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Okay so on the line, I have a very important guest here, Arnaldo Claudio.
He was a colonel in the U.S. Army in the military police in the Iraq War, in Iraq War II.
And he gave this incredible story to Univision.
They got the scoop first.
You can find it there at univision.com.
It's called Trump's National Security Advisor Challenged Over Human Rights Record.
Welcome to the show.
How are you doing, sir?
I'm doing fine.
Thank you so much.
And thank you for having me on your show.
Very happy to have you on and appreciate you making some time for us.
So unfortunately, this didn't seem to get too much coverage.
There's been so much else going on in the news, I can see why it was somewhat ignored.
But it's a very important story that you tell here.
So I guess I just will set you up by saying that General McMaster, now the National Security Advisor, is renowned as one of America's greatest army generals.
And his temporary counterinsurgency success, as it's known anyway, in the town of Tal Afar in northwestern Iraq, back in the 2005 era in Iraq War II, is a big part of that reputation.
And that's the background to the story that you tell here.
According to Univision, in 2005, you were actually sent to investigate some complaints against the command in Tal Afar.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
I was the 18th Airborne Corps Provost Marshal, but more specifically, I was the Multinational Coalition Corps Provost Marshal, which means in civilian terms, I was the chief of police for all military police in Iraq.
And I landed there on the 16th of March of 2005, and departed Iraq sometime in 2006, the second or third week of January.
Okay.
And then so who was it that actually sent you to Tal Afar?
Well, the story goes this way.
Part of my duties and responsibility as the Corps Provost Marshal to the three-star General J.R. Vines was to ensure that all the detainee operations in the Corps area of operation were done in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and also with the prescribed standard operating procedures and laws and regulations of the Corps and how we fight the fight in Iraq.
Early sometime in April, we were seeing very obscure numbers coming out of Tal Afar.
We look at the detention that was occurring in the AOR versus the numbers that were provided, and they just didn't match.
And for some reason, we thought either there were issues with reporting the numbers or something wasn't right.
So in a couple of briefings with General Huggins, who was the second in command in Iraq, I said, listen, I think we have a problem.
So we started communicating with the Provost Marshal, which was a major in Mosul, working at that time for Major General Carlos Rodriguez, later on a four-star general, and then I think he just retired.
And he was telling me that, yes, in fact, they were having problems with the numbers in Tal Afar.
So this kept on going for a little while, and we knew for a fact that the intake was about 900, when in fact they had a capacity for 250.
So we started scratching our heads.
So I kept reporting this until I was given orders by General Vines to go up to Tal Afar to find out what was going on.
I took a team of about seven people up there, which included my detention operations guy, an inspector general representative, a representative from the medical community, a representative of the operations detention ops guy, and so forth.
And we flew up to Mosul, and then we got transported by ground to Tal Afar.
But prior to that, General Vines was very specific.
He says, if this guy's doing anything wrong, okay, need to report back, and if he gets out of hand, just bring him back with you, okay?
That was my orders.
They're pretty simple, okay?
And remember, we just have gotten out of Abu Ghraib, in the scandal of Abu Ghraib, okay?
So we didn't want to get into nothing like that or close to that.
It would have been devastating for our national security, and it would have been devastating for the Army and to our nation as a whole.
So I got to Mosul, I briefed General Rodriguez at that time what I was going to do, and then we got transported by land to Tal Afar.
Tal Afar is a pretty rough area.
I mean, it's like landing on the moon.
And we knew that the skirmishes up there were pretty rough.
But I also knew, because I have a lot of insurgency and counterinsurgency background, probably more than the average military, and probably even more than many general officers.
I served in El Salvador during the war.
I served in Colombia.
I served in Peru.
And all these areas where there are insurgency operations in Central South America were taking place.
And I served as an advisor to the urban counterterrorism special forces in Colombia.
I served as the advisor for the new Special Brigade for Military Security in El Salvador in the construction of that.
So I kind of know what I was doing, okay?
It wasn't like a guy going up there didn't know his or her responsibilities and what to look for.
So we sent a message up to Tal Afar that I wanted to meet with the colonel in charge of the operation.
