10/29/14 – Gareth Porter – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, next up on the show, it's our friend Gareth Porter.
Yeah, I do interview Gareth all the time.
Well, he does good journalism all the time, and I want to ask him about it.
Welcome back to the show, Gareth.
How are you doing?
I'm doing fine.
Thanks, Scott.
Glad to be back on the show.
Good, good.
Hey, everybody, read Gareth's book.
It's called Manufactured Crisis, and it's about how they never really had a nuclear weapons program at all, and it's a giant manufactured crisis.
And so that brings us to the topic of this latest article, Resolving Key Nuclear Issue Turns on Iran-Russia Deal.
So here we are.
We're running out the extension on the interim nuclear deal reached last November.
We're working toward a final nuclear deal.
We've got optimistic leaks here and there about possible ways to resolve things that formerly seemed to be at an impasse in terms of reducing Iran's capability to make a nuke with their civilian nuclear program that they have, if they ever chose to.
And yet here is a huge new wrinkle in this, where it has seemed as though the Russians, sure, they've been playing a positive role, encouraging the Iranians to make this deal with the West all along, but there's a lot more to it than that, huh?
Well, there is.
This new development, which is the subject of my latest piece, is really the one thing that could make a final comprehensive deal possible, and that is that the United States is now proposing that instead of simply demanding that Iran give up the vast majority, the vast bulk of its centrifuges that are in operation, that it could keep at least a large percentage of them, if not all of them, and in return give up the stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which is, of course, just equally important in terms of the total capability for Iran to enrich uranium.
And the United States all along has admitted, has acknowledged, that there's more than one way to accomplish its pronounced demand that Iran has to agree to a situation which would give a so-called breakout timeline of at least six to 12 months, not simply by reducing centrifuges, but by some combination of centrifuge reduction or stabilization and reduction of the stockpile.
So, I mean, these are interacting elements of the final deal, and it seems perfectly reasonable to expect that that could be a centerpiece of the comprehensive agreement.
So, it does open that up.
That doesn't mean the United States is going to agree in the end, but it does offer the hope that there could be that part of the agreement.
And then it leaves, of course, the remaining issue of the sanctions, which is another problem entirely, which I don't know if we want to get into at all, but that's by no means resolved at this moment.
Right.
But then, now, what about Russia's interest in going along with this form of the deal?
The Russians are a key to this for the following reason.
Basically, the Iranians are perfectly willing to draw down their stockpile of low-enriched uranium, but they have other needs, or shall we put it this way, desires, which are closely related to that problem of the low-enriched uranium stockpile, and which require the approval of the agreement of the Russians.
And for one thing, the Iranians want to play a role in actually fabricating the fuel for Bushehr, ultimately, and certainly for the two new nuclear power reactors that Russia has already agreed to build for Iran in the coming years.
So that means that they don't have the capability to do that at this point.
They need the help of the Russians to acquire that capability.
And let's face it, it's a pretty big concession for the Russians to agree to give the secrets of how to fabricate the fuel assemblies for Iran's future power reactors, as well as for Bushehr, because it's a huge moneymaker for the Russians.
I mean, you know, fabricating fuel is, as the specialist on this issue from Moscow, who I interviewed for my piece, Dr. Khopkov, told me, it's a huge source of income, of profit for the Russians.
And to give that up means that they are, in fact, making a huge economic sacrifice, financial sacrifice.
So Iran is going to have to find a way to compensate the Russians for that sacrifice that they're making in agreeing, if they do agree, indeed.
And I think that the implication of this new development is that they are, if not already having signed an agreement, that they are on their way to signing an agreement between Russia and Iran on this issue.
So that's one of the things.
Another thing is that the Iranians want to have a role in actually doing some of the enrichment for future power reactors.
So they've spent all this money on enrichment, enrichment capabilities.
They've had all this talent involved in it.
And so they're saying, you know, we want to be in on the action.
So here again, the Russians are going to have to make a concession to the Iranians to allow them to do some of the enrichment as part of the deal for these power reactors.
And in return, of course, the Russians are getting a pretty big order, a very lucrative order for two power reactors in Iran.
But I would say, from what I know, that the Russians, on balance, don't really need this.
They can get along without the Iranian business.
And I think they're doing this primarily for geopolitical reasons.
I think that they're reaching agreement with Iran, making some sacrifices in return for some compensation over the long run, but certainly short-term financial sacrifices.
And in return, I think they are certainly achieving a closer geopolitical relationship with Iran in the process.
Yeah.
Well, and in a sense, though, they're kind of being put in a position to do a favor for Obama.
I think Putin must not want to do a favor for Obama right now by handing him this victory if he has such an easy method that he could use to, I guess, an excuse to scotch the deal.
Look, I mean, Putin's issue is not Obama per se, I don't think.
Well, you know what I mean.
This is a perfect time for Robert Kagan's wife to screw up everything between the two leaders, that's for sure.
That's really the bigger problem, is the longer-run geopolitical equation.
