Hey, Al Scott Horton here to tell you about this great new book by Michael Swanson, The War State.
In The War State, Swanson examines how Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy both expanded and fought to limit the rise of the new national security state after World War II.
If this nation is ever to live up to its creed of liberty and prosperity for everyone, we are going to have to abolish the empire.
Know your enemy.
Get The War State by Michael Swanson.
It's available at your local bookstore or at Amazon.com in Kindle or in paperback.
Just click the book in the right margin at ScottHorton.org or TheWarState.com.
Alright, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott.
I got Gareth on the line here.
We went a little bit over time with our last guest.
He's good.
I like that guy.
Jack Matlock, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union.
JackMatlock.com.
Check him out.
Alright, now Gareth Porter, his website is IPSnews.net.
Well that's where he writes.
He's a reporter for them, Interpret Service, IPSnews.net.
And also you can find what he writes at Truthout.org a hell of a lot of the time.
And he wrote a great book about Vietnam called Perils of Dominance and the brand newest one is Manufactured Crisis, The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
And so this will be part three of our interview series about the new book.
Welcome back to the show.
Gareth, how the hell are you?
I'm fine.
Thanks again, Scott.
I'm so glad that you're paying so much attention to my book.
That's very great of you.
Yeah.
You know, I mean, I want to know this stuff and you're the best.
So you know, yeah, I love it.
And I'm learning so much.
It's just great.
You know, hopefully we'll get into some of chapter five, but there's so much just on chapter four to cover.
I think we might only get through chapter four on the show today here.
The U.S. political origins of the nuke scare, kind of like I asked you at the beginning of this for the KPFK show on Sunday.
You know, what's it all about?
If it ain't about a fake nuclear weapons program that doesn't exist and never existed in that they've known all along or at least had a great reason to believe all along doesn't exist.
What's it all about?
And that's chapter four here, the U.S. political origins of the Iran nuke scare.
And so there, what's it all about?
Tell me.
Well, you know, what I what I cover in that chapter about political origins of the Iran nuclear scare is the sort of dual origins of this crisis.
And one of the origins is what people are, I think, quite familiar with, and that is the influence of Israel on U.S. policy toward Iran.
I mean, it has been a very profound influence ever since the beginning of the 1990s.
You know, there was some influence before that, but I have to say that during the Reagan administration, it was far less than it was during the Clinton administration.
It was really the Clinton administration that introduced a very profound Israeli influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
And that was nowhere more deeply felt than on policy toward Iran.
So that's that's pretty well known.
But I go into, I think, more depth in providing a history of how that came about and what the consequences were, more than more than other sources.
And the second part of this, which I think is really unknown to almost everyone else, is the way in which the bureaucratic interests of the national security state, particularly the CIA, but also the Pentagon, played such a key role in, you know, reinforcing, I would say, the influence of Israel.
And in some ways was independent of that influence of the Israelis on U.S. policy toward Iran.
So what I've done in the chapter is show how the CIA's interest in finding a substitute for the Soviet threat, which, of course, they knew even before the end, the official end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, was really coming to an end.
And they were in a panic mode in 1987, 88, and 89 with regard to the consequences for the CIA for that collapse of the, the coming collapse of the Cold War, because they would stand to lose much of their congressional appropriations in a sort of sigh of relief response to that development.
And so the CIA needed to have the equivalent of the Soviet threat, in effect, to try to keep as much as possible of their congressional appropriations after that happened.
And, of course, the Defense Department was in the same situation, but I think for the purpose of showing that Iran was a threat in nuclear terms, the CIA was really the critical factor in this.
So I want to go into some depth about that.
Mm-hmm.
Yeah, good times.
All right.
Well, so here's one thing.
Well, no, I'll save that for when it comes up.
Let's go back to 1989, then, where the scary old Ayatollah died and was replaced by a younger, somewhat nicer-seeming Ayatollah, and also a brand-new president, Rafsanjani, who's known to this day as a reformer, and I don't know what he ever reformed.
But I think that means that Westerners sort of kind of like the guy, and he doesn't scare them the way Ahmadinejad scares them.
That's what they really mean by reformer, right?
