02/25/14 – Gareth Porter – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, y'all.
Welcome back to the show.
Sorry for the delay.
I had to go in the other room and get a Dr. Pepper.
All right.
Hey, Gareth, the great, super Gareth.
The heroic Gareth Porter from Interpress Service and truthout.org is on the line.
His brand new one at truthout.org is called Obama Pins Fate of Nuclear Pact on documents from an Iranian curveball.
He also has a very important one here, which is sort of kind of in the new one, too.
This one is from two days ago, three days ago at antiwar.com.
U.S. adopts Israeli demand to bring Iran's missiles into the nuclear talks.
We'll be talking about that as well.
Welcome back to the show.
Gareth, how are you doing?
I'm fine.
Thanks again, Scott, for giving me a chance to be on your show.
Well, very happy to have you here.
So the alleged studies documents, the possible military dimensions, the smoking laptop, the laptop of death.
These are all synonyms.
These are all jargon in the counter proliferation movement or whatever for a batch of documents that surfaced, I believe, in 2004 and purported to prove that the Iranians had a secret nuclear weapons program.
And now you're reporting here, at least they did at one time.
And now you are reporting here, one, that, yeah, come on, these came from the MEK, which we already knew that.
You're going to prove that again.
But then also that Obama has now included, just like with the missiles, has now included these so-called possible military dimensions as issues which must be resolved by the Iranians.
In other words, again, beating them over the head, the old U.N. Security Council mandate that they must answer the endless list of questions based on these documents, which are of such dubious provenance in the first place, and how this amounts basically to a deal killer.
Am I summing it up about right?
Well, you know, it would be a deal killer.
It will be a deal killer if, in fact, the Obama administration insists that the Iranians must somehow admit to having had a nuclear weapons program.
That's really the question mark that I posed in the second article that you mentioned.
Sorry, the first article that we're talking about, not the second one.
The newest.
The one at Truthout on the Iranian curveball.
The question is, will the administration insist that Iran is supposed to confess to having had a nuclear weapons program?
I see.
I didn't include this in the story itself, but it is in the book that the Bush administration in 2007, December 2007, actually publicly called for the Iranians to acknowledge that they had had a nuclear weapons program, or somehow the tickets that they had to buy in order to have any role in future discussions about anything having to do with their nuclear program.
That, of course, was a non-starter.
Nothing ever happened.
But the question in my mind is whether the administration now actually has similar thoughts in mind.
And I don't know the answer to that, but I do know that there are people in the proliferation, the arms control community, if you will, who have suggested this in print.
And I think it's an idea that's been floating around and that might well be influencing U.S. policy.
That would be extremely worrisome if that were the case.
But if that's not the case, then this is not really a problem.
And I'll tell you why.
At least, okay, it is a problem, but it's not nearly as much of a problem as it would be if they were seeking that confession.
And what I'm talking about here is the fact that the Iranians had actually agreed to give full explanations for all of the charges that were published by the IAEA in its report, its famous November 2011 report, the dossier, if you will, of all these intelligence claims against Iran on the idea that it had a nuclear weapons program or did nuclear weapons work.
They agreed to cover every one of those issues in great detail in 2012.
And the only condition that they put on it or conditions were that, A, the United States had to share or the IAEA had to share the documents that they were using to charge Iran, to accuse Iran of having those nuclear weapons projects, and, two, that there had to be an end to the IAEA investigation.
So, in other words, once those issues were resolved, they wouldn't bring up new ones.
And, of course, the second one now, I think, is taken care of.
So the only issue remaining is whether the United States government is going to agree to share those documents that previously the U.S. government would not agree to allow Iran to have copies of.
So that's really the next issue that I'm going to be writing about, actually.
Okay, so, in other words, there was a time back in – tell me if I got this right – there was a time where, I guess, Ahmadinejad's government said, listen, we're no longer going to entertain these questions.
You're outside your safeguards agreement mandate.
