, too.
That was, I think, the border back when the nation was divided.
The east counted as the south.
And then what you're saying, I think, is the UAE is so dominant there in the south and the east, and then they have, you know, some kind of deal with the Southern Transitional Council there.
So they have their bases that they are putting in the port cities.
They've seized that island, Socotra, near the Bab al-Mandab there.
And so they've got what they wanted.
And they don't really care if the Houthis rule Sana'a at this point.
But to the Saudis, they're still determined on regime change in the capital.
Is that it?
Yes, exactly, exactly.
And what can be added is that Mohammed bin Zayed not only doesn't care about Houthis, but he wants now Houthis to get rid of his enemy number one in Yemen.
He's now supporting them in a way or another, or at least he wants them to defeat his enemy.
Who's his enemy?
The Brotherhood in Marib in the east, in the eastern province, the only stronghold under the Brotherhood.
So not only doesn't care, but he wants Houthis to defeat his enemies, the Brotherhood.
And this is how complex the situation is.
And the Saudis back the Brotherhood party there, al-Islah, right?
Yes, exactly.
And in the south, to just add something to what you said, the UAE is the only decision maker, the only decision maker until now.
And even after Mohammed bin Salman this week said that they agreed on this, on this, on that, on that, we know that it's just media and things that are not implemented at all.
Because Mohammed bin Zayed is holding key things on him.
And they are, of course, they have some strategic things, but in the south, no one is controlling the south except the UAE until now.
All right.
And then, so what is the relationship between, I mean, between bin Salman and bin Zayed over the war?
I mean, are they really at a disagreement here, like a falling out over this?
Do you know?
Yes, it is.
As I told you, it's Mohammed bin Zayed wants to finish it as soon as possible, because he's done with what he wanted.
But Mohammed bin Salman is not done yet, because what he wanted is not there.
So they are in a problem, and then this problem is noticed by anyone, by any observer.
Sometimes they hide it, and they misinform about it, but it's clear that it's, that the agenda of bin Zayed is different, and the tactics, the strategies, the plans, they are different in everything.
But they try to look like they are unified, or to look they are one front or one team, but it's not.
The ground is telling something else.
And what we see happening in the south is very clear, because the government can't return to Aden now, even if they agree now on what they want, the most important thing is the security and the military arrangements.
The security and military arrangements are the most important thing, and the most difficult thing for both of them.
Because if you form a government of 24 ministers or so, it's not a big deal, but who is controlling the military and the security is the most important thing.
And Mohammed bin Zayed is, of course, established about 1,000 soldiers in the south who are now under the so-called STC, and STC is a proxy for Mohammed bin Zayed, as everybody here knows.
So, they are holding, they are controlling their soldiers, and they are controlling Aden, they are controlling everywhere, and they will not give up or give up on the security they are controlling everywhere, and they will not give up or give in to any pressure from bin Salman or from Hadi's government, if there is any pressure from Hadi, because Hadi can't do any pressure at all, unfortunately.
Yeah.
Well, so, I mean, it sounds like the plan then in Abu Dhabi is to just re-divide the country and take the south and east.
Is that right?
Yes, this is what they are doing, and it depends on Biden now.
If Biden would do something, as you said, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed can give the green light for two Yemenis easily, because they are already now two Yemenis, but they can do it if they want, if they can do it in a way that helps them.
It's easy, but it's only Marib now.
It's only Marib.
If Marib falls in the hands of Houthi, then that's it.
Everything is done, and they are done with it, and they can say now south and north, like before 1990, like before the unity or the unification day.
And this is what they want, because they think that either they would pressure on Houthi or then they can sit with Houthi and talk with him when they have already a government in the south.
Now, you told me before that the Houthis have plenty of allies in the south, or at least people who don't want to see the country split up and would be happy to join a coalition government if the foreign nations would stop intervening.
Is that right?
Yes, they are in Sana'a, they are in Sana'a, and they are in the government here in Sana'a, and they are prominent people, prominent politicians.
Everybody knows them, and they are also in the dialogue.
And Martin Griffith, when he comes, he meets them.
He meets with them here in Sana'a, and he knows them.
And they are from all the southern and eastern provinces.
And they also, they call themselves Iraq, and they talk about the issue of the south.
And I mean, they are not talking about the agenda of Houthi at all, but they are within the government of Houthi.
And they don't want Yemen to be divided, but they want to correct the path of unity and to resolve the outstanding problems and the grievances and all these things.
And so they want one Yemen, but they want just to reshape it and to make it in a way that gives everybody what they deserve in the south and in the north.
And now, how popular is the Southern Transitional Council there?
I know they're left-leaning and obviously pro-separatist.
But I mean, how strict are they on that?
Is there a possibility of a compromise with them?