And so here was an opportunity at the end of the Cold War, when the whole deck is being reshuffled anyway, to go ahead and make peace with Iran and let bygones be bygones.
After all, their revolution, where they overthrew our sock puppet dictator, was way back ten years before.
So enough time had passed.
They could have gotten over their Cold War, and they could have had whatever nuclear deal they wanted, if they wanted a nuclear deal with Iran then.
What happened?
Well, you're absolutely right.
I mean, this was the first really major historical opportunity for an end to the enmity that clearly did exist during the early 1980s, mid-1980s, between Iran and the United States.
And it was an enmity that went both ways, for sure.
And I point out that there was a lot of-certainly there was a lot of political resistance in the United States to a making up with Iran.
But more than anything else, this sort of post-Cold War crisis, the approaching post-Cold War crisis, was the cutting-edge factor which prevented this possible opening between United States and Iran from taking place.
And the context here, people need to understand, is that president-elect-not president-elect, the new president, George H.W. Bush, in 1989, actually promised in his inaugural speech that he would reciprocate any help that Iran gave for the liberation of U.S. prisoners held in Lebanon, people who were kidnapped by Shiite activists or militants, if you will, in the 1980s and were being held in Lebanon.
And the United States knew that Iran could-or believed the Iranians could provide some assistance in this regard by influencing their allies, Shiite allies, in Lebanon.
And the Iranian-the new Iranian government of Rafsanjani did, in fact, offer to help in that regard.
And we know for a fact that there were communications through intermediaries at the United Nations between Bush and the new Iranian government of Rafsanjani, and that Rafsanjani did, in fact, assist-used his influence with his allies in Lebanon to begin to get these American hostages freed so that he could improve relations with the United States.
And he believed that that would be the consequence of his doing so.
So what happened?
Well, the reason that there was not, in fact, reciprocation appears to be a combination of interests that were at play in 1990-91.
Well, let me just interject here that I don't think you say this in the book, but these are some of the very same men, right?
George H.W. Bush had been Reagan's vice president, and it was some of the very same people running his administration, of course.
And these were the guys who had done arms for hostages, for getting hostages held in Lebanon released.
And then, of course, the whole, you know, funding the Contras in Nicaragua with the money and all of that, that became the same scandal.
But it sounds like what you're telling me is this was sort of the open market version of that same thing, only instead of selling them missiles to use against Saddam, who we were also backing at the time from the earlier exchanges.
In this case, they were saying, listen, let's go ahead and complete the You Get Our Hostages Released program that we've had going on here all these years, and go ahead and get that finished, and then we can have a real change of our relationship.
And the beginning of the end of the Cold War, reciprocal this and that, that's what he meant, was we'll give you an opportunity to become friends again, at least to some limited degree, correct?
And then you're saying, but what happened?
Well, you know, the analogy between the two situations, that is, the arms for hostages, not arms for hostages, the arms for Contra transaction in 1985, and the ability or the willingness to start to improve relations with Iran in return for the release of the hostages is not very precise for the following reason.
Remember that Iran-Contra was really an Israeli initiative.
It was the Israelis who were suggesting this to the Reagan administration and getting their friends to sort of work a deal that they believed would be in their interest, because remember that the Israelis were interested in making up with the Iranian government in the belief that it was really beneath the surface there were these people who would be cooperating with Israel who were not really hardcore Islamists.
And so they were the ones behind that.
And in 1991, the Israelis were still not hostile, not terribly hostile to Iran, but they were not the ones who were behind this.
This was an entirely different set of interests.
So you didn't have quite the same politics, I guess, is the point that I want to make here.
I guess.
Yeah.
I'm just picking up on key words, you know, Iran, hostages, Lebanon, and saying, well, we worked with the Reaganites and worked with them before.
So why not again?
You know, the common point, however, you're right.
There was a commonality.
And that was that this represented a real sort of hard-nosed realism, as opposed to a kind of extreme ideological policy toward Iran.
Well, that's very kind of you to say.
Yeah, well, that's what appeared to be possible.
But here's what happened.
The problem is, first of all, the people at the Pentagon realized that they had to have a war in order to avoid a collapse of their budget.