And these are the IAEA questions mandated by the Security Council that you have to answer this, that, and the other thing, including all kinds of questions unrelated, at least not directly related, to their nuclear program and that kind of thing.
And at some point, the Iranians had said, no, we're not even going to cooperate with answering your unending list of questions based on these forgeries, what they're calling forgeries.
But you're saying that they've changed their position.
They said, no, we will answer all of that, as long as you bring the documents with you when you ask.
That's correct.
Then we'll be able to go through with you.
They did sort of suspend their cooperation with the IAEA investigation in 2008.
And the reason was quite explicit, quite specific.
They terminated, at least temporarily, their cooperation because the IAEA was demanding that Iran turn over military secrets, both in terms of its missile program, that is to say they were asking for the specs, the actual papers showing the design of their Shahab-3 missile, which of course they weren't going to share with IAEA, and the IAEA knew that perfectly well.
And they were asking for details of the conventional or non-military uses, but including military uses of the exploding bridge wire work that Iran had done.
So those are things that lie beyond the legitimate scope of IAEA inquiry, and the Iranians made that clear they weren't going to talk about that.
But in 2012, they negotiated on an agreement in which they said, yes, we will provide full explanations, technical explanations for all of the things that you've asked about, but we want you to give full explanations for the basis for your accusation and provide us with the relevant documents.
And the IAEA at that point was not prepared to assure Iran that it would do that in every case.
Right.
Okay, well, I'm Dick Cheney and I got the 1% doctrine, and so I think that, you know, hey man, maybe these documents are legit, and maybe they're making nukes and we should nuke them.
What do you think about that?
Well, arguing that the documents are legit and authentic is, of course, the default position not only of the U.S. government and its allies, but the U.S. news media as well.
I mean, I can tell you from personal experience that it is very difficult to find anybody in the commercial news media who has had anything to do with this coverage of this issue who will express even the slightest doubt about these documents.
Isn't that funny?
Even after what we've all been through over these last years, not just lying us into Iraq, but lying us into staying day after day for eight years.
I mean, come on.
Yeah, I mean, it's an astonishing failure of the news media to even pretend to play the role that they're supposed to play, which is to inquire into the truth, to question official statements, and fact-check and investigate.
They don't do any of that.
And there's no, you know, it's not just that, but I mean, I have encountered, you know, some hostility on the part of some of the news media people, reporters, who have written about national security issues, you know, with regard to my coverage of the Iran nuclear issue, because, you know, I think that they feel very much on the defensive about the role they've played.
And so there's a certain tendency to lash out at me for allegedly, you know, always saying that whatever Iran says is the fact, whereas of course that's not what I write at all.
But, I mean, I think that there is a very automatic response on the part of the news media, definitely.
Yeah.
Which reflects a sense of subconscious guilt, I think, about the role they're playing, is the way I would explain it.
Well, yeah, I mean, that could be part of it.
I think also, too, that, you know, they're a bunch of truthers, and they just believe what they want, and they're anti-Iran truthers, so they can't, you know, they can't open their mind to the possibility that they're wrong in the first place.
Everybody knows that they have a nuclear weapons program over there, and so any dissension...
I mean, think about in 2002 and 2003, when Jude Winniski would write in defense of Saddam Hussein.
I hate the bastard, but here's the truth about him, okay?
Yeah, yeah.
And everybody would just attack Jude Winniski like he was from another planet.
And he's like, no, I'm a Reaganite who remembers the Reagan years.
I'm just being honest about what's going on, you know?
Yeah, I mean, of course, the first recourse for those people who are trying to fend off any possible criticism of themselves, or, you know, deflect that, is to attack the bona fides of somebody who raises issues that are uncomfortable.
That certainly was the case with Iraq, and now I think it's happening in this case on Iran.
Which is funny, because the whole slogan of this society supposedly is, hey, innocent till proven guilty, since we're all born free and have a natural right to be free and everything.