We knew at the time it was H.R. McMaster, period, okay?
So I got to Tal Afar, and I got out of the Humvee at that time and walked into a dining facility where I met Colonel McMaster.
As I walked in, he was alone in there, and I kind of figured out who he was by his physiques.
So I sat in front of them, and it was a very short conversation.
He basically didn't want me there, and he says, you know, get on with your duty and get out of here.
I said, not so fast.
You know, I'm here, I have orders, and if you in fact are violating, okay, the standards of how to take care of the detainees, you're going back with me, period.
So it was very short.
There were some cuss words used in that exchange, and I left.
So I got in my vehicle, and as I was approaching the area where the detainees were, I already knew something was really wrong.
There's about three to four hundred of them outside.
They looked as if they were next to each other, and in fact they were, and they were handcuffed next to each other, facing ground, some up and down.
But it was amazing, because as soon as I got out of the vehicle, I mean, you could smell the urine and the defecation in the atmosphere.
It was like, my God, you know, what is this?
So as I approached the detainees with one of my medics, okay, there was a Sergeant Major Del Valle.
I approached them.
He was the medic, and we immediately looked at their lips.
They were completely dry.
Their skin was dehydrated.
Apparently they had defecated, urinated all over themselves, and they were out there, you know, in the middle of the sun, and that day was extremely hot.
And I said, what the world's going on in here?
So they told me that they had another bunch inside a tent.
So when I walked inside the tent, I found the same conditions, okay?
And I said, what are you guys doing?
So we interviewed a couple of the guards there.
We interviewed a couple of the detainees through an interpreter, and we saw a couple of the guys kind of couldn't walk right, and we asked them.
They told us that they had been beaten with sticks in order to take them to the latrine.
So when I went to the guy in charge of that operation, I said, what the hell are you doing here?
He tells me that Colonel McMaster had ordered the good detainee behavior program.
In other words, if you won't give actionable intelligence, you're not going anywhere.
And the rules were clear.
You know, once they reach that detention facility, you have to let them go.
Within 14 days, you have something or you didn't.
And if you have something, you have to move them through the chain of command and the structures that we have set for detainee operations.
Some guys were there for months and obviously not taken care of.
So what I did was, first of all, I needed to reorganize the place and make sure the detainees were offered food, water, and a chance to do personal hygiene.
And after we did that, we spent some hours in there, and we made sure that the people who were there understood the rules of regulation and what to do.
And we worked late at night.
When we came back the next morning, they had released about 120 of them.
And so things started to work its way as it's supposed to be.
And obviously we had to depart because I had to report back to General Vines.
I went back and obviously presented my report to General Vines, a violation of the Geneva Convention and the Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures.
In a week, they released another 400, and then they kind of stabilized at 250 or less.
I was surprised.
So I never saw McMaster again.
I saw him two days later at Camp Victory.
It looks like he'd been asked to talk to General Vines.
Obviously he redeployed.
But it happened.
Some detainee abuse happened up in Talafard that was never reported through the chain of command.
Or the media.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, incredible.
But you're saying his command was moved.
That was the most recent point you made.
They took him out of there because of this.
No, no.
He did not get relief.
No.
OK.
He finished his command there and redeployed.
OK.
Well, yeah, that's what I meant.
Redeployed means what?
He was sent to somewhere else in Iraq after that.
No.
Redeployment means he left Iraq with the 3rd ACR after completion of duties.
But it wasn't as a result of this.
It was just later after the end of his tour.
No.
So here is 2006.
Nothing happens.
2007.
Nothing happens.
And I noticed that he didn't get picked for the Brigadier General as a Brigadier General.
So I said, OK, you know, good.
OK.
I retire in 2007.
And suddenly in 2008, I see his name in the Brigadier General list, and I'm scratching my head.
I'm saying, whoa, OK, what's going on here?
So here's what I understood.
He was a good friend of General David Petraeus.
OK.
Matter of fact, he worked for David Petraeus, I think, in 2006 and 2007.
On a move that it is kind of first in the Army or anybody, they bring a general officer out of a combat zone, meaning General Petraeus, to sit as the president of the board to elect these new general officers.
And he picks H.R. McMaster.
