01/15/13 – Jeremy Keenan – The Scott Horton Show

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All right, y'all welcome to the show.
I'm Scott Horton.
I'm going to start the show off today with our first interview.
It's Jeremy Keenan from the, well, let me get it right here.
The S O a S the school of Oriental and something or other.
I had it in front of me a second ago, uh, in London.
I'm sorry.
I want you to introduce yourself since I botched it so bad, Jeremy.
All right, Scott.
Okay.
I can hear that.
But yeah, my name's Jeremy Keenan.
Uh, I'm a professor at the school of Oriental and African studies.
That's S O a S London, which is part of London university.
There you go.
Great.
Um, and, uh, the piece in question here is that the new internationalist magazine, it's a new int.org, new int.org for the new internationalist magazine.
And it's from their December, 2012 issue here, how Washington helped foster the Islamist uprising in Mali.
And, um, so, uh, it's a very interesting article here and, uh, basically, uh, you say, you know, it's sort of the conventional wisdom is the kind of thing people have been hearing on this show about the situation in Mali is that this is the, um, at least mostly unintended consequence, the inevitable consequence of the war against Muammar Gaddafi and, um, how, uh, some of the Tuaregs had been working for him, came home to Mali and brought their weapons with them and started up the work and you have a lot of great detail about all how all that went down, but you go further than that and say that the Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb group that has come down into Northern Mali and has pushed the Tuaregs aside and basically taken over this, uh, area, the size of Texas, um, that they are really being run by the Algerian intelligence forces, uh, working with the United States, that this is all part of the old P2OG, uh, Donald Rumsfeld's plan for creating fake Al Qaeda groups to do his dirty work.
Is that really correct?
And can you nail down for us exactly how you know that?
Well, you, you've summarized it there, um, in a very, I would call it a very stark away, uh, which is not untrue, but it is, um, it's rather stripped it down, if you like, to the basics.
Uh, what I'm saying, it is correct, yes, but it does need to be nuanced if you like, and, and, and clarified a great deal.
We've got plenty of time, so go ahead.
These things, these things have taken on a life of their own, of course, you know, since that happened, but really what we're looking at in Mali now, which is, which is a pretty catastrophic, uh, uh, really you can trace back at least 10 years to about 2002, three, when, uh, at the beginning of the war on terror, a very complex sort of, uh, deal arrangement, uh, uh, was made, um, over a period of time, it wasn't something that was signed and sealed in 25, uh, five minutes between, uh, the, the Pentagon of the American administration and the Algerian regime, particularly secret services to fabricate terrorism in the Sahara.
Now there's nothing very new about that.
Uh, America in particular has been running false flag operations throughout history.
Uh, other, other powers in the world have done so as well, but America has a long tradition of this.
Uh, and what we see happening in 2003 is a very, very complex arrangement, which probably developed over the course of about two years, uh, following on nine, 11, when Algeria and the United States, the American administration realized they could, they, they could help each other in a, in a lot of ways.
Uh, one was that Algeria had just been through, um, uh, what's known as the dirty war of the 1990s, a horrific civil war in which 200,000 people were killed.
And this was between, uh, an illegitimate regime, which is still the present regime and broadly speaking, Islamists who were fighting it, uh, had a lot of dirty tricks and nasty things went on.
And that started winding down at the end of the 1990s.
So when, uh, we have the, the, uh, the strikes on, on, on the, on the twin towers in New York and the beginning of the war on terror, Algeria saw an opportunity to cozy up to the United States in a sense.
And during the period, uh, following on from, from nine, 11, over the next 18 months, there was a huge sort of rapprochement, lots of visits between America, uh, and, and as American presidency and senior people and Americans.
And the deal basically was, you know, we Algeria can help you America fight terrorism because we've got so much experience of it.
Uh, and America went along with this over, um, you know, 18 months of period.
And, uh, what Algeria wanted from this was military equipment.
They wanted to replenish its military, which had been run down through, uh, through sort of world boycotts and all the rest of it during the 1990s.
And it saw America as a means of providing it with a modern army, um, you know, high tech surveillance and, and, and, and, and the weapon systems and so forth.
So this was sort of the, the, the deal that was coming together.
And during the course of 2002, America kept sort of making promises to Algeria saying, yeah, we can help you out on this, but nothing was getting delivered.
And after about a year, we talk about September, 2002, thereabouts, Algeria started saying, it's all very well being friendly with America, but they never followed through on the deals.
They've been promising this, but they don't deliver.
And America said, well, you know, let's be realistic.