The burden of proof is on the accuser, the burden of proof, especially when it's a worn-out conspiracy theory like Iran has been making nukes for 25 years, but they never have gotten around to making one yet.
The burden of proof is on the ones making the accusations, not on you, who's just pointing out that their accusations are hollow.
The answer to that, of course, is that...
We have to go, it's a break.
In the United States, as anywhere else, when you have enormously powerful vested interests, then the truth doesn't really prevail at all.
Right back in a sec.
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Alright, y'all, welcome back to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
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More than 3,000 of them now, going back to 2003.
And we're in the middle of talking with Gareth Porter, author of Manufactured Crisis, the brand new book, Manufactured Crisis, about the Iranian nuclear program.
And we're talking about this new piece at Truthout.org, Obama Pins Fate of Nuclear Pact on Documents from an Iranian Curveball.
And Curveball, of course, is a reference to the, it was the secretary of Ahmed Chalabi's brother, I think, was the guy posing as an Iraqi biological weapons expert.
And he was the source of Colin Powell's cartoon drawings of what mobile biological weapons labs in Iraq might look like were they to exist in his great presentation before the United Nations back in, what, January of 2003 there on the eve of the invasion of Iraq.
And so in this case, Curveball is not a reference to the Iraqi National Congress, but the same damn difference.
It's the Mujahedin Ikhalk, the communist terrorist cult that used to work for Khomeini and then against Khomeini, then for Hussein, and then for Don Rumsfeld, and now for the Israelis, maybe the Israelis for a longer period of time throughout that part.
Anyway, so now MEK cult, Gareth, you say they are the source of the so-called alleged studies documents, why no one should worry about a thing that they say in there.
That's a primary fact, I think, and this is really what I consider to be the one headline story in my book that deserves to be really published in the news media around the world, which is that not only do we know now that the Mujahedin Ikhalk turned these weapons over to the German intelligence agency, the BND, but that the BND, senior officials of the BND, were so upset that Colin Powell in November 2004 made public reference to information that they knew he was getting from these documents that the MEK had turned over to them that they considered that it was likely that the Bush administration was going to try to do the same thing on Iran that they'd done on Iraq.
And they were quite alarmed by this, specifically because, of course, they had been the ones that turned over the information that Curveball had generated about these wild stories of mobile bioweapons labs to the CIA, and then that turned up, as you had just said in Colin Powell's UN speech, as the centerpiece of the case for war against Iraq.
And now they saw Colin Powell publicly talking about information from this other BND source.
It wasn't a spy for them, just somebody that they occasionally got information from.
And they considered that source to be doubtful.
They did not think that it was a reliable source that the United States should be citing as the basis for policy.
And how do you know that?
This is information that came from Carsten Voigt, who was then the coordinator of North American-German relations in the German foreign office.
He had been in that position since 1997.
Before that, he'd been a member of the SPD, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, in the German parliament.
And indeed, he had become the spokesperson for the SPD in the parliament.
And when the SPD candidate, Schröder, Gerhard Schröder, was elected chancellor, he was elevated to the senior position in the foreign office.
And so it was to this individual, this senior official in the foreign office, that the BND, the high-ranking BND officials, went when they were concerned about what the United States was doing with this information that they knew they'd gotten from the same documents that the MEK had turned over to them.
And they asked him, you know, in effect, what can we do about this?
And a few days later, as I show in my book, Carsten Voigt talked to the Wall Street Journal and told the journal, look, these documents should not be relied upon as the basis for policy.
And they came from a dissident group, an Iranian dissident group.
So clearly he was carrying out what he believed was the desire of the senior officials of the BND in doing that.
So he gave me the full story for my book in an interview last year.
This is the first time that the details have been revealed.
All right, now, was it the MEK committericult that forged the documents in the first place, Gareth?
No, I mean, in my book I make the case based on, admittedly, circumstantial evidence and logic rather than the testimony of some defector or something like that.
That it was the Israelis who fabricated those documents.
