08/10/16 – Marcy Wheeler – The Scott Horton Show

Hey, Al Scott Horton here.
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All right, y'all.
Introducing the great Marcy Wheeler, Empty Wheel, is what we call her on Twitter and on the internet there.
Her great blog, EmptyWheel.net.
And she's just born with the x-ray eyes, or I don't know, maybe she's well-trained with the x-ray eyes.
She can read right through the legalese and tell you what they're really saying, no matter what it is, but especially national security stuff and civil liberty stuff.
And here she is in the New Republic, for crying out loud.
I hope you don't stare too deep into the abyss there, Marcy, but this one is called...
It's the new New Republic.
It's not the old pro-war ones.
Oh, oh, okay.
Well, we'll see.
Are there any limits on Obama's drone war, really?
Very good question.
And this is in regards to this new, I don't know what to call it, I'll call it a paper, that way you can characterize it correctly for us here in a minute, that the administration released, I think of their own free will, right?
This wasn't a Jason Leopold twisted their arm or anything.
No, it was.
It was a...
Oh, yeah?
ACLU twisted their arm.
Yeah.
It was a three-year court fight.
Oh, what the hell do I know?
This was tied to the ACLU FOIA for the Anwar al-Awlaki documents, and I still have to read the court decision releasing it, but it's pretty remarkable.
ACLU had to work pretty hard to get it released.
It only came out because national security people are big blabbermouths these days, and so they like to kind of say stuff publicly and not be held accountable to it, and that's how we got the al-Awlaki memos, remember the targeted killing memo, right?
This is all part of the same package, and because of that public blabbing, this also came out.
So, yeah, they didn't want to give it to us.
Meaning the plaintiffs said to the judge, it is not a secret, they keep talking about it in the Washington Post, your honor, and they can't have it both ways, and the judge agreed with them?
Yeah, pretty much.
Now, that's pretty cool.
Yeah.
All right.
And then, so, now, there's some kind of weird thing about just what kind of paper this is, because a PPG is a brand new thing.
It's not a presidential decision directive, I think is what Bill Clinton called them.
They call them different things, the different levels and types of executive orders, but they made up a new kind of executive order just for this memo?
What?
Yeah, so, right, under Obama, these things are normally called presidential policy directives, and some of them get released.
There's been at least 51 under Obama, 51, 41, regardless, you know, and those generally start, they're written on White House stationery, which this one, bizarrely, is not, and they say, here are the rules, or their executive orders, which say, in much more detail, here are the rules.
This is not either of those things.
It's a very bizarre document, and I think it is a testament, A, to the fact that the executive, Obama, but not just Obama, more importantly, his national security staff, that they want to keep their options open while appearing to have rules in place, and then it's also a testament to the fact that the White House is really micromanaging this process, and it should be regarded, I didn't write this in the New Republic, but I think it really should be, there's been this evolution since Reagan, where the White House does more and more stuff, and there's actually, finally, in Congress, a discussion of, at what point does it become too big, at what point does the National Security Council become too much of its own agency, at what point should that become subject to some kind of oversight from Congress, because right now, it's not, and I think the fact that you have a granular procedure in place directing people in the White House how to do stuff that used to live at agencies, I think that's a testament to it's gone too far, but we're not having that discussion, at least not yet.
Yeah, well, so that's definitely interesting, where the NSC has become, kind of by loophole, its own Department of Defense, or its own, sorry, well, it is, it's the combination of the intelligence agencies and the military agencies and everybody else, the coordination branch, but it becoming its own lawless department, outside of oversight, very important perspective, a way to put it there, because, you know, I actually have read, very recently, I think I read something about, it was in terms of Hillary Clinton's frustration with how centralized the decision making was in the White House, and how in the State Department, they wanted more of a role or something like that, and they really described just how big and more and more influential, especially under Obama, the National Security Council has become.
But they still didn't quite put it that way, the way you just did, where, hey, it's sort of its own department, but outside the rule of law here at all, where at least the DOD and the State Department are, you know, there's all kinds of different legislation that governs the way that they behave in the world, but the NSC, the White House gets to get away with bloody murder here, huh?
And also to get away, to avoid congressional scrutiny, and that's the really important part is- Iran-Contra, right?
That's what they did in Iran-Contra.
So we'll use the National Security Council, the Vice President's office.