And for Putin, I suspect it's less a matter of sticking it to Obama or preventing Obama from having a personal achievement of some sort than it is looking at the longer-term implications of this agreement.
And on balance, I'm not suggesting that this is a simple equation by any means, but on balance, I think the Russians clearly believe that it's in their interest to avoid having sort of a continued escalation of tension with a lot of dangerous implications for that.
Right.
Well, now, I guess, are they not worried at all that this is maybe a fat chance kind of thing, but they're not worried at all that if America finally can get this last giant fake issue out of the way that we might have a real rapprochement with Iran and maybe try to peel them away from Russia the way we've been doing with Ukraine?
Well, I think that's certainly something that they've thought about, no question about that.
And again, it's a matter of weighing and balancing.
I think that they see some structural impediments, as I have, and I think I've said that a number of times, that there are structural impediments to the United States going all the way to a new sort of strategic relationship with Iran that's cozy.
It's going to change, certainly, but not as dramatically as one might imagine.
So from that point of view, I think the Russians still think that it's in their interest to have an agreement.
Yeah, that makes sense.
All right, hold it right there.
We'll be right back, everybody, with the great Gareth Porter in just a sec.
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Thank you.
All right, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
This is my show, The Scott Horton Show.
Talking with the great Gareth Porter from Interpress Service.
That's ipsnews.net.
We run all his stuff at original.antiwar.com slash porter.
He won awards for all his work at truthout.org about Petraeus and McChrystal and their special forces mass murder squads there in the Afghan war.
And he's the author of this great book, Manufactured Crisis, The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
And, again, ipsnews.net, his latest, is Resolving Key Nuclear Issue Turns on Iran-Russia Deal.
And I guess you're optimistic, at least on this fine point, that those two states will be able to work out their end of this.
Well, you know, I don't know if I'm – I'd say I'm confident, Scott.
What I'm suggesting here is that there is a possibility.
The United States is going to have to back off its demand for cuts in centrifuge, the operational centrifuges of Iran.
I hope they'll do that.
I'm not confident they'll do it.
I think we have to wait and see on that.
And then, of course, as I said in the first segment, there still remains the very difficult problem of getting rid of the sanctions.
And I think there's a lot of potential pitfalls in those negotiations, which we're not by any means out of the woods on that one at all.
Well, so give us a thumbnail sketch of the sanctions regime.
Just to what extent does it reach?
And what's so difficult about undoing it?
Well, what's difficult about undoing it is two interrelated factors.
One is the one that everyone is familiar with, which is the Israeli lobby and its power over Congress.
And that means that Congress is inevitably going to exert pressure, is exerting pressure on the administration to get the most out of the sanctions.
And if possible, hang on to some sanctions, not give them up so that they have leverage over Iran for the foreseeable future or even beyond the foreseeable future.
That's a given.
We know that's going to happen.
It's happening now.
It's going to continue to happen.
The second factor is that we know that the Obama administration has certainly in the past been very confident that the sanctions give the United States a whip hand over the Iranians in the negotiations, that they believe the Iranians came to the negotiating table predominantly because they had to to get rid of the sanctions, and therefore the United States has a bargaining advantage that they can use to try to push the Iranians beyond where the Iranians want to go.
And so that sets up, in my view, a dangerous possibility, which is that the Obama administration will try to get the Iranians to agree to the withdrawal of the biggest sanctions, most of the sanctions that have cut into Iran's national income from its oil sales, but hold on to sanctions which they would argue, whether it's justifiable or not, are really unrelated to nuclear and therefore should not be covered by this agreement.
So the Iranians are demanding, they've made this very clear, that all the sanctions have to be removed.
And that's perfectly understandable why they would be arguing that.
They don't want to be on the hook for the rest of their existence for the United States to have this hanging over them, this whip hand.
Well, you know, I was going to ask you, what percentage do you think they'll settle for of being repealed here if it's going to be this hard to get?
I think the Iranians are committed to demanding removal of all sanctions as part of the deal.
Otherwise, there's no point in their giving up all of their concessions.
I think that they have viewed the nuclear program, in part, as I've said in my book, as a bargaining chip for achieving the removal of all sanctions.
And I think that is going to be the bottom line for them.
I think it's a red line for them.
So that's why I do think there's still a danger that we're going to see, in the end, a serious problem of reaching agreement on the sanctions.
Yeah.
Man, that's really something else.
Well, you know, I saw a guy on Twitter arguing this morning that now that Obama's men have told Jeffrey Goldberg that Netanyahu is the chicken shit and that he's not going to bomb.
That's one example.
He's not going to attack Iran.
He was always just bluffing that that is going to really undercut the sanctions regime.
Because what America's been telling the Europeans and the Asians is that, man, this guy Netanyahu is going to bomb them.
And the only way we could get Netanyahu to not bomb them is by putting on this insane sanctions regime and convincing them that we would convince you to participate in it.
Right.
But if that's gone, then they're going to say, well, screw you guys, because they're just completely shooting themselves in the foot, stopping their trade with Iran over a big, fake nuclear weapons program that never existed.
