05/29/09 – Jim Lobe – The Scott Horton Show

For Antiwar.com, I'm Scott Horton.
This is Antiwar Radio.
Introducing our first guest on the show today, it's the great Jim Loeb, Washington Bureau Chief for Interpress Service.
That's IPSnews.org.
And he's also the author of the Loeb blog, ips.org.blog.jimloeb.
Welcome back to the show, Jim.
How are you?
I'm a little under the weather today, but otherwise fine.
Well, I'm glad you're getting by, and I appreciate you coming on the show today, despite that fact.
Okay.
Okay, so let's, first of all, kind of broad-based sort of question.
We have two new administrations in power in the United States and Israel, the Barack Obama team and Benjamin Netanyahu's team.
And the dynamic is certainly different than what it was during the Bush years, although how much different, I'm not really sure.
Netanyahu came to town last week, and they had a little discussion.
Obviously, the primary topics are a two-state solution for Palestine and what is to be done about Iran and their nuclear program.
I wonder if you can just sort of give us a broad-based outline of how you see Obama's positions on these issues as compared to Netanyahu's and the possible conflict or opportunities for real solutions to these problems laying ahead of us here.
Well, I think it was pretty clear from the meeting last week that there was substantial disagreement between the two men when they were meeting.
You know, we still don't have an iteration or a kind of comprehensive iteration of Obama's policy, but I think the rhetoric has certainly changed dramatically from Bush's.
Most recently, of course, you had Clinton saying yesterday that the United States was looking for an absolute freeze on settlements, including natural growth, which is a pretty strong position to take and one that she's now reiterated twice over the last week.
And the fact that it's she who's saying this, which she's widely regarded as kind of among the top Obama officials, perhaps historically the most empathetic to Israel, that fact has to be seen as quite significant.
I think what Obama is conveying is that they're very serious about progress on a peace process, on a freeze on settlements, and eventually a Palestinian state, and by eventually they mean earlier than what George W. Bush had in mind.
And I think this is creating quite a bit of consternation in Israel.
If you read some of the Israeli media, I should stress I don't speak or read Hebrew, so I'm relying on English translations or English editions of Haaretz.
But the media reflects this sense of consternation that, to put it in a nutshell, the United States that Netanyahu was dealing with when he was last prime minister in the latter part of the 90s is not the United States today.
I think it's also important what happened last week after Netanyahu met in the White House and what has also contributed to this sense of consternation in his government is that when he was finished at the White House he went on Capitol Hill and he heard particularly senior Jewish lawmakers, I'm thinking of people like Congressman Waxman and Berman, tell him pretty much what he had been told in the White House, that they really are not interested, they want settlements to stop, that it is in the U.S. national interest that there be a two-state solution very soon and that they expected Israel to respect U.S. interest in this regard.
And I think that's a message that really has never been communicated in quite the same way on Capitol Hill to an Israeli prime minister including even Yitzhak Shamir, the Likud prime minister who is perhaps the most recalcitrant.
Wow, so I guess I'm surprised by that too.
I think of the Jeffrey Rosen article about AIPAC where Stephen Rosen bragged, you see this napkin?
I can have 70 senators sign this by tomorrow night.
Well, I think AIPAC is in a difficult situation at the moment because AIPAC, for example, has never officially supported the settlement enterprise.
It's been sympathetic to settlements, it's defended governments that have promoted settlements, but AIPAC itself has never really taken an official position on settlements.
And what's at stake for AIPAC, what makes the present moment particularly difficult for AIPAC is that while its leadership is definitely right-leaning and even Likudist in orientation, although I'm talking more about the executive committee of the board rather than the elected leadership, like the president who is probably somewhat progressive in his views, their constituency remains at heart, at its core, the broader U.S. Jewish community.
And the broader Jewish community is not that sympathetic to Likud, and it's very supportive of Obama, at least at this moment.
And so I think AIPAC is kind of caught in the middle between a right-wing government in Israel and a core constituency that's actually rather enthusiastic about Obama, who wants to see a two-state solution and is making that very clear.
So AIPAC has to tread quite carefully.