I've said so many times, the reasoning, there are multiple reasons for believing this.
I think the most pertinent one is that the MEK is known to have served to launder intelligence that the Israelis came up with or created, and which they did not want to have known, came from the Israelis themselves.
They did this on several occasions.
And there's every reason to believe that these were not something that the MEK was capable of fabricating.
This was a very clever job.
It served the political diplomatic purposes of Israel perfectly at that moment.
It fit into their strategy, and the Israelis had already an office in the Mossad which had the responsibility for actually influencing foreign governments and news media.
So, you know, it's virtually impossible that it was anyone else except the Israelis who fabricated these documents.
Alright, now, the CIA and all the other American intelligence agencies, 16 or 17 of them, depends on who you ask, I think, they come together from time to time, as requested by the President or by the Congress, in some circumstances, to form the National Intelligence Council and produce a National Intelligence Estimate, which is supposed to represent the conclusions of the heads of all of the different intelligence agencies.
And that's a lot of them.
And as is well known, they came out in November 2007, and they said that Iran used to have a secret nuclear weapons program, but they halted it in 2003, and they have not made the political decision to pursue it any further since then.
And of course, as everyone probably already knows, hopefully already knows, Clapper, when he's not perjuring himself, the Director of National Intelligence, likes to testify before the Senate under oath that that's still the conclusion.
They stand by that.
They even did a whole new NIE, I believe, at the end of 2010, beginning of 2011, you know, reaffirming that same conclusion.
And yet they say that there was a secret nuclear weapons program of some description up to 2003.
Are they talking only about these alleged studies documents, or do they have some other evidence that there actually ever was a nuclear weapons program there in the first place?
Gareth, what do you think?
And I know we talked about your recent report where they had been wrong since 1992 based on some dual-use technology and that kind of thing, but then they figured out, they agreed with you about that, that they had been wrong about those conclusions, so that's not what they're referring to, right?
You're right.
The NIE in 2007 was based on more than the documents that were turned over by the MEK, and I'll get to that point in just a moment.
But first of all, it should be understood that despite the fact that there was more information that they had, that group of analysts were very much influenced by the belief that the documents that we're talking about here were genuine, were authentic.
And I got that, I specifically asked Thomas Finger, who was in charge of that whole NIE process, you know, what was your view of these documents?
Did you assume that they were authentic or not?
And his answer was, which you'll find in my book, those documents did in fact help us to understand that Iran did in fact have the intention of getting nuclear weapons, whereas prior to those documents, as he put it, the Iranian nuclear intention was more ambiguous.
And so he very strongly confirmed that the working assumption of that team was that the documents were authentic and that indeed Iran had had a nuclear weapons program.
And, of course, one should not forget that until the summer of 2007, after the team had drafted an initial estimate, an initial draft of the estimate, they still believed that the Iranians had still been working on a nuclear weapons program as of that day.
They still believed that there was a nuclear weapons program going on until they came up with this new information.
They obviously cracked the computers of some people in the military-industrial complex of Iran and found some messages in which one or more, I'm not clear on this, I don't think it's ever been clear whether it's one person or more than one person, had expressed very, well, anger or being upset that they had been stopped from working on a nuclear weapons project.
They even had an Onion headline like that about frustrated Iranian scientists being forced to halt their work.
Hang on, can I keep you one more segment here, Gareth?
I want to ask you about the missiles and the talks too.
Okay.
Alright, we'll be back at 6 after, so take a break.
Hey, y'all, Scott here.
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Alright, y'all, welcome back to the show.
It's the Scott Horton Show.
I'm Scott Horton.
I'm on the phone with Gareth Porter the Great.
Super Gareth.
Author of Manufactured Crisis about Iran's nuclear program.
I say that because I forget the actual technical sub-headline on it.
But anyway, it's called Manufactured Crisis.
It's for sale right now.
Go buy it.
He's got a new piece at Truthout.