OK.
So I'm going, OK.
I see how this works.
So the list comes out in sometime, I think it was July of 2008.
And I went into the website of the Inspector General of the Army, and I said, hey, listen, I said my story again.
And this time, the Inspector General Army got a hold of me.
It wasn't him directly, but people within the Inspector General's office.
But they also went in an interview.
Another eyewitness, his name is John Sabo, he's a first class, just retired, a very, very good man, a very honest and ethical and moral person.
And we told them the story again.
They got back with me, and they got back with Sabo, well, we don't know.
We don't have anything, you know, the typical, I don't know.
And obviously the forces are bigger on the other side than in my side.
So they held kind of his promotion, because he didn't get promoted until sometime August of next year, 2009.
So I said I had it, OK, I'm not going to, I'm done.
So I went on with my life until recently.
A friend of mine posted something on Facebook, and talking about H.R. McMaster having been selected as the National Security Advisor.
And I just nonchalantly put on my Facebook, you know, I said, if they only knew what happened back in 2005.
That's all I did.
I didn't write anything else than that.
And looks like my friend, being the type of friend he is, he had a friend in Univision, and they called me.
I have absolutely no issues talking about it, because it's true, OK, it happened.
And that's how the story comes about.
Unfortunate, but it happened.
These were abused in Tal Afar under the orders and command and control of H.R. McMaster.
All right, now, so when it comes to him being skipped over for promotion, do you believe it's because of this report that nobody else apparently knew about?
Because part of his story is that, yeah, he was skipped over and everybody who loved him so much really resented that and lobbied for him to finally be promoted like he really deserved.
I, you know, in speculating, OK, and because I knew and I had made the report, I was wishing the fact that that was the case.
But there, my understanding is there were other issues with him in terms of personality and in terms of what type of person he is.
Remember, the Tal Afar story is told only by one person, him.
Reporters really didn't tell the Tal Afar story, and everything coming out of Tal Afar, for example, if you take my story in El Salvador, I tell my story through military review, OK, and it was my story.
And if I wanted to change it to my favor, that was too easy, because nobody else witnessed it, OK?
So that's the way these things go, OK, where you have what it seems to be tremendous victories, but you're the author of the book, OK?
And I remember, I remember talking to General Petraeus when he was a two-star.
I did have Landon in Iraq, and we found ourselves, I think, it was in the Minister of Defense, OK?
And his philosophy for cops was, you know, we're going to build, you know, some special forces type of cops and stuff like that.
I said, no, you won't, OK?
And I said, what you need to do is community policing type efforts here in Iraq.
The last thing we need is a cop that looks like a warfighter.
We need a cop that looks like a cop, that when the kids go to school, OK, they can feel comfortable with it, that we can do traffic control, that we can do crime prevention, that we can do things that police do.
And I think that upset him, and he asked me what kind of, you know, where I was coming from.
I said, pretty easy.
I've been through this before, OK?
I was in Panama, and I worked, you know, as the Botanic Commander for Military Police there.
It had a lot to do with the Panamanian reorganization of police.
I told him I constructed the military police over in El Salvador from scratch, OK?
I worked in Colombia, so I know about these things.
And he just walked away.
But luckily, General Casey in 2006 called it the year of the police, and we were able to do something with the police in Iraq.
As a matter of fact, I remember that we did a functional military police, and let me explain that.
We had two brigades in Iraq of military police, and one was dedicated for detainee operations because we thought, we really, really believed that this was a national security issue, and that if another Abu Ghraib was about to happen, or would happen, and on the other side, we needed to train the police force in Iraq to be, you know, consonant with human rights, OK, and civil rights in Geneva.
So we were very serious.
Well now, let me ask you to elaborate on that, because I'm going to end up quoting you later.
You mentioned this twice now, that the story, you were afraid that the story of the detainee treatment at Tal Afar, that if it got out, that that would threaten American national security.
What do you mean by that?
Well, it just, yeah, good question.
I appreciate that.
And what I'm trying to say is that that was not my view.
That was the view of everyone, that we just have gotten out of Abu Ghraib.