I mean, they have gotten a lot of senators and congressmen to sign a letter in the last few weeks, which is not particularly supportive of Obama's position.
It doesn't address settlements, and it does say it supports a two-state solution, but it says the United States has to let the parties kind of settle this.
It suggests that the United States should not take too aggressive or too independent a position, make sure that it's aligned with Israel.
That reflects more or less its traditional position, and a lot of lawmakers have signed on to that.
I think Obama, or at least the White House at this moment, feels confident enough that this letter of which AIPAC is making a big deal is not going to be so significant, at least until the new government in Israel kind of adjusts to this new reality and devises a kind of counter-strategy, which it could.
I think it's quite possible they may go along with the settlement freeze, but confident somehow that enough bad things will happen so that it won't be reciprocated by Arab states.
I mean, the Arab states won't come forward and recognize the progress that's been made, which is what Obama is hoping, and that the Palestinians will remain deeply divided and kind of screw things up in one way or another.
They could make a big show and say, OK, we're not doing anything on settlements, we're going to freeze, so don't put any additional pressure on us.
And I think there's something of a danger of that happening, because that's not going to necessarily result in progress toward a two-state solution, although a settlement freeze is definitely indispensable to any kind of progress in peace talks.
Well, I mean, I guess nobody should underestimate Benjamin Netanyahu.
It seems like if he doesn't want to get the settlers out of the West Bank, which really is a prerequisite, isn't it, for having a two-state solution there, then he's just not going to, and he's got all the time in the world, and what's Obama really going to do about it, cut off all aid or something?
Well, I mean, I think the accepted wisdom in Washington and in other capitals is that some settlements that straddle the Green Line and that are particularly large will remain Israeli under a two-state solution, provided that Palestinians get comparable amounts of Israeli land in return, but that some settlements, some of the smaller settlements that are scattered around the West Bank, will eventually have to revert to Palestinian control.
That's been the assumption now since Clinton, and Jerusalem will have to be shared in some fashion.
That's been the assumption of what would constitute a two-state solution since Clinton's Camp David meeting in 2000.
So, in other words, this really does seem possible to you.
Am I reading that right?
Well, let's say, I think a settlement freeze is indispensable to any credible peace process.
So, the United States used to demand a settlement freeze, but then would do nothing if settlements continued to be added to, either by reason of natural growth or the creation of a legal outpost or whatever.
The U.S. rhetoric was essentially hollow because U.S. presidents did not want to confront the Israeli government and its allies here on that issue.
Now, I think you have a U.S. government which says, we mean it when we say we want a settlement freeze.
It is in our interest that a peace process proceed, and the only way a peace process will proceed is if Palestinians and other Arab states see that Israel is no longer trying to expand its settlement.
And I think it's possible that Netanyahu, or if his government should fall, a successor will agree to a settlement freeze.
The question then is, what happens after that?
And, you know, there are many, many, many difficult issues to overcome, and there are many, many players, some of whom can act as spoilers.
So, just because you may get a settlement freeze out of this, doesn't mean you're going to get a two-state solution that's viable.
So, I mean, I personally am heartened by what appears to be Obama's very hard line on this, his insistence about this.
But, you know, I think there are many, many more mountains to go over.
Yeah, mountains.
That was what I was thinking of, too.
An extremely steep hill to climb, at least.
There's, what, a hundred things have to happen or something to finally get to the point where Israel would concede the West Bank and Gaza as separate sovereign territory.
Yeah, no, and as I say, it's not just the Israeli side.
I mean, there are spoilers on the other side as well.
Sure.
Yeah, so it's by no means a done deal.
I mean, not even close.
Well, and now part of this, too, is the tie between Palestine policy and Iran policy.
In fact, I was reading something, now I'm trying to remember, it may have very well been something that you wrote about Dennis Ross and how he has a new book out basically denouncing what Obama has taken to be very important, which is tying the two issues together.
Can you kind of elaborate on that for us?
Well, I haven't seen the new book or I've seen some allusions to the new book.
I mean, I think we first have to ask the question, how influential is Ross in the current configuration?
And I think the answer to that is not very influential or perhaps somewhat influential, but only to the extent that he echoes Obama's views.