Obama pins fate of nuclear pact on documents from an Iranian curveball.
And then also, U.S. adopts Israeli demand to bring Iran's missiles into nuclear talks.
And this one, well, don't get me sidetracked on this Barack Obama character and how I can't figure out his crappy diplomacy.
But anyway, tell us all about this Israeli demand that America bring Iran's missile program into the nuclear talks.
Sounds like maybe that's important.
Maybe not.
I'll be glad to answer that, Scott.
But first, I want to make sure we don't leave hanging in the air the rest of the answer to the question that you posed before the break.
And that was about the National Intelligence Estimate and its conclusion that there was, in fact, a nuclear weapons program from 2001 to 2003.
And, of course, you know, just as I was saying before we broke, they did, in fact, intercept communications from somebody who was angry that he had been prevented from continuing to pursue research that related to nuclear weapons.
Now, the rest of the answer is this, that there's no information made available by the people who did that estimate as to what the person or people were working on, what kind of research it was.
Was it tabletop research?
Was it on the back of an envelope?
Was it, you know, was it field research testing parts of a nuclear weapon?
You know, it makes a big difference, of course, what kind of research they were doing.
It also makes a difference whether they had, in fact, done this research as part of a government-approved nuclear weapons program.
There's no evidence presented and no additional evidence to support the idea that there was, in fact, a nuclear weapons program.
And when I quizzed Tom Finger about this, as people will see if they get my book, you know, he was not willing to say anything more about it, except that he implied very strongly that, well, this is sources and methods.
But I strongly criticized that suggestion on the basis of that there were leaks to the news media, not leaks, there were briefings for news media in which they did talk about sources and methods.
They talked about, you know, the kind of sources that they used to get this information and the type of people who were, in fact, whose communications were picked up.
So they went very far towards revealing sources and methods.
What they didn't reveal was the substance.
So that's why I think that NIE is extremely flawed.
It's been highly misunderstood.
And I think people who care about this will be interested to read the entire story from my book.
So now let me turn to the missile issue very quickly.
I think, you know, this whole business of Obama administration now saying that Iran has to discuss in the nuclear talks their missile, their ballistic missile program, is really a kind of false issue.
I think that it was put forward almost completely for political reasons, for domestic political reasons, to fend off criticism from the Israeli lobby people in the Senate, particularly, who have been extremely aggressive on this issue of why didn't you, the Obama administration, do something in the nuclear talks about the Iranian missile program?
Here they're being allowed to continue their work on missiles.
So Wendy Sherman, the chief negotiator on the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, goes before the Senate and says, oh, well, we didn't do anything in the interim agreement, but believe you me, we're going to do something about it in the final agreement.
You just watch.
And so they basically came up with this idea that now Iran has to talk about its ballistic missile program.
But all the while, they knew perfectly well that that was not going to fly.
The Russians would never agree to go along with that.
And in the end, they won't be able to get a consensus among the P5-plus-1.
So it's really the same thing as they say in the National Football League.
It's a free play.
They can kind of just play the hard line for their hardliner critics in the Senate, while at the same time knowing that they're not really going to be able to do anything about this in the talks.
I think it's just a free play, which is just, once again, a political ploy by the Obama administration.
Which, you know, I guess that's fine, as long as they don't push it too hard and end up bluffing so bad that they actually screw everything up.
But I understand that there's a lot of pressure from the right.
Well, the one problem here, how do they – I mean, of course they can say, well, we tried, but we couldn't get the Russians to go along.
I guess that's going to be their excuse.
But, you know, why set yourself up for something that you know you're going to have to say in the end, you know, this is not going to be realistic?
Why not just say that from the beginning?
I mean, I think that there's a kind of – Well, for that matter, you can just say Obama could – There's almost an addiction to fiction here on the part of the national security state, is the way I would put it.
Yeah, yeah, exactly.
I mean, Obama, if he really wanted to face the Republicans down, he would say, look, this whole thing is a manufactured crisis.