And anything that was similar to a story that looks like, smelled like Abu Ghraib would have given the United States a terrible black eye again, and it would have been devastating for the United States to, you know, to confess or to bring apart that some stuff like this happened.
But at Tal Afar, my findings were pretty close to something like that.
Not at the scale of Abu Ghraib, but at least, you know, a reminisce or something close to detainee abuse.
But you're referring to just, you know, the Japanese would have had less respect from us from now on?
Or you're referring to the actual state of the situation in Iraq War Two, if the story had come out there, how the Iraqis would have reacted?
Well, not the Japanese, the entire world.
We went through Abu Ghraib, we fixed it, and we're going back to that?
I mean, what kind of force were we?
What kind of nation of ethics and morals are we?
Well, now, you say that you threatened to arrest McMaster.
You told him, hey, listen, I'm going to investigate, and if I think you're committing crimes here, you're coming back with me in handcuffs.
I said a little bit more than that.
But why didn't you arrest him then?
Because apparently there were crimes taking place right in front of your eyes.
Right.
That's a great question.
I went back looking for him and he had disappeared.
He got on a helicopter and got the hell out of there, huh?
Scott, I have no idea where he went.
I went all over the public.
But you planned to arrest him, you're saying.
That day, you would have arrested him if you could have found him.
I would have asked them nicely to come with me.
Because it never happened.
I'm not going to speculate, but I'm pretty sure I would have done that, knowing what I know about Claudio.
And now, in terms of military police, law and order, and all these things and how this works, you would have gone ahead and charged him, or you would have recommended charges to your superiors?
I did.
You did recommend charges?
Yeah, I went up to...
You actually charged him yourself, is that what you're saying?
Well, I don't have the ability to charge him.
I recommend it.
I see.
Okay.
Basically, what you do in the Army, it is almost like a formal 15-6 is what you use as the baseline to go.
I did not do that.
I just provided information and recommendations to the command in general.
And I went and said, this is what's going on.
This is what happened, and this is what I recommend.
And obviously, there is somewhere, somewhere, there is a piece of paper that says that.
So I am pretty sure that when I saw McMaster two days later, somebody was talking to him.
But again, not my job.
I was the provost marshal.
I was not his commander.
Gotcha.
All right.
Now, just to rehash the abuse for a minute here, to make sure I understand you right, you're saying that this was a facility that was designed for 250, and there were up to or more even than 900 people being held there.
Less cap it at about 900.
900.
Okay.
And then, and you're saying outright that you could just, you could tell on inspection with your staff, your professional medical staff with you, that these men were being deprived of food and water, as well as being left to defecate on themselves, etc.
And physically abused.
Yes.
And now, you keep mentioning, in terms of the public relations of the whole thing, and of course, that is part of it.
But legally speaking, too, this is after Abu Ghraib, where whichever rules had been changed were presumably changed back.
And if anybody was going to be torturing anybody, it would be the CIA in Morocco, it would not be army soldiers in Iraq, treating regular Iraqi civilians this way.
So can you explain the difference in the law from, say, January 2004 to April 2005, when you're looking at this?
Well, it was clear.
We had mandates within the 18th Airborne Corps, the Multinational Coalition Corps, how was expected the treatment of detainees.
Matter of fact, General Casey went even further.
He created what they call Task Force 134.
Task Force 134 was commanded by a two-star general.
His last name was Brandenburg.
He was an infantry officer.
And his job was to ensure the proper care of detainees throughout the entire area of operation.
Okay?
That was his job.
My job was to ensure to the corps commander that detention operation of the units he commanded were done in accordance with the rules of regulation.
I mean, they were clear.
And not only they were clear, I mean, to the point that all detainees were given, you know, a number as they were processed in, because one of the things that we didn't want to do, it is not have accountability of these people.
We wanted to make sure that they were treated correctly.
We wanted to make sure that they were fed correctly.
And we want to make sure that we give them, you know, the deserving respect of any human being.
Listen, regardless of what happened.
I mean, as a provost, Marsha, there was two brigades with us.
And unfortunately that year, the two brigade commanders, obviously we lost 42 military police.
So it could have been very easy that one of those detainees had to do with the direct death of one of our military.