And so we had the first Gulf War.
And the result of that was that the United States now had a commanding military position in the Middle East, or at least the potential for that.
And the neocons, particularly the person who was later to become the architect of the Iraq War, Wolfowitz, and his staff were pushing the idea that this meant that the United States was now an entirely new power position in the Middle East, and they didn't need to have good relations with Iran.
And so they were the ones who were basically saying, you know, don't do this, don't get into a posture of sort of moderation towards Iran.
And at the same time, it was very important that Robert Gates, who was just getting back to the CIA as the new director in late 1991, had this interest in sort of using the imagined threat of an Iran getting nuclear weapons as the key to sort of rebuilding a constituency in Congress for continuing very high levels, sort of Cold War levels, of congressional appropriations for the CIA.
And those two interests, you know, basically worked together to essentially veto the initiative that the White House had planned to carry out to reciprocate the Iranians' help in getting U.S. hostages out of Lebanon.
All right, now, it's funny, because I actually remember, I was very young at the time, but I remember, you know, one of these probably PBS news shows my dad was watching or something like that, where the eggheads are saying, yes, you know, the rogue states and proliferation of long-range missile technology and nuclear technology will certainly be the problem of the coming generation.
They really were thinking ahead.
I mean, I'm thinking back to, say, 91, 92, something like that.
They were really on the ball.
This is the message, that it's a dangerous world out there, USSR or not.
This is one of the great manipulations of public opinion in the history of the Cold War and post-Cold War.
It goes along with, of course, the recreation of political support for the use of military force by the United States through the first Gulf War, which was an immensely popular war.
So those two incredibly successful manipulations took place during the same time frame.
It was quite a major shift that took place sort of below the surface without people understanding it.
Yeah, without the masses thought, well, where's our peace dividend?
And that is where it went.
They couldn't see it.
All right.
And there was, believe me, at the CIA, there was a great deal of thought given to what they had to do to try to create a shift in political consciousness towards the CIA.
What do we have to do to get people to think, well, we've got to have a big CIA budget and they realized that it was sort of a WMD threat from, you know, from regional powers.
That's that was the ticket.
And of course, Iran was the poster child, the poster country, if you will, for that for that theme.
And I'll encourage people to really look at this book, Manufactured Crisis, for reference after reference after reference.
This is not a construction of Gareth Porter.
This is Gareth Porter with the ultimate in detail of these people announcing exactly what their intentions are and and in very cynical fashion and whatever, you know, read it yourself and weep for real.
I highly suggest you look at it.
It's all there in their own words.
And in fact, before we get on to the Clinton years and we're going to go over time anyway, I hope it's OK with you.
I got to ask you about what you say about CENTCOM here.
The Central Command responsible for, you know, the Middle East and Asia and all that all the way to India, at least their plan in the Cold War years was centered around the idea of keeping the Soviets out of Iran back when Iran belonged to us and the Soviets were a threat.
So then Iran had ceased belonging to us a decade before and the Soviet Union was falling apart.
And so over at CENTCOM, they decided to drop a new reason for existing and, you know, stop me, I don't want to sound too conspiratorial or put words in your mouth that you didn't say or anything like that.
I'm the only one making the connections here that you don't make in the book.
But I got to ask for your comment on this, where in 1990, they say you say Norman Schwarzkopf cited Iraq as the most plausible enemy for a permanent war plan, not necessarily to attack right now or anything like that, but to build a war plan around a reason for CENTCOM's existence around the theory that Iraq is someone that we might need to fight and specifically because we might need to keep them out of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
And this was their plan that they wrote up or began writing up or something, something you tell me in 1989.
And then it was just a year later.
And again, this is not in the book.
I'm going off my own separate references here.
The April Glaspie memo and, of course, all the controversy about whether James Baker in effect gave the green light or maybe waved the red flag at Saddam Hussein's bull and baited him into invading Kuwait so that they had an excuse to put their troops in Saudi Arabia and establish that heightened military presence that you just talked about Wolfowitz referring to there and that they had their excuse.
And I mean, is it not is it too obvious and not that simple or what am I getting wrong here other than that?