That's why I said it's Reagan, is that, you know, the lesson of Iran-Contra was everything's moving under the National Security Council, and that creates oversight problems, and Obama gets a lot of criticism.
Bill Clinton was the same, so it's not like Hillary should be complaining, but, and I guarantee you Hillary will continue the trend.
So at some point, Congress needs to say, hey, we need to exercise oversight over this stuff, and that's not happening yet, but it really does, and the drones, I think, are a really good example of why that needs to happen.
Yeah, now, okay, so, and now, what exactly do you mean, then, elaborate a little bit about this micromanaging, because the drones are flown by Air Force kids, right?
But the targeting and the choosing is done mostly by the CIA, and I think that goes for Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, as well, I don't know, maybe Islamic State is a different subject matter, I don't know, but, so, just how much of the decision-making has to go from, you know, Langley, or the Pentagon, over to the White House for final approval?
Well, here's the interesting thing, is this was finalized in May 2013, but it was mostly written in 2012, by Obama's then-Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security, meaning John Brennan, and the procedure, the granular procedure I described, basically puts a lot of the decision-making power in that role.
So John Brennan wrote the rules for John Brennan, and then moved to CIA, and as he was writing it, there were reports that he had exempted, for example, Pakistan from these rules.
There was a Wall Street Journal report, for example, that said there was a classified annex.
I asked an administration official about this, and he gave me a non-answer.
I said, you know, here in 2012, the Wall Street, or it may have been 2013, but here, the Wall Street Journal said that Brennan created an exception for Pakistan, which he will then run when he's at CIA.
Is that true?
And this person said, well, the whole thing is classified, and didn't answer the question about a classified annex or not, so, but one thing, just as an example that's clear, one of the things that's particularly disturbing about Pakistan is that we know the government has done a lot of what are called side payment strikes.
Right, against Pakistani Taliban forces that the Pakistani government wants as sort of their payoff for letting us attack al-Qaeda targets that we want in their country.
Right, so our job is first to go kill people that Pakistan wants killed, and only after we've killed a certain number of people will Pakistan then let us kill the people we want, and, you know, there's a question about whether we're allowed to kill the terrorists that Pakistan likes.
I mean, so it's a mess.
That's true, especially in Pakistan, but also has been true for a lot of the period we've been working in Yemen, and it's not clear who counts those strikes.
Like the Director of National Intelligence came out with a completely unrealistic number of how many civilians had been killed, and one of the questions I have, which hasn't been answered, is are they not counting these side payment strikes?
When we're done with U.S. drones or U.S. planes, do they not count if we are attributing them to Pakistan, to Yemen, they're the ones who gave us the crappy intelligence that ends up killing wedding parties?
Those don't go on our balance of dead civilians?
Don't know.
But what is clear is that the PPG does include, it's got this broad language that says, here are the rules, but the President can basically do what he wants, and as part of that language tied to the President can do what he wants, it explicitly says, and that includes killing other people to protect other people's citizens.
So it includes that side payment strike as part of the rule set, but it doesn't explain a lot of other things, such as what that means for these numbers.
And then there were other things that were pretty remarkable and really deserve more attention, but there's a lot of discussion about capture.
Wait, wait, hang on one second, let me stick with Pakistan for a second.
I just want to say this out loud just so I'll remember it better later, and I don't know if you'll have a remark about this or not, and we'll definitely get to the capture, because that was next on my list actually also.
But you're so smart, because the thing that you said, well I already knew that anyway, the thing that you pointed out there kind of as an aside about, well what about targets that America does want to hit, but they're terrorists that the Pakistanis like, or targets anyway, that the Pakistanis like.
So we're hitting the people that they want hit as a payoff for them to allow us to hit the guys we want hit, like say al-Qaeda guys up in the northwest provinces or whatever, but what about the fact that apparently all the Afghan Taliban who hide on the other side of the border in Pakistan, they're not up in the northwest territories, they've been down in Quetta.
That's where Mullah Omar was hiding all this time, and America apparently hadn't been doing one or two, I mean now they've done just a couple, which is setting the new precedent, but apparently they had that veto, or for other reasons the Americans didn't want to go after the leaders of the Afghan Taliban hiding out in Pakistan, only al-Qaeda guys and Pakistani Taliban that the Pakistani government wanted targeted.
