All right, y'all, welcome to the Scott Horton Show.
I am the Director of the Libertarian Institute, Editorial Director of Antiwar.com, author of the book Fool's Errand, Time to End the War in Afghanistan, and I've recorded more than 5,000 interviews going back to 2003, all of which are available at scotthorton.org.
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All right, you guys on the line is Nasser Arabi, reporter from Sana, Yemen, joining us again.
Welcome back to the show.
How are you, Nasser?
Thank you very much, Scott.
Thank you.
Thank you for having me.
Very happy to have you here, and I know it's been a few weeks at least since we've spoken, and there's a lot to catch up on.
I think the last time we talked was after the successful, the biggest, the major drone attack by the Houthis against Saudi oil interests last fall.
And since then, there have been a lot of political developments.
I don't know how meaningful they are, but it seems like there are talks going on between the Houthis and the Saudis, and it seems like the Americans are starting to shift their position a little bit and send mixed messages about whether they really believe the Houthis are agents of the Iranians and this kind of thing.
So I figured I'd just have you on to tell us all about how it looks from Sana.
Yes, a lot of things happening, yes, as you said, but I'll start with the most important one that is connected to all.
That is the Houthi-Saudi talks, yes, the Houthi-Saudi talks, and through this issue, we can talk about everything.
There is sort of Saudi-Houthi talks, yes, not formal yet, informal, indirect, sort of behind the scenes through back channels in Oman and other places, but very, very, very important and they are seen as a key to everything.
These talks between Houthis and Saudis revolve around four points.
One is the Saudi borders, the Saudi borders with Yemen.
Two is the international airport of Sana'a.
Three is the relations with Iran, the Houthi relations with Iran.
Four is the Houthi ballistic missiles and powerful drones.
Let me go through these four again.
Saudi borders with Yemen, where Saudis want to establish a buffer zone or sort of safe zone along the borders with Yemen, because this is number one Saudi concern.
They want to, of course, to secure themselves, because Houthis now are positioning in huge areas of Saudi lands in the south, in Najran, Jizan, and Asir, along the south border with Saudi Arabia.
Number two is the international airport of Sana'a.
Houthis have been insistently demanding the opening of the airport of Sana'a, because of course it caused a lot of humanitarian problems and it caused a lot of political isolation for Houthis.
It's very, very important for Houthis to open, and for Yemenis, of course, because everybody knows that the population of Yemen are in the areas under the control of Houthi.
The south is only 5 million, and Yemen is 30 million, 30 million people.
Do you think, Nasser, that the Houthis really have ambition to expand their power north across the Saudi border, or they're really just on the defensive here?
They are already there.
This is why they are already there, but not to expand, but to enrich, to dig in, to continue at least.
The Saudis tried over and over again, time and time again, to remove them, to drive them back.
They were not able to do that.
No, but I mean, on the question of actually changing the border between Yemen and Saudi for the long term, moving people north, seizing control in a political fashion, not just tactically, militarily, during the fight, but for later.
Are they trying to take part of Saudi, or they're just...
This is a very, very sensitive issue, because the Houthis now do not talk about this, Yemenis and the Houthis do not talk about these things, because there are agreements, there are hysterical agreements between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The south, Najran, Jizan, and Asir were Yemenis, but there were already agreements about this in about 80 years ago, 80 years ago.
So it's not, I think it's not something that would be of issue if the war is over.
But if the war is not over, this is something else.
I mean, if the struggle continues, Yemenis are talking about this land as Yemen.
But this is something that is very, very deep and very long, and has nothing to do more with the war that is going on now.
Let me now complete the four points.
Number one is the borders.
Number two is the reopening of the airport.
Number three is the Houthi relations with Iran.
Of course, Saudi Arabia wants to see Houthis distancing themselves from Iran.
They want to reduce the influence of Iran in Yemen and in the region.
And this is what Saudi Arabia wants to do.
But this issue is a little bit, at least not clear and not, it's vague and ambiguous.
But it is not important for Houthis.
The one that is more important is this, the ballistic missiles and powerful drones.
Saudis want to see Houthis dismantling their weapons, their ballistic missiles and powerful drones.
This is the most difficult and the most divisive and most controversial, and it's highly unlikely that Houthis will accept such a thing, I mean, under any circumstances, in any shape, in any form.
I don't think they are going to accept this at all, at least for the time being.
So this is the most controversial one about the weapons, about the ballistic missiles of Houthis.
So these talks are revolving about these four points.
And what's happening in the region is also very important when it comes to the Saudi Houthi talks.
So United States changed the shift now with Brian Hawk, the envoy in Iraq, the envoy in Iran said that Houthis are independent, Iran is not speaking for Houthis.
And this is, of course, a new shift.
This is not what, this was not the case in September by him.