Yeah, this was their plan was to start a war.
Well, it's always a bit it's always a bit more complex because there are enabling factors.
There's no question about that.
I mean, Saddam played into the interests of the people you're talking about and made it easy for them.
But having said that, I mean, you know, absolutely.
There's no doubt about it that the war that was fought in in 1991, the first Gulf War was a war, not just a war of choice, but it was a war that was chosen by the interests of that were going to stand to gain the most from it, which are the the army, the Air Force and CENTCOM.
I mean, it was it was the people who needed to have a rationale for future congressional appropriations at Cold War levels or as close as possible at Cold War levels that required a new war plan.
And as you point out, when the CENTCOM new CENTCOM commander came came into office, he looked at the old war plan, which had the Soviet Union invading Iran.
And he points out in his memoirs, look, that nobody took that seriously, really.
Everybody knew that was ridiculous.
It was always simply a way of of justifying a U.S. military presence in the Middle East of some sort, nothing more than that.
And so he could see that they needed a new one because the Cold War was ending.
There was a very strong interest in putting forward a new war plan.
So that's why that happened.
And having that new war plan obviously was a precondition for the war that took place in 1991.
So I think it all it all constitutes very strong evidence that that war was nothing more than taking advantage of an opportunity which presented itself in order to ensure that the national security state and particularly the military and its industrial allies would go on to enjoy power, prestige and and lots of resources for the next 20 years.
Well, and again, I'm sorry to stay off the exact topic of the subject matter of the book here, but I believe I just learned recently, was it from Barry Lando?
Do you know?
Have you ever heard that the Americans were actually encouraging the Saudis and the Kuwaitis to keep overproducing and keep the prices low and to deliberately snub Saddam Hussein and refuse to show up at their meetings and all that, because that was what the fight with Kuwait was about, was about.
He was trying to pay them back.
I have not actually I've not actually seen that documentation, but I do know that there are indications that there is evidence that Thatcher, Prime Minister Thatcher, was absolutely doing that in her contacts with the Kuwaitis specifically.
And I mean, there's every reason to believe that Thatcher was communicating directly with the Bush, senior Bush administration officials.
So I have no doubt that there is truth in that in that in that report.
And then, of course, one of the big lies of that invasion, it wasn't just the incubators, which is the thing that people remember the most because it's just so galling that they would lie to us about murdered babies in order to start a war.
Not that it was the first time, but it really bothers people when they find out what a lie that was.
But one of the other major lies, of course, was the other part of this war plan, right, that it's keeping Saddam out of Saudi.
And that was their threat, that Saddam was just going to keep rolling south.
And everybody knows now that the Russians released the satellite pictures.
The Canadian news service, I believe, CBC, got the satellite pictures of the empty desert where Saddam's tank divisions supposedly were preparing to invade Saudi Arabia.
And I actually know a guy who was in the Air Force at the time looking at satellite pictures of the empty desert while on TV they were proclaiming that, you know, they weren't sure if they could get enough planes there in time to keep Saddam from rolling his tank divisions down and sacking Riyadh.
Every war the United States fights, as you know better than hardly almost anyone, Scott, has had an intelligence, a false intelligence basis.
There's been some intelligence claims that turns out to be untrue.
And no doubt, no doubt about it, this was the false intelligence that helped to make possible the entry into war in Kuwait.
All right.
So now hope and change.
1993, Bill Clinton comes to town and those mean, arrogant Republicans are gone.
And the soft, friendly Vietnam beatnik generation guys come in.
And they decided that they would be friendly with the Iranians because why not, right?
Well, they should have.
But as we now know, of course, it was exactly the opposite, that Bill Clinton farmed out his Middle East policy to the Israelis, making a political decision early in his campaign, apparently by hiring Martin Indyk as his Middle East advisor.
And as I show in the book, the first thing that happens is that Indyk convinces him that he must follow precisely what the Israeli government wants him to do, which is to essentially rely on a strong Israel as the basis for his peace policy in the Middle East.
And that, of course, then translates into hostility toward Iran and indeed considering Iran to be an outlaw state, which is what his new administration immediately declares within weeks of his being inaugurated.