Ain't that something?
Yeah, and it's, I mean partly, some of the redactions in this document must relate to negotiations with the country in question, and in fact, last we heard, those were the drone memos that still weren't being shared with people like Ron Wyden.
So in 2013 they were able, the intelligence community, after asking for years, was finally able to see the memo authorizing the killing of, the memos I should say, authorizing the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, but the government kept refusing to turn over these memos that govern things like these side payment strikes.
So we don't know, and it's not even clear Ron Wyden knows, so that's a problem, but a lot of that language, I mean, some of it is unredacted, which makes it clear that they're still using that the other country is unwilling or unable to take out the target.
That's the logic we use to go in after Osama bin Laden.
So this memo, by and large, would cover us taking out bin Laden, and it's important to remember too that this is not just about drone strikes.
The way we'd kill those people, most likely, would be to send in a SEAL or somebody to go in and kill him face to face, which would be a little more subtle, rather than taking him out with a drone strike.
So we're going to use any methods to kill people that we want to kill, and that language about a country being unwilling or unable to take out somebody that we want taken out, I've never seen a solid meaning for that phrase, and I think it's probably abuse.
It probably means, you know, we wouldn't ask Pakistan, depending on whether you believe Sy Hirsh or not, we wouldn't ask Pakistan to take out Osama bin Laden.
We're just going to go in and do it ourselves, assuming that they as a government would be unwilling to take him out because people would quickly protect him.
And so you quickly see how that language kind of permits pretty much anything.
And then once you've agreed that you're going to kill people using whatever means you need to, then, you know, I think it still kind of permits the United States to kill the people that they want to kill.
Well, you know, I don't know, man, you know, if we're talking about just up in the Swat Valley or something where, you know, cops can't go, that's one thing.
But if we're, you know, if you look at the history of the terror war, there are at least scores if not hundreds of arrests by the Pakistani National Police in cooperation with the CIA.
And turning people over.
That's how they got Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abu Zubayr, a bunch of these guys.
I just interviewed a lawyer for a guy who was a case of mistaken identity at Guantanamo for 14 years.
He was arrested by the Pakistani police and the CIA.
So it's not it's not altogether clear that, yeah, you just can never arrest someone as long as they're in Pakistan or something like that.
And that goes to the next thing about the capture is because we know from the when I started reading the memo, that was one of the first things that caught my eye.
We know from the beginning of the Obama years that he didn't kind of really want the burden of what do we do with these guys once we capture them?
So let's just kill them instead.
And that's something that this guy, Anthony Walker, wrote in his piece about the drone memo that's running on antiwar.com today as well, is that, yeah, this says something about capture.
And obviously, none of the process is about capturing someone or I think, as you write it, checking off the list that, no, we definitely can't capture.
So only now are we left in the position where we have to figure out how we're going to kill these guys, whether with a gunshot or a drone strike, that kind of thing.
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Yeah, there were two really important aspects of that.
One is the the process for the kill list only starts when an agency says, hey, I want to kill this guy.
And then there is this process laid out where you're supposed to go and make sure that it's not feasible to capture the guy instead of killing him.
But if an agency has already decided that they want to kill a guy, chances are good that they will invent evidence or find evidence.
They don't need to invent it.
That can justify their claim that they can't go in and capture capture him or come up with some other reason.
And so it's kind of back the way procedures are supposed to work is if you want an outcome, if you prefer an outcome, which in this case is ostensibly capture, then the first question you should ask is, can you capture the guy?
But instead, that question doesn't get asked, at least as the process is laid out in this document until much later.
And then an even later point in the process, there's another consideration that says, well, does this guy have intelligence we actually want?
Because maybe we'll decide that in the future we will be able to capture him.
And it's, you know, there's no reason to believe that the killer capture decision coming out of this process is real because of the way the process is built.
So that's one thing is that if you want a process that's going to result in capture, you need to redo this procedure because it's not written to do that.
But then the other thing is, there is a, excuse me, there is a procedure for what you do with capture, a lot of which has to do with, what are you going to do with the body?
What are you going to do with this guy once you do capture him?
There is a very clear statement against bringing anybody to Gitmo.
That's good.