He was saying something else.
Brian Hawk was saying that Houthis are proxies and Iran is dictating them what to do in Yemen.
But now he's shifting.
And I think the shift, the U.S. shift is to help, is to encourage Saudis to do what they are doing, because Saudis now are more interested than ever before to engage with Houthis and to end the war.
Because after what happened in September the 14th, the attacks on Aramco that disrupted more than half of Saudi oil production seems to be driving Saudis crazy, because they don't want this to happen again at all, and they are doing everything now to end this war with Houthis.
I think they are scrambling because of many things, because not only with the Houthis, but also with the Iranis.
You know, there are some mediations now between Saudi and Iran, like a Pakistan mediation and Iraqi mediation, and many people try to help because they know it's very dangerous to continue like this.
And there is also one more thing that makes Saudis now want to finish this war.
That is the huge losses, of course, the huge losses of Saudi Arabia, because they are being criticized now by everyone.
What did you achieve?
What did you achieve?
What did Mohammed bin Salman achieve over the last five years in Yemen?
Nothing.
Just the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, and also the huge losses in blood and in treasure, locked to what happened to the Aramco.
Aramco now, they tried to fix what happened to them, but it's very, very difficult.
In addition to the increasingly bad reputation, now the reputation of Saudi Arabia is getting worse and worse and worse almost every day.
What happened last week in Pensacola in Florida reminded us all, reminded us and reminded the Americans and everyone of September 11th, where 15 of 19 terrorists were Saudis.
And what happened in Florida was something like this.
So Saudi Arabia is having a very bad reputation, and they try to polish it, they try to repair, and they know that the only thing to polish its image is to stop the war in Yemen, because it's now, Mohammed bin Salman is almost defined by the war crimes in Yemen and by the murder of Fakhshoggi.
So it's a very, very bad image now, and they try to polish it.
They try to make it look a little bit good, especially now because they want to fix their economy.
And I think you might have heard what happened last week when they bought their Aramco in the stock markets.
They failed.
I mean, Mohammed bin Salman failed to sell the shares of Aramco because of his bad reputation.
He was touting and trying and pushing from 2016 for three years now, and he failed over and over again.
He failed to sell in New York Stock Exchange and in London Stock Exchange.
And he wanted to raise, for example, $100 billion from the selling, but unfortunately he raised last week only $25 billion from his local market, from his local stock exchange in Riyadh.
But no one came from New York, no one came from London, no one came from any place because they don't trust him at all after what happened in Yemen and for Fakhshoggi, and after also what happened to the Aramco itself last September.
So this is the new thing that I see as a new thing.
But also, I can leave you, if you want to ask a question, or I can continue about how it can be solved.
Yeah, go ahead.
I'm listening.
Well, that's right.
There are now, there are four, actually there are four, three pathways to end the war in Yemen.
Saudi-Houthi talks that we have talked now about is only one pathway.
So Saudi-Houthi talk is one pathway.
The second is the Emirati-Saudi, the so-called Riyadh deal between the Saudi and the Emirati proxies on the ground.
This is also the second path.
And the third path is the UN, that is the Hodeidah agreement, the Stockholm agreement, which has been in place for one year to this month, to 18th of December, one year.
And it is still in place, and it is still holding, yes, but with a lot of problems.
So now Saudis, because they want now, because Mohammed bin Salman himself wants to end the war in Yemen, they want, he seems to be wanting to get these three pathways together in one pathway that could end up in stopping the war in Yemen altogether.
But it's not this easy because the Riyadh agreement did not achieve anything, unfortunately.
It was, the deadlines have passed in 5th of December, and this week, last week, without achieving anything.
So why?
Because Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a deep rift because they have different agendas and different goals, and Saudi Arabia wants something, and the United Arab Emirates wants something different.
So they are conflicting.
And I think now the only thing or the only obstacle, big obstacle, is the Saudi Emirati rift, because the path of Saudi Emirati proxies is not moving forward at all, while Hodeida path is moving.
Yes, slowly, but it is moving.
And the Houthi Saudis are or seems to be moving very fast, because Saudis know that it is the key thing.
If they succeed with Houthis, they will succeed with the others, because it is difficult and Houthi are controlling on the ground, and they can do a lot if they achieve with Houthis.
But I told you about the sticking points.
There are a lot of problems, and the most important one is the Houthi weapons, because Houthis would not accept, would not want to dismantle his weapons at all, at least for the time being.
And Saudi Arabia will not, of course, will not feel secured, will not feel comfortable if Houthi still or keep having this powerful weapons.
So, I think they are going to meet in the middle, at a point in the middle, by making concessions and making compromises.
And without these concessions and compromises, they would not be able to find a way out at all.