Compromise with whom?
With the Southern Transitional Council.
And I guess, and I'm sorry, I should just let that the first question.
How much popular support do they have in the south?
In the south, okay.
Very, very, very little popularity.
And the reason is because they came from above.
They came from top.
Mohammed bin Zayed made missionaries, and then he chose people who are not popular at all.
And one of them is Salafi, who is the vice president of the council, and who was working and studying there in the UAE.
And he's not popular at all.
Now, for example, he's now talking about what the normalization will look like, and what the Jewish state will look like, and how good if Yemen normalizes with Israel.
And he's talking about these things.
The things that would make Mohammed bin Zayed happy.
But he doesn't care about the daily life of the people.
He doesn't care about the rising of the value of riyal.
I mean, riyal is 1,000, the one dollar is 1,000 riyal now.
I mean, very, very, very high.
And he doesn't care also about the poverty and the insecurity and the assassination.
So he has no popularity at all.
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Okay, now let's talk about Al-Qaeda.
I've been reading a lot about this because I'm writing a book about it, which I probably ought to send you my Yemen chapter to check over.
But I know that they have made major gains throughout the now six years of war.
And hey, here's a fun footnote.
I'm not sure if you're aware of this, Nasser.
But we've talked before about how CENTCOM had an arrangement with the Houthis and was working with the Houthis to pass them intelligence to use against Al-Qaeda in early 2015.
And then two months later, of course, Obama took Al-Qaeda's side and stabbed them in the back and started, you know, this phase of the war.
Decisive storm, they called it.
But anyway, guess who was the commander of CENTCOM at the time that the military was working with the Houthis to kill Al-Qaeda guys?
It was General Lloyd Austin, who is about to be sworn in as the new Secretary of Defense.
So at least he knows who's who and, you know, can understand the difference between the guys who bombed the coal and the guys who did not bomb the coal over there.
So, you know, I think there's reason to at least have hope if you're going to have that kind of specialized knowledge of the situation at that level.
It's not the same as having Mike Pompeo decide or Jared Kushner.
But and in fact, they say that in fact, I'm going to interview Mark Perry later today.
Mark Perry wrote a piece that he said that he was so mad when Obama started this war that he considered going to the president and demanding that the president demand that the Saudis stop.
But the other generals talked him out of it because they said it wasn't going to happen.
That was apparently how upset he was about this.
But anyway, so that was six years ago.
And America has been fighting for Al-Qaeda ever since then.
The Saudi, UAE, USA, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda alliance here against the Houthis.
And I know, too, that the Special Operations Command and the drone CIA drone warriors have done some strikes against the UAE.
But when I brought that up to you before, you just laughed and said, yeah, that's why they all went and joined.
I mean, I'm sorry, against Al-Qaeda, I meant to say.
They have been doing some drone strikes against Al-Qaeda there.
But when I brought that up to you, you just laughed and said, yeah, that's why they turn around and join the UAE's militia so that they won't be bombed anymore because now, you know, they're under American protection again.
But, you know, this is the only thing that matters to most Americans in this equation, other than, you know, the humanitarian crisis for the civilians there, is what of the fortunes of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
And assuming this phase of the war for them ends soon, how big of a problem is left to deal with there?
You see, if the Americans or if there is no talk, if there is no talk with the Houthi on this issue, or if they keep, if Americans and Saudis and UAE keep going the way they are going now, Al-Qaeda will only get better and better because they have many names or they change their names.
But people know who they are and what they want, and even if they change their names.
Now, if, for example, when they, when the anti-Houthi, let me say, the anti-Houthi coalition, when they want to deal a blow against the Houthi, they enlist the help of Al-Qaeda everywhere, in Marib or in the east or south or wherever.
Which means they don't have their own things.
They don't have their own, they don't have fighters.
They don't have army.
They don't have security.
And where is the, where is the money?
Where is the money going?
Where that millions and millions of money going?
I mean, they steal it and they use that in other things, which means the only people who fight Al-Qaeda now, who fight Al-Houthi, are Al-Qaeda or the sympathizers of Al-Qaeda.
But there is no national army.
There is no national resistance, as they say.
So this means what?
This means that if they don't sit with Houthi and talk with him on everything, including Al-Qaeda, I think they will keep going nowhere and they will help only Al-Qaeda to get stronger and stronger.
And Houthi, of course, will do as they are doing now.
The north now is very clean from Al-Qaeda, almost clean.
No bombings, no assassination, no insecurity in the south.
People are OK.
Yes, the problem is the blockade.
This is what the real problem is, that they are weaponizing the food of the people, the water of the people, the shelter of the people, and everything, the medicine.
But fighting Al-Qaeda or establishing a government or making Yemen stable, they don't do anything, unfortunately.
All right.