And as part of that, then, you know, he essentially follows a policy that regards Iran as a officially as a nuclear weapons threat.
And that that becomes an established policy, which I think very clearly has a profound impact on the way the intelligence community deals with that issue.
And, you know, one of the I think one of the best things about my book is that it documents the way in which U.S. intelligence was immediately distorted by the the policy of the the administration of the Clinton administration.
And intelligence analysts were expected to come up with evidence to support the idea that Iran was a nuclear weapons threat.
And lo and behold, that's exactly what happened almost immediately.
All right.
Now, I'm sorry that I got to stop you there.
Rewind a second.
And this is going to be the subject of the next interview because it's really in the next chapter about the Israeli politics behind all of this.
But you just mentioned it and it bears repeating because even though I just finished reading this, hearing you say it out loud, it's almost unbelievable just in how sad it is, not that a politician wouldn't come up with this as his plan.
But when you say that Yitzhak Rabin, the reason that he decided that he needed to be such a hawk on Iran and he needed to drum up this so-called threat of an Iranian nuclear program, which then translated pretty much directly into the Clinton administration stance, was because he needed he thought he needed to have that tough guy, right wing hawkish stance on Iran or somebody while he was trying to negotiate peace for the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip before somebody shot.
That's exactly right.
I mean, he is absolutely tragic.
Right.
It is.
It is tragic.
It's emblematic, I think, of the broader historical pattern in Israeli policy whereby Iran's a bogeyman, which, you know, fulfills multiple functions for the Israeli government, whether it's Labor or Likud, you know, it provides a convenient sort of whipping boy or bogeyman for for the Israeli government to point to, both on the Palestinian issue as well as for ensuring that the United States doesn't stray from its very close sort of strategic relationship with Israel, relying on Israel as the main ally in the Middle East, which which is, of course, a fundamental interest of every Israeli government.
So.
So when Netanyahu uses Iran as an excuse for everyone to look away from what he's doing wrong in Palestine, Rabin wanted to use it to get everybody to look away from his chance he thought he wanted to take there to do the right thing and give up the West Bank.
Right.
I mean, I think that that is that is the the interesting pattern that we see, regardless of whether the policy was to negotiate with the PLO or to try to crush the Palestinians, which, of course, is the Likud approach.
The the idea was to to cite the threat from Iran in either case.
Man, ain't that something?
All right.
So now Clinton hires Martin Indyk to be his point man for all things Middle East policy.
And he came up with this policy of instead of making peace with Iraq and Iran, which both used to be friends, instead of even offshore balancing, they decided instead on this policy of dual containment.
What's the big deal?
What's the big difference?
Well, the the idea of dual containment, the concept of dual containment was really a mechanism by which Indyk could get the United States to to take as hard a line toward Iran as it was already taking toward Iraq.
It was a rather clever formula for accomplishing that objective.
And what it meant was essentially he wanted the United States to adopt the same kind of economic sanctions against Iran that were had already been adopted towards Iraq.
And, of course, the intention would be to to do the same thing, to weaken the fabric of society, to basically have the kind of suffering take place in Iran that took place in Iraq, that that would serve the broader interests of Israel.
And that was certainly one of the more ingenious policy ideas that that came out of the Martin Indyk school.
Yeah, except for what a bad idea it was.
I guess it accomplished what he thought it would accomplish for his ends.
But for the American national interest, you know.
Well, bearing in mind, of course, that Martin Indyk started as the media advisor to the Yitzhak Shamir Likud government, the prime minister Yitzhak Shamir.
And he had no Middle East expertise.
He had no claim to be an expert on Middle East policy.
All he had going for him was that he had been a propagandist for Shamir and then, you know, became the founder of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which, of course, is well known as a think tank to to advance the interests of Israel and Washington.
Right.
And which is always cited on Syria issues, Iran issues.
And they say, oh, you know, the Washington Institute, where they're smart over there or whatever.
But what they're talking about is a group that was literally created by AIPAC to serve their point of view.
Absolutely.
This is this is nothing more than a very sophisticated propaganda outfit.