But there's a, you know, there's a lot of other, and I didn't look at this in detail in the New Republic thing, but there's a lot of other subtleties about the way in which they deal with a capture issue, such as when in the process they ask whether, you know, asking Pakistan or Egypt or Saudi Arabia to hold somebody, whether that's going to result in this person being tortured.
That question is asked at a weird point in the process as well and probably results in people being tortured by our friends.
And we've seen that, you know, Jeremy Scahill, for example, has done coverage of a prison that the CIA basically runs, but it's considered a Somali prison and lots of torture goes on there, but it's the Somalis doing it and we pretend that they're going to treat these guys humanely.
But then there are some, these other interesting questions, like they don't consider capture done by somebody we train and pay to capture people, our capture.
So in other words, if we go to Somalia and say, or Kenya, and say, here, we're going to pay and train your guys to be special forces and we're probably going to have an advisor on site and we're going to go capture these guys and once you capture these guys, we're going to pretend we had nothing to do with that capture, which is not credible, right?
But it gives us a kind of plausible deniability, gives us a kind of legal distance from actually capturing that body that I suspect allows a whole bunch of abuse to still go on.
And then, you know, there's another interesting question about when it happens in the process is where the process says you've got to bring in the Red Cross and tell them we've got these guys and where it doesn't happen.
And it's pretty easy to see how the process would result in Red Cross not getting noticed that we've got a guy until well into the process and we've sort of seen that played out.
So it's, you know, it's written such that people go, ooh, nifty, we have rules to make sure that we're not rule-less drone strikes, right?
But when you read the rules very closely, it doesn't work out that way.
The things that we are supposed to care a lot about really aren't prioritized, except for killing the right person.
There does seem to be an effort to, like, make sure that when the CIA is killing somebody, they are actually killing the right guy, which, hey, is an improvement over what the drone strikes were at their worst.
Yeah.
And, of course, they're still wrong a lot and sometimes kill Western hostages and God knows who, but at least they're trying.
Right.
I mean, after this came out that you've got the Western hostages where we should have known they were present.
We should have, you know, the level of that's one of the things that this rule guide, this rule book says you need to be really certain for and says that it's one of the only things that agencies must do, which is develop a really good procedure to make sure that there are no civilians present, except in exceptional circumstances.
But there's no allegation that there were exceptional circumstances in that particular drone strike.
It still happened.
It still took out a wedding party in Yemen, which, depending on who you talk to, was a legitimate target that we just happened to take out tens of other civilians in the process.
But we're still, I mean, we're not conducting as many drone strikes, so we're not making as many catastrophic errors, but we're still making catastrophic errors and in some cases killing Americans, right?
Killing American and Italian.
Right.
All right.
So now, you know, I wonder about the Bagram wink nudge secret prison over the hill, right?
Because there are two prisons at Bagram and at least for a time there.
And you mentioned the authority of the CIA's, you know, secret torture prison dungeon really underground there in Somalia.
There's two of them.
I believe Eli Lake.
I don't know.
I guess we'll just stick with Scahill.
There's at least one there.
But then.
Well, if Eli Lake is reporting it, then they're proud of it, right?
Yeah.
That one was up in Somaliland, I think, or in Puntland, I forget now which.
But it seemed credible in that instance, but I don't know.
But yeah, it also could be completely made up by him.
But yeah.
So anyway, but the secret wink nudge prison at Bagram, do you know, was that owned by the CIA or that was officially an Afghan prison?
And so would that fall under the rubric of, hey, you know, I don't know, it's somebody else has captured and tortured these guys, not us, because there was plenty of reports of torture at the hands of Afghan, you know, soldiers and goons in the Obama years.
You know, never mind the Bush ones.
I'm not certain what the legal status is at what given time, but some interesting details about prisons in Afghanistan and yeah, in Afghanistan.
One is the only guy related to the CIA who ever got prosecuted for torture was a guy David Pissarro, who got prosecuted for abuse, largely because he couldn't get the evidence to prove that he was doing what Kofor Black had ordered him to do and was perfectly within the guidelines of the program that he was working in.
But anyway, so he got prosecuted for abuse that took place at a forward operating base.
So this teeny tiny mud walled compound.
And that was considered a U.S. prison so that so that the CIA could have a scapegoat.
And technically, that's the standard.
That's the standard in the Fourth Circuit.
But at the same time, to avoid prosecuting the killers of Gul Rahman at the salt pit, who were actual CIA officers, the guy they froze to death.