Read Gareth Porter and shut up.
Exactly, exactly.
That's precisely my point.
I think that they are so averse to telling the truth about things, they don't even know what the truth is anymore.
And therefore, it's very hard for them, you know, to sort of stand up to people who are obviously completely off base and say to them, you know, let's face facts here.
Well, God, at least it isn't Hillary Clinton, you know?
Well, it is Hillary Clinton on steroids, is the way I would put it.
I mean, that's who they're dealing with.
I'm sorry, you're talking about the government itself, it's not Hillary Clinton.
Yeah, yeah, I mean, at least she ain't the one in charge.
I mean, they had to wait until after the sanctions were already dead for her to come out against them in the Senate just two weeks ago.
I'm certain her policy would be worse right now.
We can hope and pray that she's not the next president, but, you know, I would not want to put too much money on that one.
Well, you know, everybody thought she was going to be back, you know, in 2006 and 2007, and look how wrong that was.
I'd like to point out that there are basically, what, like 45% of people hate her and will always hate her no matter what, and so that's a pretty high negative to overcome.
She does have high negatives, you're right.
On the other hand, of course, the Republican Party has even higher negatives at this point.
Well, that's true, too.
Yeah, I mean, if she gets the nomination, then it probably is a done deal, but you never know.
That's right.
Yeah, anyway, that's the faintest of praise for our current emperor.
I mean, I can't honestly, Garrett, if he's wise enough to pursue this agenda at all and as difficult as it is to accomplish and to pursue it, even to the degree that he has already, it, you know, begs the whole question, raises the whole question of why is he so horrible on every other freaking matter of foreign policy whatsoever?
I mean, it seems like whatever is the wrong thing to do, he does it.
If he knows well enough to do the right thing here at all, to even lean toward the right thing here, it, to me, it makes it a puzzle of why he's such, he doesn't have to be as bad as he is.
He didn't have to start a war in Libya, for example, but he did.
Yeah, I mean, he doesn't have to do any of the things that he's done in any legal sense.
But, you know, I think as we've talked about many times, you know, the political reality in this country is that with the exception of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States has not had a Cold War or post-Cold War president who had the degree of independence necessary to be able to carry out any rational policies in the field of political and military policy abroad.
I mean, you know, the fact is that the war state, the national security state has had so much power that presidents have been intimidated.
Even when they knew better, as in the case clearly of, you know, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson on the case of Vietnam, they knew better, they knew it was a huge mistake, they knew they shouldn't go to war on Vietnam.
But so in other words, what you're saying is this Iran thing is more a matter of consensus of the establishment and the national security state rather than him grabbing him by the collar and making him go along.
Well, in this case, I mean, look, it's mainly, this policy toward Iran is mainly a matter of the Israeli lobby and the fact that over the years the national security state people have accepted the Israeli, basically the Israeli manufactured view of the history of the Iranian nuclear program.
That's really, I think, at the bottom of this of this present impasse or this present problem that we face.
Right.
All right.
Well, we're over time.
We got to go to this break.
Thanks very much for your time as always.
Good talk to you, Gareth.
Thanks again for having me.
All right.
That is Super Gareth, the great Gareth Porter, the great author of Manufactured Crisis, all about the fake controversy over Iran's nuclear program and writer for IPS News dot net.
Check him out today at Truthout and Antiwar dot com.
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On March 7th at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., the Council for the National Interest is co-hosting the first ever national summit to reassess the U.S.
Israel special relationship.
Confirmed speakers include Walt Scheuer, Giraldi, McGovern, Katowski, Porter, McConnell, Weiss, Raimondo, USS Liberty survivor Ernie Gallo, as well as co-sponsors Alison Ware of If Americans Knew and the great Grant Smith of the Institute for Research Middle East Policy.
That's the national summit to reassess the U.S. Israel special relationship.
Friday, March 7th, all day at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.
NatSummit dot org.
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