Something he wrote last year, for example, may no longer be operative or if he has in fact lost or never had real power within the administration, whether he's marginal to the process.
And I have a question about that.
Coming out of the Netanyahu meetings, it's clear that Netanyahu wanted a deadline for diplomatic engagement after which the United States, he was hoping, would be prepared to take very strong measures against Iran and leading eventually perhaps to a military attack or to permitting or green lighting Israel to carry out a military attack on Iran's nuclear installations.
And I think Obama handled that probably quite well in indicating that of course the United States wasn't going to wait forever, but he never talked about a military option and he at one point said that he didn't think arbitrary deadlines were useful, that he wasn't going to impose any arbitrary deadlines.
He did say that the United States would by the end of the year or by early next year would assess whether its attempt to engage Iran, which probably won't begin in earnest until after the Iranian elections next month, whether they are bearing any fruit.
But he very carefully avoided setting any kind of deadline for any stronger action.
I think some people read that differently.
I read some things that said, I guess there was that piece in the New York Times that said that Netanyahu had really gotten over on Obama, that Netanyahu didn't have to concede anything really about Palestine, but Obama had to concede that something, and I guess he was a little bit vague, but there must be some kind of progress shown by the end of this year in terms of talks with Iran.
No, he said that early next year the administration would assess how efforts to engage Iran have worked out and whether progress is being made, but he didn't then say, and then we're going to apply really tough sanctions.
He simply said that there would be a review.
And it's true, there was a New York Times article that said what you indicated, but I think generally speaking that article is not accepted as particularly reflective of what took place.
Just the fact that you have all of these reports in Israel now about the degree of consternation that Netanyahu and his delegation felt leaving Washington, that they really didn't recognize the place as being as compliant as it was ten years ago.
And I think the notion that Netanyahu somehow emerged from these meetings, having gotten one over Obama, number one, were wrong, and number two, they probably fueled the White House's determination to convey to Netanyahu that they're serious about their core positions on settlements and probably on Iran as well.
Well now, you pointed out how Hillary Clinton, the fact that she's the one who's laid down the hardest line, the Secretary of State, is important because, for example, a year ago during the primaries she was the more hawkish of these two, you know, her boss Obama.
What do you think is behind that?
It's just that, well, I don't know.
You tell me.
Why is it that the American establishment all of a sudden, as represented by Hillary Clinton here, really cares whether there's a two-state solution there or not, or even a halt to the settlements?
Well, I think the American, I don't know how you would define American establishment, but Clinton is definitely part of the American establishment.
And I don't think the American establishment has ever been enthusiastic about settlements.
The issue has been, was it worth the political cost to take on an Israeli leader on the question of settlements since Ronald Reagan?
And with the exception of George H.W. Bush and a brief period where Clinton negotiated with Netanyahu over a bronze, the American administration has decided it's not worth fighting over.
The establishment has decided it.
I don't think this is a sudden decision.
I think, for example, the Gaza campaign really, really backfired against Israel in terms of the perception, not just in the United States, but globally, of what the Israelis were up to.
And because the U.S. was seen as more or less an unconditional supporter, it put the U.S. even deeper in the hole into which George H.W. Bush had dug it in terms of world opinion.
But I think there is a conviction now, especially in the wake of Gaza, that in order for the United States to recoup its position in the Islamic world and in the greater Middle East among Arabs, particularly vis-à-vis Iran, there must be tangible progress toward settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The establishment has always believed that it was important to settle this, but it was a matter of political will and the degree of intensity, they believe, that made this difficult.
In fact, George H.W. Bush, apparently Colin Powell got his ear after September 11th, and he started to push for this a bit.
And if I remember the book The Israel Lobby by Mearsheimer and Walt correctly, it was Tom DeLay who came leading the charge from the fundamentalist right, saying, you better back off, Mr. President.
Well, I think that's true, and now I think you see in the wake of the election that the Christian right is not just the Republican Party, the Christian right is much diminished.
And I think that, too, is a big factor.
I mean, when Netanyahu was Prime Minister last, the Christian right was definitely ascendant.