You know, it's, it's very difficult for us to give you sort of weaponry because, you know, it's, uh, uh, has implications worldwide and so forth.
And anyhow, you don't really need it.
You're on top of the terrorist situation.
You've got a marvelous job, you know, uh, you don't really need it.
At the same time, uh, while that discourse was going on, America was, uh, realizing that it had an energy crisis.
This goes back to the Cheney report, which was, you know, well known in the late 1990s, but it came to public attention in 2001, 2002, 2001 year with the publication of Cheney's report on the energy crisis and the realization that much of, uh, United States is future energy imports.
We're going to come from Africa, particularly the West coast of Africa.
So we get the increasing awareness in the, in the American administration of the importance of Africa, uh, to the United States economy, particularly oil, but not exclusively other things as well, but primarily oil and the realization that America needed to somehow get greater control over Africa.
And that involved, if you like the militarization of Africa, militarization being the way in which America does most things internationally.
Uh, so it's, um, you know, has a slightly different meaning perhaps to Americans than it does to, to sort of Western Europeans.
So the idea of kind of militarize Africa to ensure greater access and control over these resources.
And the way this was legitimized, cause you can't just go and militarize a continent was to use the pretext of the war on terror, but there hadn't been much terror in Africa, uh, in the conventional sort of sense of the term.
So the idea began to ferment through 2002 of maybe sort of a false flag operation.
And this is where the Algerians came on board because the Algerians also needed a bit more terrorism to legitimize, you know, greater assistance in terms of, of, of military technology from, from America, America needed a little bit of terrorism to justify if you like, uh, what became AFRICOM, but the increasing militarization of the continent.
So this idea came together through the latter part of 2002.
And what we see happening is the American, the, the Algerian secret services, known as the DRS, I refer to them as the DRS, uh, carrying out a false flag operation in 2003.
They tried it in 2002, made a mess of it.
And they started again in 2003 of kidnapping, um, 32 European tourists in different groups.
So I had seven, eight groups of tourists in the Algerian Sahara.
And the story was put out that they were kidnapped by, um, the Islamist terrorists, the terrorists, which at that time were called the GSPC.
Uh, GSPC was a group which changed its name into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
So this became known ultimately as sort of as an Al-Qaeda franchise.
So these tourists were kidnapped and huge international publicity, largely because of America was sort of promoting this and the overall leader of this group, uh, the chief, if you like, Islamist, the man whose war name was El Para, uh, hostages, sorry, ransoms were, were, were demanded.
And after six months, you know, ultimately ransoms were paid and they were released, but this sort of saga got huge international publicity.
Uh, and the Al-Para story sort of ran on for the next year or two with massive profit propaganda from the United States saying, this is a terror zone, uh, you know, this is Al-Qaeda in the Sahara, we need to do something about it and so forth.
And this provided that sort of saga, which was a false flag operation provided the basis for much of the subsequent militarization of Africa.
Okay.
Now, hold on.
I got to stop you there.
I got to stop you there.
And I know you, you still have a lot to get to, to bring us up to present day, but I got to ask a follow-up on particularly, I mean, pretty much everything you say there's is open source material if anybody wants to go look it up, all that history is out there, but how can you, do you have a footnote, can you nail down for us how we can all verify that that set of kidnapping attacks was all false flag thing run by the Algerian, uh, secret services?
Well, uh, there is no one single piece of evidence.
You don't get Donald Rumsfeld signing an open letter saying, by the way, I've just authorized a false flag operation and rubber stamping it.
The world doesn't work like that.
Uh, well, occasionally, I mean, the Israelis have been caught red-handed setting up fake Al-Qaeda cells a couple of times by cell phone numbers, that kind of thing.
Basically this, uh, I've just got, I think in the article you mentioned, I've got a book coming out, two books.
The first one came out a few years ago.
The second one's coming out in a few weeks time.
Which does bring together a huge amount of evidence, um, over 10 years to show how the Algerian secret services with the blessing of America have been conducting one false flag operation after another.
Uh, very often the things that shouldn't even happen, very often we talk about incidents and the incidents didn't even happen.
Right.
Yeah.
You talk about in the article, there was a protest over wages or something.
They just turned that into an act of terrorism if they want to.
Absolutely.
So let me, I want to make clear here, sir, I want to make clear that I don't really doubt yet.
It sounds perfectly plausible to me.
I just, uh, you know, I'd like to have, you know, give the audience a chance to, you know, give them something to sink their teeth into on that.
Cause after all the world is lousy with bands of kooks with machine guns willing to kidnap for ransom or, or, uh, in the name of Allah or anything else.