That was the whole purpose to mask, to whatever degree it was possible, the propaganda function of the organization by casting it as a as a sort of quasi academic kind of outfit, doing doing research, which is more high toned rather than openly propagandistic.
Right.
Well, and you know what, though, even from the Lacuna's point of view, it doesn't seem that brilliant to me because it's still all just ends up backfiring.
Like we talked about the other day, all the pressure on China to prevent them from cooperating with the Iranians just drove their program underground and really committed them to the principle that they better master their own fuel cycle and uranium enrichment, because if they have to go to the world market, the Americans are going to stop them from pursuing their rights under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
And so they end up buying junk from AQ Khan, which very well could have included weapons blueprints if they'd been interested in such things.
And they develop their experiments and whatever else they're doing in secret instead of under the watchful eye of the IAEA.
And then, you know, as I gather in this chapter here, their pressure on Boris Yeltsin and the Russians to stop helping with the Boucher reactor.
Ultimately, it didn't work, but it led to, you know, consequences right there as far as, you know, remaining basically a wedge issue to prevent reconciliation on any other thing.
Well, I agree with you, Scott.
But I think, in fact, the impact of Israeli policy, particularly, I mean, both Labor and Likud, you can't really distinguish between them in terms of how bad the policy was, is even much worse than what you've suggested.
Because, in fact, in the 1990s, the Iranians were perfectly willing to have a reasonably live-and-let-live policy toward Israel, even though they were not very keen on the negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO, primarily because they needed to appeal, I think, to the Islamic men on the street to show that they were pro-Palestinian.
I mean, they were afraid that they would be in worse shape in the Arab world if they didn't have a very strong policy of support for the Palestinian rights.
But they were definitely ready to reach an accommodation with Israel.
And it was the Israelis who, in the end, decided to follow a policy of hostility toward Iran to make them the bogeyman and to threaten to carry out strikes against this fictional weapons program, I mean, basically to carry out strikes against any nuclear program in Iran, which resulted in the Iranians going much farther in regard to ballistic missiles than they would have otherwise.
Yeah, none of this makes any sense from their interest point of view.
It just gets worse and worse.
And then now here's where we get back to the American national interest here, and we're already over time.
I know I've got to let you go, but you make sure and mention this in your chapter there about how in the 1990s, the political pressure to hawk it up about Iran for this, that, or the other thing was such that, and you don't really focus on this that much, but you certainly draw the examples out where the government really failed to do their job when it came to investigating and or, you know, in any way protecting the American people from the Al-Qaeda threat because they were so hell-bent on blaming Hezbollah for everything.
I didn't even realize they had originally tried to blame the first World Trade Center bombing on Hezbollah.
And then, of course, as you have famously documented in the past, they quite falsely blamed Hezbollah for the attacks in Buenos Aires in 92 and 94, and then for the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, which was...
The degree to which there was the hostility toward Iran permeated the CIA...
Wait, I didn't mean to say, I didn't mean to imply that I thought that Al-Qaeda did Buenos Aires, but I just meant that certainly the first World Trade Center, the blindshake, and the Khobar Towers, I mean, these are attacks against Americans by the budding Al-Qaeda movement that, for political reasons, our federal police and national government leadership blamed on Israel's enemies instead.
And this is another case of a really clear-cut example of how the broad policy orientation of the administration, in this case the Clinton administration, basically shapes to a great extent the orientation of the intelligence agencies, both in this case, I mean, we'll call it the FBI intelligence, although it's not intelligence, but agencies working on terrorism towards the cases that they're asked to look at, because they inevitably reflected the overt hostility toward Iran that the Clinton administration would just talk about constantly.
All right, well, that's a good place to stop.
Well, there really is no good place to stop, but that's as good as any.
Tomorrow, when we catch up, we'll be starting off with more of the politics inside Israel about ginning up this threat in the 1990s and through the 2000s as well, as we continue with our interview series with Gareth Porter about his great new book, Manufactured Crisis, The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
Thanks very much, Gareth.
Talk to you tomorrow.
Thanks a lot, Scott.
Talk to you tomorrow.
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Don't worry about things you can't control.
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