And now I think it's just kind of a shadow of itself and certainly has no voice at all within the administration.
I mean, they're still a factor in Congress, but much less of a factor than they were, I think.
Right, and none of these people are voting for Obama anyway, so he's not worried about that part.
He's only got to worry about the liberal Jews in the Democratic Party, not the Christian right.
Yeah, no, it's true.
I mean, again, there are many, many, many things on Obama's plate, and he may have to make a very difficult calculation about how far he's willing to press Netanyahu, how much political capital he's willing to spend on trying to get major progress towards a two-state solution and then ultimately perhaps a settlement.
Well, maybe it's time for some positive reinforcement by us and some letters to the White House saying, hey, I sure like the tone of Hillary Clinton's voice there.
Keep it up.
Yeah, I mean, I'm a reporter, so I can't advocate for anything.
Oh, there you go.
Well, I can.
I'm a commentator.
Let me ask you one more question.
Sorry, we're right up against the time here, and I know you've got to go, but it's always been very strange to me, Jim, the fact that anybody who has really decided to look into this knows that Iran is only enriching uranium to 3.6 percent industrial grade, that their program is safeguarded, that not even the CIA or the Mossad accuse them of really having a secret nuclear program.
We're just supposed to take their safeguarded electricity program as a weapons threat for some reason.
I never really could figure out what this is about, but I see some of this work by Daniel Lubin at your blog, some of which I think we've reposted at Antiwar.com, about this tradition in Jewish history about Amalek, or however you say it, and how from Benjamin Netanyahu's point of view, it almost sounds like rather than looking at Iran as it really exists, he's using an ancient religion to interpret Iran as some sort of existential threat, and the facts be damned.
I'm not a biblical expert like Daniel.
Oh, I see.
You've got to be able to comment on this a little bit, right?
Tell us something, Jim.
Well, I mean, my understanding of this is based on a blog or on an article by Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic who claims to have heard from a close Netanyahu advisor that Netanyahu sees Iran as Amalek, which as I understand it primarily from Daniel, historically has meant the great nemesis of the Jewish people who never dies and who is always a threat that hangs over Jews.
And that's how Netanyahu supposedly sees Iran at the present.
And the problem that Daniel raised in his series of excellent blog posts, I thought, is the way the Bible deals with Amalek is that it's just trying to exterminate the Amalekites, that basically the solution to Amalek is extermination or genocide.
So the use of that word by whatever advisor it was that Goldberg was quoting was heavily, heavily loaded.
And now I think Goldberg regrets having, I don't know if he supports Netanyahu, but he's acted as the kind of scribe for Netanyahu.
I think he now regrets having even raised this issue because it's put Netanyahu in an extremely dangerous and apocalyptic light.
The same kind of light that he accuses Ahmadinejad of living under.
Well, I mean, exactly.
It makes me think that Netanyahu is the Israeli Tom DeLay and that what Americans are involved in here is somebody else's religious war.
Yeah, yeah.
Well, I personally believe Netanyahu is much more cynical, much more opportunistic than that.
But I think it's interesting that at least someone around him, if not himself, is trying to convey the idea that he's as apocalyptic as his chosen enemies.
I mean, it goes back to this notion that Nixon and Kissinger talked about as sometimes it's helpful in diplomacy if you are perceived as being so crazy you'd do anything to get your end.
I think there may be some kind of an attempt on the part of the Israelis to depict, on the leadership anyway, to depict themselves with that in order to intimidate not just Iran but to intimidate Obama and the administration as well.
Like, you know, we are extremely dangerous and if you don't go along with what we want we're going to bring the whole show down, something like that.
I don't believe that's consistent with Netanyahu's personality which, as I said, I think is entirely opportunistic.
Well, thank God for that.
Well, I may be wrong, so you don't want to take chances.
All right, well, thank you very much for your time on the show today, Jim.
I really appreciate it.
Okay, sure.
Everybody, that's Jim Loeb.
He is the Washington Bureau Chief for Interpress Service.
The website is IPS.org and you can find his great blog, IPS.org slash blog slash Jim Loeb and, of course, you can regularly find his work at Antiwar.com.