Right.
Uh, yes and no.
Um, they're probably not quite as many as, as, as, as, as, as that sort of slant puts on it.
Um, but I mean, you had almost every incident that was going on in, in, in this part of the world, Algeria, Southern Algeria, in the Sahel, for example, the example you raised there, which was a bunch of kids in a small Oasis protesting about lack of employment.
Um, and they went out to the airport and they made a noise out there and so on and so forth.
Uh, this was a hugely embarrassing to Algeria.
So they immediately turned it around and said, this was an Al Qaeda operation.
They gave the names of the people and so on and so forth.
America went ahead and we published that and blew it up into an international incident.
It never happened.
So we have a huge amount of evidence of one incident like that after another following on from that first incident incident in 2003, and these sort of build up one after the other, um, uh, mostly being carried out by the Algerians, but with the blessing of, of, of the Americans and increasingly the last few years with the support of the British government as well, which of course is, has, has, has also, uh, if you'd like to take them to supporting the Algerian regime here.
Well, and in fact, the way you write the story in the article, and I'm sorry, I didn't really start the interview this far back, but you do talk about how this was a big part of how the Algerian government defeated the Islamists after the Americans had them cancel the election results of two of 1993 and they had to fight this bitter civil war.
This is a lot of how they did it was false flag attacks in the name of the terrorists, horrible atrocities against civilians to discredit them.
Absolutely.
So they really have not been up to this kind of thing since 1993, at least.
Absolutely.
And basically they just carried on doing it, uh, through the last decade.
So we've had sort of 20 years of this sort of pattern of literally fabricating terrorism.
All right.
Now bring us up to current with the Tuareg rebellion and all that.
Okay.
Well, what has happened is that if you're going to do this sort of thing as, you know, kidnapping tourists and so forth, what it did initially was completely kill off the tourism industry in the Sahara.
That wasn't huge, but it was quite big for the Tuareg of the region.
These are the nomadic indigenous population of the Sahara who were getting much of their cash income now in the modern world from tourism.
Well, the tourism industry, not surprisingly crashed to zero, you know, overnight, uh, that immediately put a stop to the livelihoods of many of the Tuareg population who altogether number maybe about 3 million people scattered across Southern Algeria, Libya, Mali, where we are now, where the crisis is Niger and that part of the world.
So we see this, all this false flag, this false flag, these false flag incidents to create, if you'd like to legitimize the war on terror is doing huge damage to the local economies.
These people are drawn more into criminal actions to keep alive into drugs, trading and so forth, whatever's going across the Sahara and they're getting fed up with this.
And, uh, over the last two, three, four years, there've been a series of Tuareg rebellions against this marginalization, the destruction of their, their way of life, uh, their economies and so forth.
All of which in a sense, uh, have been exacerbated by these false flag incidents, the, the so-called war on terror.
And if you like fingers being pointed at them and accusing them of being terrorists when, when, when, you know, they're not, they're sort of keeping alive.
So that this pattern of rebellion amongst the Tuareg was, was going on through 2004, 2006, 2007, eight, nine, almost ongoing simmering rebellions, mostly directed against the governments in the Sahel.
Uh, and of course with Algeria sort of controlling the situation in the North.
When you get the Gaddafi situation, he is defeated.
A lot of the Tuareg are thrown out of Libya.
They go back home, they take their arms with them.
And again, this is an opportunity to carry on if you like, or to re-energize the rebellion, but when they start rebelling, uh, roughly 12 months ago now, uh, because they are well armed, thanks to the, the Gaddafi situation, uh, there is a very high likelihood, almost a racing certainty that they would actually take over, uh, geographically, if you like the whole of Northern Mali, which they did very quickly.
And that in itself became another threat to the Algerian regime, uh, and to all those around it to have an autonomous, if you like, Tuareg state suddenly sort of forming itself in the middle of the Sahara.
So what we see here is a strategy again by Algeria, but, uh, again, with the blessing of the Western powers or the knowledge of the Western powers of putting in their own sort of homemade terrorists, if you like, what we call, uh, Al Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb, uh, pushing them down into Mali.
Uh, and these are the core, if you like the rump of the Islamists, which have now sort of developed and taken over in Northern Mali and have created the, the, the crisis, which we're seeing unfolding literally as we speak, you know, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.
So the roots of it are in this sort of 10 year, uh, very messy history of first of all, fabricated terrorism to justify the war on terror that destroys a lot of local lives and economies.
It makes the situation internally much worse, generates rebellion by the local people.