But I think, because Saudi Arabia now, because Mohammed bin Salman in particular, and his brother, you know, the envoy of Mohammed bin Salman is his brother, that is Khalid bin Salman, the deputy minister of defense.
He's the envoy between Houthis and his brother.
I mean, he went to Oman, he met with the Houthis directly or indirectly.
And this is why the Saudis and Saudi Houthis talks having that high momentum, because it's Mohammed bin Salman behind them and his brother.
And why?
Because they want to end the war.
They want to get out of the quagmire that they are bogged down in for five years now without achieving anything.
You know, that's really the best news about this.
I mean, he's the one who started this war, MBS, back in 2015.
And the fact that he wants out, that's a good thing.
Hopefully, he can find an escape route.
As you said, there are many paths to peace here.
And I'm sorry, because I'm so late.
I called you late.
And now I have to go.
I have just one minute left.
But I was one thing I was wondering about was about...
I give you the most important thing.
No problem.
Go ahead.
What are you left with?
Well, I already know what the most important thing is.
I'll ask you that in a second, too.
But I guess I'll ask them both.
First of all, I'm curious about the amount of popular support for the Houthis in the capital city.
They are this group that came out of the north and are not traditionally the ones who hold power in the so-called central government there.
So I wonder, in all these years of war, and in all the hardship and all that, what popular opinion of the non-Houthi population or the non-Zaydi Shia population of Yemen, you know, what their opinion is of this regime.
And then, of course, the most important thing is the humanitarian crisis that's still going on.
So I'll let you go on about that, please.
Yes, I'll tell you very clearly about this point in particular.
Houthi is Zaydi, yes.
And Zaydi is the minority, 33 or 30, let me say, 33 of the population of the north of all Yemen.
But this is not the issue.
It's not about this.
It's not sectarian now.
Houthis now proved that they are leading Yemen like anyone.
They have a unity government.
They have a council, presidential council.
And they are also ready to open a dialogue, to engage in dialogue with the other people.
So it's not like this.
I mean, it's not this way.
It's not working this way, as one might understand when he or she is outside Yemen.
No, Houthis tries to deal with it as a group that is ruling the other groups, because there are a big coalition now.
But he's political parties and also tribal federations.
I think you told me, Nasser, a couple of years ago, that once the bombs start falling, that the general opinion is, hey, we're all Houthis now.
I mean, these guys, the same way Americans rallied around George W. Bush, of all people, you attack us, we're all one in defense, whoever's in charge, right?
This is the most important point.
This is the most important point.
And I can also remind you of myself.
I myself, I'm a secular, I'm a secular, I'm a secular, but I am supporting Houthi.
Why?
Only because I'm under bombings for five years, and I'm under starvation and Saudi atrocities and all these things.
So the others are like me.
So it's not a matter of sectarianism only or regionalism or partisanship or something like this.
It's a national thing.
It's security.
It's dignity.
It's all these things, not only.
And because of the Saudis' foolishness and the atrocities and the crimes, they united the Yemenis.
They united Yemenis by their crimes.
And please give a word now for the humanitarian situation, because this is clearly the worst thing that the U.S. government is doing right now.
And that's really saying something.
And yet, at the same time, as bad as it is, is the depth of the silence.
The American people just don't know the truth about this.
Yes, the humanitarian crisis is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, as UN says and everybody knows.
And I would tell you that it's even worse than they say, because they think, UN thinks that it does a lot.
It does not that much, because what Saudis are damaging and what Saudis are harming every day is much, much, much more than UN can heal or can help.
No, because there is a real problem.
People are dying now because of diseases or because of starvation and because of a lot of things.
Because Saudi Arabia is still using the starvation and blockade as a weapon of the war.
Until today, they said, for example, many times they would open the airport of Sana'a at least for the sick people, because hundreds of people die because they can't go abroad for further treatment.
So Saudis said, OK, we will open the airport.
For two months now, they did not.
The airport is still closed.
So because Saudi Arabia feels or uses the humanitarian issues as a lever, they use it as a weapon.
They don't want to open the airport until they are sure that it's OK.
They don't want to also lift the blockade for humanitarian aid and commercial things until they know that Houthis would do what they want.
So they are still trying to use the humanitarian issue to bring Houthis to their knees.
This is the thing that they will not be able to get.
And the last five years proved this.
But Saudis still sometimes keep being stupid.
They never learn from the past lessons at all.
So the humanitarian crisis is still the worst.
And it's getting worse by the day, unfortunately.
All right.
I'm sorry I'm running so late.
I hope we can do this again very soon here, Nasser.
And again, I'm really sorry for what my country is doing to yours.
Thank you very much for your interest in Yemen and for having me.
Thank you.
Take care.
Talk soon.
Thank you.
All right, you guys, that's Nasser Arabi, reporter out of Sana'a, Yemen.