No question that the Obama administration did use the alleged, the supposed threat of an Israeli attack on Iran as a leverage on the Russians, particularly the Chinese.
It was used particularly on the Chinese and perhaps some of the Europeans, like the Italians, for example.
And my view, as you know from reading my book, is that the Obama administration never really took very seriously the idea that Netanyahu was going to attack Iran, contrary to what Goldberg argues in his book, in his article.
But, you know, I don't think now, I don't really think that it was the fear of war that has continued to propel the Europeans in particular to support sanctions.
I think it's more politics, domestic politics in places like France, for example, and the UK.
And at this point, you know, I do think, in fact, that it's going to be very difficult to maintain support for these sanctions once there's an agreement.
That is a reality.
No question in my mind about that.
I think that that is going to be a factor in the politics as we come down to the wire on this, that the Obama administration is very well aware that it's going to be tough to try to maintain international sanctions.
And, you know, that's why I think they're going to be ready to give them up.
But, you know, the other sanctions that I think are still going to be, there's going to be a temptation to try to hold on to them, are the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States.
Which is everything, because America's Treasury Department is as powerful as every other Treasury Department.
That's absolutely right.
Just to illustrate that, a little vignette from my last trip.
When I was coming to Tehran from Dubai, I was sitting next to a young Iranian businessman who was involved in motorcycle parts, and his main overseas market was India.
And he told me that he had spent a lot of time preparing a very complex business plan to show to his Indian counterparts, his Indian potential markets, to get around the sanctions.
And when he got there and presented, he found that they were all saying, you know, it doesn't matter what your plan is.
We've been told by the Americans that regardless of what the sanctions legislation or the sanctions agreement has been, they don't want us to do any business with Iran.
And so we don't have any choice.
We've got to say no.
So I think you're absolutely right.
It's the market power that the United States disposes internationally in places like India and elsewhere, in Europe as well as in Asia, that is the real problem here.
And that, again, I think underlines the danger that exists, that they're going to feel that they've got the power here to hold out and try to force the Iranians to agree to keep some sanctions.
And that's, again, I think it's a very dangerous situation because of that power and of the sort of diplomatic overconfidence that it inspires in the part of the United States.
Yeah.
Well, you know, I don't know, man.
It seems like Barack Obama is willing to – and, you know, I don't even think we should have a president, and I'm not for executive power of any kind.
In this case, we're talking about basically reaching a peace deal with a country that's not threatening us.
We've been threatening them, and we're trying to put to bed a fake issue that's been the excuse for our Cold War against their country for my whole lifetime, basically.
Yeah, yeah.
That's right.
And here Obama has worked really hard.
The fact that we're having this conversation at the end of October 2014 here, Gareth, means that Obama's worked really hard to get to this point at least starting a year ago, a year and a half ago, even though he botched a lot of his own progress back in earlier days of his administration.
But it seems like – so he's willing to really push and to send the guys to Oman for the secret talks and to give John Kerry the diplomatic support – or, you know, the kind of political support, a bit at least, that he certainly didn't seem to give him when it came to, say, for example, negotiating a Palestinian state, something like that.
Yeah.
And, you know, even in the State of the Union he said, don't pass new sanctions, I'll veto them anyway.
That's pretty good.
I agree.
I agree.
But it seems like if he just said, damn it, I'm the president, I'm negotiating a peace deal, and I'll be damned if you guys are going to screw it up, Congress, and the American people are with me on this, that he would just win, and that would be it.
Maybe he doesn't even need to go that far at all if he just makes his intentions really known and fights for it politically like that.
You've stated the case.
But it doesn't seem he wants to do that.
I've stated the case for optimism very well, and I agree that that is a real possibility as well.
You think he will, maybe?
I guess I wasn't saying that.
I was saying, damn him, he won't do that.
He won't fight for it.
Well, he hasn't yet.
You know, it remains to be seen how hard he's going to fight.
I think that's the question, and I still think there's a good possibility that he will fight hard and that he can win, and that he will see it in his interest to win on this.
So I'm just stating the negative possibility here just to make sure that we don't lose sight of the fact that it's there.
Well, I sure don't believe in him.
I just believe in the possibility, because it's right there.
All he has to do is take it.
Yes, I agree.
I don't trust that he will.
I trust him to do the wrong thing, never the right thing.
I don't trust that he will either, and part of the reason is that the way in which the Obama administration, and perhaps it's true of every administration to some significant degree, when they make these decisions on really very important issues, such as going to war and making peace, is piecemeal.
They sort of decide one day based on the latest information, the latest developments, not necessarily based on a comprehensive sort of thinking through all of the implications.
So there's a certain sort of making it up as you go along to the way in which the Obama administration is making these decisions.
That's what I find scary.
All right.
Well, I've kept you over time.
I've got to go.
You've got to go.
But thanks very much.
It's great to talk to you again.
Thank you, Scott.
Bye-bye.
And Gareth's great piece is at IPSnews.net.
IPSnews.net, resolving key nuclear issue turns on Iran-Russia deal.
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