They in turn are accused by the bigger powers of being terrorists and troublemakers and so forth.
Uh, they use the Gaddafi situation, which is an accident, if you like, but to get more arms, to strengthen themselves and they become a threat to the government of, of, of Mali.
And in a sense, to make it fairly simple, to put a stop to that, the Algerians with the, you know, the blessing of, of, of the, the, the Western powers use their own homegrown terrorists, uh, now known as Al Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb, the leaders of whom are linked to the Algerian, uh, um, secret services, although the foot soldiers are genuine, you know, um, Islamists, if you like, who were recruited, they moved into Northern Mali, uh, where they have taken on something of a life of their own.
Uh, they've expanded with other groups, uh, like minded, uh, also with some support from the Algerian regime, but with the knowledge of the West.
And this is important.
The Western intelligence services are aware of this, uh, which is why in a sense there hasn't been a great urgency by the West, by America in particular, uh, by the United, uh, UN security council, where Britain and France are aware of this situation, they haven't seen the crisis in Northern Mali as quite so urgent as the press have sometimes made it out to be talking about Afghanistan in Africa and, and this sort of thing, because they've known that behind it are the Algerians and they can turn off the tap if you like, and maybe can control the situation.
Well, that has now got out of hand.
Uh, and you know, we've now got the crisis and that we're seeing with the French troops going in and, and, and, you know, all the things that may or may not happen in the next few weeks.
So a very complicated 10 years, but the roots of it, the, the original cause, if you like, was this fabricated terrorism between America and Algeria, uh, which has triggered off, you know, this is the outcome, if you like, of these events.
And over this period of 10 years, I have written, I don't know how many articles, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, where I have said, you know, this will lead, uh, these events, you know, over the years, the last 10 years will lead to a regional conflagration and, and a massive human disaster.
Obviously I couldn't predict the detail of it, but in a sense that statement, this conflagration, this great disaster, that is what we are now seeing erupting and being played out in Mali.
Um, so in a sense, it's a consequence really of the war on terror, but particularly the fabrication of false flag incidents to legitimize the war on terror.
And that is where America has this responsibility.
Of course, there's been a lot of, you know, internal dynamics, a lot of internal agencies, things morph, they change, they take on a life of their own.
And of course, he's seen all that during the last 10 years.
But the bottom line of this is that the roots of this crisis, which we're now seeing taking on the form that it is, um, if you like, lie in those decisions and those actions that were made in 2002, 2003.
All right.
Now, again, let me try to nail you down on the most controversial part of that, which would be that the leaders of this group, um, are closely tied to Algerian intelligence.
Can you tell us their names, their histories?
And again, how you're so sure that these men are operating on behalf of the Algerian government, and then probably also wink nudge with the United States as well?
Yeah, the key, the key leaders, the key, the key Islamist leaders in in the region, these have been the same ones for several years now.
There is some dispute, you might say locally over which one is, you know, ranks number one or two.
But probably the key person is is Abdul Hamid Abu Zaid.
Many aliases, by the way.
He has been running ACME in the region for several years.
Yahya Juwadi, who is nominally actually his leader.
But I personally think Abu Zaid is probably the more important of the two.
So those two, Yahya Juwadi, Abdul Hamid Abu Zaid.
You've got a new new one emerging on the on the blocks now in northern Nigeria.
Iyad Aghrali, who actually is a Turek, but Iyad goes back, his connections with the Algerian DRS go back to the 1980s.
And he has worked and done favors for them over the years.
And a fourth one, Mokhtar Ben Mokhtar, who is more of a freelance and is actually just in the last few weeks probably pulled out of the region.
But he has had connections with the with the Algerian secret services on and off through this period.
So you've got this little agglomeration of key leaders, all of whom are closely linked to the DRS.
Now, to give you some idea of the evidence for this, going back to 2006, 7, 8, there were large terrorist training camps, one camp in the singular, at least there may be more, but I only know of one deep in the Algerian Sahara, which was being run by these these three names I've just given you, which was being supplied by the Algerian army and the DRS in terms of as a training camp, if you like, numbering data I have is about 270 people training so-called al-Qaeda terrorists in killing, floating, sniping and all the various functions that they need training in.