They claimed that wasn't a U.S. prison.
So this little tiny mud, hot mud walled compound on the border of Pakistan, yes, a U.S. prison, the salt pit, not a U.S. prison.
Then we transferred it to Afghanistan legally.
And that's how we got out of U.N. criticism for abusing these people.
Then it became Afghanistan's torture, even though we were involved in it.
And then I don't know if you saw the the complaints by the 9-11 defendants that the CIA destroyed evidence that was pertinent to their to their defense.
And it turns out the evidence was a black site.
There's a lot of reason to believe that was one of the Afghan prisons, and I'm not positive it was the salt pit.
But in other words, the CIA has been able to go and destroy these prisons that are arguably our own, but that Afghanistan holds the legal bag for.
And they've done it to protect the home country, to protect Afghanistan.
So Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the others won't be able to say, here is the hook hanging off the wall that you guys hung me off of, because they've destroyed that.
They've taken down some of the evidence, and I think there are real questions about why they felt the need to destroy that prison.
But they did.
Court said it was OK.
And I think it goes again to this, like, the CIA is going to claim whatever is most convenient as far as ownership of these prisons.
And that, frankly, was the same argument that they tried to make on success, you know, that that was overturned in Boumediene, but that the government basically said Gitmo is in a place with no sovereignty.
So we can do whatever we want there because it's outside the rule of law.
We don't own it.
And then the Supreme Court was like, well, yeah, actually, we own it.
So they've been playing this game with who owns the prison forever.
And it's clear that that is still envisioned by this PPG, by this rule book.
Yeah.
Well, and the history of the salt pit doesn't leave much question as to who owned it.
I mean, they even called it Site Cobalt.
Right.
That was their official name for it.
It was their property if you ask them then.
But the original way in which they avoided prosecuting the people who killed Gul Rahman was to say, well, it was in our prison.
Therefore, we're not sovereign.
Therefore, we can't prosecute.
I'm crazy, but that's what they did.
And again, and I mean, you just explain this, but just to reiterate, to make it real clear, this was the whole theory about, I know, let's put him at Guantanamo in the first place since we stole it from from Cuba, basically, or, you know, it's this funny lease deal that we have with the previous government there, so to speak.
And so since it's offshore, hey, screw you, court system.
But the Supreme Court said no, as long as you guys, I mean, you say it was an ownership thing, whatever.
You guys are federal government employees.
You're doing this.
Your exercise of sovereignty over this base counts as, you know, common law ownership then or whatever it is.
It's undeniable.
Possession is nine tenths of the law.
This kind of thing.
Right.
Right.
And and and that, you know, and ultimately, I think, again, this rule book is made to look really nifty.
Oh, we are choosing to put order to our assassination program.
But in fact, there are multiple places in it where you can see these games are still being played and and we don't even see all of it.
And, you know, whether you believe the administration official who wouldn't go on the record with me and wouldn't even say where he worked, even though it's probably obvious where he works.
You know, when he says, oh, yeah, this is the only PPG.
Oh, yeah.
It hasn't been changed.
Oh, yeah.
It carries the same weight as a PPD directive as opposed to guidance.
You know, I don't know whether I buy that, but but but certainly this ultimately here's the thing.
I think the future is about the decision being made within the White House and the White House, you know, imposing rules, mostly which get imposed on DOD because John Brennan, you know, John Brennan's always immune from the rules.
We'll see what happens if and when Hillary replaces Brennan with somebody like Mike Vickers or whatever.
But there are a set of rules that DOD has to follow.
I think it's good that you have this interagency discussion about who to assassinate.
No downside to that, I don't think.
But but ultimately, the decision is still micromanaged within the White House and the White House retains full prerogative to blow off the rules.
And so the rules are their their guidance.
I think that's why the thing is called guidance, not directive is is they're written in pencil.
Right.
And hey, even if they were called directives, no one to get in trouble for breaking them anyway.
But it's nice, I guess, when they make that clear up front that these are simply suggestions.
Don't don't worry about anybody looking over your shoulder or anything, which, by the way, is another kind of a segue into one last point here that you make very well about a giant omission in these guidelines.
And that is the after action report.
Was it worth it that time we killed that guy?
And especially when we're talking about, you know, hundreds and hundreds of drone strikes, thousands, I guess, count everything going on in Pakistan and all around.