But our job was to protect that person and to ensure that due process was in effect.
And that was my duty and my responsibility, not to drag them and let them defecate and let them urinate all over themselves, you know, guide them to the, you know, to the latrine with a stick, hit them, depriving them from food and stuff like that.
Because at the end of the day, you don't know what you have in front of you.
You know, he's a detainee, but, you know, the process would take care of him or her or what they had done.
Listen, Scott, I just, I'm a good person, okay?
That doesn't mean that I was going to feel pity and stuff like that, but what's right is right.
And I have a daughter who's in the Air Force, and if she ever gets captured or stuff like that, and myself, I want to make sure that our rules of regulation are modeled, okay, to the world, how you treat people, because then we, we, we ourselves, then we'll have to complain about why we treat it this way, and it's easy because you guys treated us like that, and that can't happen.
That just can't happen.
Well, now, did you and your men find that any men had died there, been deprived to death?
No, no, we didn't find that.
I'm interested in the part about what you say to, well, oh, no, let me ask you, as far as just being deprived, being locked there, left out in the sun, as you describe, left to defecate on themselves and all these things, was there also evidence of stress positions and temperature manipulations and beatings and these other things, or they were just being held, warehoused in the worst way?
My operations sergeant was the one in my medic about, they were being with a stick, okay, behind the legs, so that did happen.
But listen, you don't, let's get this right.
Wrong is wrong.
It doesn't matter the level, okay?
You can hang a guy, or you can hit him with a stick.
What's worse?
They're the same.
It's wrong, okay?
And I had a responsibility to the nation first, and everybody else, to ensure that would not happen, okay?
It just was wrong.
So it doesn't matter how you put it, Scott.
What's wrong is wrong.
Well, I'm just thinking ahead to the spin, if this story ever grew bigger, that, well, you know, yeah, they could have warehoused them better, but it's not like they were really beating them and torturing them like in the Abu Ghraib days.
But then you're saying, yeah, they were hitting them with a stick.
That goes to show, I think, that the way that they were being held was part of that, right?
Well, if you remember, I spent a lot of time in Abu Ghraib, and I spent a lot of time in Bukha, a lot of time, okay?
Because that was part of my responsibility.
You look at Bukha and Abu Ghraib, nobody was handcuffed like that for days.
Nobody was deprived, okay, of food and shelter and stuff like that.
They were given the opportunity to pray, you know.
And I know there's a lot of people out there who say, well, who gives a hoop about all of that?
I said, we have to.
It is the law.
It's the way.
It's basic human rights.
Period.
Okay?
Because I remember, listen, I remember in Salvador, I was in the middle of the jungle, okay, when we were doing the treaty with the, you know, with insurgents.
We were just a few of us, military and Iraq, and there was like 5,000 of them.
And they didn't touch us.
They want to make sure that things were right.
And the only reason they did that is because we respected the fact that, you know, when the surgeons were in the hands of any of the advisors and stuff like that, which did happen, that it was done correctly, okay?
So, you know, sometimes it's tit for tat, but, you know, then you have these crazy lunatics of the ISIS that they don't care how you treat them.
They're going to decapitate you.
And I remember seeing those guys because we had four, you know, core area, you know, kind of big confinement facilities, okay?
We had the one in Camp Crawford.
That's where Saddam Hussein, you know, initially was into, and where they had all the high value detainees, okay?
We had Camp Ashraf, which unknown to a lot of people, there were Iranians, all of them, actually led by female Iranians, which was a bunch of Iranians that special forces found in the town of Ashraf, called the MEK, okay?
And we had, we have a battalion of military police security in them, and that story that I think they already closed that down, and they left and went to third countries.
Then we have Abu Ghraib itself.
And remember, we got out of Abu Ghraib, kind of the cement facility, okay?
And then we established a tent-like facility that was housing about, Jesus, you know, thousands of detainees.
And then you had the final stage, which is Camp Bukha, which is at the border, south border of Iraq.
And at one given point, there was about 16,500 of them.
So you imagine, you know, if 16,500 would have been abused and treated different, stuff like that, we would have gotten out of our hands.