Now, I want to go back to the humanitarian crisis here, because I kind of changed the subject on you before when you brought this up.
But there's all kinds of new stories coming out, I guess, for the end of the year, the anniversary of the war and just kind of the end of the year.
You have the humanitarian aid groups are kind of doing their list of all the worst things in the world.
And, of course, as it says here in this Al-Jazeera piece, Yemen is first for the third year in a row.
I can't imagine who was ahead of you all before that.
But this is the International Rescue Committee, the IRC, say that Yemen is the country most at risk of humanitarian catastrophe in 2021 for the third year running.
And something that we've talked about on the show over the entire course of the war is the amount of deaths being undercounted, not just the deaths in the violent airstrikes and Al-Qaeda campaigns on the ground and this kind of thing, but also just from the deprivation from the war, the Saudis' deliberate targeting of the infrastructure, the farms, the irrigation systems, the markets, every part of what people need to survive.
And so I was just wondering if you have any kind of updated numbers that people need to know of overall amounts of death and if you want to divide it, violent deaths versus overall deprivation increases and whatever.
I know that the information is very sketchy in a lot of places, but I also know that all along your numbers have been far more accurate than what everybody else in the media has been saying too.
So I was just hoping to give you a chance to address just what does the situation look like for people so far away?
Well, let me start with this.
The money that the UN says Yemen needs this year, 2020, and 2021, is 3 billion and something, 3 million and something, maybe 3.3 billion or something.
Most of this money comes from Saudi Arabia and UAE, most of it, more than half.
Now they won't give any riyal, they said, or they almost said they won't give any penny to Yemen, who?
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
So we are left only with some European, like the US, I mean, the US also maybe will ally with them, with the Saudis and the Emiratis, because they say it's helping Houthis and Houthis helping Iran and all these things.
So what I want to say now is, even the aid is not coming to the aid of Yemen, is not coming to the aid agencies, which is life-saving for two-thirds of the population, that is 30 million people, 30 million people, about 20 million people in Yemen in urgent need, in desperate need for the aid.
They can't live without this aid.
So it's not coming, because Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed think that Houthi, as they say, as they claim, Houthi is taking it or Houthi is diverting the aid.
In terms of casualties and those who died from this war in Yemen, I think it's very clear now.
Let me start with the UN, with what the UN said.
The UN said that the number would be 250 by the end of 2020, 250,000.
This number, if we take it, it's close to reality.
It's close to reality, although I would say that the UN stopped.
I would keep saying this.
I've been saying this all along.
And I would keep saying it, that UN started by counting, but then two or three months later, they stopped counting.
And they stopped at 10,000 people, 10,000 Yemenis were killed.
Now we are at a quarter of a million, and they still say 10,000, 10,000, 10,000.
So I want to say that those, the Yemenis who died.
I'm sorry, just to clarify there, you're saying the UN has finally updated their number from, and this was like a year ago, they said it was 233,000.
So they updated it from 10,000 to 233,000, kind of indicated that they had dropped the ball for a while there.
But then you're saying the media still cite the 10,000 number, and they don't even realize.
Is that right?
Exactly.
This is what I mean, because that was a team, that was only a team that said 250,000, a team belonging to UN.
I see, I see.
Yes.
But for the UN here, for the office and UN officially, they don't use it.
Oh really?
So I'm sorry, I misunderstood you.
When you were saying they still say 10,000, you meant the UN's official numbers still.
You can see, you can see yourself.
You can see yourself that they say, it's about this.
They mislead, they misinform until now in a very bad way.
I mean, they deliberately say that they make it, you know, they want it to look very small, quite not bad, these things.
So I want to say the misinformation and misleading and disinformation is very clear from the UN and also from the Saudi and Saudi media, of course, all the time.
And there are people who work with them, whether media or lobbies or whatever, because they work on all these fronts.
But what we see on the ground, we see people dying.
We see people dying, dying of hunger, thousands of people dying in front of our eyes.
So who do you think, should we believe, the statistics or the papers or our eyes?
What we see with our own eyes on the ground, we see people die every day, die of hunger.
So, I mean, this is something not fair at all to say that it's a few people or no people or because of Houthi diverting or these are very weak things and they do not amount to the problem that Yemen is facing now.
Right.
And Martha Mundy from the London School of Economics has done a great job documenting how they deliberately bomb the farms.
They bomb the flocks of sheep in the field, the grain silos, the irrigation systems, the tractors, or, you know, whatever farm equipment that they can.
And we've got a poor connection.
Let's see if we can fix this.
All right, you guys.
And well, Nasser's having some internet problems there with the connection.
So I guess we'll call it quits here.
I've got to go to Ray McGovern anyway.
But that was Nasser Arabi, reporter out of Sana'a, Yemen.