And but there is no process for going back to see whether this worked or not.
In fact, there was just a open source.
I forgot who did it.
Some private somebody just put out a whole report about just how counterproductive all the drone strikes have been in Pakistan.
Some academics, I think, and how, you know, recruitment soared in in it was it wasn't just ten to one.
It might have been 50 to one.
Every time you kill somebody, you make more enemies and it's clearly not working.
You cite the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, who's still on YouTube anyway and has been replaced by others.
And, you know, maybe it was still inspiring attacks.
If the problem with al-Awlaki was that he was going to inspire somebody to kill 40 people in a nightclub in Florida and he's still inspiring people to kill 40 people in a nightclub in Florida, which Omar Mateen was partly inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki, then what have you accomplished by killing him?
Right.
And because he wasn't no matter what CIA wants you to believe, he was not an operational genius.
He never succeeded in launching an attack from Yemen, even if you believe everything they say.
And and that's the thing.
So it is true.
I mean, it is true that as part of the decision making process, the agencies have to say, does this fit into our strategy?
And one of the reasons to have this interagency discussion at the White House is because that question is what our strategy is and what serves our strategy is a question that should be decided by political appointees.
That's why we have elections in this country.
So I'm fine with that part.
But but the after action reports, again, I think they're laudable to have 48 hour reports.
They get reported back to the people who are part of the discussion.
So if State Department says, I don't think you should go kill Osama bin Laden, wouldn't happen with Hillary at State Department, but, you know, because you're going to blow up our relationship with Pakistan and things will get worse.
At least then Hillary will get a report of what happened with the assassination.
But there's not a reporting mechanism to say after a year, after two years, after we've been doing signature strikes for four years, let's review it and let's find out.
I mean, this is something that's generally true of the intelligence community overall, that they don't have efficacy assessments that are that are worth very much.
Although there there is that CIA study that shows that funding rebels actually turns out not to be useful at all.
But aside from that, I mean, the intelligence community is not very good at saying, you know, we've been doing these drone strikes for years now and we are not winning the war on terror.
What's what's going wrong with our drone strikes?
And there have been a lot of good commentary, both from within the national security community and out that says, like, look, you know, taking out the leaders of a movement instead tends to get them replaced with somebody more radical, more committed to violence and therefore makes the problem worse rather than better.
And so there's not a means in here to review the assassination, the capture and assassination programs generally to find out whether they're working.
Yeah.
Well, and doesn't that just make perfect sense, too?
I mean, it's hardly in their interest to write up reports about how we'd be better off without them all the time.
You know, all their reports are about what to do next, of course.
So I heard there's somebody needs drone striking.
Let's get to it.
Right.
Makes sense to me.
All right.
Hey, listen, thank you so much for giving us some of your time on the show here, Marcy.
Always great to be on, Scott.
Appreciate it.
Thanks.
And this is the heroic Marcy Wheeler.
Empty wheel dot net is her great blog, and that's her handle on Twitter, too.
You should follow her there.
She writes lots of great stuff.
This one is actually in the New Republic, the new New Republic, she says.
Are there any limits on Obama's drone war, really?
Right there at New Republic dot com.
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Hey, I'll start here for Wall Street Window dot com.
Mike Swanson knows his stuff.
He made a killing running his own hedge fund and always gets out of the stock market before the government generated bubbles pop, which is, by the way, what he's doing right now, selling all the stocks and betting on gold and commodities.
Sign up at Wall Street Window dot com and get real time updates from Mike on all his market moves.
It's hard to know how to protect your savings and earn a good return in an economy like this.
Mike Swanson can help follow along on paper and see for yourself.
Wall Street Window dot com.
You hate government.
One of them libertarian types.
Maybe you just can't stand the president.
Gun grabbers are warmongers.
Me too.
That's why I invented Liberty Stickers dot com.
Well, Rick owns it now and I didn't make up all of them.
But still, if you're driving around, I want to tell everyone else how wrong their politics are.
There's only one place to go.
Liberty Stickers dot com has got your bumper covered.
Left, right.
Libertarian empire.
Police state founders quote central banking.
Yes.
Bumper stickers about central banking.
Lots of them.
And well, everything that matters.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.
Everyone else's stickers suck.
Liberty Stickers dot com.