And specifically, even worse, okay, that we were to tarnish, you know, the image of our nation once more time.
What about Camp Nama, that was under the control of Stanley McChrystal, did you ever investigate that?
I can't talk to you about that.
You can't talk to me because it's just a secret?
Because I don't know.
Because you don't know?
Okay.
Well, that's a different answer than not allowing it.
Exactly.
No, I don't know.
Now, here's something that I think is important, because, you know, assuming that there's ever a controversy about this, which it seems like there ought to be, I think, well, part of the spin from Camp Nama is, okay, yeah, well, it was all happening on McChrystal's watch.
But he's such a high god up on the top of Mount Olympus, that he couldn't have known or been accountable for what was happening.
And now, so I'm trying to draw the parallel to what's happening here.
Well, there's no parallel, because I had a conversation with McMaster.
I told him this is what's going on.
Well, and he was just a colonel, right?
He wasn't a three-star general.
He was a colonel.
He was the one responsible directly.
He is the commander.
Everything stops, but he knew.
He knew because basically the orders of the good, you know, the good behavior program was instituted by him.
And the good behavior program, meaning they were canceling the rules that said you have to let them go after two weeks, and they were keeping them as long as they could.
And the good behavior program was instituted by them, saying, if you don't give me what I think is actionable intelligence, you're never going to leave this place.
Right.
In defiance of the rule that says that they're supposed to spring them after two weeks.
So in other words, what they call a good behavior program is actually an indefinite detention program.
Yeah.
Until you feel like it.
I mean, what kind of, you know, this is just insane.
But now, so no one was ever held accountable, even lower on the chain than McMaster for these crimes in Tal Afar.
And then again, I was not the guy who was going to do punishment.
That was for somebody else to do.
My job was to report it, and I did.
But you would have heard if anything had happened or not.
Certainly nothing happened to him.
I'm not going to lie to you.
I was so busy that once I did that, I had a million other things going on in Iraq to include, you know, ensuring that major supply routes and activities of the military police at core level was done correctly.
I had the, you know, there were like 98 forward operation base that needed to ensure the safety and security through the military police.
I was doing everything else with the K-9.
I had 106 dogs, you know, all over the place that we needed to take care of the training of these dogs and ensuring the access control, OK, of all forward operating bases.
So you know, war heals fast.
And in a day you get an issue, you tackle it, you fix it, and you go to the next issue.
And that's what I did with this.
I understand.
All right.
Now, so tell me one more time, then again, here, please, sir, if you could, about when you went back to the inspector general, I believe you said that this is in 2008.
When I remember, I'm retired at that point already.
And this is when I heard that General McMaster was picked up for brigadier general.
And it just I went like, what?
So that's when I go in into the website of the of the inspector general of the Department of the Army, and I write and I tell them the story I'm telling you today, OK?
They did contact me.
They contact us other eyewitnesses to that.
I think they called me three times, OK, and then never heard from them again.
And then, boom, in August, I think, of 2009, they promoted him finally to brigadier general.
Yeah.
So I wonder, well, I know a journalist who's really good with the FOIA.
And I'm wondering, you know, if we can get maybe, yeah, either or both of those things, you know, because you didn't just tell them you wrote the story again, basically, and turned it into them.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, it's it's it should be in the inspector general, you know, complaint of of 2008.
Just look for my name and it should be there.
OK, well, listen.
I really appreciate your time on the show and appreciate you coming forward about this very important subject.
Yeah.
Yeah.
OK, well, I got a great job right now.
I don't know if you know what I'm doing right now, but I'm the police monitor in Puerto Rico.
I'm the guy who's in charge of the oversight for the agreement that's going into between the Department of Justice and the police, specifically for human rights and civil rights abuses of police.
So I haven't changed.
All right.
Well, very good to hear.
Thank you very much for your time.
Appreciate it.
OK.
All right.
So that is Arnaldo Claudio, formerly a colonel in the U.S. Army, and he was the provost marshal of the 18th Airborne Corps, basically the chief of police of all the military police during Iraq War Two.
And for more background, you can find this very important story at Univision dot com.
Trump's national security adviser challenged over human rights record.
I'm Scott Horton.
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