And this, this, this, the existence of this camp really came to light two or three years ago, when at least two of these members fell into the hands of Western intelligence by accident, they were picked up for drug smuggling and then jumping across Western European borders and then picked up for theft and then falling falling into the hands of the authorities and myself and along with the intelligence services have been able to have access to them and talk with them now for over a couple of years and to build up a picture of this camp where it was the people with within it and from that data I've been able to cross check that with a number of other incidents, people, names, movements, so that a picture of this is really getting, if you like, created from multiple sources, one can cross check this with other events, so that we have quite a lot of detail of who was in this camp, who was running it, the dates that existed and it was much of that camp, about 270 people that have been more or less moved from about 2008 plus or minus that sort of period down into Northern Mali and that is the rump, the base, if you like, of the Islamist forces that have now taken over Northern Mali.
So again, we can trace most of these players back into this training camp, the individuals who were running it, the location of it, access, supplies and so on and so forth, really through multiple strands of what I would call, if you like, sort of forensic research, small bits of data which all the time have been brought together, put together, cross checked as far as possible with people in the area, interviews, all the methodologies that one can bring to bear to gradually build this picture together and that is what is detailed and set out in this second volume on terrorism in the Sahara, which is called The Dying Sahara and that is the book that will be out in a few weeks time.
So all that detail is written in there, a huge amount of footnotes in terms of source references and so forth, so a very, very messy complex picture and a very nasty one and also in there are the links, if you like, to Western governments, particularly the British government, the American government, the French government, in terms of how much Western intelligence services would have known about this whole pattern of events that have been building up over the last ten years in the sort of Western half, really, of the Sahara.
All right, now, so all the headlines are that these groups are now threatening attacks inside France.
Is that a legitimate thing or is that just NATO moving their sock puppets' lips?
Well, there's both propaganda there and the real possibility because what is happening now is that since last Thursday, French troops have moved against the Islamists in northern Mali.
They had very little choice.
They were sort of presented with a situation where, you know, pretty well immediate action had to be taken or there would have been a disaster in Mali, so the French troops have gone in.
They've gone in very thoroughly, I would say, in a military sense.
It looks in the last three or four days as if they've inflicted pretty heavy casualties.
Very difficult to get precise details, but this is the picture that's coming out and the threat, of course, here is that the Islamists themselves are now invoking jihad.
We're being attacked by the West, the infidel, and there is a very real possibility that that call might well be taken up by Israelists and Islamist sympathizers in other parts of the world, in Europe and elsewhere, to conduct terrorist actions against France.
So France is now on a state of high alert, emergency.
I think it's at the highest level it has on a sort of, you know, its rating of emergencies.
And I think that threat should be taken very seriously because the picture that's coming out of northern Mali now is of a Western part, France, attacking, if you like, Islamist forces that have taken over the north of the country.
And this is being portrayed, if you like, as the West against Islamists.
The reality is rather different, but that is how it's being portrayed, and it's within that context that there is a very real possibility of terrorist actions being taken against France and against the West, perhaps, in general, but France would obviously be the likely target.
So France at the moment is on a state of high alert because of that, and again, you know, what we will see happening in the next few days and weeks, I think, will determine probably the course of events, you know, in this part of the Sahara for the next few years, quite a long time to come.
So we're looking at a very critical few days and weeks as to how this might pan out.
It could be that the Islamists there, who have taken on a dimension, if you like, a life of their own, in a sense, they're not just stooges of the Algerian regime.
On the contrary, they've taken on a life of their own.
Well, and in fact, even part of the army has defected to their side and brought all their American training and weapons with them, and I'm thinking that probably wasn't part of the plan either.
Ah, okay.
It's a slightly different issue.
What happened here was the first rebellion we talked about was the rebellion of Tuareg, okay?
So it was the Tuareg in the Malian army.
Many of those defected from the Malian army to the Tuareg rebellion, but that's not the end of it.
Those would already have been pushed aside by now, I get it.
Yeah, they've already been pretty well pushed aside.
All right, listen, I'm sorry to cut it out here, Jeremy.
It's a great bit of work.
I really hope people look at it.
I hope I can have you back on the show.
I'll definitely be ordering your books, and I'm sorry that we have to go.
It's Andy Worthington time, but thank you very much for your time on the show today.
It's a great pleasure.
Thank you for having a chat.
All right, everybody, that is Jeremy Keenan, and you really ought to look at what he's written here at the New Internationalist magazine.
It's newint.org, How Washington Helped Foster the Islamist Uprising in Mali, and there's another one along those lines at Al Jazeera called Al-Qaeda in the Sahel.
No, that's not what it's called.
It's called, yeah, it is, Al-Qaeda in the Sahel by Jeremy Keenan, and his last book is The Dark Sahara, America's War on Terror in Africa, and the new one coming out is The Dying Sahara.
He's a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London.
Jeremy Keenan, thanks very much to him, and we'll be right back with Andy Worthington after this.
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